JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - These two revision applications relate to a proceeding under. Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (in short the 'Act'). One Biswanath Joshi thereinafter referred to as the 'accused'), opposite party in Criminal. Revision No. 95 of 1937 and Petitioner in the other revision application, faced trial for alleged intervention of provisions, of Section 16(1)(a)(ii) read with Section 7 of the Act. 2. According to the prosecution, the food Inspector attached to the Chief District Medical Officer, Sambalpur visited the business premises; of the accused on 3-11-1981. On demand the accused could not produce licence that he was required to obtain under the provisions of the Act read with the Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (in short the 'Rules) and the Orissa: Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1959' (for short the 'Orissa Rules' though he had exhibited for sale certain food articles for human consumption. 3. At the time at trial the accused took the plea that there was never any visit by the food Inspector as alleged and the case was been falsely foisted. The Food Inspector examined himself as a witness and the Peon attached to his office was examined as P.W. 2. No witness was examined on behalf of the defence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the prosecution has been able to establish that the accused did not have the requisite licence and, therefore, was guilty of the offences as provided in Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. After convicting him under the aforesaid provisions he sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days more. He indicated that the accused did not make any submission of the question of sentence but because the offence was one for not obtaining the food licence, he had taken a lenient view. In appeal the learned Session Judge upheld the conviction, but applied the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and directed release of the accused u/s 3 thereof. 4. This Court issued notice to the accused in exercise of its suo motu revisional power so far as the application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act is concerned. 4. This Court issued notice to the accused in exercise of its suo motu revisional power so far as the application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act is concerned. It has also been submitted on behalf of the State that reasons have to be recorded under the second proviso to Section 16(1)(a)(ii) if a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum is awarded. In the instant case no such reasons have been assigned and the trial Court erred in awarding a sentence which was lesser than the prescribed minimum without any compelling reason. On behalf of the accused, who has filed the second criminal revision, it has been strenuously urged that the prosecution suffers from several lacunae which rendered it unsustainable and, therefore, the conviction and sentence passed are not tenable. Specifically it has been urged that non-application of mind by the trial Magistrate is apparent from the fact that he has taken cognisance u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities' Act and, therefore, there was no cognisance taken under the provisions of the Act for which the accused could have been made to face trial. It was also indicated that though Rule 50 of the Rules may be held to be applicable to the facts of the case, yet there being no provision in the Orissa Rules for a retailer to take a licence, the law requires an impossible feat to be achieved which no retailer can ever accomplish; It has also been submitted that the prosecution has squarely failed to, establish its case in view of the apparent contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses; the accused statement has not been recorded u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, the trial was vitiated; there being no material to show that a food Inspector made any attempt to procure attendance of independent witnesses at the time of inspection, the requirements of Section 10(7) of the Act have not been fulfilled; the Chief District. Medical Officer who had submitted the prosecution report had no competency to do so. The learned Counsel for the State has urged that these aspects were not highlighted by the accused in the Courts below, and the points raised being not pure question of law, it cannot be agitated at this stage. Medical Officer who had submitted the prosecution report had no competency to do so. The learned Counsel for the State has urged that these aspects were not highlighted by the accused in the Courts below, and the points raised being not pure question of law, it cannot be agitated at this stage. It has also been submitted that there is no infirmity in the prosecution, and even if there is any irregularity, the basis of the accusation being within the knowledge of the accused no prejudice has been caused to him and, therefore, the prosecution was validly launched and trial conducted against him. The points raised by the learned Counsel for the parties involve some substantial points which need adjudication. 5. The question whether the Orissa Rules sufficiently provide for issuance of licence as required under Rule 50 has to be answered in the affirmative. The heading of Rule 7 is "licence for manufacture of food for sale, for sale of any articles of food, etc., and fees and condition of licence". Rule 7 of the Orissa Rules contain three tables. Table II deals with cases were licence is to be obtained for sale of any article of food by wholesalers. Table II dells with Cases of retailers and street hawkers who are required to take licence in respect of articles of food indicated therein. The expressions 'manufacture', 'retailer', 'street hawker' and 'wholeseller' have been defined in Clauses (e), (d), (f) and (h) respectively of Rule 2 of the Orissa Rules. It may be indicated here that the expressions used in the tables are not properly worded and left much to be desired. It may be indicated that in table No. III the description is in relation to several articles of food or which a licence is to be taken, as enumerated in items (a) to (u). Unfortunately items (v) to (y) have also been included in the table. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the accused, these are not food articles. But Oat the Same time the legislative intent seems to be clear that while for retailers and street hawkers specific licence fee is indicated in respect of food articles covered in items (a) to (m) and items (n) to (u) respectively, the category of establishments have also been included therein. But Oat the Same time the legislative intent seems to be clear that while for retailers and street hawkers specific licence fee is indicated in respect of food articles covered in items (a) to (m) and items (n) to (u) respectively, the category of establishments have also been included therein. The inaccuracy in expressions is further apparent from item (u) Khile item (m) conveys some meaning by excluding from the category of food articles, those covered under Food Products Order 1955; item (u) unfortunately is rather confusion in indicating the order food articles except the Food Products Order, 1955. This is a case of careless drafting. But the legislative intent seems to be clear as indicated above, and the provisions are to be read in a harmonious manner so as to render provision of the statute capable of compliance instead of making it unworkable. Similarly Rule 7 has to be read in a manner to bring it in line with the legislative intent. Therefore, Sub-rule (1) has to be read as every licence for the purpose of manufacturing for sale, for sale, storage for sale of any article of food. The legislative intent can be gathered from the heading of the rule itself, and the tables which form a part of the rules; otherwise the provisions become meaningless and it cannot be certainly said that the legislative thought of enacting certain provisions which are unworkable in law. The reading of the' provisions in the manner indicated would make it workable, in consonance with the legislative intent. The legislative intent is further apparent from Form A appended to the Orissa Rules, which clearly indicates that the licence is for manufacture for sale/sale/storage for sale/exhibition for sale; and the licence issued under Sub-rule (5) of Rule 7 also makes it clear. The further contention of Mr. Panda for the accused is that even in as per table No. III, a retailer who sells his own produce in one place or in a shop for consumption alone is required to take a licence. Here again though the submissions seem to be attractive, yet considering the entry along with the definition of retailer as given in Clause (d) of Rule 2, the stress seems to be on the sale in a shop for use of consumers-and "his products," as used in the table does not necessarily mean the food articles produced by a person. Here again though the submissions seem to be attractive, yet considering the entry along with the definition of retailer as given in Clause (d) of Rule 2, the stress seems to be on the sale in a shop for use of consumers-and "his products," as used in the table does not necessarily mean the food articles produced by a person. 6. So far as the question of defective charge is concerned, even though the contention appears to be correct, I find no prejudice has been caused to the Petitioner because from beginning he was made aware that he was being proceeded for violation of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Here again the desirability of the trial Court's applying mind at the time of taking cognisance needs no elaboration. It is the duty of the Court to see that it applies its mind at least at the time of taking cognisance, and does not commit a type of mistake as committed in the instant case. However, I do not intend to delve into the matter in detail because of the fact that no prejudice has been caused to the accused as indicated above. This irregularity was also not pointed out in the Courts below, and have not been dealt with them. Therefore, I am not inclined to agree with the submissions made in this behalf by the accused. 7. On the question of discrepancies in evidence, I find them to be minor, and not of such a nature which can render the evidence unacceptable and unreliable. Even though a different view may be possible to be taken, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction, I feel that the inferences drawn by the Courts below are not perverse, and cannot be characterised as one incapable of being taken by a Court of law. Therefore, I find no substance in the argument made in this behalf. 8. On the question whether the Food Inspector made attempt to examine independent witnesses I find that such a challenge was not raised in the Court below. Further P.W. 2 has categorically stated that the Food Inspector asked some persons present to state their names so that they on be called as witnesses, but they denied. Nothing has been shown as to how this statement is unreliable. The contention, therefore, is not acceptable. Further P.W. 2 has categorically stated that the Food Inspector asked some persons present to state their names so that they on be called as witnesses, but they denied. Nothing has been shown as to how this statement is unreliable. The contention, therefore, is not acceptable. The accused has a shop in a remote village in Sambalpur district and the articles which he exhibited for sale were few biscuit packets, mixtures and lozenges as indicated by the Courts below. The trial Court had the jurisdiction to award a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum by recording special reasons for doing so. He did not record any special feature to warrant a lesser sentence to warrant a lesser sentence. The appellate Court also did not address itself to that question. It merely observed on the non-desirability of imposition of any punishment and, therefore, extended the protection of the Probation of Offenders Act. The action of the learned Sessions Judge is clearly contrary to law. A sentence is imperative even though it is lesser than the prescribed minimum by operation of the two provisos to Section 16(1). He also committed another faux pas by extending the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act, clearly overlooking the bar in Section 20-AA. of the Act which excludes operation of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. To this extent the order of the learned Sessions Judge is illegal and needs interference. 9. As observed earlier, the accused is a small retailer belonging to a remote village of Sambalpur district and is of advanced age. The interest of justice would be best served if sentence is restricted to the period already undergone, and fine imposed by the trial Magistrate is retained. In case of default in payment of fine, the default sentence as indicated by the trial Magistrate shall be undergone by the accused. 10. The revision applications are disposed of accordingly.