GULAB C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE applicants, who are officers of the Cantonment Boad, Jabalpur, (hereinafter referred to as the Board) a statutory authority constituted under the provisions of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), feel aggrieved by issue of process against them by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur by Order dated 2-6-1989 passed in Criminal Case No. 2887/89 and pray for quashing those proceedings by filing this application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) THIS order shall also govern disposal of Misc. Cr. , Case No. 2334/ 89 wherein a similar process has been issued by the same learned Magistrate by his order dated 16-6-1989, in Criminal Case No. 2963/89. The non-applicant, in these cases, are husband and wife and the dispute between the parties is about house No. 8, Theatre Road, Cantonment, Jabalpur, which is admittedly owned by Shri R. P. Sangal, the non-applicant in the other case and the husband of the non-applicant in this case. ( 3 ) IT appears that Shri Sangal wanted to construct a shopping complex in the compound of aforesaid bungalow and hence applied for sanction of the Board under Section 179 of the Act on 22-12-1986 and submitted map and other details of the new construction as required by law. The said non-applicant did not receive any sanction from the applicants and, therefore, sent reminders on 12-2-1987 and 11-3-1987. The Board, however, informed him on 26-3-1987 that the matter has been referred to the Defence Estate Officer for his report. The Defence Estate Officer informed the Board on 28-3-1987 about his objection to the proposed construction under Section 181 (4) (a) of the Act. The said non-applicant addressed a letter dated 30/03/1987 to the Board that since no order was passed on his application for sanction, there was "deemed sanction" under Section 181 (6) of the Act and, therefore, he has started constructing the complex. The Board wrote back on 1-4-1987 that there could be no deemed sanction, since the period of 30 days has to be counted from the date of the report of the Defence Estate Officer and not from the date of reminders sent by the said non-applicant. The Board, thereafter filed a civil suit on 16-4-1987 for declaration and injunction against the said non-applicant and prayed for a temporary injunction to stop the construction in progress. The Board, thereafter filed a civil suit on 16-4-1987 for declaration and injunction against the said non-applicant and prayed for a temporary injunction to stop the construction in progress. Application for temporary injunction was unfortunately rejected by the trial Court on 2-5-1987 but the appellate Court granted the temporary injunction prayed for on 28-7-1987. The said non-applicant filed, thereafter, a writ petition in this Court against the Board, which was dismisses on 30/10/1987. This Court, however, directed the Board to furnish security for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rs. Two lacs only) to compensate the said non-applicant for the loss that may be caused to him on account of temporary injunction. Thereafter, on 4-4-1988, the Board issued a notice under Section 256 of the Act, requiring the said non-applicant to demolish the unauthorised construction. The legal validity of this notice was challenged by the said non-applicant by filing a writ petition in this Court which was the subject-matter of Misc. Petition No. 1171/88. This Court, by its order dated 12-10-1988, held that since a Civil Suit has also been filed by the Board and temporary injunction granted, no interference was called for. This Court, however, recorded the undertaking given by the Board that they will not take further action in pursuance of the notice under Section 256 of the Act, pending trial of the civil suit. In the meantime, the plaint filed by the Board was returned to them on 1-11-1988 for presentation before the proper Court. The returned plaint was presented before the Vth Additional District Judge, on 3-11-1988, who granted ex parte injunction in their favour on 4-11-1988. It appears that the non-applicant felt that return of the plaint meant automatic vacation of the temporary injunction, he started construction again. The Board demolished the construction on 5-11-1988. Since it was found that the said non-applicant had constructed subsequently, the Board demolished the construction again on 11-11-1988. ( 4 ) IT appears that the non-applicant Shri Sangal felt that demolition was contrary to the order passed by the High Court in Misc. Petition No. 1171/88, he filed an application for contempt, which was the subject-matter of Misc. C. S. No. 667/88. A Division Bench of this Court, however, found no substance in the application and dismissed the same on 13-1-1989. Petition No. 1171/88, he filed an application for contempt, which was the subject-matter of Misc. C. S. No. 667/88. A Division Bench of this Court, however, found no substance in the application and dismissed the same on 13-1-1989. ( 5 ) IN the meantime two separate complaints were filed on 19-11-1988 against the applicants in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur alleging commission of offences under Sections 149, 294, 341, 352, 392,451,452,448 and 427, I. P. C. The learned Magistrate examined the complainant under Section 200 Cr. P. C. and witnesses under Section 202, Cr. P. C. and found that the material on record, prima facie, discloses commissions of offence under Section 448 and 427, I. P. C. He, therefore, issued process under Section 204, Cr. P. C. for appearance of the non-applicants before him to answer the charge. It is this order that is under challenge in these applications. ( 6 ) THE learned Magistrate has apparently issued process in exercise of his power under Section 204, Cr. P. C. which reads as under : 204. Issue of process:- (1) if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be- (a) a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or (b) a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing every summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 87. Basic requirement of this provision is that, there must be 'sufficient ground', for proceeding against the accused. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 87. Basic requirement of this provision is that, there must be 'sufficient ground', for proceeding against the accused. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, AIR 1976 SC 1947 : (1976 Cri LJ 1533), it was held that if material on record discloses 'sufficient ground, for proceeding against the accused, the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence is bound to issue process and at this stage, the Magistrate is not required to weigh evidence meticulously. Indeed, in Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan, AIR 1980 SC 1780 : (1980 Cri LJ 1271), it was held that a Magistrate weighing evidence meticulously at this state exceeds its jurisdiction. "sufficient ground", appering in this section has been held equivalent to "prima facie case". A reading of Sections 200, 202, 203 and 204, CR. P. C. together, makes it clear that the Magistrate is required to form his opinion on the basis of material collected under these provisions. Under the circumstances, it will have to be examined whether, the material placed for consideration of the learned Magistrate discloses 'sufficient ground', for issuance of process against the applicants? There appears to be no dispute between the parties that the statements of the complainant and witnesses do make out a prima facie case against the applicants. The objection of the applicants appears to be that the learned Magistrate should have taken into consideration the applicants' defence that construction by the complainant was contrary to the provisions of the Act and, therefore, they had a right under Section 256 of the Act to demolish the said construction in Nirmaljit v. State of W. B. , AIR 1972 SC 2639 and Chandra Deo v. Prokash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1430 : (1963 (2) Cri LJ 397), it was clarified that where there is prima facie evidence for commission of offence, the defence that an accused may take subsequently is not the reason for not issuing process. The following passage from Nirmaljit's case ( AIR 1972 SC 2639 ) (supra), details the law on the subject and is as under:- ( 7 ) SECTION 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate can take Cognizance of an offence, either on receiving a complaint or on a police report or on information otherwise received. The following passage from Nirmaljit's case ( AIR 1972 SC 2639 ) (supra), details the law on the subject and is as under:- ( 7 ) SECTION 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate can take Cognizance of an offence, either on receiving a complaint or on a police report or on information otherwise received. Where a complaint is presented before him, he can under S. 200 take cognizance of the offence made out therein and has then to examine the Complainant and his witnesses. The object of such examination is to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case against the person accused of the offence in the complaint, and to prevent the issue of process on a complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass such a person. Such examination is provided therefore to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding. Under Section 202, a Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint, may postpone the issue of process and either inquire into the case himself or direct an inquiry to be made by a Magistrate subordinate to him or by a police officer for ascertaining its truth or falsehood. Under Section 203, he may dismiss the complaint, if, after taking the statement of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the investigation, if any, under Section 202, there is in his judgment "no sufficient ground for proceeding". The words 'sufficient ground' used also in Section 209 have been construed to mean the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the person accused by the evidence of witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree of credit, and no sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction. this Court considered the scheme of Sections 200 to 205 and held that the inquiry envisaged there is for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complainant that is for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process. The section does not say that a regular trial of adjudging the truth or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage, for such a person can be called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has been issued and he is on trial. Section 203 consists of two parts. The section does not say that a regular trial of adjudging the truth or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage, for such a person can be called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has been issued and he is on trial. Section 203 consists of two parts. The first part lays down the materials which the Magistrate must consider, and the second part says that if after considering those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, (1964) 1 SCR 639 : AIR 1963 SC 1430 : (1963 (2) Cri LJ 397), where dismissal of a complaint by the Magistrate at the state of Section 202 inquiry was set aside, this Court laid down that the test was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction, and observed (p. 653) that where there was prima facie evidence, even though the person charged of an offence in the complaint might have a defence, the matter had to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of a process could not be refused. Unless, therefore, the Magistrate finds that the evidence led before him is self-contradictory, or intrinsically untrustworthy, process cannot be refused if that evidence makes out a prima facie case. In a revision against such a refusal, the High Court also has to apply the same test. The question, therefore, is whether while applying this test the Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in refusing process and the High Court in revision could confirm such a refusal. " in spite of it, it may be examined ifthe aforesaid provisions provide a good defence to the applicants ? It must however be noted that such an exercise might prejudice the applicants during trial; but this Court is unable to help them as the point was seriously pressed for consideration in spite of this risk. ( 8 ) THE facts stated in paragraph 3 above indicate that the alleged demolition which farms the basis of criminal offence was done on 5-11-1988 and 11-11-1988. ( 8 ) THE facts stated in paragraph 3 above indicate that the alleged demolition which farms the basis of criminal offence was done on 5-11-1988 and 11-11-1988. It is also clear that the returned plaint was represented before the Vth Additional District Judge on 3-11-1988; and as ex parte injunction granted in favour of the applicants on 4-11-1988. it may be that the construction by the non-applicant complainant was in violation of this injunction. In a case like it, the plaintiffs are expected to move the Court granting injunction for action under Order 39, Rule 2-A, C. P. C. The notice under section 256 of the Act was admittedly issued before this injunction. If the applicants thought it proper to obtain injunction against the respondents from an appropriate Civil Court in spite of remedy available to them under Section 256 of the Act, it must be assumed that they deemed it proper and necessary to obtain the Court's help. In such a situation, it would be inappropriate for the applicants to disregard civil suit and proceedings and insist on giving effect to their notice under Section 256 of the Act. This course of action, in the opinion of this Court, is prima facie objectionable. Once the matter becomes sub judice in an appropriate Court, the applicants prima facie loose their authority and jurisdiction under Section 256 of the Act. In any case, the applicants should have considered the question of "propriety" before resorting to demolition by force. By allowing the matter to be decided by the Civil Court where the suit was pending, they would not only have shown their regard to the process of the Court, but would have shown that they also firmly believe in the rule of law. The hot haste shown by them must therefore be regretted. In a situation like it, submission of the applications based on Section 256 of the Act should not deserve any serious consideration. ( 9 ) SECTION 256 of the Act, on which serious reliance has been placed, reads as under:-256. The hot haste shown by them must therefore be regretted. In a situation like it, submission of the applications based on Section 256 of the Act should not deserve any serious consideration. ( 9 ) SECTION 256 of the Act, on which serious reliance has been placed, reads as under:-256. Power of Board in case of non-compliance with notice, etc.- in the event of non-compliance with the terms of any notice, order or requisition issued to any person under this Act, or any rule or bye-law made thereunder requiring such person to execute any work or to do any act, it shall be lawful for the (Board), (or the civil area committee or the Executive officer at whose instance the notice, order or requisition has been issued) whether or not the person in default is liable to punishment for such default or has been prosecuted or sentenced to any punishment therefor, after giving notice in writing to such person, to take such action or such steps as may be necessary for the completion of the act or work required to be done or executed by him and all the expenses incurred on such account shall be (recoverable by the Executive Officer on demand, and if not paid within ten days after such demand, shall be recoverable in the some manner as moneys recoverable by the Board under Section 259 : provided that where the action or step relates to the demolition of any erection or re-erection under Section 185 or the removal of any projection or encroachment under Section 187, the Board or the civil area committee or the Executive Officer may request any police officer to render such assistance as considered necessary for the lawful exercise of any power in this regard and it shall be the duty of such police officer to render forthwith such assistance on such requisition. "a bare reading of this provision indicates that it deals with cases of non-compliance of the terms of any notice or order issued under this Act or any Rule or bye-law made thereunder. In such a situation, it is lawful for the Board or the person issuing notice to take such action as may be necessary in the matter after giving notice in writing to the person defaulting compliance. In such a situation, it is lawful for the Board or the person issuing notice to take such action as may be necessary in the matter after giving notice in writing to the person defaulting compliance. Interpreting this provision in the context of facts of this case, it means that if notice for demolition had been issued to the complainant under the Act or Rules or Bye-laws made thereunder and terms of the said notice had not been complied with, the Board or the person giving such notice could, after giving notice in writing to the complainant, take action towards demolition andrecover all expenses involved therein from him. Unfortunately, the applicants have not filed a copy of their notice alleged to have been issued u/s. 256 of the Act and, therefore, this Court is not in a position to ascertain the contents thereof. Indeed the learned counsel did not have this notice with him while making the submission. However, facts mentioned in the photo-copy of the order of this Court in Misc. Cr. Case No. 567/88 indicate that the notice dated 4-4-1988 issued by the Board under Section 256 of the Act was for demolition of unauthorised construction. If this be the true content of the said notice, it does not authorise the Board or the applicants to demolish the construction themselves. Non-compliance with this notice would enable them to take action towards demolition after giving notice in writing to the non- applicant in that behalf. Such notice contemplated by Section 256 of the Act, must be to the effect that since the non-applicant has failed to comply with the terms of the earlier notice, the Board intends to demolish the construction itself and recover the costs. Admittedly this was not done, and hence it is not possible to accept that there has been compliance with S. 254 of the Act. ( 10 ) SUBMISSION, however, is that notice whose terms have not been complied with, as required by first part of S. 256 of the Act, is the communication dated 1-4-1987, istimating the non-applicant that there was nothing like "deemed sanction" in the instant case. In other words, it refers to notice under S. 181 of the Act. Section 181 of the Act enables the Board to refuse to sanction the erection or construction or sanction the same. In other words, it refers to notice under S. 181 of the Act. Section 181 of the Act enables the Board to refuse to sanction the erection or construction or sanction the same. Sub-section (5) of S. 181 of the Act requires the Board to communicate in writing the reasons for such refusal or sanction. Refusal to sanction does not, in the opinion of this Court, amount to notice of demolition of construction already made. Indeed, power to demolish is conferred on the Board under S. 185 of the Act. This provision while giving power to the Board to order demolition of building or any part thereof which has been constructed without sanction, does not make it obligatory for the Board to order demolition and authorises the Board if it so wishes to accept a reasonable sum by way of composition. Sub-section (2) of this section prescribes notice and decision on the matter. It is only when an order under this provision has been passed and the same is not complied with, the question of taking report to S. 256 of the Act may arise. Even when such an eventuality arises, it will be necessary for the Board to give notice u/s. 256 of the Act to the effect that since the order passed u/s. 185 of the Act has not been complied with, it proposes to undertake demolition itself. Considering the nature of the provision under S. 195 of the Act, it confers a quasi judicial power in the Board which has to be exercised is accordance with the provisions of the Act and also the principles of natural justice. It is not the applicants' case that any order under S. 185 of the Act has been passed against the non-applicant. Under the circumstances, their so called defence based on S. 256 of the Act has no legs to stand upon. ( 11 ) SINCE the non-applicants claim that they were constructing in accordance with law which fact is seriously disputed by the applicants, the same may also be considered. Admittedly, there has been no sanction of the plan is writing by the applicants. ( 11 ) SINCE the non-applicants claim that they were constructing in accordance with law which fact is seriously disputed by the applicants, the same may also be considered. Admittedly, there has been no sanction of the plan is writing by the applicants. The non- applicant claims "deemed sanction", under S. 181 (6) of the Act which reads as under : 181 Power of Board to sanction or refuse :- xxx xxx xxx xxx (6) Where the Board neglects or omits, for one month after the receipt of a valid notice, to make and to deliver to the person who has given the notice any order of any nature specified in this section, and such person thereafter by a written communication sent by registered post to the Board calls the attention of the Board of the neglect or omission, then if such neglect or omission continues for afurther period of fifteen days from the date of such communication the Board shall be deemed to have given sanction to the erection or re-erection, as the case may be, unconditionally : xxx xxx xxx xxx under this provision the Board is required to decide the question for grant or refusal of sanction within one month after the receipt of the notice. If the Board neglects or omits to do so the applicant is required to send a written communication by registered post calling the attention of the Board to the said neglect or omission. If the Board continues its neglect or omission for a further period of 15 days from the date of such communication, the Board is deemed to have sanctioned the erection or re-erection unconditionally. Proviso to this section applies to a case where the Board is required to refer the application to the Defence Estate Officer, because the land on which erection or re-erection of the building is sought, is under the management of Defence Estate Officer. The notice for sanction was admittedly given on 20-12-1986. The Board did not take any action on the said notice within one month as required. The non-applicant sent further communication on 12-2-1987 and, therefore, satisfied the second requirement of S. 181 (6) of' the Act and became entitled to assume that the plan has been sanctioned unconditionally on the expiry of 15 days, i. e. , the deemed sanction would become operative on 28-2-1987. The non-applicant sent further communication on 12-2-1987 and, therefore, satisfied the second requirement of S. 181 (6) of' the Act and became entitled to assume that the plan has been sanctioned unconditionally on the expiry of 15 days, i. e. , the deemed sanction would become operative on 28-2-1987. It is rather surprising that the Board had not referred the matter to the Defence Estate Officer by then. It appears that they might have not made the reference in case the non-applicant had not sent another reminder on 11-5-1987. In fact, they referred the matter to the Defence Estate Officer on 15th day, i. e. , 26-3-1987. The question for consideration is whether, this subsequent reminder dated 11- 3-1987 is sufficient to arrest the application of S. 181 (6) of the Act. The answer to this question is in the negative. If the application of law after 12-2-1987 has already resulted in unconditional deemed sanction on 28-2-1987, the subsequent reminder dated 11-3-1987 would not nullify the same. It is also not clear as to why the Board made reference to the Defence Estate Officer. The Defence Estate Officer is required to be asked about his objection only if the land is under his management. Admittedly the land is in the control and management of the non- applicant who is the lease holder. There was, therefore, prima facie no reason for making this reference which seems to have been done only to avoid the effect of Board's neglect or omission to consider the notice of the non- applicant within the period provided by law. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the non-applicant was constructing illegally. ( 12 ) RELYING on the provision of S. 272 of the Act, it is submitted that prosecution of the applicants is illegal and deserves to be quashed. Section 272 of the Act reads as under :"272. Protection of Board, Executive Officer, etc.- no suit or prosecution shall be entertained in any Court against any (Board) or against any (Officer Commanding a station) or against any member of a Board, or against any Officer or servant of a (Board), for anything in good faith done, or intended to be done, under this Act or any rule or bye-law made thereunder. "a plain reading of this provision shows that it protects the Board and its officers and servants from prosecution "for anything in good faith done or bye-law made thereunder". Clearly therefore, the immunity from prosecution is only in relation to:- (1) acts done under the Act or Rules or bye-laws made thereunder, and (2) acts done in good faith. Under S. 3 (22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a thing is said to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently. Section 52 of the Penal Code provides that nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care or attention. In H. Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97 : (1964 Cri LJ 82), it was held that good faith does not require logical infallibility but only such care and attention along with the capacity and intelligence of a person and the position he occupies, as is held by a Court to be sufficient to constitute due care and attention on his part. The definition in the General Clauses Act appears to be recognizing that a careless man is not necessarily a dishonest man. In either case it is a matter of evidence and decision in each case and the conclusion would differ from case to case depending on the facts of the case. Under the circumstances, this Court would not like to pass any final opinion on the question at this stage. Taking into consideration the status and intelligence of the applicants, act complained of does not prima facie seem to be covered by the provisions of the Act or any Rule or Bye-laws made thereunder and the hot haste in which the demolition has been done prima facie indicates absence of good faith. In this view of the matter this Court is unable to hold, at this stage, that the action of the applicants is protected under S. 272 of the Act. ( 13 ) IN view of the conclusions aforesaid, this Court finds no ground for interference with the impugned order and is pleased to dismiss this application. In this view of the matter this Court is unable to hold, at this stage, that the action of the applicants is protected under S. 272 of the Act. ( 13 ) IN view of the conclusions aforesaid, this Court finds no ground for interference with the impugned order and is pleased to dismiss this application. Even while dismissing this application, this Court is not able to shake off its feeling that the applicants have taken the law is their own hands and have, in this process, shown scant regard to the process of the Court of Additional District Judge before whom their suit is still pending. They should have, in the opinion of this Court, acted with patience and circumspection because that is the only way to bring glory to the institution represented by them. Heavens would not have fallen if the Applicants, instead demolishing the construction themselves, had allowed the matter to be decided by the Additional District Judge, in accordance with law. The application fails and is dismissed. Application dismissed. .