Judgment Pabitra Kumar Banerjee, J. : 1. This appeal is from an appellate decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 6th Court, Alipore, affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional Court of Munsif at Serddah and it arises out of Title Suit no. 647 of 1964 renumbered as Title Suit no. 49 of 1966 commenced by the plaintiff Bhupati Chandra Chakraborty, since deceased, against Sri Sudhendu Nath Banerjee and his wife Smt. Snehalata for a decree for eviction from the suit property of which the plaintiff claimed to be the owner by purchase, on the ground that the defendants were permitted to occupy the suit property as licensees in the year 1954 and that the said licence has been revoked by a notice. The defendant no. 1 alone contested the suit by filing a written statement in which the plaintiff's title to the suit property was challenged and the induction of the defendants therein as licensees was denied. It was further alleged that the father of the plaintiff who was also the father of defendant no. 2 and father-in-law of defendant no. 1 was a Pakistani national and with a view to acquiring some properties for the benefit of the defendants he purchased the suit property with the consideration money paid by defendant no. 1 Soon after the purchase the defendants came to Calcutta from East Pakistan and erected the house on the suit property in the year 1951 and since then they have been residing in the house continuously and without any interruption from any quarter. By an additional written statement filed on 20.7.66 defendant no. 1 urged that the plaintiff had no right, title and interest in the suit property in as much as the same had vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property under the provisions of the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). An additional Issue being additional issue no. 8 was framed as to whether the right, title and interest of the plaintiff in the suit property had vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property under the Act. 2. On the above pleadings the parties went to the trial and the Trial Court upon consideration of the materials on record came to a finding that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit property and that the defendants were occupying the same as licensees. 2. On the above pleadings the parties went to the trial and the Trial Court upon consideration of the materials on record came to a finding that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit property and that the defendants were occupying the same as licensees. With regard to the additional issue no. R it was held that the plaintiff was a Pakistani national and that the interest of the plaintiff in the suit property had vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property for India with effect from 10.9.65. The suit was accordingly dismissed. On appeal the appellate Court affirmed all the findings of the Trial Court with regard to the title of the plaintiff and the status of the defendants, but reversed the findings of the lower Court with regard to the additional issue no. 8 holding inter alia that the title of the plaintiff was not lost and that he was competent to proceed with the suit. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was decreed. The defendants moved the High Court in second appeal. 3. In the second appeal being S. A. No. 810 of 1972 the questions as to the competence of the plaintiff to prosecute the suit in respect of the enemy property after the vesting of the same in the Custodian and the bar under s. 83 C P. Code were raised on behalf of the appellants and the learned Judge by his judgment and order dated 23.76 negatived such• contentions of the appellants holding inter alia that despite the vesting of the suit property in the Custodian, the plaintiff did not lose his right, title and interest in the property and that the suit did not ipso facto abate. It was further held that mere vesting of the property under the Act does not prevent the enemy from continuing the suit if the Custodin does not take any steps for the carriage of the suit. With regard to the bar under S. 83 C.P. Code it 'was held that the p1aintiff could prosecute the proceeding as soon as they ceased to be alien enemies. With regard to the bar under S. 83 C.P. Code it 'was held that the p1aintiff could prosecute the proceeding as soon as they ceased to be alien enemies. The learned Judge, however found that the decree of dismissal was passed at a time when the Act was in force and the plaintiff was still an enemy within the meaning of the Act, and accordingly, he remitted the case to the Trial Court for a fresh decision according to law in the light of the observations made in the order of remand. During the pendency of the second appeal before the Hon'ble Court, the plaintiff and defendant no. 2 died and their legal heirs were substituted in their place. 4. Since the order of remand both parties adduced evidence and the learned Munsif decreed the suit on contest with the findings that the plaintiffs' title in the suit property had been established, that the defendants' occupation therein was that of licencees and that the plaintiffs could prosecute the suit. The appeal preferred against the decree was dismissed. The unsuccessful defendants have come up in second appeal for the second time. 5. Mr. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee, the learned advocate for the defendant appellants, contended before us, in the first instance, that the original plaintiff Bhupati Chandra being a Pakistani national was an enemy within the meaning of the Act and that the suit property being enemy property had vested in the Custodian of the Enemy Property under the provisions of the said Act. It was next contended that Bhupati Chandra was not competent to institute the suit and in view of the embargo placed under the Act and under S. 83 C P. Code the suit should have been dismissed, at the first instance. it was contended in the last resort that the findings of the learned Judge in the S. A. No. 810 of 1972 cannot be accepted as concluded findings of facts or law and the same do not operate as resjudicata so as to preclude the appellants from challenging those findings in this appeal. 6 Mr. Shyama Prasanna Roy Chowdhury, the learned advocate for the plaintiff-respondents, on the other hand drew our attention to ss. 6 Mr. Shyama Prasanna Roy Chowdhury, the learned advocate for the plaintiff-respondents, on the other hand drew our attention to ss. 5, 6, 8 and 18 of the Act, took us through the judgment delivered by R. Bhattacharjee J in the earlier second appeal and argued before us that this Court having the co-ordinate jurisdiction cannot enter into and question the propriety of the findings arrived at by the learned Judge finally while disposing of the second appeal. Another branch of argument advanced by Mr. Roy Chowdhury was that as the suit was instituted before the plaintiff became an enemy and the suit property was declared as Enemy Property, the suit could have been duly and effectively prosecuted at the instance of the legal heirs of the plaintiff after the embargo was lifted in 1971 when East Pakistan ceased to exist with the emergence of the friendly State. Bangladesh. Both the learned Counsel cited land relied on several reported decisions which we propose to discuss at the appropriate stage. 7. In the context of the aforesaid rival contentions the points which call for our decision are :- 1. Do the findings of the learned Judge in S.A. No. 810 of 1972 operate as res judicata so as to preclude the appellants from raising the same contention in the subsequent stage of the suit? 2. Did the plaintiffs right to continue the suit survive after the declaration of emergency on 10.9.65 ? 3. Were the plaintiffs entitled to continue the suit as alien enemies? 8, The subject matter in dispute comprises 13 decimals of land with a structure standing thereon within mouza Panihati in the district of 24Parganas. The plaintiff Bhupatichandra purchased vacant land by two registered Kobalas dated 234.48 exts. 1 and la and erecled the structure thereon which is under the occupation of the defendants since 1954 as licensees under the plaintiff. All these facts have been proved during the trial on evidence and since concluded by concurrent findings of facts of the Court below. These findings were sufficient for granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff.,. But the enactment of the Enemy Property Act 1968 stood in their way and the judgment of .Bhattacharjee, J. in S. A. No. 810/72 made the situation difficult for the defendants. These findings were sufficient for granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff.,. But the enactment of the Enemy Property Act 1968 stood in their way and the judgment of .Bhattacharjee, J. in S. A. No. 810/72 made the situation difficult for the defendants. This difficult situation seems to be the central problem involved in this appeal in as much as while the appellants insisted that they are entitled to challenge the aforesaid judgment and to reopen the issue as to the effect of the vesting under the Act, the respondents resisted on the ground that the said findings are conclusive and are not open to challenge on the principle analogous to res judicata. It has now been well-settled that the principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court whether a trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceeding. The earlier view in that regard taken in the case of G. H. Hook v. Administrator Genera! Bengal & ors. reported in 33 CLJ p.405 has been reiterated with some reservation in the later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhan vs. Smt. Deorajin Debi reported in AIR 1960 SC p 941. In order to resolve the controversial issue it becomes necessary to look into the judgment in S. A. no 810/72 first. It has already been stated in what context and through which processes the matter came up for the consic1eration of the learned Judge of the High Court for the first time. 9. The two issues which were raised in S A. no. 810/72 were whether clue to the vesting of the suit property in the Custodian and the bar under s. 83 C. P. Code the suit had automatically abated and the same was liable to he dismissed as not maintainable. 9. The two issues which were raised in S A. no. 810/72 were whether clue to the vesting of the suit property in the Custodian and the bar under s. 83 C. P. Code the suit had automatically abated and the same was liable to he dismissed as not maintainable. In answer to the questions the learned Judge held (I) that despite the vesting of the suit property in the Custodian the plaintiffs' title to the property was not lost, (2) that the suit did not abate, and (3) that the alien enemies (in this case the plaintiffs) arc competent to proceed with the pending suit with the lifting of the Emergency declared under the Defence of India Rules or under the Ordinance Promulgated before the Enemy Property Act, 1968 came into force. The judgments and decrees of both the Courts below were set aside and the entire case was remitted to the trial Court with direction to proceed with the suit as it stood on 8.9.65. Thus the effect of the remand was that that the parties were relegated to the stage as if the trial had commenced but not concluded. The test in such a case is to ascertain if the findings given by the learned Judge on appeal were final decisions. It is the decision that operates as res judicata and not the reasoning in support thereof. Upon proper construction of the order of remand it appears that the determination as to the effect of vesting of the enemy property in the Custodian under the Enemy Property Act and the plaintiffs' competence to proceed with the pending suit was final determination. The question decided by the learned Judge was the sole question in dispute at the hearing and that is the cardinal point in the suit. ft is an admitted position that this Division Bench and the Bench which vide the remand order on the previous occasion have co-ordinate jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances stated above it now becomes necessary to consider the question of res judicata which has been urged by the respondents and resisted by the appellants. 10. The first link in the chain of reasoning’s of Mr. 10. The first link in the chain of reasoning’s of Mr. Banerjee was that the appellants had no right of appeal against the impugned order of remand and even if any appeal would lie the decree of the Courts below having been set aside, there was no decree from which the appellants could appeal. The substance of Mr. Banerjee's argument was that everything that should have been authority of res judicata is, and ought to be, subject to appeal and reciprocally an appeal is not admissible on any -point having the authority of res judicata. We cannot countenance the argument for more than one reason. It is true that when an order of remand is not open to appeal its correctness can be impugned in an appeal against the revised decree passed pursuant to it. But that cannot be the surest test of res judicata, particularly when the High court makes the order of remand and admittedly no appeal lies to the Supreme Court against such order of remand. (Satyadhyan's case (supra). The question as to whether an order of remand is. appellable or not is undoubtedly important when the matter is covered by section 105(2) C. P. Code and a plea is taken in that regard but in given cases, like the present one, there no appeal would lie, this test might not be appropriate. Viewing the question of res judicata from another standpoint we hold that this Court exercising co ordinate jurisdiction is not competent to reassess the order of remand made on a previous occasion by another Bench of the 'came- Court and the previous decision is binding on the parties to the snit as also on the Bench sitting in appeal from the revised decree passed pursuant to the remand. The following reported decisions of different High Courts and of the Supreme Court, where such questions were raised and dealt with, may be cited as authorities for such proposition......... (a) In the case of G. H. Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal & Ors. (Supra) it has been held that previous decision in the same suit prevents subsequent revival of question decided. (a) In the case of G. H. Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal & Ors. (Supra) it has been held that previous decision in the same suit prevents subsequent revival of question decided. (b) A Division Bench of the Patna High Court, in Sunder Ahir v. Phuljharia, AIR 1957 Pat 534 consisting of Ramaswami C. J. and Raj Kishore Prasad, J., laid down the following guiding principles with respect to finality of matters decided by order of remand and the power of the Court of appeal to go behind its earlier decisions. If a High Court remands a case to the lower court, the matters finally disposed of by the order of remand cannot, any of them, be reopened, when the case comes back from the lower Court but, if at the time of remand, no final decision is given on a point, though some observations only are made in respect of it, it is open to another Bench, a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, when finally determining the cafe, to came to its own conclusions on it ; and, (2) that even in a case, decided by the first court of appeal other than a case, decided by the High Court, if a Judge on appeal decides certain points and remands the case, his decision is binding on his successor, before whom the case comes up again from the judgment after remand, because such a court is a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and, therefore, he cannot go behind the earlier final decision of his predecessor before remand. (c) In another case reported in AIR 1963 Madhya Pradesh 344 (Budhilal Devaprosad & Anr. v, Jagannathdas Bajrangdar) the trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to lead oral evidence to prove that a particular transaction was not out and out sale but a loan transaction. The dismissal of the suit was affirmed by the appeallate Court. In second appeal the High Court reversed both the judgments and the decrees holding that the plaintiff could lead such oral evidence and remanded the suit to the trial Court for a fresh decision. After the remand order the trial court decreed the suit. On appeal the appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit property had vested in the State under the M. P. Abolition of Propriety Rights Act, 1951. After the remand order the trial court decreed the suit. On appeal the appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit property had vested in the State under the M. P. Abolition of Propriety Rights Act, 1951. In the second appeal T. C. Srivastava, J. sitting singly held that in view of the Full Bench decision in Rahamatulah Khan's case (AIR 1956 Nagpur p. 132) the suit land could not vest in the State. The decree of the lower appellate court was set aside and the case was remanded to the appellate court for a fresh decision on merits. This time the lower appellate court decreed the suit. The defendants again appealed and the second appeal came up for hearing before T.C. Srivastava. J. I n the meantime the decision Rahamatullah Khan's case was reversed by the Supreme Court. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that in view of the changed circumstances the learned Judge should reconsider his earlier decision. The learned Judge, however negatived such contention on the ground that the could not go behind his remand order which, so far as he was concerned, was resjudicata". With the certificate obtained from the Court the matter came lip before a Bench hearing Letters Patent Appeal. Their Lordships relied on the decisions of the Privy Council and Supreme Court reported respectively in 43 Indian Appeals page 9 (Seoparsan's case) & AIR 1960 SC page 941 (Satyadhan's case) and came to a finding that the learned Single Judge was correct in holding that he could not reconsider his order of remand when hearing the appeal from the decree of the lower appellate court passed after remand, (d) In another Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court reported in AIR 1966 Patna page 209 (Bandhu Kunjrav v. Rahaman Kuhjra), their Lordships refused to interfere with the order of remand passed by a Single Judge in an earlier stage of the same suit. Similar question arose before the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Cherion v. Kachuvareed & anr. reported in AIR 1975 Kerala page 197. Without going into the details of the facts it is enough to state that in that case the suit was dismissed by the trial court in the first instance and the decree of dismissal was confirmed in appeal. reported in AIR 1975 Kerala page 197. Without going into the details of the facts it is enough to state that in that case the suit was dismissed by the trial court in the first instance and the decree of dismissal was confirmed in appeal. In second appeal the concurrent decisions of the Lower Courts were set aside and the suit was remitted to the trial Court. After remand the trial court decreed the suit, on appeal the decree was set aside and in the second appeal the learned Single Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The matter came up before the Division Bench under s. 5 of the Kerala High Court Act. The appeal was allowed because the learned Single Judge took a view contrary to that taken by the High Court in an order of remand in S. A. No. 272 of 1961. Their Lordships after reviewing the authorities, old and current, on the subject held that when the High Court or even a first court of appeal decides some matters in an order of remand, the decision is binding on his successor. In the case of Krishnaswamy Rediar v. Muthy by Reddiar reported in AIR 1979 Madras p. 173. an order of remand made by the Court of first appeal was not appealed against. When the matter came up for hearing before the High Court in second appeal, the appellant was not allowed to dispute the correctness of the finding in the remit order and the bar under s. 105(2) C.P. Code was given effect to. (e) In the case of Sushil Chandra Roychowdhury v. Sambhu Nath Guha reported in 1976(1) CLJ page 325 the question of resjudicata was raisrd and disposed of by Chittatosh Mukherjee J in this way. The defendant tenant against whom an eviction decree under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was passed had filed an application under s. 17E of the Amending Act, 1970 for setting aside the decree. The application was rejected but the revisional application taken out of it was allowed by the High Court. The impugned order was set aside and the proceedings were remitted to the trial Court for rehearing. At some subsequent stage of the same proceeding the correctness of the remand order was challenged. The application was rejected but the revisional application taken out of it was allowed by the High Court. The impugned order was set aside and the proceedings were remitted to the trial Court for rehearing. At some subsequent stage of the same proceeding the correctness of the remand order was challenged. The learned Judge rejected the contention holding inter alia that, "the said order until set aside by a Superior Court, not only binds the parties but also myself exercising co-ordinate jurisdiction", 11. The next link in the chain of reasoning of Mr. Banerjee was that an order or remand being in the nature of an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order and in support of the contention aforesaid Mr, Banerjee relied upon Satyadhan's case (supra). The learned Counsel also relied upon the decisions reported in XII Indian Appeals p. 23 (Rojha Run Bahadoor Singh v. Mushamat Lachucoa), and AIR 1962 Calcutta p. 808 (Rupeshwari Devi v. M/s. Lokenath Hosiery Mills). To start with Satyadhyan's case (supra), it appears that in a Thika Tenancy proceeding at one stage the High Court held in connection with a revisional application that the petitioners were Thika Tenants under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. The order of the learned Munsif was set aside and the application under s. 28 was remitted to the Court of the Munsif for disposal in accordance with law. After remand the eviction decree was rescinded and the landlord's application under s. 115 C.P. Code was rejected by the High Court on the ground that the question as between the same parties already decided operated as res judicata. Against the order of the High Court an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court. After remand the eviction decree was rescinded and the landlord's application under s. 115 C.P. Code was rejected by the High Court on the ground that the question as between the same parties already decided operated as res judicata. Against the order of the High Court an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court. K.C. Das Gupta, J (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court put this question, "Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a Court had decided an interlocutory order in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher Court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again ?" The learned Judge held that when a Court had decided the matter it is certainly final as regards that Court but it will not be so treated in later stages of the proceeding in a higher Court (underlining is ours). The learned Judge was fully conscious that no appeal lay to the Privy Councilor lies to the Supreme Court against an order of remand. This decision contains warrant for the conclusion that the order of remand passed by a Single Judge on the first occasion could not be questioned by the same count in an appeal from a decision passed after remand, but this can be done before a superior Court. 12. In the case of Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hemraj Multanchand reported in AIR 1972 SC 1011 certain findings given by the High Court in a remand order at an earlier stage of the proceeding were questioned before the Supreme Court by the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the findings rendered by the High Court in its remand order at an earlier stage will bind the Sub-Courts as well as the High Court or any Court of co-ordinate authority hearing the matter at the later stage, but not the Supreme Court while it deals with an appeal from the High Court. In the case of Y.B Patil & anr. v. Y.L. Patil reported in 1976 (4) Supreme Court Cases p. 66 it has been held that once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding on the Court exercising co-ordinate jurisdiction at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. In the case of Y.B Patil & anr. v. Y.L. Patil reported in 1976 (4) Supreme Court Cases p. 66 it has been held that once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding on the Court exercising co-ordinate jurisdiction at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. In this connection reference may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 997 where similar view was taken. 13. The ratio and principles emerging out of the decisions referred to above apply in full force to the facts of the instant appeal and consequently the findings of the learned Judge in S. A. 810 of 1972 would operate as res judicata precluding the appellants from raising the same contention in this appeal. In the facts and circumstances stated above the decision on two other points raised by the appellants and which have been mentioned earlier becomes unnecessary. The decisions reported in the cases of Ranbahadur & Rupeswari Devi (supra) have no application to the issues under consideration. 14. In the aforesaid view of the matter the appeal is dismissed and the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are affirmed. The plaintiff respondents do get a decree for eviction and mesne profits. 'The quantum of future mesne profits will be determined by the Trial Court on an enquiry under Or. 20 r. 12 C. P. Code and at present the plaintiffs do get the amount on which Court fees have been paid. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. The lower Court records be sent down at an early date. L. M. Ghosh, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed. decree affirmed.