Judgment :- Thomas, J. The simple question in these appeals is whether the insurer can be saddled with liability under S.92 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the Act') without determining the dispute that the insurance policy became invalid as a consequence of violation of a condition in the policy. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded compensation in two cases to the injured under S. 92A and directed the owner and his insurer to pay the amount. The Claims Tribunal observed that in the light of the decision in Mohammed Iqbal v. Bhimaiah and others (AIR 1985 Kar.171=1985 ACJ 546) that the objection regarding violation of policy condition need not be considered when the award is passed on the principle of "no fault liability". The insurance company has filed these appeals. 2. S.92A provides that "where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement accordance with the provision so this section". No doubt, S.92 A does not mention the word 'insurer'. Apparently, it is the owner alone who has to bear the liability mentioned in Chapter VII A of the Act. However, mere non-mention of the word "insurer" in any of the provisions in the said Chapter is hardly sufficient to absolve the insurance company from liability under no fauk theory. The succeeding Chapter which deals with insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks contains definition for the word 'liability' as this: "'liability 'wherever used in relation to the death of or bodily injury to any person includes liability in respect thereof under S.92 A". Hence the only question is whether the Claims Tribunal is debarred from passing the award against insurer without deciding the dispute that a policy condition was viola ted entailing the consequence of rendering the policy invalid. 3. S. %of the Act casts duty on the insurer to pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree (award) such sum as would not exceed the coverage, "as if he were the judgment debtor". 3. S. %of the Act casts duty on the insurer to pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree (award) such sum as would not exceed the coverage, "as if he were the judgment debtor". This is the statutory provision, which makes the insurer liable to pay the award amount whether the award is the one passed under S. HOB of the Act or under Chapter VIIA of the Act. It is not very necessary that there should be an express provision in Chapter VII A conferring power on Claims Tribunal to give a direction to the insurer. 4. S.92B(2) of the Act enjoins on the Claims Tribunal to dispose of the claim for compensation under S.92A "as expeditiously as possible" and at any rate before disposing of the claim for compensation based on the principle of fault. The intention of Parliament to give reliefs to victims in motor accidents with utmost expedition and urgency can be discerned from the words used. One such relief is based on the principle of "no fault liability" as envisaged in Chapter VII A. If an insurance company contests that the vehicle was not insured with them, no doubt, the Claims Tribunal cannot pass an award against the insurance company without deciding that the vehicle was covered by a policy of insurance during the accident period. Urgency is no excuse in such a case to ask the insurance company to pay the award amount if the company disputes even the existence of a policy. There, the burden is on the claimant or the owner as the case may be to prove that the vehicle was in fact insured during the accident period. However, that is not the situation in a case where the insurance company admits that the vehicle has been insured but the policy of insurance became invalid on the happening of a certain event or non-compliance with a certain term. Here, the burden is on the insurer to prove that the event had happened or the term was not complied with entailing the consequence of rendering the policy invalid. If the Claims Tribunal passed the award under S.92 A only after deciding the contention that the policy became invalid due to violation of the condition in the policy, the urgency and expedition envisaged in S.92 A are negated and the intention of the legislature superseded. If the Claims Tribunal passed the award under S.92 A only after deciding the contention that the policy became invalid due to violation of the condition in the policy, the urgency and expedition envisaged in S.92 A are negated and the intention of the legislature superseded. All endeavors should be made to give the relief with as much promptitude and speed as the legislature manifested its intention in express terms. The Claims Tribunal, if the dispute is limited to that contention is not obliged to go the whole hog before passing the interim award under S.92 B. 5. By incorporating Chapter VIIA in the Act, Parliament expressed its intent that every victim of a motor accident if he sustains a permanent disability and the legal representatives of a victim who died in the motor accident, must be compensated with money, with as much promptitude as possible. Automobile proliferation became life hazard and humans run under the great risk of being injured in motor accidents. Such injury is mainly attributed to automation of vehicles. That is why the person who brings the vehicle is asked to pay compensation to the sufferer. The sufferer in motor accidents cannot be put under further suffering on account of procedural delay in receiving the compensation money which is based on the principle of no fault liability. For exercising powers under S.92 A, the Claims Tribunal is not obliged to wait until the insurer establishes that one or more of the policy conditions had been violated. Such a dispute need be determined while passing the award under S.110 A If at the final stage, the Claims Tribunal finds that the policy was rendered invalid as a consequence of violation of the policy condition, the Claims Tribunal can observe that the insurer can recover the amount, if paid pursuant to the interim award, from the insured concerned. The principle hidden in S.96(4) of the Act would justify such observation. On the other hand, if passing of the interim award is delayed on account of a mere dispute having been raised that the policy condition was violated, the victim in the motor accident will be practically deprived of the benefit contemplated in S.92 A. 6. The principle hidden in S.96(4) of the Act would justify such observation. On the other hand, if passing of the interim award is delayed on account of a mere dispute having been raised that the policy condition was violated, the victim in the motor accident will be practically deprived of the benefit contemplated in S.92 A. 6. In MohammedIgbal's case (AIR 1985 Kar.171) which has been referred to by the Claims Tribunal, the nub of discussion was not the point involved here and hence we do not find any support from the said decision. A Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has considered this question in Oriental Fire and General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Beasa Devi and others (1985 ACJ 1). The Division Bench has observed thus: "If objections be treated as preliminary issue and be decided by the nature of things would result in delay in regard to the payment of amount under S.92 A to the claimants, which may partly defeat the very purpose underlying the enactment of the said provision i.e., of providing immediate succors to the persons who had suffered disabling injury in an accident or the heirs of the persons who had died as a result of the accident. We are of the view that provision of S.92 A is a piece of beneficial and ameliorative legislation providing for an immediate aid to the hapless and helpless victims of the motor accidents. The moment it is either admitted by the owner of the vehicle that his vehicle was involved in the accident or from the evidence adduced on the record, the Tribunal positively holds that vehicle of the owner in question was involved in that accident, if he denied that fact and then if the Tribunal comes to a further prima facie conclusion that the vehicle was insured, then the Tribunal without inquiring into correctness of other objections that may be raised by the insurance company would be entitled to make the award under S.92A and require the insurance company to pay the given amount to the claimants Forthwith " The aforesaid observations are in tune with the view, which we have Expressed in the foregoing paragraphs. Bombay High Court has followed the said decision in New India Insurance Co, v. Minguel Lourenco Correia (1986 (2) ACJ 646). In Oriental Fire and GefJeral Insurance Co. Bombay High Court has followed the said decision in New India Insurance Co, v. Minguel Lourenco Correia (1986 (2) ACJ 646). In Oriental Fire and GefJeral Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Aleixo Fernandes and others (1986 (2) ACJ 1137) a single judge of the Bombay High Court has adopted the same view and observed that "the object underlying this provision is immediate benefit to the relations of the victim in case of his death and the disabled victim of the accident in case of permanent disability". Support to the view can also be found from the decisions in (Babban Tiwari v. Usha ran/an Chakraborty [1987 (2) ACJ 863] and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Member, MACT [1988 (2) ACJ 612]). We, therefore, hold that Claims Tribunal would be well within its powers in directing the insurer to pay the award amount under S.92 A notwithstanding the insurer's contention that the policy of insurance became invalid consequent on violation of a policy condition. Hence, we confirm the awards and dismiss the appeals without any order as to costs.