Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. This First Appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1985, pasted by Sri Birjo Kandir, 1st Additional Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh, in Title Suit No. 93 of 1979, whereby and whereunder the said learned court decreed the plaintiffs-respondents suit. 2. The plaintiffs "filed the aforementioned suit for declaration of their raiyati right in respect of the suit properties and further for a declaration that the State of Bihar is bound to recognize the same and the action of the State of Bihar in derecognizing the plaintiffs raiyati right is incompetent and illegal and further for a decree for confirmation of possession in respect of the properties described in Schedule A of the plaint or in the alternative for a decree for recovery of possession by evicting defendant Not. 1 and 2 therefrom. 3. The plaintiffs filed the aforementioned suit, inter alia, on the ground that the lands in suit being plot Nos. 9,135 and 137 appertaining to khata No. 3 of village Bigha were recorded as Gairmajarua Khas in the name of the ex-landlord Raja Ram Naraiyan Singh, grand father of Raja Bahadur Kamakhya Narayan Singh. In the year 1938, plaintiff No. 1 being a settled raiyat of the village, took verbal permission of Raja Bahadur Kamakhya Naryan Singh to reclaim the aforementioned land and the said plaintiff, allegedly commenced reclamation thereupon and in course of two years, he put an embankment and converted a portion of the said land into tani land, 4. Thereafter in the year 1940, an Amin was disputed for the purpose of measuring the lands allegedly by plaintiff No. 1 which was followed by grant of settlement in favour of the plaintiffs by the then landlord on 24-12-1940. 5. It is alleged that the plaintiffs continued to be in possession of the said land converted it into dhankhet. They also planted trees thereupon. The plaintiffs have further alleged that they sunk two wells in portion of plot No. 135/1 and constructed a small house in portion of plot No. 9/1. 6. It is alleged that t e plaintiffs reclaimed a further area of 2.50 decimals of land as shown in the map annexed to the plaint. The plaintiffs further alleged that they have amalgamated a portion of the reclaimed land with their contiguous raiyati lands. 6. It is alleged that t e plaintiffs reclaimed a further area of 2.50 decimals of land as shown in the map annexed to the plaint. The plaintiffs further alleged that they have amalgamated a portion of the reclaimed land with their contiguous raiyati lands. According to the plaintiffs they are continuing in peaceful possession of the lands in suit in the manner as stated hereinbefore. 7. It is alleged that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2, in the year 1965, started disturbing the possession of the plaintiffs over the lands resulting in initiation of a proceeding under Sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was eventually converted into a proceeding under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said proceeding was ultimately decided against the plaintiffs. 8. It has further been alleged that during the course of the said proceeding under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the plaintiffs came to learn that the State of Bihar had settled a portion of Schedule A land which has been described in Schedule B of the plaint with defendent Nos. 1 and 2. According to the plaintiffs the said purported settlement was wholly without jurisdiction and the papers showing settlement are also forged and fabricated. 9. In the said suit, the defendants-appellants appeared and filed written statements, wherein they denied and disputed that the ex-landlord granted any settlement in favour of the plaintiff in the year 1940 as alleged. The defendants further contended that two wells were sunk even prior to the cadastral survey settlement records of right and as such the question of plaintiffs sinking wells therein does not arise. The defendants further denied and disputed that the plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit land by amalgamating the same with their settled lands. 10. According to the defendants the lands in question being Gairmajurua Khas land of the ex-landlord, vetted in the State of Bihar in terms of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1930 and thus the State of Bihar became the owner of the land. The defendants further stated that thereafter the said lands have been settled with defendants 1 and 2 and they are in possession thereof. 11. The defendants further stated that thereafter the said lands have been settled with defendants 1 and 2 and they are in possession thereof. 11. In the aforesaid suit, the State of Bihar also filed its written statement, wherein it was contended that both the plaintiffs and the other defendants have neither any title nor possession in respect of the lands in suit. The State, in this case, set up title and possession of the disputed lands in itself. The defendants have further asserted that the learned Magistrate has rightly decided the proceeding under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in their favour. 12. On the basis of the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the learned court below framed the following issues: 1. Is the suit as framed maintainable ? 2. Have the plaintiffs cause of action for the suit ? 3. Is the suit barred by Law of Limitation and Adverse Possession ? 4. Is the suit barred by law of estoppel, and acquiescence ? 5. Is the notice under Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure valid and legal ? 6. Are the suit lands raiyati lands of the plaintiffs over which they have acquired occupancy right ? 7. Have the defendants right, title, interest and possession over the land in suit ? 8. Are the plaintiffs entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit ? 13. The learned trial court upon consideration of the evidences on record held that the plaintiffs have been able to prove their title and possession in respect of suit land. 14. Mr. P.P.N. Roy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the learned trial court approached the case from absolutely a wrong angle and thus came to an erroneous decision. The learned Counsel submitted that the basis of the plaintiffs case, namely, Ext. 24 is a forged and fabricated document which would be evident from the fact that the plaintiffs did not examine Shri Bateshwar Prasad Singh, the Manager of Ramgarh Raj Estate, although the genuineness of the said documents was challenged by the defendants. 15. The learned Counsel submitted that an adverse inference should be drawn as against the plaintiffs for non examination of the aforementioned Bateshwar Prasad Singh. The learned Counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani V/s. Meena alias Mota -- . 16. 15. The learned Counsel submitted that an adverse inference should be drawn as against the plaintiffs for non examination of the aforementioned Bateshwar Prasad Singh. The learned Counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani V/s. Meena alias Mota -- . 16. The learned Counsel, further submitted that, on the other hand, the defendants examined D. W. 9 Sirdhar Prasad, who specifcally stated that Bateshwar Prasad Singh had joined Ramgarh Raj as Manager-incharge of settlement on 1-2-1941 whereas the purported Hukumnama, being of the year 1940, must be held to be forged and fabricated document. The said witnesses further stated that the signature purported to be appearing on Ext. 24 was not of Bateshwar Prasad Singh. 17. The learned Counsel further drew my attention to Paragraph 10 of the deposition of P. W. 9 who stated that P. W. 5 Yadunandan Prasad was never posted in the settlement department. 18. My attention was further drawn to Paragraphs 17 and 23 of his deposition of the said witness to the effect that every Hukumnama, bears the seal of the settlement department and that Raja was the final authority in the matter granting settlement. 19. It was further submitted that the learned trial court wrongly shifted the burden of proof upon the defendants inasmuch as the same was upon the plaintiffs. The learned Counsel, in this connection, has also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in A. Raghavamma V/s. A. Chenchamma reported in AIR 1984 SC 136. 20. It was further submitted that the learned trial court wrongly relied upon Ext. 2 series which are applications for acceptance of rent inasmuch as the same were not filed before the proper authorities. 21. It was further submitted that the defendants have proved various documents to show that the procedure for grant of settlement of the suit land were followed by the Circle Officer. In this connection, the learned Counsel drew my attention to Ex. J-1 and J/1-1(Istehars), Ext. K (notice) and Ext. 1 to 1/7-1 which are order sheets of the settlement cases. 22. The learned Counsel submitted that in any event official acts would be presumed to be done in accordance with law and thus, the learned trial court would ought to have drawn a presumption in favour of the defendants in terms of Sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. 1 to 1/7-1 which are order sheets of the settlement cases. 22. The learned Counsel submitted that in any event official acts would be presumed to be done in accordance with law and thus, the learned trial court would ought to have drawn a presumption in favour of the defendants in terms of Sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. 23. The learned Counsel further submitted that the evidence of the P. Ws. ought not to have been believed by the learned trial court. 24. The learned Court further relied upon a decision of this Court in Harihar Singh V/s. Additional Collector, reported in 1978 BBCJ 323 for the purpose of showing that the Block Development Officer could grant settlement and his jurisdiction in this regard ceased only after 1969. 25. Mr. B.Y. Kishore, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents, on the other hand, submitted that there is nothing to show that Ext. 24 and the other rent receipts filed by the plaintiffs, namely, Ext. 4 to 4/B were forced and fabricated documents. 26. According to the learned Counsel, the defendants failed to bring on record the date on which Shri Bateshwar Prasad Singh was aapointed and other records from the office of the Ramgarh Raj, although, according to D. W. 9, the same were available in the Raj office. 27. According to the learned Counsel, the said document having been legally proved by a competent person, it was for the defendants to show that the said documents, namely, Ext. 4 to 4/B and Ext. 24 were forged ones. 28. The learned Counsel, in this connection, submitted that it is worthwhile to note that D. Ws. did not say a word regarding the Parcha filed by the plaintiffs (Ext. 3). 29. The learned Counsel further submitted that Ext. 2 series have also been proved in order to show that the plaintiffs had all along been filing applications for acceptance of rent from them by the State of Bihar. 30. According to the learned Counsel, as those applications (Ext. 2 series) prove bond fide on the part of the plaintiffs, wherein, they in unmistakable terms stated that they had obtained settlement of the lands in question from the ex-proprietor of Ramgarh Raj Estate. 31. 30. According to the learned Counsel, as those applications (Ext. 2 series) prove bond fide on the part of the plaintiffs, wherein, they in unmistakable terms stated that they had obtained settlement of the lands in question from the ex-proprietor of Ramgarh Raj Estate. 31. It was further submitted that the said documents were filed in a proceeding under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which would also be evident from the order passed by the Executive Magistrate, namely, Ext. 20/A. 32. The learned Counsel further submitted that in the instant case, the plaintiffs have been able to prove that the parchas granted by the State of Bihar in favour of the defendants were forged and fabricated an the procedures therefore were not at all fulfilled. 33. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, the following questions arises for consideration in this appeal: (1) Whether the documents of title filed by the plaintiffs are genuine ? (2) Whether the State of Bihar had any authority to grant settlement in favour of the defendants-appellants ? (3) Whether the purported settlement was obtained in collusion with the Mukhia of village and without following the procedures therefor ? Re: Question-I. 34 Admittedly, the lands in suit were recorded as Gairmajurua Khas land belonging to Raja Ram Narain Singh, the then proprietor of Ramgarh Rai Estate The plaintiffs alleged that in the year 1938, an oral permission to reclaim the said land being plot Nos. 9. 135, 136, and 137 were taken by Shri Dwarika Singh who converted the same into Tank land. 35. It is further the case of the plaintiffs that in 1940, the then landlord deputed an amin for the purpose of measuring the same and classification thereof and on the basis of his report, a parcha was prepared for an area of 10.18 acres. 36. The plaintiffs further case is that the landlord upon the receipt of a Salami of Rs. 75, issued a Hukumnama dated 24-12-1940 and thus confirmed the occupancy right of the plaintiffs. 37. In order to prove the settlement in their favour, the plaintiffs have proved the Parcha (Ext. 3), the rent receipts issued by the then landlord (Ext. 4 to 4/B) and the Hukmnama (Ext. 24). The aforementioned documents were proved by Yadunandan Prasad, the law-agent of the ex-landlord, who was examined by the plaintiffs as P. W. 5. 38. 37. In order to prove the settlement in their favour, the plaintiffs have proved the Parcha (Ext. 3), the rent receipts issued by the then landlord (Ext. 4 to 4/B) and the Hukmnama (Ext. 24). The aforementioned documents were proved by Yadunandan Prasad, the law-agent of the ex-landlord, who was examined by the plaintiffs as P. W. 5. 38. D. W. 9 upon whose evidence, the defendants-appellants have strongly relied upon in his deposition admitted that P. W. 5 was the law-agent of the ex-landlord, although a suggestion was given to the said witness that he was never an employee of the Ramgarh Raj Estate. 39. D. W. 9 as has been submitted by Shri Roy, sought to prove that Ext. 24 did not bear the signature of Batcshwar Prasad Singh. The said witness, however, admitted that the Hukumanma used to be prepared by Rameshwar Prasad which was also the statement of P. W. 5. 40. Again the Hukumnama in question was admittedly issued under the signature of Bateshwar Prasad Singh, although it was suggested to P. W. 5 that that Bateshwar Prasad Singh never executed any Hukumnama. 41. It is true that D. W. 9 alleged that Bateshwar Prasad Singh joined the Ramgarh Raj Estate in the year 1941 as the manager settlement but D. W. 9 himself in Paragraph 13 of his deposition admitted that the documents relating to the appointment of Bateshwar Prasad Singh are available in the office of Ramgarh Raj Estate. 42. As no such suggestion was given to P. W. 5 and the said fact was sought to be brought on record for the first time by reason of the settlement made by D. W. 9, it was for defendants to prove the said fact. The defendants did not take any steps whatsoever to call for she necessary documents from the office of the Ramgarh Raj. 43. In the instant case, as noticed hereinbefore the genuineness of the Parcha (Ext. 3) was not challenged. 44. The learned trial court, for good reasons, did not believe the evidence of D. W. 9 inasmuch as he purported to have alleged that he was a settlement clerk since August, 1937 but in his cross-examination, he admitted that one Harihar Prasad was the settlement clerk from 1929-1939. 45. It has also rightly been pointed out by the learned trial that D W 9 is a court-bird. 45. It has also rightly been pointed out by the learned trial that D W 9 is a court-bird. It is true, that the plaintiffs did not examine Bateshwar Prasad Singh although he was alive but the task of the plaintiffs had been made easier in view of the fact that the dafendants themselves filed an application on 27-11-1974 for examining the said Bateshwar Prasad Singh on commission on the ground that he had became completely blind. In that view of the matter no purpose would have been served by examining the said Bateshwar Prasad Singh as it was not possible for the plaintiffs to show Ext 24 a. also Ext. 4 series to him for the purpose of proving the said document Thus Bateshwar Prasad Singh, although, sought to be examined but was not examined even by the defendants-appellants. 46. Further even D. W. 9 did not deny the genuineness of Ext. 4 to 4/a the rent receipts granted by the Ex-landlord, which coupled with the parcha were sufficient for proving the raiyati-settlement granted in favour of the plaintiffs the ex-landlord of Ramgarh Raj Estate; provided, of course the plea set-up by the plaintiffs with regard to their coming in possession of the suit lands was correct. 47. In view of the fact that the plaintiffs had been paying rent and the Parcha was granted in their favour, in my opinion, the learned trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have been able to prove the settlement in their favour. 48. Further, the plaintiffs have brought various applications namely. 49. Ext. 2 series have been supported by Ext. 9 series and 10 series. 50. P. W. 93, in Paragraph 15 of his deposition, categorically stated that after vesting of the Ramgarh Raj Estate in the State of Bihar in terms of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the original plaintiff No. 1 made several efforts to pay rent in the office of the State of Bihar. 51. P. W. 2 Ramdeo Singh proved Ext. 2 and 2/A which was also corroborated by P. W. 23. P. W. 23 further proved Ext 2/B to 2/J the acknowledgement receipt in respect of the aforementioned Ext. 2 series are Exts.9 to 9/D and the signature on the acknowledgement due are Ext 10 series. 51. P. W. 2 Ramdeo Singh proved Ext. 2 and 2/A which was also corroborated by P. W. 23. P. W. 23 further proved Ext 2/B to 2/J the acknowledgement receipt in respect of the aforementioned Ext. 2 series are Exts.9 to 9/D and the signature on the acknowledgement due are Ext 10 series. Although, the suggestion was given to P. W. 23 on behalf of the appellants that the said documents namely, Ext. 2 series and 9 series were not filed in 145 Cr. P. C. but from a perusal of Ext. 20/A which is the order passed in the aforementioned proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it would appear that the said documents were filed in the said proceedings. 52. Further, from Ext. 2/p which is dated 17-6-1967, it appears that the application for mutation of the name of the plaintiff No. 1 was filed 2/h was also received by the addressee. 53. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that in Ext. 2/d, the plaintiffs purported to have made a prayer therein for grant of settlement of the lands in question. 54. According to the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants this fact itself would show that the lands in question were never settled with the original plaintiff No. 1 inasmuch as had that being so there was no occasion for him to file an application for grant of a fresh settlement before the State of Bihar. 55. However, from a perusal of Ext. 2/d, it appears that the plaintiffs made the aforementioned prayer for grant of settlement in respect of such lands which, according to them were further reclaimed by them after grant of settlement in their favour in respect of the suit lands, 56. From a reading of the said Ext, 2/d in whole, the contention of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents appear to be correct. 57. So far as the possession of the plaintiffs in or over the suit lands are concerned, it may be mentioned at the outset that D. 11, who is one of the defendants himself in Paragraphs 1 and 14 of his deposition admitted that the plaintiffs have constructed a house on the said lands. 58. It is true that the defendants purported to prove their possession on the basis of alleged settlement granted in their favour by the State of Bihar. 58. It is true that the defendants purported to prove their possession on the basis of alleged settlement granted in their favour by the State of Bihar. 59. Further, it appears from Ext. 20 which is report of the Circle Officer, wherein it was suggested that the purported settlement granted in favour of the defendants-appellants should be annulled as the plaintiffs were found to be in possession thereof. 60. According to the plaintiffs, they had not only converted the lands into Paddy Khets but had also dug two wells therein. 61. The existence of wells have not been denied by the defendants but it had merely been suggested by them that the said wells were excavated by the Hat Thikedar. In the survey map (Ext. 15) and in Khatiyan No. 19/A, the existence of the wells on plot No. 135 have not been shown. 62. Thus, the story of excavation of the said wells by the Hat Thilkedar has to be ruled out. 63. The learned trial court has rightly held that the circle mark shown in plot No. 135 in the survey settlement plan denotes the fixed point and not a well. This fact has also been admitted by D. W. 24 who is an employee of defendant No. 9. 64. Further, according to the plaintiffs, they have dug two wells after obtaining settlement of the lands in question i.e., much after the survey settlement operation and in this view of the matter, it has to be held in view of the pleadings of the partie that the plaintiffs had dug the aforementioned wells and not the Hat Thikedar as alleged by the defendants-appellants, inasmuch as had that allegation been correct, the existence thereof would have been found place in the village map as also in the remark column of the khatian. 65. So far as the conversion of the lands into paddy "khets are concerned, as noticed hereinbefore, it is not the case of the defendants, they did so. In fact, the evidence sought to be adduced in this behalf was not pleaded in their written statement. 66. Further so far as the case of the plaintiffs relating to the amalgamation of the lands is concerned, it appears that the plaintiffs have been able to prove the same by Ext. C/t-2 and Ext. H/2 which are maps and reports prepare by Amin of the Anchal. 66. Further so far as the case of the plaintiffs relating to the amalgamation of the lands is concerned, it appears that the plaintiffs have been able to prove the same by Ext. C/t-2 and Ext. H/2 which are maps and reports prepare by Amin of the Anchal. The Amin only reported the amalgamation of plot No. 135 but in the plan (Ext. C/1-2) he has clearly shown that there had been amalgamation of both plot Nos. 9 and 135 with the other lands of the plaintiff. The defendants did not advance any such plea of amalgamation. The plea of amalgamation set up by the plaintiffs has also been supported in the evidences at P. Ws. 3, 7,10 and 19. 67. The plaintiffs have further proved partition of the lands by Ext. 11 which is Batwara Schedule. The said document bears the signature of the husband of defendant No. 3 who did not examine herself to deny the said signature. 68. Further case of the plaintiffs is that they made extension of area of 205 acres of land towards such of the land they converted the said land into Korkar. This fact was proved by P. W. 23. 69. The fact that the plaintiffs put forward such a case of extension of land to the extent of 2.15 acres towards South also appears to be correlated from the statements made by them in their written statement in Title Suit No. 113 of 1972 which was marked as Ext. 17. Ext. 17 being a written statement filed in a suit, the authenticity thereof cannot be disputed and in that view of the matter, the plaintiffs relied upon the said document for the purpose of corroborating their evidences. 70. Further, as noticed hereinbefore, from a perusal of Ext. 2/d which is a letter of the year 1963 also is evident thus the plaintiffs have also put forward this plea of reclamation of further lands before the Circle Officer. 71. Even the maps which have been brought on record namely, Ext. 7 and 7/A also prove the said fact. The learned Court below, on the basis of the aforementioned evidences on record, in ray opinion, has rightly found that the story of possession as put forth by the defendants in respect of the suit land, are not correct and the case of the plaintiffs in this regard was correct. 72. 7 and 7/A also prove the said fact. The learned Court below, on the basis of the aforementioned evidences on record, in ray opinion, has rightly found that the story of possession as put forth by the defendants in respect of the suit land, are not correct and the case of the plaintiffs in this regard was correct. 72. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the circumstances as pointed out hereinbefore, clearly prove the case of the plaintiffs. 73. From Ext. 9/B, it appears that the same was prepared in fife name Of grand-father of P. W. 3, Maninath Pandey. He stated that he was an Aria Kisan. Another witness P. W. 6 is also an Aria Kisan of the plaintiffs which had been admitted by D. W. 11 in Paragraph 36 of his evidence. D. W. 11 further admitted that P. Ws. 7, 3 and 4 are also holding Samaj Lands, P. Ws. 8 and 9 are residents of village Bigha, P, W. 10 is holder of neighbouring lands. All these witnesses proved the possession of the plaintiffs. 74. In the aforementioned background, in my opinion, the statements of the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants to prove possession namely, D. W. 6, D. W. 9, D. W. 10 as also defendant No. 1 (D. W. 11), cannot be relied upon. 75. It is now well known that the respective cases of the panics have to be judged on broad probabilities. 76. It is further well known that so far as the analysts of the oral evidence is concerned, the opinion of the trial court carries grant importance inasmuch as it bad the opportunity to look to the demeanour of the witnesses. 77. It is a settled law that except for cogent reasons normally the findings of the trial court on the basis of the oral evidences are not disturbed the appellate court. 78. It has been suggested by Mr. P.P.N. Roy that Ext. 11 (Batwara Schedule) is not admissible in evidence but from a perusal of the said document it would appear that thereby a partition of immovable properties have not been effected. 79. The said document being a Batwara Schedule was admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing the past conduct of the parties. P.P.N. Roy that Ext. 11 (Batwara Schedule) is not admissible in evidence but from a perusal of the said document it would appear that thereby a partition of immovable properties have not been effected. 79. The said document being a Batwara Schedule was admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing the past conduct of the parties. Reference in this connection may be made to in Mama Lal V/s. Suraj Bhan reported in AIR 1975 SC 119, wherein the law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the following terms: Turning to Ex. Y we find it impossible to accept the contention that the partition of the shops was itself effected by the document. The document expressely mentions that the parties had appointed one Thakar Chandgi Ram Gupta as a Punch and that they had decided to accept the decision given by him. The document then sets, out the terms of that decision and says j We both shall be bound by that decision. It is contended that the decision of the Punch must be treated as nullity because a Punch is in the position of an arbitrator and he could not have acted except in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. This argument seems to us too sophisticated to be applied to the facts before us. The parties appear to have asked a person of common confidence to effect the partition and it was not intended to resort to any formal proceeding under the Arbitration Act. It was therefore not necessary for the parties to execute a formal reference or for the Panch to declare a formal written award. As a memorandum of a, past event the document could, therefore, be received in evidence though it is not registered. The first contention accordingly, falls. Re: Questions 2 and 3: 80 At the outset, it may be mentioned that the State of Bihar, namely, defendant No. 9, in its written statement did not support the case of the contesting defendants. The State of Bihar in its written statement admitted that on plot No. 135. Ragho Bhulyan. Jehal Bhuiyon Bhulon Bhuiyan and Khiru Bhuiyan had "made constructions of some houses. In respect of plot Nos. 136 and 137, it was contended by the State that the same being Ahar and Pind lands, the question of actual possession by any of the parties does not rise. 81. Ragho Bhulyan. Jehal Bhuiyon Bhulon Bhuiyan and Khiru Bhuiyan had "made constructions of some houses. In respect of plot Nos. 136 and 137, it was contended by the State that the same being Ahar and Pind lands, the question of actual possession by any of the parties does not rise. 81. In Paragraph 14 of the written statement, it has been contended by the State that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants are in cultivating possession of the lands in Schedule A. 82. It has further been alleged that the defendants did not reclaim the lands alter obtaining alleged settlement. It has further been contended that even the defendants do not live near the lands in question. It has further been alleged that the defendants did not obtain any legal settlement. It is further stated that the defendants have not acquired any right on the basis of the alleged settlement as the same was in violation of the provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act as also the Government Settlement Manual. 83. The State of Bihar has not preferred any appeal before this Court against the impugned judgment. It is therefore, clear that the State of Bihar through whom the defendant-appellants are claiming their title and possession did not support their case. 84. The defendants, as noticed hereinbefore, sought to prove the case of their alleged statements by bringing on records Ext. J and J/l-1 (Istehar), Ext. K. (notices) and the orders-sheets of the settlement cases namely Ext, I to 1/7-1, 85. From the order-sheets of the aforementioned two settlement cases and the parchas (Ext. F series) granted in favour of the defendants, it appears that the proceedings for grant of settlement of the lands were initiated on and from 3-6-1961 by the Haiku Karmchari. The defendants, however, could not bring on record any evidence to show that they had filed any application for grant of settlements in their favour. 86. D. W. 1 stated that the order of settlement proceeded measurement and classification of the lands by Amin, but on such fact are available on records of the aforementioned settlement cases, whereform it would appear that Amin has nothing to do in the matter of grant of settlement. Even the Parcha was prepared before the Istehar was issued. 87. 86. D. W. 1 stated that the order of settlement proceeded measurement and classification of the lands by Amin, but on such fact are available on records of the aforementioned settlement cases, whereform it would appear that Amin has nothing to do in the matter of grant of settlement. Even the Parcha was prepared before the Istehar was issued. 87. As noticed hereinbefore, the learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon Harihar Singhs case (supra) for the purpose of showing that before 1969, the Circle Officers had the power to grant settlement. 88. However, from a perusal of Paragraph 7 of the said judgment, it would be evident that in that case it was held that till 1969, new Jatnabandis on the basis of Sada Hukunanama and rent receipts grants by the ex-inter. mediaries were not only being opened with the app oval of the Anchal Adhikari and also by the Karmchari themselves. 89. A land, which has vested in the State of Bihar, can be settled only in terms of procedure laid down under Sec. 13 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and not otherwise. A power to open a Jamabandi is not and cannot be said to be synoymous with the power to grant settlement. The lands of the State of Bihar can be settled only by the competent authorities who can also execute a necessary document in favour of the settles in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. 90. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the Anchal Adhikaris or the Block Development Officers were empowered to grant such settlement. 91. Even in terms of Sec. 13 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the State is to follow the same procedures which are followed in the matter of grant of settlements of Khas Mahal Land, Khas Mahal land can only be settled by the Deputy Commissioner or the Collector of the District. 92. As noticed hereinbefore, even the State of Bihar did not support that the defendants-appellants have acquired any title by reason of the said settlement. 93. 92. As noticed hereinbefore, even the State of Bihar did not support that the defendants-appellants have acquired any title by reason of the said settlement. 93. The learned trial court, of course, have committed a mistake as has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant t at it held that the State did not initiate a proceeding under Sec. 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 as against the plaintiffs inasmuch as the question of initiation of any proceeding under the said provisions could arise only in the event the settlement in question was granted after 1-1-1946. 94. In the instant case, the plaintiffs definite case is that the settlement was granted in the year 1940 and in that view of the matter, Sec. 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act could not have any application whatsoever. 95. In the instant case, no Bujharat was produced by the State of Bihar. The learned trial court has also rightly pointed out that the defendants event could not prove the publication of the Istehar. 96. There is nothing to show that the Istehar was published in the Gram Panchayats Office. From Ext. J series, it does not appear that the same was either published at the support or at the office of the Gram-Panchayat. 97. The defendants-appellants have also not disclosed the name of the Amin who allegedly measured the lands in question. 98. So far as the three Parchas allegedly granted by the State of Bihar are concerned, Ext. F/l and Ext. F/1-1 were not proved in accordance with law inasmuch as the same were truncated documents apart from the fact that they were not the original parchas. 99. This description of the lands as given in the said parchas also do not tally with the description of the lands given by the defendants in their written statement. 100. The learned trial court has also found that the defendants have changed the plan which was made part of Ext. F/l. The plan supplied by the Anchal Office to them has not been proved. A copy of the said plan was made Annexure-1 to the written statement but no steps was taken by the defendants either to file the original plan or to call for the same from the Anchal office. 101. F/l. The plan supplied by the Anchal Office to them has not been proved. A copy of the said plan was made Annexure-1 to the written statement but no steps was taken by the defendants either to file the original plan or to call for the same from the Anchal office. 101. As noticed hereinbefore, the plaintiffs filed two plans prepared by the Amin of the circle office which were marked |as Ext. 7/A and 7/B, Ext. 7/B was proved by the Amin P. W. 23 which related to the lands settled with Dhaman Sao, Ext. 7/A (plan) related to the lands settled with defendant No. 2. 102. If the said plan was original, it would appear that there could not have been any discrepancy in the descriptions of the lands as mentioned in the parchas and as mentioned in the written-statement. But as noticed hereinbefore, the defendants replaced it with another map which was marked as Ext. E/l, which do not tally with the boundaries of the lands as stated in the Parcha. 103. The defendants-appellants in order to prove their possession, examined D. W. 10 who although, is said to be in possession of some documents to prove that he had some land in village Bigha, did not produce the same. 104. In this connection, it may be noticed that D. W. 11, who is defendant No. 1 himself, alleged that the defendants are in possession of the lands settled with them. As noticed hereinbefore, the Parchas and the plans do not tally with each other and as such, it is not known as to the identity of the lands which are allegedly in their possession i.e., as to whether they are in possession of the lands in accordance with the description of the lands as shown in the plans, namely, Ext 7/b and 7/c or the lands as described in their Parchas, namely, Ext. F series. 105. D. W. 11 also in his evidence, could not state the names of the adjacent raiyat and further did not deny that the plaintiffs amalgamated the suits lauds with their other lands. 106. In this view of the matter, all the questions posed hereinbefore, must be answered against the appellants and in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. 107. F series. 105. D. W. 11 also in his evidence, could not state the names of the adjacent raiyat and further did not deny that the plaintiffs amalgamated the suits lauds with their other lands. 106. In this view of the matter, all the questions posed hereinbefore, must be answered against the appellants and in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. 107. In view of my findings aforementioned, the decisions cited by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant must be held to be not applicable, in the facts and circustances of this case. 108. In Lachman Utamchand Kirpalanis case (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down that non-examination of material witness may give rise to draw of an adverse inference against a party not examining him. 109. However, as noticed hereinbefore, no purpose would have been served examining Bateshwar Prasad Singh who became absolutely blind and, thus, it was not possible for the plaintiffs-respondents to draw his attention with regard to their documents of title. 110. So far as the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Raghuvammas case (supra) is concerned the Supreme Court merely held that there is a distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof, the proposition aforementioned is well settled. However, in the instant case, the plaintiffs having been able to discharge their onus with regard to the title of the land, the burden shifted upon the defendants to show that they have acquired title by prescription or that by reason of a subsequent event, the plaintiffs have lost their title. 111. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. 112. Before parting with the case, it may be mentioned that the plaintiffs-respondents filed an application on 9th September, 1985 for amending certain clerical mistakes and omission etc. in the judgment and decree which was allowed by an order dated 11-9-1985 but despite the same except the amendment No. 6, the same has not been incorporated in the judgment from the decree. 113. In this view of the matter, the learned trial court should direct the. office to make necessary amendments in the judgment and decree pursuant to the aforementioned order.