SHYAMSUNDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition arises out of an order passed by the educational appellate tribunal on 22-9-80, produced as per Annexure-A and the order passed by the addl. District judge, gulbarga on 31-3-87 in kpea No. 2/81, produced at Annexure-C , dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioner complaining of an act of the management who is the respondent herein in reverting her to the post of a lecturer from that of a principal of a pre-university college, run and maintained by respondent institution, as not maintainable. ( 2 ) THE tribunal was persuaded totake the view that the institution in question being founded and administered by a minority community the disciplinary jurisdiction of the tribunal under the Provisions of the Karnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1975 ('the act' for short) was not attracted and the action of the management of a minority institution is immune from interference by educational appellate tribunal, acting under the Provisions of the act in question. ( 3 ) AS pointed out the tribunal wasasked to adjudicate the matter of reverting the petitioner to the post of a lecturer from that of the principal. The tribunal had not gone into and investigated the petitioner's complaint on merits but has rejected her appegl in limine holding the action of the management albeit in the sphere of disciplinary matters was insulated against interference by the tribunal because of the protection guaranteed to the institution under art. 30 of the Constitution of india. The tribunal having accepted the stand of the management as aforesaid and having chosen to dismiss the appeal holding it to be incompetent had ofcourse not taken the occasion to delve into and investigate the merits of the complaint made to it. ( 4 ) IN the circumstances the onlyquestion that arises for consideration is : whether the tribunal was justified in dismissing the petitioner's appeal on an in limine ground of non-maintainability because it pertained to a disciplinary action taken by a minority institution which was immune from the Provisions oi the act by virtue of the certain privileges given to it under art. 30 of the Constitution to answer this point few facts are necessary to be stated and they are, the petitioner was appointed as principal of bibi raza junior college for women and in due course her appointment also was approved by the pre-university board and eversince then she has been functioning as principal of that institution but was surprised to receive a communication from the respondent-institution on the 22nd september, 1980 as per Annexure-A telling her that the management of the society had decided to appoint her henceforth as a lecturer of history in the same college and directed her to co-operate with the management even thereafter make it clear that action to revert her was taken because her performance as principal was found to be unsatisfactory etc. The said communication which is at Annexure-A may be reproduced in full:"it has been observed that your performance as principal has been found unsatisfactory and you have failed to oblain the favour and co-operation of the staff to run the college administration on proper lines- hence, it is with profound regret, I am to inform you that the management of the khaja education society has decided to appoint you as lecturer in history in the junior college. Further, I am to state that after careful consideration on all aspects the management has profoundly taken a decision to run the bi bi raza junior and degree college as a single unit 'composite college' to keep up and improve our standard of discipline and education. I hope and trust that you would also extend your co-operation to attain a higher standard of discipline and education and also in smooth running of the college administration. "not unnaturally the petitioner being unhappy about this communication approached the educational tribunal by preferring an appeal under sec. 8 (1) of the act and asked the tribunal to set aside the communication on the jprincipal ground that she was punished without an enquiry although such an enquiry was mandatory vide. Sec. 6. ( 5 ) THE management appeared beforethe tribunal and took the stand that being a minority institution they were entitled to administer the institution without any let or hindrance and, therefore, contended that the tribunal had no sway or jurisdiction to go into the tenability or otherwise of the order which was the subject matter of the appeal before the tribunal. The stand of the management was that the adjudication by the tribunal of a disciplinary order made by the management pertaining to an action taken against an employee of the society clearly amounted to interference with the rights to manage its affairs and consequently violated the fundamental right guaranteed to a minority institution under art. 30 of the Constitution ensuring them absolute right to administer its institution according to its own dictates. This stand of the management was sought to be supported by relying on a decision of this court in deccan model education society v state of karnataka. Karnataka law journal. (1983 (1), 337 ). Therein it was held :"the court under art. 226 of the Constitution can investigate the status of the petitioner who asserts his or her fundamental rights under art. 29 and 30 of the constitution. Once the institution has established prima facie that it is a minority institution within art. 30, the burden of proving that it is not so is on those who assert the contrary. An educational institution established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority need not obtain any permission at all. The need to seek recognition of such institution arises only when it wants to conform to the general education imparted and recognized by the state. "i must mention there is no dispute that the management in question is la minority institution which is entitled to protection under art. 30 of the Constitution which reads :" (1) all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. (1a) in making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the state shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause. (2) the state shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority whether based on religion or language. (2) the state shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority whether based on religion or language. "on an appreciation of the factual matrix the tribunal in this case concluded in fine as follows:"both oral and documentary evidence support the fact that the respondent institution is a minority institution established, managed and controlled by the respondent and simply receiving state aid and admitting outsiders as members and students of other religions to the college it will not shed its character as minority institutions. Hence, i hold that the present appeal filed under sec. 8 (1) of the k. p. e. l. (discipline and control) act 1975 is not maintainable, as held in almost all the decisions until now rendered by the Supreme Court and also by various high courts as quoted above. "basing itself mainly on this finding the tribunal proceeded to dismiss the appeal as not maintainable. ( 6 ) IT is now contended for thepetitioners that in the light of the later judgment of Supreme Court in frank anthony public school employees' association v union of India and others, a. i. r. 1987 S. C. 311, the verdict of the tribunal professing incompetence to entertain and dispose off an appeal under sec. 8 (1) of the act was clearly otiose and that such an appeal was in fact maintainable. There seems to be little doubt that the position is such, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to supra. Before i advert to that contention i must point out that the decision of this court in deccan educational society's case did not deal with the precise question that has now arisen for consideration in that whether an order passed by the management of a minority institution touching the service conditions of an employee was adjudicatable under the Provisions of the Act, for the question dealt with in the deccan educational society's case was only in regard to obtaining of recognition. The court in that case held such recognition to be wholly unnecessary regard being had to the fact that the institution was a minority one and was without more entitled to run and manage the same not being obliged to seek recognition under the Provisions of the educational code. The court in that case held such recognition to be wholly unnecessary regard being had to the fact that the institution was a minority one and was without more entitled to run and manage the same not being obliged to seek recognition under the Provisions of the educational code. The decision of this court not having dealt with the point that now arises for consideration, therefore , cannot be an authority for any universal proposition that whatever a minority institution does same is immune from the the perview of the act. ( 7 ) I now proceed to consider thequestion on hand in the light of the decision of the supreme court. That was a case in which a set of four teachers had been suspended by the management of the frank anthony school which is an anglo Indian institution andaminorityinsti tution for having organised a silent protest against the acts of management in not paying heed to the demand for revision in the pay-scales of the teachers. The management not having taken kindiy to the peaceful protest organised by the teachers, chose to dismiss the teachers and those teachers through their association challenged the action of the management in the Supreme Court. The stand taken by the management before the Supreme Court was that it was completely insulated against all actions under the Delhi school education code and, therefore, the prayer by tha petitioners for a direction to the institution to abide by tha Delhi school Education Act was clearly untenable. The Delhi school Education Act amongst other things contained Provisions similar to sec. 6 and 8 of the educational tribunal's act. Their lordships after an elaborate consideration of all the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the context of a conflict between citizen and a minority institution and the punctilious endeavour made by the minority institution to ward-off the challenge to its action by the employees under the cover of protection available to it under art. 30 of the constitution, held that such protection did not extend to cases where the management had taken disciplinary action against its employees in which event the employees can take recourse to the educational tribunal founded under the Delhi school Education Act. 30 of the constitution, held that such protection did not extend to cases where the management had taken disciplinary action against its employees in which event the employees can take recourse to the educational tribunal founded under the Delhi school Education Act. Their lordships pointed out that efficient running of the educational institutions depended very much on the teaching faculty of the institution and if that faculty was not adequately cared for and nurtured, it would in turn affect the quality or performance of the teachers in which event it would be the students who would suffer consequently leading to an erosion in the standard and quality of education. It was further held that in order to ensure excellence in the standard of teaching preservation and maintenance of an aura of contentment by the teaching faculty being essential, it is just and proper that they be given a forum or a place to ventilate their grievances against any unjust or improper action by the management affecting their service conditions. Mainly on the basis of the aforesaid consideration, their lordships went on to hold that the Provisions of the Delhi educational act providing for an appeal to a tribunal constituted under the act and headed by a district judge was clearly permissible and those Provisions did not affect the fundamental rights guaranteed to the institution under art. 30. It would be appropriate to refer at this stage to the relevant excerpts from the judgment of his lordship chinnappa reddy who spoke for the bench on these aspects as follows:"the excellence of the instruction provided by an institution would depend directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, and inturn, that would depend on the quality and contentment of tha teachers. Conditions of service pertaining to minimum qualifications of teachers, their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service which ensure security, contentment and decent living standards to teachers and which will consequently enable them to render better service to the institution and the pupils cannot surely be said to be violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by art. 30 (1) of the constitution. The management of a minority educational institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by att, 30 (1) of the constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any othor private employer. 30 (1) of the constitution. The management of a minority educational institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by att, 30 (1) of the constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any othor private employer. Oppression or exploitation of the teaching staff of an educationsl institution is bound to lead, inevitably, to discontentment and deterioration of the standard of instruction imparted in the institution affecting adversely the object of making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. The management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object of art. 30 (1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education. " (emphasis supplied) his lordship dwelling on the need to provide some protection to the employees, had this to state :"how necessary it is to afford some measure of protection to employees, without interfering with the management's right to take disciplinary action, is illustrated by the action taken by the management in this very case against some of the teachers. These teachers took part along with others |in a silent March first on April 9, 1986 and again on April 10,1986, despite warning by the principal. The March was during the break when there were no classes. There were no speeches, no chanting or shouting of slogans, no violence and no disruption of studies. The behaviour of the teachers appears to have been orderly and exemplary. One would have thought that the teachers were, by their silent and dignified protest, setting an example and the soundest of precedents to follow to all agitators everywhere. But instead of sympathy and appreciation they were served with orders of immediate suspension, something which would have never happened if all the Provisions of s. 8 were applicable to the institution. One would have thought that the teachers were, by their silent and dignified protest, setting an example and the soundest of precedents to follow to all agitators everywhere. But instead of sympathy and appreciation they were served with orders of immediate suspension, something which would have never happened if all the Provisions of s. 8 were applicable to the institution. "the above dicta of the Supreme Court making it abundantly clear that a minority institution cannot claim a blanket protection against scrutiny of its action visa-vis its own employees and at any rate has to suffer the corrective jurisdiction of an appellate authority under an act like the educational appellate tribunal, it becomes therefore evident that the tribunal had erred in toto by dismissing the petitioner's appeal in limine after holding it to be unmaintainable. ( 8 ) HENCE, it is, this revision petitionsucceeds and is allowed and the order of the appellate tribunal dated 31-3-1987 in No. K. p. e. a. (misc.) Appeal No. 2/81 is hereby set aside and the case remitted back to the tribunal for a denovo disposal in accordance with law after providing a due hearing to the petitioner and management. On remit the tribunal will now call the matter for hearing on 25-5-1990. On that day the petitioner and the respondent management will report to the tribunal. Thereafter, the tribunal will dispose off the appeal within 3 months from this data ie. 25-5-1990. Writ petition allowed --- *** --- .