JUDGMENT 1. - This petition for the removal of Abdul Wahid as Receiver has been filed in this Court by the plaintiff of Original Civil Suit No.12 of 1978, Yusuf v. Hamidullah and others , which is pending in the Court of Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur. 2. The Original Civil Suit was filed by the plaintiff for rendition of accounts etc. against the defendants on March 27, 1978, in the Court of District Judge, Jodhpur. On April 16, 1979, an application by the plaintiff was moved in the Trial Court for the appointment of a Receiver, but the same was dismissed by the Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, by the order dated March 31, 1980. Against this, the plaintiff filed an appeal in this Court. This Court, by the order dated January 5, 1982, allowed the appeal, set-aside the order of the Additional District Judge No. 2 and appointed Abdul Wahid (defendant No. 5), Non-petitioner No. 1, herein, as the Receiver. By the said order, the Receiver was required to comply certain conditions. The case of the petitioner is that the Receiver has committed breach of the order of this Court as also of the Trial Court and, therefore, deserves to be removed. This petition has been filed in this Court as the order of appointment the Receiver was made by this Court. 3. The non-petitioner No. 1 has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that this petition for his removal should have been filed in the Trial Court where the suit is pending. The application directly made to this Court is not maintainable. 4. The question for consideration is whether the application for the removal of the Receiver would directly lie to this Court or it should have been filed in the Trial Court where the original civil suit is being tried. There is a conflict of opinion in the High Courts on this point. Shri Mathur, counsel for the petitioner, has referred to the decisions of the Lahore High Court in Bihari Lal v. Shaular Das, AIR 1925 Lahore 309 , and of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Seth Sunder Parshad v. Stale of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1984 H.P. 9 . These Courts have taken the view that the application for removal shall lie before the Appellate Court which appointed the Receiver. These Courts have taken the view that the application for removal shall lie before the Appellate Court which appointed the Receiver. Shri Jain, counsel for the non-petitioner has, on the other hand, relied on the decision of the Patna High Court in Kuar Jagdish Bahadur v. Ganesh Prasad, AIR 1953 Pat. 253 whether it was held that the application for the discharge of the Receiver must be made before the Lower Court. I may in this connection refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Saurastra v. Chitranjan Rangnalh Rajan, AIR 1980 SC 1528 , where the Supreme Court directed restitution to be initiated in the Court of first instance even though the decree passed by the Trial Court was reversed in appeal by the High Court and further the reversion was affirmed by the Supreme Court and in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir , where the Supreme Court held that an application for stay of the execution could have been made before the Court of Munsif,Varanasi, which was the original Court. It was held: "The suit, which was the subject matter of appeal was decided by the Munsif, Varanasi, who had passed the decree. Therefore, an application for stay of execution if any, could have been made before that Court and not before any other Court, including the Civil Judge." Not that these cases arc direct on the point. They have been decided by referable to specific provisions in the C.P.C. Nonetheless, they indicate a trend and inconsistance on the matter being initiated in the Court of first instance. 5. My view accords with the one taken by the Patna High Court. This also finds support by a decision of the division bench of this Court in Fatuu Khan v. Abdul Wahid and others, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2170 of 1988, decided on July 15, 1988 , where this Court held and observed: "Learned counsel for the petitioner stated at the bar that the Receiver was appointed by the Court in the suit which is pending in the Court of Additional District Judge No. 2 Jodhpur. It may be state that the Receiver is administering and managing the property under the direct control and supervision of the Court and on behalf of the Court. What powers the receiver enjoys can be examined by the Court on whose behalf he is managing the property. It may be state that the Receiver is administering and managing the property under the direct control and supervision of the Court and on behalf of the Court. What powers the receiver enjoys can be examined by the Court on whose behalf he is managing the property. If the receiver has acted without jurisdiction exceeding his powers then it is open to the petitioner to bring all these facts to the notice of the Court and seeks redress of his grievances from the Court where the suit is pending. It is the Trial Court which is exercising the control and supervision over the actions of the receiver." In a pending suit, the power to appoint a Receiver vests in the Trial Court and by necessary implication, the power to remove him could also be exercised by that Court. True, the order appointing the Receiver, in the present case, was made by this Court but it was done in a suit pending in the Trial Court. It was meant to replace an erroneous order passed by the Trial Court, in an appeal brought to this Court against that order by the aggrieved party. The effect was merely to substitute a correct order in place of the erroneous one passed by the Trial Court. Thus, the order appointing the Receiver, though passed by this Court, was really made in exercise of the power of the Trial Court under Order XL, Rule 1, C.P.C. Therefore, the Receiver must deemed to have been appointed by the Trial Court. It follows that the power to remove the Receiver must also be exercised by the Trial Court. The removal or discharge of a Receiver depends on several factors, namely, his continuance is no longer required; he may have failed to comply with the conditions of his appointment, he may have misconducted or may have abused his position to the detriment of the subject matter or may have mis-managed the properties or there may be some other causes warranting his removal. These factors may need an elaborate enquiry and in some cases receiving or recording of evidence as well. These functions can be discharged better by the Trial Court. Difficulties may arise and confusion prevail if issues involved in the suit are tried by the Trial Court and the proceedings for the removal of the Receiver are held in this Court. These factors may need an elaborate enquiry and in some cases receiving or recording of evidence as well. These functions can be discharged better by the Trial Court. Difficulties may arise and confusion prevail if issues involved in the suit are tried by the Trial Court and the proceedings for the removal of the Receiver are held in this Court. The High Court is already full of enough work and it would not be prudent to expand its field by arrogating to itself adjudication of original matters, which fall within the power and domain of the Trial Court. Further, an order appointing or removing a Receiver is appealable and if the order removing the Receiver is appealable and if the order removing the Receiver is passed directly by this Court, the aggrieved party would be deprived of his valuable right to appeal. For these reasons, in my opinion, the application for removal of a Receiver in a matter pending trial would lie in the Trial Court, irrespective of the fact that the order of appointment was made by the High Court in appeal against the order of the Trial Court refusing to appoint a Receiver, unless, of course, this Court, while a appointing the Receiver, retained to itself the power to remove him. 6. The order appointing the Receiver was read over to me. The relevant portion extracted below shows that this Court conferred in the trial Court the control and supervision over the Receiver: "Learned counsel appearing for the contesting defendants-respondents submitted before me that the partnership business is actively looked after by defendant No. 5 Abdul Wahid. In these circumstances, I consider it proper that defendant respondent No. 5 Abdul Wahid should be appointed as a receiver to manage the partnership business. I order accordingly, Defendant No. 5 Abdul Wahid who has been appointed as a receiver is directed to maintain proper accounts of the partnership business inclusive of its assets and to submit three monthly accounts to the court where the suit is pending. One copy of the three monthly accounts to be submitted by defendant No. 5-respondent will be delivered to the plaintiff before filing it in Court. One copy of the three monthly accounts to be submitted by defendant No. 5-respondent will be delivered to the plaintiff before filing it in Court. The Trial Court on objections being filed by the plaintiff, will from time to time decide them and, if necessary, give appropriate directions to defendant No.5 respondent for the management of the proper accounts particularly with respect to the income and expenditure of the partnership business. In order to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff with respect to amount that may be found payable to the plaintiff at the time of the decision of the suit, a further direction is given to the effect that the contesting defendants will furnish a solvent security to the satisfaction of the Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur for the payment of the amount regarding which their liability may be adjudged in the suit. That security will be accepted after notice to the plaintiff. The result is that I allow this appeal, set aside the order dated March 31,1980 of the Additional District Judge No.2, Jodhpur, by which he refused to appoint an interim receiver on the application of the plaintiff and dismissed his application under Order XL, Rule 1 and order that defendant No.5 Abdul Wahid be appointed as an interim receiver to manage the partnership business of the parties until the decision of the suit on the terms and conditions mentioned above. It is further directed that the contesting defendants will furnish a solvent security to the satisfaction of the Additional District Judge No.2 Jodhpur, for the payment of the amount that may be found due to him at the time of the decision of the suit. Defendant No.5 will not be entitled to any remuneration as receiver as he is actively managing the partnership business as stated by his learned counsel. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs of this appeal". It is dear from the perusal of the aforesaid order that it was die Trial Court which was to receive objections, decide them and if necessary, give proper directions to the Receiver. This, in my opinion, plainly indicates that the control and supervision over the actions of the Receiver was vested by this Court in the Trial Court. It is dear from the perusal of the aforesaid order that it was die Trial Court which was to receive objections, decide them and if necessary, give proper directions to the Receiver. This, in my opinion, plainly indicates that the control and supervision over the actions of the Receiver was vested by this Court in the Trial Court. However, to make doings clear and in order to remove any doubt, ambiguity or misunderstanding, it is hereby clarified and declared that the Receiver appointed by this Court by the order dated January 5, 1982, shall be deemed to have been appointed by the Trial Court and the Trial Court shall have complete control and supervision over the actions of the said Receiver, including the power to remove or replace him, if the circumstances so warrant. If one finds any lack of authority in the Trial Court by virtue off the order dated January 5, 1982, it is conferred hereby. 7. Therefore, in my view, the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the non petitioner deserves to be up-held. Any application for the removal or for the issuance of any direction to him has to be presented in the Trial Court. 8. In the result, the petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed as not maintainable in this Court. It is, however, made clear that it such an application is made before the Trial Court, the Trial Court shall decide it expeditiously. There will be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******