JUDGMENT 1. The 7th defendant in a suit for redemption is the appellant. The suit was resisted on various grounds. The resistance was of no avail. The courts below concurred to decree the suit. He has come up in second appeal. 2. The questions on which notice has been issued by this Court read: "(i) Whether the finding on the question of limitation entered by the courts below is right ? (ii) Whether Ext. A-3 and B-4 where there is no admission of any subsisting liability to be redeemed were not signed by the 1st defendant would amount to a valid acknowledgment to save limitation and when in the plaint sufficient plea is not made." 3. Counsel for the appellant sought leave to formulate other questions as well: such as one on the question of his tenancy. I am disinclined to permit raising additional questions or raising new contentions. The learned Judge who admitted the second appeal, found only one possible area for scrutiny that pertaining to a legal contention as regards the limitation. Justice does not require a subsequent expansion of the area of controversies. 4. The contention regarding limitation may now be discussed. The mortgage is dated 5th July 1946. Consequent on the reduction of the period of limitation under 1963 amendment, the suit had to be filed before 5th July 1976. It was filed a few days later. Acknowledgement had been pleaded to escape from the limitation bar. 5. The Trial Court took the view that there was an acknowledgement of the mortgage liability under Ext. B-4 purakkadom arrangement. That document, on a proper reading, does contain all the requirements of a valid acknowledgement. The nature of the property, about its being owned by a family of which the parties to Ext. B-4 are members, is indicated therein. There is a reference specifically to the mortgage Ext. A-1 of the year 1921 (1946). The execution of the mortgage under that document for a consideration of Rs. 3,000 is recited. In addition to the pre-existing liability, and in respect of the property so described, an additional liability of Rs. 2,000 is created under the purakkadom. It was so expressly stated in the document. Then comes a further, more significant and forceful sentence. It is stated that the property has to be enjoyed by paying tax; aggregating the liability by taking on Rs. 2,000 is created under the purakkadom. It was so expressly stated in the document. Then comes a further, more significant and forceful sentence. It is stated that the property has to be enjoyed by paying tax; aggregating the liability by taking on Rs. 2,000 created under the purakkadom is envisaged. At the time when the property is redeemed by the tarward, the executants should also pay the amount covered by purakkadom document. Thereafter, the details of the consideration are given. 6. The court below concurred to hold that Ext. B-4 does contain specific and categoric acknowledgement of the liability under the mortgage. 7. On a consideration of the various recitals in the document, I am in full agreement with the view taken by the courts below. In that view of the matter, the suit would be well within the prescribed time. 8. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the acknowledgement was not specifically in terms of Ext. B-4, as is seen from the averments in the plaint. That is a technical contention. If raised sufficient early, the plaintiff could have got over that technical difficulty by appropriate - and permissible methods, such as by an amendment of the plaint. When the Trial Court entered a finding adverse to the 7th defendant on the question of limitation, he did not pointedly raise that question in the memorandum of appeal before the court below. There were only two grounds which pertained to that question of limitation in that appeal; and they are : "The court below ought to have found out that the suit is barred by limitation. The so called acknowledgement relied on by the lower court in Ext. A-3 is not a valid acknowledgement at all. Since the plaintiff never recognises the Purakkadom Ext. B-4 that document cannot be relied on for acknowledgment by the plaintiff." (emphasis supplied) No contention about the absence of plea of acknowledgment possible under Ext. B-4 had been raised in the grounds of appeal. Looked that way, the appellate court could not be accused of having abdicated its function in considering the contention relating to limitation based on the absence of a specific acknowledgment with reference to Ext. B-4. The only argument proceeded on the basis that the recognition of the Purakkadom by the 7th defendant was necessary if Ext. B-4 has to be relied on as acknowledgment. That is not the legal position. B-4. The only argument proceeded on the basis that the recognition of the Purakkadom by the 7th defendant was necessary if Ext. B-4 has to be relied on as acknowledgment. That is not the legal position. The appellate court therefore considered the documents and came to the conclusion that there was an acknowledgment under Ext. B-4. The finding reached by the appellate court is correct. Thus, a technicality has been dealt with by another technicality and the resultant position is one of emerging substantial justice. 9. Counsel referred to the two decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his plea. The decision in Valliamma v. Sivathanu AIR 1979 SC 1937 , is clearly distinguishable. In that case, there was only a recital of a mortgage and a statement of its discharge. A mere admission of a past liability is not sufficient to constitute an acknowledgment. Hence, a mere recital in a document as to the existence of a past liability, coupled with a statement of its discharge, did not constitute an acknowledgment. The mortgages had been extinguished by payment of the mortgage debts in their entirety, by the redeeming co-mortgagor. There was therefore no acknowledgments of a subsisting liability, but only a reference to a past liability and its extinction. The position is not the same here. Ext. B-4 refers to a liability, alive and kicking. It reassures about a payment made under Ext. B-4 at the time when the tarward redeems Ext. A-1. The contingency when Ext. A-1 is redeemed is clearly postulated. Such a recital cannot be characterised as a dead liability and a mere chanting of its earlier existence. 10. Reliance was placed again on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tilak Ram and others v. Nathu and others AIR 1967 SC 935 . What was emphasised in that case was about the existence of a jural relationship and a clear admission of the liability to acknowledge such a jural relationship. Decided cases where it has been held that the acknowledgment need not specify the exact nature of the property, have been indicated therein. That an intention to acknowledge could be inferred by implication from the nature of admission, has been emphasised there. When there is nothing to show that a reference to anterior mortgage has been made with an intention of admitting that relationship, it may not amount to acknowledgment. That an intention to acknowledge could be inferred by implication from the nature of admission, has been emphasised there. When there is nothing to show that a reference to anterior mortgage has been made with an intention of admitting that relationship, it may not amount to acknowledgment. Para.5 of the judgment would show that the statements in the document considered in that case only mentioned, without anything more, the fact of jural relationship. Para.10 again emphasises the important aspect: "Where the statement is relied on as expressing jural relationship it must show that it was made with the intention of admitting such jural relationship subsisting at the time when it was made. It follows that where a statement setting out jural relationship is made clearly without intending to admit its existence an intention to admit cannot be imposed on its maker by an involved or a far-fetched process of reasoning." 11. In the above circumstances, no reliance can be placed on the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court decisions referred to and discussed above. The facts of the case on hand are distinctly different. It will be impossible to spell out from Ext. B-4 that the parties thereto merely "set out jural relationship clearly without intending to admit its existence". The existence of the jural relationship was reiterated. It was emphasised over again. There was a re-assurance about the payment of purakkadom document along with the mortgage money, implying thereby that the liability under the mortgage is very much alive. In the result, there is hardly any scope for interference with the concurrent views of the courts below. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. I do not, however, make any order as to costs.