SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) IN these petitions, the petitioners question the postponment of the polls to be held for the elections of the Councillors, City Corporations, in the State of Karnataka. However, W. P. No. 5726 of 1990 questions the postponement of the poll regarding Shimoga Municipal Council. Arguments were addressed by Sri H. B. Datar, the learned Senior Advocate, with reference to w. P. 3080 of 1990 and hence relevant facts are stated from the said Writ Petition. ( 2 ) ELECTIONS were announced to various Town Municipalities and the six City Corporations in the state. The decision was announced on 29-12-1989 by the Chief Electoral Officer (who is the secretary to the State Government ). Subsequently there was another direction dated 4-1-1990 to the concerned Commissioners, fixing the various dates relevant to the calendar of events. The last date for filing the nomination was 1-2-1990; scrutiny on 2nd February and the date of withdrawal 5-2-1990 and the date of the poll was 25-2-1990. Completion of the election was to be 28-2-1990- Calendar of events were, accordingly notified and the various stages were duly over till 15th February 1990. ( 3 ) ON 15th February, 1990 the State Government employees went on a strike throughout the state. According to the petitioners, the State Cabinet met and decided to postpone the elections by putting forth the strike as a ground for the same, even though, only polls were to be held on 25-2-1990. On 20th February 1990 teleprinter message was sent regarding the postponement. On 22-2-1990 a notification was issued by the Commissioner postponing the poll until further orders. In the mean while, the Governor promulgated an Ordinance called the 'karnataka Municipal corporations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1990' (referred hereinafter, as 'the Ordinance'), amending section 55 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 ('the Act', for short); this ordinance came into force on 19-2-1990. By the amendment, a power was created in the State government to issue directions regarding all matters connected with the elections including directions for postponement of the poll. ( 4 ) THE postponement of the poll was opposed by many and motives were attributed by a few, as disclosed from some of the write-ups in the news papers. According to the petitioners there was utter confusion and misleading statements as to the election, at one stage. ( 4 ) THE postponement of the poll was opposed by many and motives were attributed by a few, as disclosed from some of the write-ups in the news papers. According to the petitioners there was utter confusion and misleading statements as to the election, at one stage. Directions were issued again, by the State Government to hold the polls on 25-4-1990. By virtue of these directions, notifications were issued by the Commissioners, notifying the postponed polls to be held on 25-4-1990. In the meanwhile, the State Government introduced a Bill (L. A. Bill No. 12 of 1990) in the State legislature to make the Ordinance into an enactment. The Bill though passed in the Assembly, was defeated in the Council. Consequently, the Bill failed. The Government did not pursue the matter further. The Bill was defeated in the Council on 4th April 1990. ( 5 ) MR. Datar, the learned Counsel, raised the following contentions in support of these Writ petitions: . The State Government has no competence at all to direct the postponement of the polls, having regard to the scheme of the Act, and in particular, in the light of Sections 24, 55, 99 (8) and 100 of the Act. The Commissioner is the only Competent Authority under the Act to hold the elections and he has abdicated his function and acted in terms of Governmental direction.. The Ordinance lost its efficacy by the failure of the Bill introduced in the State Legislature and therefore, the purported amendment made to the Act by the Ordinance cannot vest any power in the State Government.. The exercise of power by the State Government was mala fide and actuated by collateral considerations. According to the petitioners, the only course now open to the Commissioner is to hold a fresh election, with a de novo calendar of events, the postponment of the polls being entirely illegal. RE. CONTENTION NO.. ( 6 ) SECTION 24 (1) of the Act reads: "24. Commissioner to fix date of elections (1) All vacancies in the office of Councillors shall be filled by elections which shall, subject to approval of Government, be fixed by the Commissioner to take place on such dates within three months before the occurrence of vacancies as he thinks fit: provided that Government may, for sufficient cause permit holding of such elections on any later date. " Section 55 of the Act, vested a power in the State Government to make Rules to regulate the election of Councillors; no executive power to issue directions was found earlier in the said provision. Sections 99 and 100 were referred to show that there exists a duty to hold elections in certain cases. All these provisions were read to establish that only Section 24 (1) was available as the source of power to hold the elections, even though, the opening words of Section 24 (1) refer to vacancies; subject of casual vacancy is dealt by Section 24 (2 ). ( 7 ) THERE was no serious dispute that Section 24 (1) is the main provision creating a power to hold the elections. According to Mr. Datar, the original authority is the Commissioner, in whom vested the exclusive function of holding the elections and the State Government has no power to issue any direction to the Commissioner, to interfere with this statutory function of the commissioner. Governmental power was only to accord approval to the Commissioner in the matter of fixing the dates of the election and the concept of election includes all the stages of an election. Even otherwise, the State Government lacked any power to interfere with the election process which has already commenced by the issuance of the notification, and the publication of the calendar of events. GUNJAHALLI NAGAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1975 (2) KLJ 77 was relied heavily by Sri Datar, to contend that only the Commissioner is the Competent authority to postpone the election and this exclusive power cannot be exercised at the dictate of the Government, nor, the Government could postpone the poll through the Commissioner, by issuing executive directions. Under Rule 75 of the Karnataka Municipalities (Election of councils) Rules 1965 the State Government and subject to the general or special orders of the government, the Commissioner had the power of superintendence, direction and control of the conduct of elections. For the purpose of holding the election to a Town Municipal Council, the government issued notification determining the territorial divisions. Calendar of events was issued by the Returning Officer. After the nominations were filed, scrutinised etc. , and before the poll, State Government directed the Returning Officer to issue a fresh calendar of events, after splitting up of the voters' list. The direction was challenged before this Court. Calendar of events was issued by the Returning Officer. After the nominations were filed, scrutinised etc. , and before the poll, State Government directed the Returning Officer to issue a fresh calendar of events, after splitting up of the voters' list. The direction was challenged before this Court. A Bench of this court held that, under Rule 75 referred above, the State Government had the power only to issue directions for the proper conduct of the elections, but it did not confer any power to cancel a calendar of events validly issued by the Returning Officer. At page 80 it was held that apart from rules 24 and 28, there was no other provision to issue directions to adjourn the date of poll. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in STATE OF KARNATAKA v. G. NAGAPPA AIR1975 SC 1708 , (1976 )1 SCC204 , [1976 ]1 SCR57 , 1975 (7 )UJ568 (SC ) Supreme Court held that, under the relevant enactment, the Returning Officer had to take the electoral roll for the territorial area of the division as it is, with whatever mistakes there may be in it and that would be the list of voters for the division; the mistakes can be rectified only by applying under Section 22 of the Representation of the People Act; therefore the division-wise split up made by the Tahsildar, if reflected the electoral roll, voters list cannot be held to be defective; if so, the Returning Officer was incompetent to alter this split up and the state Government had no power to direct the Returning Officer to alter the divisional lists. The direction, issued by Government, was, held to be an interference with the election process, which was going on in accordance with law and hence impermissible under Rule 75. The Supreme court, thus upheld the conclusion of this Court by assigning a different reason. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, Mr. Datar contended that the State Government could not interfere with the election process held validly under law, by directing postponing the polling date. The above two decisions were based on the language of Rule 75. Neither this Court, nor the supreme Court was concerned with a situation as arisen in the instant cases. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, Mr. Datar contended that the State Government could not interfere with the election process held validly under law, by directing postponing the polling date. The above two decisions were based on the language of Rule 75. Neither this Court, nor the supreme Court was concerned with a situation as arisen in the instant cases. According to the state Government, it resorted to the postponement of the polls, because of the Statewise strike indulged by the Government employees and the consequential confusion and dislocation of the governmental work for a few days. The question is not whether continuation of the election process was in accordance with law, but whether a proper election could have been held, having regard to the unexpected strike and the uncertainty in the actual administration, in the State of karnataka. Even though the strike was called off on one day, (on or about the night of the 18th february 1990), it was revived on the very next day and actually the normal workings were resumed only on the 21st February 1990 (Wednesday ). On the 19th February 1990 office of various Departments of the State were not effectively functioning at all. In these circumstances, it has to be examined whether, Government could direct the Commissioners to postpone the holding of the polls. ( 9 ) UNDER Section 24, the power exercisable by the Commissioner is subject to the approval of the government. According to Mr. Datar, the word 'approval' connotes the existence of an independent person exercising a power, which is to be 'approved' by Government; in other words, the original action or decision should be of the Commissioner, requiring 'approval' of the government. But, the said action or decision of the Commissioner cannot be preceded by the dictates of the Government, No doubt, jurisprudentially, 'approval' is not creative but confirmatory and therefore relates back (vide GUJARAT STEEL TUBES LTD. 's CASE) AIR1980 SC 1896 , (1980 )I LLJ137 SC , (1980 )2 SCC593 , [1980 ]2 scr146. But words in a statute are to be understood to effectuate the purpose of the enactment and if possible to be read widely to provide for an unexpected contingency. 's CASE) AIR1980 SC 1896 , (1980 )I LLJ137 SC , (1980 )2 SCC593 , [1980 ]2 scr146. But words in a statute are to be understood to effectuate the purpose of the enactment and if possible to be read widely to provide for an unexpected contingency. If one stage of the election ('the poll') cannot be held on the date fixed in view of a particular State-wide situation, is the Government helpless without a power to direct the Commissioners of various Corporations to act uniformly in a particular manner? An election announced to be held throughout the State, has a greater impact on the public, than an isolated bye-election. It is not an act of interference with the election process, but an act to smoothen the process remaining to be completed. It is unnecessary for me to express a definite view on this question, in view of the Ordinance promulgated, which has specifically empowered the Government to issue directions regarding all matters connected with the elections including directions for postponement of the poll; this power is created by inserting a new sub-section to Section 55. RE. CONTENTION NO.. ( 10 ) ORDINANCE was promulgated with effect from 19th February 1990. It amended Section 55. The existing Section 55 (1) was altered to be read as Section 55 (2), and a new Section 55 (1) was inserted. A few words underlined below were added to the heading. Thus by virtue of the ordinance, Section 55 was altered to read as follows:section 55: "control of elections and power to make rules regulating the election of Councillors; (1) Every election of Councillors shall be subject to the control and supervision of the government and it shall be lawful for the Government to issue directions regarding all matters connected with the elections including directions for postponement of the poll. " section 55 (2) is omitted as unnecessary; this deals with the rule making power. ( 11 ) THE Ordinance was promulgated on 19-2-1990. Thereafter, when the State Legislature met, a bill (Bill No. 12 of 1990) was introduced to enact these provisions; the Bill was passed in the legislative Assembly; however, in the Council it failed. From these facts, a contention was urged, that, the Ordinance having merged in the Bill, no longer is operative as a law, because, the bill failed in the Council. From these facts, a contention was urged, that, the Ordinance having merged in the Bill, no longer is operative as a law, because, the bill failed in the Council. ( 12 ) THE learned Advocate General pointed out that the Assembly met for the first time on 15-3-1990 after the promulgation of the Ordinance (on 19-2-1990 ). Therefore, by virtue of article 213 (2) of the Constitution, the Ordinance continues to be law and in the normal course, it will be in force even on 29th April 1990 (which is within six weeks from 15th March 1990 ). It was contended by the learned Advocate General, that, the Ordinance never stood disapproved by the Legislature, and the failure of the Bill in the Council, is not an act of disapproving the ordinance, as provided by Article 213 (2) of the Constitution. Article 213 (2) (a) reads thus: "an Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, but every such Ordinance (a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative council, if any, upon the passing of the Resolution or, as the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council, and (b) omitted as unnecessary. " ( 13 ) THE law on the subject is quite clear. An Ordinance has all the force of law. Whatever is done under it is not only valid but also continues to be effective unless, specifically taken away by a valid law. Its impact has a quality of permanence in respect of the subject covered by it and acted upon. After the Ordinance lapses, it is not operative; but, the effect of its operation already completed, is not erased by the lapsing of an Ordinance. The principle is stated in HARAN chandra DUTT AND ANR. v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. After the Ordinance lapses, it is not operative; but, the effect of its operation already completed, is not erased by the lapsing of an Ordinance. The principle is stated in HARAN chandra DUTT AND ANR. v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. AIR1952 Cal 907 : "all acts completed during the currency of the Ordinance have the same effect as acts done under a permanent statute and they endure permanently notwithstanding the expiry of the ordinance. It is only the pending proceedings or the unfinished acts which cease to operate or exist with the expiry of the Ordinance, unless such proceeding or acts are preserved by appropriate provisions in the Ordinance itself or by other appropriate Acts of the Legislature. " ( 14 ) MR. Datar's contention is quite unique. According to him, the Ordinance stood merged with the Bill and the Bill failed in the Council; therefore, the Ordinance stood disapproved or lost its efficacy, because, according to him the failure of the Bill does not result in reviving the ordinance. The basic assumption in this contention, itself, is not valid. The Ordinance does not get merged in the Bill at all. There is no such provision in the Constitution. The process of law making is specifically and clearly laid down in the Constitution. This contention obviously, was to overcome the difficulty countenanced by the petitioners, in view of the Supreme Court decision in T. VENKAT REDDY AND ORS. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AIR1985 SC 724 , 1986 Lablc357 , 1985 (1 )SCALE613 , (1985 )3 scc198 , [1985 ]3 SCR509 , 1985 (1 )SLJ561 (SC ), 1985 (17 )UJ991 (SC ). , an almost similar contention was negatived: "it is argued on their behalf that on the failure of the State Legislature to pass an Act in terms of the Ordinance it should be assumed that the Ordinance has never become effective and that it was void ab initio. This contention overlooks two important factors namely the language of clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution and the nature of the provisions contained in the ordinance. This contention overlooks two important factors namely the language of clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution and the nature of the provisions contained in the ordinance. Clause (2) of Article 213 says that an Ordinance promulgated under that article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the governor but every such Ordinance (a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the state, or, where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or, as the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council and (b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. It is seen that Article 213 of the Constitution does not say that the Ordinance shall be void from the commencement of the State Legislature disapproving it. It says that it shall cease to operate. It only means that it should be treated as being effective till it ceases to operate on the happening of the events mentioned in Clause (2) of Article 213. " ( 15 ) 'disapproval' contemplated by Article 213 (2) (a) has to be a specific disapproval, by a resolution; such a resolution has to be passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the council. In the instant case, there was no such resolution; the Bill, in fact was passed by the assembly; it failed only in the Council. The Constitution does not contemplate the lapsing of the ordinance, by the disapproval of the Council only. The Ordinance does not stand merged in the bill, and failure of the Bill in the Council, in no way amounts to disapproval of the Ordinance by the State Legislature. Since the Ordinance is still in force, Section 55 (1) as introduced by the Ordinance fully operates. If so, there cannot be any doubt that, the Government has the full power to issue directions for the postponement of the poll. ( 16 ) IN this connection, two decisions cited by the learned Advocate General requires to be noted. Since the Ordinance is still in force, Section 55 (1) as introduced by the Ordinance fully operates. If so, there cannot be any doubt that, the Government has the full power to issue directions for the postponement of the poll. ( 16 ) IN this connection, two decisions cited by the learned Advocate General requires to be noted. The first one is DODDAHANUMANTHAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA ILR (Karnataka) 1979, 1685 wherein, a similar provision in Karnataka Act 10 of 1959 was construed as enabling the Government to direct the postponement of the poll. The validity of the provision was also upheld. In BENAKAPPA BHIMAPPA BANNADA AND ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ors. ILR (Karnataka) 1979, 1772, another Division Bench, had an occasion to consider a similar provision in the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. The Bench agreed with the earlier decision rendered in Doddahanumanthaiah's case. ( 17 ) IT is immaterial, whether the Government took the decision to postpone the poll before the promulgation of the Ordinance. The material date is the date on which effective directions were issued. These legal orders were issued by the Government only after the Ordinance. Therefore, the postponement of the polls by the Government cannot be held to be without the authority of law. These impugned directions clearly fall within Section 55 (1) of the Act, as amended by the ordinance. RE. CONTENTION NO. III, ( 18 ) IT was contended that the power postponing the polling was exercised mala fide and was actuated by collateral considerations. A few news-paper cuttings were referred in support of this contention. These newspapers cuttings were actually write-ups of reporters and at the most were expression of individual opinions. Decision to postpone the polling was, admittedly not an individual decision. Even according to the petitioners, it is the decision of the State Cabinet. The collateral purpose sought to be achieved by the alleged motive has not been pleaded in the Writ petitions. It is easy to allege the existence of mala fides, but difficult to establish. Court cannot act on the basis of general expression of opinions. Even according to the petitioners, it is the decision of the State Cabinet. The collateral purpose sought to be achieved by the alleged motive has not been pleaded in the Writ petitions. It is easy to allege the existence of mala fides, but difficult to establish. Court cannot act on the basis of general expression of opinions. Clinching circumstances exposing the motive, the collateral purpose to be achieved, the men behind the alleged scheme, source of petitioners' information are some of the factors to be clearly pleaded and proved; the burden is Very heavy on the petitioners, especially, when the decision attacked as motived, is a collective decision of a responsible body like the State Cabinet. The Government was concerned with the polls to be held for about 170 Town Municipalities and Six City Corporations; the situation that prevailed during 15th to 20th February 1990 in the State, due to the strike of the State Government employees, was one of confusion, and uncertain. the availability of other employees of local bodies or of teachers to conduct the poll, would not be of any avail in the situation that prevailed, when the State Government employees were on indefinite strike and the administration was under great strain. ( 19 ) IN these circumstances, no further consideration of this contention is called for and it is accordingly rejected. ( 20 ) IN none of the petitions, the petitioners have impleaded the candidates whose nominations have been accepted. The prayer to set aside the entire election, cannot be granted on this ground also. Cancellation of the election would certainly affect the rights of the validly nominated candidates. They are necessary parties to any proceeding in which cancellation of the entire election is sought - (vide Doddahanumanthaiah and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. ). ( 21 ) NO other contentions survive for consideration. ( 22 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, these petitions fails and are dismissed, without any order as to costs.