Judgment :- Manoharan, J. One Alekutty Sebastian widow of Augusthy Sebastian presented a Will for registration before the Sub Registrar's Office; Kidangoor (Kottayam District) claiming that the said will was executed by her husband on 13-12-1975. Proceedings were started by the Sub Registrar and later that case was transferred to the Principal Sub Registrar's Office, Kottayam. On completion of the proceedings the will was registered. Thereafter the aforesaid Alekutty Sebastian filed an original petition in the District Court for issue of Letters of Administration. Since petition was contested by some of the opposite parties, it was numbered as an Original Suit. However, in the end, the District Court granted Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will annexed thereto in favour of Alekutty Sebastian. Later the first respondent herein filed an interlocutory application under S.263 of the Indian Succession Act (for short the Act) for revoking the grant of Letters of Administration. During the pendency of the said petition Alekutty Sebastian died, and her legal representatives were impleaded. The lower court by the impugned order revoked the grant of Letters of Administration.] 2. First respondent contended that, though he resisted against registration of the Will before the Sub Registrar, he was prevailed upon by the deceased Alekutty Sebastian and others to withdraw from contest with the offer that his due share in the estate of deceased Augusthy Sebastian would be given. According to him it was for that reason that he did not contest the proceedings for grant of Letters of Administration. He also averred that when Alekutty 'Sebastian instituted another civil suit against him he realized that fraud was practiced by her; so he has come forward with the present application alleging that Ext.A1 Will was not executed by Augusthy Sebastian, and that the same was concocted after the death of Augusthy Sebastian. 3. It should be noted that there is no allegation that fraud was practiced on the court. The contention is that fraud was practiced on the first respondent. The first respondent who was served with notice did not contest the proceedings instituted for grant of Letters of Administration. Ext.Dl proceedings before the Sub Registrar will show that, the first respondent testified before that authority that the will is genuine. The contention is that fraud was practiced on the first respondent. The first respondent who was served with notice did not contest the proceedings instituted for grant of Letters of Administration. Ext.Dl proceedings before the Sub Registrar will show that, the first respondent testified before that authority that the will is genuine. It is important that he had no case to the effect that, there was defect in any of the proceedings before the Sub Registrar or in the court. The brothers of the first respondent though had contested the proceedings in the court initially they also withdrew their contentions. The aforesaid circumstances will reveal that, the parties inclusive of the first respondent, who had sufficient opportunity to contest the proceedings did not contest as the parties reached some kind of settlement. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that inasmuch as there was no contest in the issue of Letters of Administration, the granfmust be revoked and the Will has to be proved in the "solemn form". He made reliance on the decision in Kokollochun Dutta & Others v. Nilruttun Mundle (ILR 1879 Calcutta 360). It was observed in the said decision that, where there was no previous contention the Will has to be proved afresh so as to give the objector an opportunity to test the evidence in support of the Will. It has already been noticed that the respondents had opportunity to contest, but they did not contest. In appreciating the argument of the respondent it will be useful to refer to the decision in Mt.Rananandi Kuer v. MLKalawati Kuer (AIR192£ PC Page 2), after noting that "there has been some divergence of opinion in the Courts in India as regards the law and procedure governing cases for revocation of probate, due in part to the introduction into Indian Practice of the difference in English law between the grant of probate in common form and probate in solemn form", the court observed: "It has often been pointed out by this Board that where there is a positive enactment of the Indian Legislature the proper course is to examine the language of that statute and to ascertain its proper meaning uninfluenced by any consideration derived from the previous state of the law - or the English law upon which it may be founded". What is stated by the Privy Council reveals the correct position of law on this aspect. 5. Revocation or annulment of the grant of probate or letters of administration can be had only on proof of "just cause" within the meaning of S.263 of The Indian Succession Act. S.263 of the Act reads: - "263 The grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just " cause. Explanation: --Just cause shall be deemed to exist where - (a) The proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; or (b) The grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion, or by concealing from the Court something material to the case; (c) The grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; (d) The grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances; (e) The person to whom the grant was made has willfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of this Part, or has exhibited under that chapter an inventory or account which is untrue in a material respect. Illustrations (i) The court by which the grant was made had no jurisdiction. (ii) The grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited. (iii) The will of which probate was obtained was forged or revoked. (iv) A obtained letters of administration to the estate of B, as his widow, but it has since transpired that she was never married to him. (v) A has taken administration to the estate of B as if he had died in testate, but a will has since been discovered. (vi) Since probate was granted, a letter will have been discovered. (vii) Since probate was granted, a codicil has been discovered which revokes or adds to the appointment of executors under the will. (viii) The person to whom probate was or letters of administration were, granted has subsequently become of unsound mind". The averments in the petition, if proved, would fall under explanation (b) and illustration (iii) of S.263. When there is statutory provision providing for revocation of the grant, such revocation cannot be on any ground other than those mentioned in S.263. (viii) The person to whom probate was or letters of administration were, granted has subsequently become of unsound mind". The averments in the petition, if proved, would fall under explanation (b) and illustration (iii) of S.263. When there is statutory provision providing for revocation of the grant, such revocation cannot be on any ground other than those mentioned in S.263. Explanation to S.263 states as to when just cause can be deemed to exist. Since the explanation to S.263 enumerates what are to be deemed "just cause*', the function of the explanation, in the context, is to remove any uncertainty or scope for any doubt as to what are "just cause" so that debate on the point can be avoided. The explanation along with the illustrations is exhaustive; they are not illustrative of the grounds on which revocation Can be allowed. The decisions in In re Sureman Singh and another (AIR 1955Mad.622) and George Anthony v. Millicent Spencer (AIR 1933 Bombay 370) also held that, the explanation is exhaustive. The Supreme Court in the decision in Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Dassi and another (AIR 1955 SC 566) at page 572, in dealing with the argument that, the grant has to be revoked on the simple ground that no citation was issued observed as to the scope of "just cause" as follows: "The explanation has indicated the circumstances in which the court can come to the conclusion that just cause has been made out". When such is the position the petitioner has to prove that there is "just cause" as envisaged in S.263 of the Act for revocation of the grant. But the learned counsel for the respondent contended that, the question of genuineness of the Will could arise only after the court decides to revoke the grant. Akileswari Das/ v. HariCharan (AIR 1925 Cal. 223) was cited in support of the said contention. As regards this aspect, in Anil Behari'S case (AIR 1955 SC 566) the Supreme Court referring to a similar proposition mentioned v. Mokashadayini Dassi v.Kamadhaf Mandal (AIR 1915 Cal. 421) stated thus: "The observations relied upon by the appellant were made with reference to the facts of that case and were not intended to be of universal application. As regards this aspect, in Anil Behari'S case (AIR 1955 SC 566) the Supreme Court referring to a similar proposition mentioned v. Mokashadayini Dassi v.Kamadhaf Mandal (AIR 1915 Cal. 421) stated thus: "The observations relied upon by the appellant were made with reference to the facts of that case and were not intended to be of universal application. As pointed out above, S.263 of the Act also contemplates a case for revocation based on the single ground that the will in respect of which the grant in question was obtained was a forged one. In such a case, whether or not the will was a forged one would be the only question to be canvassed before the court before the order of revocation could be made". Thus where the ground urged for revocation is that the Will is a forged one, the only question to be canvassed before court is whether or not the will is a forged one. 6. It was con tended on behalf of the respondents that, existence of suspicions circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will is a ground for revocation, and that, it is enough if the court has prima facie satisfaction as to the existence of any such suspicious circumstances. Learned counsel referred to the decision in Southern Bank v. Kesardeo (AIR 1958 Cal. 377). In the Southern Bank's case it was found that circumstances throwing suspicion on the due execution of the will if they were kept back from the court can be regarded as just cause falling within the ambit of Explanation (b) to S.263 of the Act. As the Supreme Court said in AnilBehari's case (AIR 1955 SC 566) what should concern the court is whether there is prima facie reasons to believe that it is necessary to have the will proved afresh in the presence of interested parties. The court observed: "The law has vested judicial discretion in the court to revoke a grant where the court may have 'prima facie" reasons to believe that it was necessary to have the will proved afresh in the presence of interested parties". The question therefore is whether there are prima facie reasons to believe that the Will has to be proved afresh. 7. The question therefore is whether there are prima facie reasons to believe that the Will has to be proved afresh. 7. A close analysis of the evidence in this case along with attending circumstances will disclose that, no case has been made out, much less a prima facie case, that the will requires proof afresh. The definite case of the petitioner is that, Ext.A1 will is a forged one brought into existence after the death of Augusthy Sebastian. The case developed in evidence is that, the will was made on a blank paper signed by Augusthy Sebastian which was one among such papers in the possession ofPW-4, an Accountant with whom Augusthy Sebastian used to entrust blank signed papers. PW-4 Said that, after the death of Augusthy Sebastian he handed over the papers to PW-1 who in turn handed them over to Alekutly Sebastian. If at all PW-4 had with him such papers and if at all such papers were handed over to PW-1 it remains a riddle as to why such signed papers of Augusthy Sebastian were handed over to his widow. PW-1 had no case that he was quite certain that his brother's widow would not misuse such signed papers. It may be remembered that PW-1 has a case that the properties left behind by Augusthy Sebastian included some items, which were in fact acquired by his brothers in the name of the deceased. In such circumstances it is not consistent with ordinary human conduct that PW-1 would have handed over the signed papers to the widow of his brother. 8. In considering the evidence of PWs.1 and 4, one important fact has to be borne in mind; PW1 had given evidence before the Sub Registrar supporting the genuineness of the will. PW-1 admits the said fact in his cross-examination. His explanation is, he said so because he was promised a share in the property. PW-4 also admits in his evidence that he has given evidence in the proceedings before the Sub Registrar to the effect that, there was no chance of getting signed papers from him for making the Will. Ext.Dl proceedings show that Doctor who treated Augusthy Sebastian was examined. He was admitted in the hospital on 27-5-1975 and was discharged on 22-12-1975. The Will was executed on 13-12-1975. Augusthy Sebastian died on 31-7-1976. Ext.Dl proceedings show that Doctor who treated Augusthy Sebastian was examined. He was admitted in the hospital on 27-5-1975 and was discharged on 22-12-1975. The Will was executed on 13-12-1975. Augusthy Sebastian died on 31-7-1976. Merely because the signature is in different ink that cannot and need not create suspicion, though in a given case along with other circumstances such a circumstances may have some probative force. A point which the learned District Judge has highlighted in the difference of the ink in the signature of Augusthy Sebastian, when compared with the ink in the other writings in the Will. The District Judge felt some suspicion on that score. The evaluation of the evidence has to be with due regard to ordinary human conduct as to what a person in the position of the testator could have done. It should be noted that, Augusthy Sebastian was childless. He was hospitalized and was nursed by his wife. No case that she was not a dutiful wife. Naturally, as a husband he must have been eager and anxious to make a provision for his wife. In a situation like that, a person placed in the position of Augusthy Sebastian if though of making a Will of the type as Ext.A1, one cannot say that, it was not ordinary. Therefore, there is nothing un-naturalin the execution of the Will. The attest or of the Will was examined before the District Court in the proceedings for issue of letters of administration. The order of the District Judge dated 30-7-1983 states that, PW-1 therein was the attest or who has sworn to the testamentary capacity of Augusthy Sebastian. 9. According to the first respondent fraud was practiced on him by Alekutty Sebastian because though there was an agreement or settlement under which she agreed to give him due share, she did not act in accordance with the said agreement. The said agreement or settlement is not admitted. The Advocate who appeared for the first respondent was examined as PW-2 and the Advocate who appeared for Alekutty Sebastian was examined as PW-3. PW-3 said that the first respondent withdrew his objection without consulting him. PW-3 said that what Alekutty Sebastian agreed was, since she is the widow without issue, she would make provision for both her heirs as well as heirs of her husband. PW-3 said that the first respondent withdrew his objection without consulting him. PW-3 said that what Alekutty Sebastian agreed was, since she is the widow without issue, she would make provision for both her heirs as well as heirs of her husband. The evidence does not show, that she agreed to give the respondent his due share as alleged by him. 10. It is thus clear that, there is no likelihood of proof being offered that Will was either not genuine or had not been validly executed. There is nothing to show that, the legatee had concealed something material to the case. We are not satisfied in the circumstances of the case that "just cause" within the meaning of S.263 of the Act had been made out. Therefore, the petition filed by the first respondent was liable to be dismissed. In the result the appeal is allowed and the order appealed against is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Thomas, J. 1 agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brother Manoharan, J. teat the appeal has lobe allowed and the impugned order has 10 beset aside, I also agree with the reasons given by my learned brother except the observation that "just causes" mentioned in the Explanation to S.263 of the Indian Succession Ana are exhaustive. I express my inability to concur with the said view, despite the fact that a catena of decision rs support the said view. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that, the second clause in the Explanation to S.263 of the Act will come into play only if fraud had been played on the court and not if fraud was practiced on the parties alone. According to the counsel, since the allegations of the first respondent are only to the effect that fraud had been Played on the parties and not on the court, there is no just cause for revoking the grant. It was in the wake of the said contention that the argument was raised that the five instances enumerated in the Explanation to S.263 of the Indian Succession Act are exhaustive. Even if fraud could be established as to have beers practiced on the parties the same would not be a "just cause" to revoke the grant since such a cause does not fall within the ambit of the Explanation, contended learned counsel. 3. Even if fraud could be established as to have beers practiced on the parties the same would not be a "just cause" to revoke the grant since such a cause does not fall within the ambit of the Explanation, contended learned counsel. 3. Fraud, whether it was played on court or on parties, must be regarded as sufficient to vitiate the grant. If fraud played on the parties cannot be urged as a just cause to set at naught the grant obtained, its consequence will be perpetuation of the result of that fraud. If the instances enumerated in the Explanation to S.263 of the Act cannot be treated as exhaustive, there is no difficulty because frail played on the parties to a cause can then be regarded as a just cause to revoke the grant. Hence it is important to decide whether the instances specified in the Explanation are exhaustive or whether the court can revoke a grant on any other just cause also. 4. Three decisions have been cited before us by the learned counsel for the appellant who contended that the section is exhaustive of "just causes". They are (1) George Anthony v. Millicent Spencer (AIR 1933 Bombay 370); (2) In re T. Arumuga Mudaliar (AIR 1955 Madras 622); and (3) In re Sureman Singh (AIR 1969 Patna 183). There are other decisions also which adopted the same view eg: Annoda Prasad v. Kali Krishna, (ILR 24 Calcutta 95) and Surendra Nath v. Amrita Lai, (AIR 1920 Calcutta 584). In George Anthony's case (AIR 1933 Bombay 370) a single judge expressed the view that "the explanation of the term "just cause" in S.263 is exhaustive and not merely Illustrative.se that the application of the plaintiff must fall under one or more of the said grounds". With respect, I may point out that no reason has been stated by the learned single judge in George Anthony's case to come to the said conclusion. In Arumuga Mudaiiar's case (AIR 1955 Mad, 622) a single judge of the Madras High Court has referred to George Anthony's case. However, no other reason is mentioned for adopting the said view. In Surernan Singh's case (AIR 1969 Pa tea 183) a Division Bench relying on Arumuga Mudaiiar's case has merely observed that the words "just cause" are exhaustive and not merely illustrative. However, no other reason is mentioned for adopting the said view. In Surernan Singh's case (AIR 1969 Pa tea 183) a Division Bench relying on Arumuga Mudaiiar's case has merely observed that the words "just cause" are exhaustive and not merely illustrative. The Mysore High Court took the same view in K.N. Srinivasan v. C. Krishna lyenger (AIR 1957 Mysore 74). Reference was made by the leared judges to the early Calcutta decision in Annoda Prasad v. Kali Krishna (ILR 24 Calcutta 95). It appears that it was the Calcutta High Court which adopted this view for the first time and had reiterated in Surendranath v. Amrita Lai (AIR 1920 Cal. 584) and that seems to have been followed in other decisions. The Calcutta High Court was, in the said decisions, dealing with S.50 of the Probate and Administration Act (Act V of 1881). S.263'of the Succession Act was not in contemplation then. S.50 of Act V is, no doubt, analogous to S.263 of the Succession Act, Yet there is a subtle difference between the two. S. 50 contains provision for revocation or annulment of grant of probate or letters of administration for just cause. That provision contains an Explanation clause which commences with the words "just cause is - "and specified four instances which are the same as the first four instances mentioned in the Explanation under S.263* of the Succession Act. The starting words in the Explanation under S.263 of the Succession Act a re these: "Just cause shall be deemed to exist where..."(Five instances Were then enumerate din the Explanation). If the legislature intended those five instances enumerated in the Explanation to S.263 to be regarded as exhaustive, legislature would have borrowed or adopted the same frame of words /is in S.50 of Act V of 1881 especially since the Calcutta High Court interpreted it like that. In 1925 when the Succession Act was passed, a different approach was made by the legislature in the same context. There is no reason to think that the legislature did not want to invest the court with the power to revoke the grant on any just cause (other than those mentioned in the Explanation). In 1925 when the Succession Act was passed, a different approach was made by the legislature in the same context. There is no reason to think that the legislature did not want to invest the court with the power to revoke the grant on any just cause (other than those mentioned in the Explanation). The necessity for including a deeming provision in S.263 must have been to clear the doubt, which may arise in the absence of such a deeming provision that the instances enumerated in the Explanation may not be sufficient to revoke the grant. What the legislature did by including the deeming provision is to keep those five instances beyond controversy that they too are just causes. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not think that there is any necessity to restrict the scope of the words "just cause" in S.263 to the five instances mentioned in the Explanation.