JUDGMENT : V. Gopalaswamy, J. - This appeal is prefered against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur, convicting the accused Appellant under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and sentenging him there under to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years under each of the counts, with a direction that the sentence so imposed on him should run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that on 21-08-1982 at about 9 p.m. in Sambalpur town, the Circle Inspector of Police, Sambalpur, on getting information that the accused persons wanted in connection with town P.S. Case No; 501 of 1982 were present near the Municipal Office, proceeded with A.P.R. Force and on seeing them the associates of the Appellant managed to escape, while the Appellant failed in his attempt to escape and at that timed Appellant pointed a loaded revolver and a knife at the C.I. (P.W. 1.) standing close to him and, as the C.I. (P.W. 1) struck him with a lathi, he fell down and thereafter the Police arrested him and seized the loaded revolver and the knife, and a1so recovered some live cartridges from him. The Circle Inspector of Sadar P.S. Iodged the F.I.R. against the Appellant and after due investigation charge-sheet was filed against him u/s 307, I.P.C. and 25 and 27 of the Act. The trial Court acquitted the Appellant of the charge u/s 307, I.P.C. and convicted him only under Sections 25 and 27 of the Act. 3. The plea of the accused is that he was in no way connected with the culprits in the said P.S. Case No. 501 of 1982, but all the same the Police had arrested him and interrogated him regarding the whereabouts of one Md. Hussain and as he was unable to say anything about him, he was assaulted and arrested by that Police and as he threatened to file a case against them regarding the assault on him and his illegal arrest the foisted this false case against him. No witness was examined on behalf of the defence. 4. At the outset the learned Counsel for the Appellant raised a preliminary point that the trial Court acted illegally in taking cognizance against the Appellant under Sections 25 and 27 of the Act without valid sanction as required u/s 39 of the Act. No witness was examined on behalf of the defence. 4. At the outset the learned Counsel for the Appellant raised a preliminary point that the trial Court acted illegally in taking cognizance against the Appellant under Sections 25 and 27 of the Act without valid sanction as required u/s 39 of the Act. As the preliminary point urged by the learned Counsel for the Appellant goes to the root of the matter; it is proper that the same should be decided in the first instance, before considering, the case on merits. 5. Section 39 of the Act provides: 39. Previous sanction of the Disrict Magistrate necessary in certain cases.-No, prosecution shall be instituted against any person in respect of any offence u/s 3 without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate. The accused was charged u/s 25 of the Act on the ground that without having a valid licence he was illegally possessing a loaded revolver and thereby violated the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. So it is not disputed that valid sanction is required for instituting a Prosecution against the Appellant u/s 25 of the Act Ext. 5 is the sanction order. From Ext. 5 it is seen that the sanction was accorded by the Additional District Magistrate, sambalpur. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that sanction u/s 39 of the Act must be accorded by the Magistrate and so the sanction accorded by the additional District Magistrate was vested with such power by the State Government under section20(2), Code of Criminal Procedure (which corresponds to Section 10(2) of the Code ). Section 20(2), Code of Criminal Procedure provides; The State Govermnent may appoint any executive Magistrate to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Magistrate shall have such of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code or under any other law for the time being in force as may be directed by the State Government. 6. The burden of proving the validity of sanction lies on the prosecution. (See Madan Mohan Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, and Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, ). 6. The burden of proving the validity of sanction lies on the prosecution. (See Madan Mohan Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, and Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, ). So when the defence has questioned the authority of the Additional District Magistrate to accord sanction, it is the bounden duty (if the prosecution to produce the required notification or other direction which empowers the Additional District Magistrate to accord the sanction u/s 39 of the Act u/s 20(2), Code of Criminal Procedure it is seen that the Additional District Magistrate shall have such of the powers of a District Magistrate under the Act as may be directed by the State Government. No material was placed on record to show that the Additional District Magistrate was empowered by the State Government to accord sanction u/s 39 of the Act. Under Rule 2(f) of the Arms Rules, 1962 the expression "district magistrate" includes an Additional District Magistrate and the learned Standing Counsel relying on the said rule, contended that an Additional District Magistrate can as when accord sanction u/s 39 of the Act. The definitions provided by the Arms Rules govern the Rules only and they cannot be applied to the expression used in the Act. The requirement of a sanction as an essential condition of a prosecution is contained not in the Rules but in Section 39 of the Act and the expression 'District Magistrate' cannot therefore have in the said provision, that extended meaning which has been assigned to it by the definition given in the Rules. This view receives support from the decision Jawahar v. State, AIR 1968 Al1 87. In view of the provisions of Section 39 of the Act read with Section 20(2), Code of Criminal Procedure. I find that unless the Additional District Magistrate is empowered by the State Government to accord sanction, he has no authority to accord sanction. This view of mine receives support form Lal Singh Kabui Vs. The State of Assam, (a decision u/s 10(2) of the old Code) and Jawahar's case (supra). So as no notification is placed before the Court showing that the Additional District Magistrate, Sambalpur, was empowered to accord sanction u/s 39 of the Act, on that score alone Ext. 5, the sanction order of the A.D.M., must be held to be invalid. 7. So as no notification is placed before the Court showing that the Additional District Magistrate, Sambalpur, was empowered to accord sanction u/s 39 of the Act, on that score alone Ext. 5, the sanction order of the A.D.M., must be held to be invalid. 7. The learned Standing Counsel contended that even if there was no valid sanction for prosecuting the accused u/s 25 of the Act, yet the criminal proceeding was maintainable u/s 27 of the Act. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that even for prosecuting the accused u/s 27 of the Act sanction is necessary. The gist of the offence u/s 27 of the Act is the possession of the arms with the intention to use the same for any unlawful purpose. In the instant case the prosecution alleges that the accused had pointed the loaded revolver at the Circle Inspector of Police with a view to prevent him from arresting him and there by he rendered himself liable u/s 27 of the Act. 8. Section 39 of the Act forbids prosecution of any person without sanction in respect of an offence committed u/s 3 of the Act. Section 3 of the Act simply prohibits possession of a firearm or acquisition of it or carrying the same or any ammunition unless one holds a licence for the same issued in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made there under Reading the provisions of Sections 25 and 27 of the Act it is clear that a person may possess a licence of a firearm and may have firearm but the moment he uses the firearm for any illegal purpose, he commits an offence u/s 27 of the Act and for prosecution for such offence no sanction of the competent authority is required. This view was held by the Patna High Court in Ratandev Singh v. State to Bihar 1979 Crl.L.J. 1348. Relying on the said decision of the Patna High Court, I hold that the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that sanction u/s 39 is necessary for prosecuting the accused u/s 27 of the Act is without any substance . 9. Relying on the said decision of the Patna High Court, I hold that the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that sanction u/s 39 is necessary for prosecuting the accused u/s 27 of the Act is without any substance . 9. The learned Counsel for the Appellant next contended that in the facts of the present case, as the offences alleged against the accused under Sections 25 and 27 of the Act arise out of the same transaction, when the accused could not have been prosecuted u/s 25 of the Act for want of sanction, it vitiates the proceedings u/s 27 of the Act as well, In this context he relied on State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy Alias Vemareddy and Another. That is a decision u/s 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure. In that decision the Supreme Court held that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a Court is necessary u/s 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a Court is necessary under that Sub-section are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure should be up held. Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure has been enacted as a safe guard against irresponsible and reckless prosecutions by private individuals in respect of offences which relate to the administration, of justice and contempt of lawful authority. Section 39 of the Act providing that sanction for prosecuting an accused u/s 25 of the Act is necessary was enacted with an entirely different object altogether. So the above referred decision of the Supreme Court cannot offer any solution for the question raised in this case. The issue raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant in the present case must, therefore, be decided on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act itself. 10. It is earlier found that for prosecuting a person u/s 25 of the Act sanction is necessary, whereas no such sanction is necessary for prosecuting a person u/s 27 of the Act. Possession of a firearm without a licence is punishable u/s 25 of the Act. Section 27 of the Act prescribes punishment for possessing a firearm with intent to use it for any unlawful purpose. Possession of a firearm without a licence is punishable u/s 25 of the Act. Section 27 of the Act prescribes punishment for possessing a firearm with intent to use it for any unlawful purpose. A person may possess a licence of a firearm and under that licence he may have a firearm, but the moment he uses the firearm for any illegal purpose he commits an offence u/s 27 of the Act. Hence it is seen that for holding a person guilty u/s 27, it is immaterial whether he has a valid licence for possessing the same or not. So it is not always that a person who is found guilty u/s 27 of the Act is also guilty u/s 25. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is earlier found that there is no valid sanction for prosecuting the Appellant u/s 25 of the Act and so no cognizance ought to have been taken against him under that section. But that does not mean that the Appellant cannot be prosecuted for having committed the offence u/s 27 of the Act, because for holding him guilty u/s 27 it is not necessary to give a finding on the issue whether he was having a valid licence or not. In a given case a person may be found not guilty of the offence, u/s 25 of the Act and yet he may be convicted for having committed an offence u/s 27 of the Act. In that view of the matter, merely on the ground that the Appellant cannot be prosecuted u/s 25 of the Act, it cannot be said that the charge u/s 27 of the Act, must also fail, even though there is sufficient material to substantiate the charge. 11. In view of my finding that even though there is no sanction for prosecuting the accused u/s 25 of the Act, yet it is open to the Court to find out if the charge against him u/s 27 is brought home to him, I proceed to consider the prosecution evidence to find out if its case against him u/s 27 of the Act is proved. On 21-8-1982 P.W. 1 was the Circle Inspector, Sadar P.S. Sambalpur and P.W. 2 was the S.L Town P.S and their evidence shows that on that day they along with the A.S. 1. (P.W. 4), Junior S. 1. On 21-8-1982 P.W. 1 was the Circle Inspector, Sadar P.S. Sambalpur and P.W. 2 was the S.L Town P.S and their evidence shows that on that day they along with the A.S. 1. (P.W. 4), Junior S. 1. (P.W. 5) and other police officers went to the Municipal Office, Sambalpur, to arrest the accused persons wanted in Town P.S. Case No. 501/82- u/s 397, I.P.C. as information was received that they were concealing themselves behind the Municipal Office. It is in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that as they entered into the Municipal Office through the main gate on seeing them the culprits started running when they were chased by them, but they managed to escape. The Appellant, who was with the said accused persons, also tried to escape, but he failed in his attempt and P.W. 1 came very close to him and then the Appellant had charged P.W. 1 with a loaded revolver and then P.W. 1 dealt the "Appellant successive lathi blows as a result of which the revolver fell down from his hand and then P.Ws. 1 and 2 caught hold of him. P.Ws. 1 and 2 deposed that when they searched the pocket of the accused they found two live cartridges in his pocket. P.W. 2 stated that subsequently the accused gave out his name to be Subhan. P.Ws. 1 and 2 found that the revolver was loaded with six live cartridges. P.Ws. 4 and 5 were the other police officers who arrived at the spot soon after the accused was caught hold of by P.Ws. 1 and 2. They corroborate the version of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that the revolver was loaded with six cartridges and that two live cartridges were recovered from the pocket of the accused. Nothing substantial was elicited in the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 and 2 to discredit their testimony that as P.W. 1 tried to catch hold of the accused and went close to him, the accused had charged P.W. 1 with his revolver P.W. 1 lodged the F.I.R. Ext. 1 and on the basis of that F.I.R. P.W. 7 took up the investigation of the case. The revolver M.O.I. and the live cartridges 8 in number were seized. P.W. 8 is an independent witness who deposed about the seizure of the loaded revolver a1ong with two cartridges from the possession of the accused. 1 and on the basis of that F.I.R. P.W. 7 took up the investigation of the case. The revolver M.O.I. and the live cartridges 8 in number were seized. P.W. 8 is an independent witness who deposed about the seizure of the loaded revolver a1ong with two cartridges from the possession of the accused. He states that M.O.I. is the revolver so seized from the possession of the accused. From the report of the Ballistic Expert Ext. 6 it is seen that the seized revolver M.O.I. is a double action revolver and a firearm and it is in working order and an the 8 seized cartridges are live cartridges. On a consideration of the above reliable evidence, agreeing with the finding of the trial Court, I hold that the accused bad used the seized revolver M.O.I. for an unlawful purpose when he threatened the police officer by pointing out the revolver at him with a view to prevent him from arresting him and thereby rendered himself liable u/s 27 of the Arms Act; Hence the prosecution could successfully bring home to the Appellant the charge u/s 27 of the Arms Act. Considering the nature of the offence committed by him, I see no reason to interfere with the sentence imposed on him. 12. In the result, the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court against the accused u/s 25 of the Arms Act is hereby set aside. However, the order of the trial Court convicting the accused u/s 27 of the Arms Act and sentencing him there under to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years is hereby confirmed. With the above modification in the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed