This appeal by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Manipur passed in Civil Appeal Case No. 15 of 1978 whereby he decreed the plaintiff's suit by setting aside the judgment and decree of the Munsiff, Imphal West dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. 2. Plaintiff's case, briefly put, is that the plaintiff is the sister of late Takhelmayum Amu Singh who left behind the plaint Schedule C land, which is hereinafter referred to as the "suit land". After his death about 40 years ago his wife late Amubi Devi inherited the suit land and after her death her daughter late Balki Devi inherited the same. The plaintiff's case goes further, Balki Devi died issueless about 2 years ago and after her death the plaintiff, being the nearest relative of the original land owner, has been in possession of the suit land. But the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have attempted to oust the plaintiff from her peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit land and therefore she brought the suit for declaration of her title to the suit land and for injunction restraining the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from making any interference with her peaceful possession of the same. 3. The defendant Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 7 have contested the suit while the defendant No.5 admits the claim of the plaintiff. But the case has been proceeded ex parte as against defendant Nos. 3 and 4. 4. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have admitted in their written statement that the suit land originally belonged to and stood in the name of Amu Singh who died about 15 years ago leaving behind his wife Amu Devi who inherited and enjoyed the suit land during her life time and that after her death her daughter Balki Devi inherited and enjoyed it. It is, however, pleaded that the defendant No. 2 is the adopted son of Thombi Singh and his wife Balki Devi and as such he is entitled to the suit land to the exclusion of the plaintiff. It is, however, pleaded that the defendant No. 2 is the adopted son of Thombi Singh and his wife Balki Devi and as such he is entitled to the suit land to the exclusion of the plaintiff. Thus from the pleadings of the contesting parties it is candidly seen that the suit land once belonged to Takhelmayum Amu Singh and that on the death of Amu Singh his wife Amu Devi inherited the suit land and also that after her death the suit land has been possessed and enjoyed by Balki Devi as inherited from her mother. It has not also been disputed that the plaintiff is the sister of late Takhelmayum Amu Singh and as such she will be entitled to the suit find in the event of the failure on the part of the defendant No. 2 to establish the factum of his adoption by Balki Devi and her husband Thombi Singh. 5. The learned Munsiff held that the defendant No, 2 was legally adopted by Balki Devi and her husband and, therefore, she dismissed the plaintiff's suit. However, the learned District Judge held that the defendant No. 2 was not taken in adoption by late Balki Devi and her husband; that the plaintiff is the only nearest surviving relative of late Balki Devi and, therefore, she is entitled to inherit the suit land and that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. On the basis of the said findings the learned District Judge decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 6. Shri Ibobi Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged that the finding of the learned District Judge that the defendant No. 2 was not taken in adoption by late Balki Devi and her husband Thombi Singh is perverse inasmuch as it is not supported by the evidence on record. The learned counsel has also submitted that the finding of the learned District Judge that the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since the death of Balki Devi till the filing of the suit is unwarranted inasmuch as it is not supported by the evidence and materials of the case. The learned counsel has also submitted that the finding of the learned District Judge that the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since the death of Balki Devi till the filing of the suit is unwarranted inasmuch as it is not supported by the evidence and materials of the case. Shri Priyananda Singh, learned counsel for respondent, on the other hand, strenuously urges that the learned District Judge was fully justified in making the above submissions inasmuch as it is supported by evidence on record and that there is no question of perversity in his above findings. 7. In this case, the first point for consideration is whether the defendant No.2 was legally adopted by late Balki Devi and her late husband Thombi Singh. Learned counsel of both the parties, with their usual frankness, have conceded at the bar that the present case will be governed by the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The essential ingredients of a valid adoption under that Act are as follows : (1) The person adopting must have the right to take and be lawfully capable of taking a son or daughter in adoption. (2) The person giving in adoption must be lawfully capable of doing so. (3) The person adopted must be lawfully capable of being taken in adoption. And (4) The conditions relating to adoption including actual giving and taking of the child with the intention of transferring the child from the family of his birth must be complied with. 8. Shri Ibobi Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the finding of the learned District Judge that the alleged adoption has not complied with the condition that the adoptive father and the mother by whom the alleged adoption was made had no son living at the time of adoption of the defendant No. 1, is perverse inasmuch as it is not supported by the evidence on record. Shri Priyananda Singh, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has forcefully and capably urged that the said finding of the learned District Judge is supported by the evidence on record. Therefore, the first point for consideration is, whether there was any son of the adoptive father and mother at the time of the adoption of the defendant No.2. 9. Therefore, the first point for consideration is, whether there was any son of the adoptive father and mother at the time of the adoption of the defendant No.2. 9. On this point, the evidence of Tomchau Singh (DW 1) and Mani Devi (DW 5) is material. Tomchau Singh is the guardian- ad-litem of the defendant No.2 (the alleged adopted son) and Mani Devi is his natural mother. Both the witnesses, in their cross-examination, have categorically admitted that Thombi Singh, the alleged adoptive father, had three sons at his house at Ghari. Undoubtedly, they have not stated that the three sons were living at the time of adoption of defendant No.2, However, as they have admitted the existence of the three sons, the onus lies on them or the defend­ants to prove that the three sons were born after the adoption of defendant No.2. Undoubtedly, Mani Devi has made a faint attempt to establish that there was n son of the adoptive father and mother at the time of the adoption of defendant No. 2. She testifies that the eldest of the three sons of Thombi Singh (the alleged adoptive father) was only 4/5 years old. However, she deposes that she knew this fact from some villagers. She does not mention the names of those villagers and therefore her above evidence was rightly discarded by the learned District Judge as hearsay. A person who seeks to dislocate the natural succession to the property by alleging adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proving the factum of adoption and its validity. The proposition of law is very general and there­fore it requires no further elucidation. In the present case, as discussed above, the defendants have not discharged their burden that Thombi Singh had no son at the time of the adoption of defendant No.2 or that the three sons of Thombi Singh are younger than the defendant No.2, by cogent and satisfactory evidence. Hence, I do not find any substance in the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 10. Hence, I do not find any substance in the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 10. The next contention of Shri Ibobi Singh is that the learned District Judge misinterpreted the evidence of the three DWs, namely, Tomchau Singh (DW 1), Shamu Singh (DW 2) and Mani Devi (DW 5) and erroneously held that the defendants have proved one of the most important ingredients of a valid adoption, that is, the giving and taking ceremony which took place in the form of actual handing over and taking of defendant No 2 and the performance of Swasti Puja and Chakhangba ceremony. 11. Let me now take up the actual giving and taking ceremony. On this point the evidence of Tomchau Singh (DW 1), guardian-ad-litem of defendant No.2,is that the ceremony took place on the day of birth of defendant No.2 in the presence of Thombi Singh (the alleged adoptive father) and his wife Balki Devi (the adoptive mother) and one Shamu Singh (DW 2). He has not mentioned about the persons of Budhi Singh the natural father. According to section 9 (2) of the Hindu Adoptions-and Maintenance Act, 1956, the father, if alive, shall alone have the right to give in adoption, but such right shall not be exercised save with the consent of the mother. There is, therefore, even if the version of defendant No. 1 is taken to be true, the necessary ingredient that Budhi Singh, the natural father of the adopted son, that is, defendant No.2, should have given the defendant No.2 in adoption, is certainly in wanting in the alleged adoption. Further, his evidence does not find corroboration in the evidence of Shamu Singh (DW 2t who categorically stated that he was not at all present at the time of the said ceremony. He however stated that Balki Devi (the adoptive mother) expressed her desire to adopt the defendant No.2 to him. Thus, it will now be seen that he has introduced enti­rely a new case which is not deposed to by Tomchau Singh. The evidence of Tomchau Singh does not also find corroboration in the evidence of the natural mother Mani Devi (DW 5). Thus, it will now be seen that he has introduced enti­rely a new case which is not deposed to by Tomchau Singh. The evidence of Tomchau Singh does not also find corroboration in the evidence of the natural mother Mani Devi (DW 5). She has not mentioned the presence of her husband Budhi Singh and Thombi Singh on that occasion but under section 7 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, any male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption and under section 9, the father alone, if alive, shall have the right to give in adoption subject to the consent of the natural mother. According to this witness, Mani Devi, her husband Budhi Singh, the natural father, was not present on this important day. I find it difficult to understand as to why the two important persons, that is the adoptive father and the natural father, were not present on this important function which ought to be held to give publicity to the factum of adoption. Therefore, I have been persuaded irresistably to hold that the learned District Judge was fully justified in holding that this important ingredient of a valid adoption is lacking in the present case. 12. As I have already held that the defendants have utterly failed to discharge their burden that at the time of the adoption of the defendant No.2 there was no son of the adoptive father Thombi Singh and that the giving and taking ceremony has not been proved by the defendants, I consider it unnecessary to discuss as to whether there was Swasti Puja ceremony of the birth of the defendant No.2 and also the performance of Chakhangba ceremony. Thus, I do not find any force in the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 13. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the finding of the learned District Judge that the respondent was in possession of the suit lands at the time of the institution of the suit is perverse inasmuch as it is not supported by the evidence on record. I find force in this contention of the learned counsel. 14. I find force in this contention of the learned counsel. 14. On this point, the plaintiff relies on the evidence of herself (PW 1), Kerani Singh (PW 2), Samu Singh (PW 3), Tomba Singh (PW 4) and Babudhon Singh (PW 5). I now proceed to discuss their evidence hereunder. The evidence of the plaintiff, Khomdonbi Devi (PW 1) is that the disputed lands comprises of one Ingkhol measuring about one Lourak and situated at Heinou Bok Langing and the Lou measuring about three Sangams lies at Patsoi. The disputed land was enjoyed by Balki Devi during her life time. Since the death of Balki Devi, she has been enjoying the disputed land by getting 9 pots of paddy every year till now from the paddy land which was cultivated by Kerani Singh, Tomba Singh and Lobongo Singh, that is, one Sangara by each of them. Thus, according to her, the disputed three Sangams of paddy land have been cultivated by her three tenants, namely, Kerani Singh, Tomba Singh and Loboago Singh and that she was getting three pots of paddy as Louchal from each of them. Her above evidence is however falsified by the evidence of Kerani Singh (PW 2). His evidence is that he is the tenant of the plaintiff in respect of three Sangams of land and he however left 2/3rd portion of the said Lou to two other persons, namely, Tomba and Lobongo. Further, in his cross-examination he testifies that Tomchau Singh (DW 1) has been managing the said disputed Lou on behalf of the defendant No.2. Thus, this witness in his cross-examination has falsified the evidence of the plaintiff that she has been possessing the disputed Lou since the death of Balki Devi. Since this witness has admitted the possession of the defendant No. 2 in respect of the disputed Lou at the time of cross-examination I have to give much weightage on the version of this witness. Further, Caamu Singh (PW 3) states that the said Lou is in the cultivating possession of Kerani Singh only. He does not say that the other two persons, namely, Tomba Singh and Lobongo Singh are in cultivating possession of any portion of the disputed Lou. Again, Tomba Singh (PW 4) deposes that the disputed land was/is culti­vated by Kerani Singh and his younger brother, Lobongo Singh. He does not say that the other two persons, namely, Tomba Singh and Lobongo Singh are in cultivating possession of any portion of the disputed Lou. Again, Tomba Singh (PW 4) deposes that the disputed land was/is culti­vated by Kerani Singh and his younger brother, Lobongo Singh. He also states that Kerani Singh and Lobongo Singh gave 4 pots of paddy for the three Sangams of land cultivated by them for the last four years and that for this year no payment of Louchal is made to the plaintiff as there v as no harvest. It is to be noted here that the plaintiff has not mentioned anything about the possession of the disputed Ingkhol which measures one Lourak of land. She however states that she has not been to the suit Lou and the suit Ingkhol for the last many years. Kerani Singh (PW 2) also docs not say any­thing about the possession of the said Ingkhol by the plaintiff. However, Chamu Singh (PW 3) has testified that the suit Inglhol is now under the supervision of his father and the plaintiff. PW 5, Babudhon Singh, says that the Ingkhol is now lying vacant. 15. From the above discussion of the evidence of the five witnesses it is now seen that none of the PWs states as to who was/is in possession of the suit Ingkhol. It is also seen that the version of the plaintiff that she has been enjoying the suit Lou by getting nine pots of paddy from her three tenants, namely Kerani Singh, Tomba Singh and Lobongo Singh, is not corroborated by any of the PWs. In other words, all the witnesses have given different version as to who is in cultivating possession of the suit Lou as tenant of the plaintiff, All the witnesses have given different version as to the Louchal given by the tenants to the plaintiff in respect of the suit Lou. Above all, Kerani Singh (PW 2) has admitted in his cross-examination that the defendant No. 1 has been managing the suit Lou on behalf of the defendant No 2. Hence I take it that the plaintiff has failed to establish that she has been in possession of the suit Lou since the death of Balki Devi till the institution of the suit. Hence I take it that the plaintiff has failed to establish that she has been in possession of the suit Lou since the death of Balki Devi till the institution of the suit. It appears that the learned District Judge did not consider the evidence of these witnesses threadbare before coming to his conclusion that the suit Lou and Ingkhol are in the possession of the plaintiff. 16. The learned District Judge in his judgment observed that the defen­dants have not led any evidence on this point. I cannot endorse this view of the learned District Judge. Tomchau Singh, the guardian-ad-litem in his deposition as DW 1 has categorically stated that the lands left by Budhi Singh is now enjoyed by the defendant No. 2 in the last part of his examination in-chief. This statement is not denied by the plaintiff in his cross-examination though the plaintiff made a question suggesting that the suit properties are now possessed, managed and enjoyed by the plaintiff as her heir. Similarly, Tombi Singh (DW 4) states that the suit land is in possession of the defendant No. 2, Nilamani Singh. Here again, his above evidence is not denied by the plaintiff in his cross-examination. The learned District Judge has not given any credence to the evidence of these witnesses on the ground that they have not stated anything about the manner of possession by the defendant No.2 I find it difficult to endorse this view of the learned District Judge, because, as discussed above, Kerani Singh (PW 2), who is said to be the tenant of the plaintiff, has admitted in his cross-examination that the disputed land has been in the management of Tomchau Singh, the guardian-ad-litem, on behalf of the defendant No.2. In view of this admission, it is absolutely not necessary on the part of the defendants to adduce evidence elaborately on the factum of possession of the suit lands. It appears the learned District Judge did not consider this aspect when he assessed the evidence of the witnesses. Hence I take it that the suit lands were/are not in the possession of the plaintiff. 17. The question now arises is whether the title of the plaintiff to the suit land can be declared without any relief as to possession. It appears the learned District Judge did not consider this aspect when he assessed the evidence of the witnesses. Hence I take it that the suit lands were/are not in the possession of the plaintiff. 17. The question now arises is whether the title of the plaintiff to the suit land can be declared without any relief as to possession. On my anxious and careful scrutiny of the plaint and written statement it is seen that the plaintiff has claimed for declaration of her title and perpetual injunction against the defendants restraining them from threatening to her possession. There is, therefore, no doubt that the plaintiff's suit is for declaration of her title to the suit lands with a further relief that is, injunction. In a suit for declaration of title to land with a prayer for injunction against the defendants is a prayer for consequential relief inasmuch as it is a prayer for confirmation of possession. But as stated above, the plaintiff was/is not in possession of the disputed lands and as such the prayer for injunction cannot be granted. The proposition of law is very well settled and therefore it requires no further elucidation. Therefore, the question want left for decision is whether the plaintiff's title to the disputed lands can be declared without the relief for possession. 18. Where the plaintiff is not in possession of the property in dispute and it is in the possession of the defendant, the further relief would be the relief for recovery of possession. In the case in hand the plaintiff alleges her possession of the disputed lands, but her allegation of possession is ultima­tely found to be false and incorrect and therefore section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 will come into operation and a suit for a mere declaration becomes barred. Therefore, the plaintiff's suit will be barred by section 34 of the said Act. The question now arises for consideration is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed for not seeking the relief for delivery of possession. In the present case, the appellant had not taken the plea that the plaintiff's suit is barred by section 34 of the said Act. For the first time, Shii Ibobi Singh has taken this plea in this second appeal. In the present case, the appellant had not taken the plea that the plaintiff's suit is barred by section 34 of the said Act. For the first time, Shii Ibobi Singh has taken this plea in this second appeal. However, mere declaration of plaintiff's title to the suit land, the plaintiff' cannot get her remedy. In other words, the decree for declaration of title will be meaningless. 19. A suit should not be rejected merely because it asks for declaration of title only without a further relief of possession. The plaintiff can ask for necessary amendment to comply with the provisions of section 34 of the Act. It is the majority view of the High Courts of this country that suits should not be rejected merely because it asks for declaration of title only when further relief could be claimed. If any authority is to be cited on this point we may refer to the decisions reported in AIR 1961 Punjab 102 and 281. In the said case it was held that it is no doubt open to the Court in its wide discretion to remit amendment of the plaint in a proper case if considered necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case, but a party cannot claim as of right the indulgence for amendment of the plaint, more parti­cularly, when this prayer is made in second appeal. It was tersely held that the plaintiff should be allowed to amend plaint by including further relief subject, if necessary, to paying additional court fee etc. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree is, therefore, set aside. The suit is remanded to the learned Munsiff with a direction to allow the plaintiff to amend her plaint in the light of the observations made in the above paras and to dispose of the same in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout.