V. GOPALASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred against the order dated 4-1-1985 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jaleswar in I. C. C. No. 89 of 1982 acquitting the accused persons (the present respondents) of the charges under Sections 448 134 and 427 134, I. P. C. under Section 256, Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) THE impugned order dated 4-1-1985 is quoted below :"41. 4-1-85 Complainant files hazira. Accused persons are represented in two separate petitions u/s 317, Cr. P. C. Heard. It is allowed. The complainant though files hazira is absent on call. Again call after 15 minutes. Later The complainant is absent on repeated calls. No witnesses are also produced by him for hearing although directed in the last date. Hence the accused persons are acquitted u/s. 256, Cr. P. C. Sd. S. D. J. M. "the relevant portion of the order passed on the preceding date that is on 17-12-1984 is quoted below :". . . . . . . . . . . Hearing of the cases cannot be taken up in absence of the accused Shibanarayan Ghadei. To avoid further delay in hearing of this case split up the case against the accused Shibanarayan Ghadei and put up on 4-1-85 for fixing a date of hearing. Accused persons represented today are as before. " ( 3 ) UNDER Section 256, Cr. P. C. , when the complainant is absent, the Court can proceed in either of the three ways : (i) it may acquit the accused or (ii) adjourn the case or (iii) proceed to hear the case under the proviso if the complainant is represented by an advocate or by the officer conducting the prosecution or if the personal attendance of the complainant is not considered necessary. An order under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which operates as a final order barring a fresh complaint should be passed after proper application of mind and sound exercise of judicial discretion. Each case has to be examined in its own context to determine as to whether there has been proper exercise of the discretion vested in the Court. Each case has to be examined in its own context to determine as to whether there has been proper exercise of the discretion vested in the Court. ( 4 ) ON a perusal of the order of the preceding date, it is seen that on that date (that is 17-12-1984) there was no direction given by the Magistrate to the complainant to produce his witnesses for hearing on 4-1-1985. On the other hand, from the relevant portion of the order quoted above, it is seen that the case was posted to 4-1-1985 for fixing a date of hearing. So the learned Magistrate was not justified in observing : "no witnesses are also produced by him for hearing although directed in the last date. " Section 256, Cr. P. C. (corresponding to Section 247 of the old Code) is not intended to serve as a shortcut for the trial courts to dismiss cases by snap judgements. The power to dismiss the case is undoubtedly there when the complainant in a case, instituted on a complaint, is absent in a summons case, but that power must be judicially exercised. When, in the light of the order passed on the preceding date, the impugned order is read, it would show absolute non-application of the judicial mind of the learned Magistrate to the situation at hand, when he acquitted the accused persons under Section 256, Cr. P. C. and so such an order is not sustainable in law. Under the circumstances, it would be just and reasonable that the order of the learned Magistrate acquitting the accused persons should be set aside. ( 5 ) IN the result, the impugned order acquitting the accused is hereby set aside and, accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jaleswar is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. ( 6 ) AS this is an old case, trial of the case be completed as soon as possible. Appeal allowed.