KAMAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH — 1990 DIGILAW 191 (ALL)

G. D. DUBEY, J. ( 1 ) THE above case arises from district which is covered by the Dacoity Affected Area Act, 1986 which shall hereinafter be referred to as Act. In this case an objection has been raised by the learned A. G. A. that as 180 days have not passed after the arrest of the accused-applicant the bail cannot be considered by this High Court. In this respect my attention has been drawn to proviso to S. 10 of the Act. It was also submitted that it is a Special Act and this proviso will apply and the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Code) will stand excluded. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant urged that the provision of S. 10 of the Act only puts some restrictions on the granting of bail in matters of scheduled offences mentioned in the Act. There is no complete blanket on the powers of this Court to grant bail within 180 days of the arrest of the accused persons. ( 3 ) SARVASRI G. P. Dixit and J. S. Sengar Advocates have intervened in the matter and urged that as the matter raises an important question they may be permitted to address this Court. Consequently the above Advocates had advanced their arguments in order to assist this Court in interpreting the provisions of S. 10 of the Act. ( 4 ) SRI H. P. Tripathi counsel for State has drawn by attention to State of U. P. v. Karam Singh, 1988 All Cri C 375 and urged that according to this decision the provisions of the Act should prevail over the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 5 ) THERE can be no dispute with the above contention that the special law prevails over the general law. The principle in maxim generalia Specialibus Non Derogant i. e. special provision must prevail over general has been approved in Motiram Dhela Bhai v. Jagan Nagar, (1985) 2 SCC 279 : AIR 1985 SC 709 . ( 6 ) APPLICANTs learned counsel Sri R. K. Srivastava and the two learned Advocates had drawn my attention to Gurucharan Singh v. State, AIR 1978 SC 179 . It was pointed out that in this case the Supreme Court of India had interpreted the provisions of Ss. 437 and 439 of the Code. ( 6 ) APPLICANTs learned counsel Sri R. K. Srivastava and the two learned Advocates had drawn my attention to Gurucharan Singh v. State, AIR 1978 SC 179 . It was pointed out that in this case the Supreme Court of India had interpreted the provisions of Ss. 437 and 439 of the Code. The Supreme Court had observed that while exercising the powers under S. 439 of the Code the Sessions Judge or the Court cannot be oblivious of the considerations as mentioned in Cl. (1) of S. 437 of the Code for granting bail. The Supreme Court had considered the provisions of Ss. 437 and 439 along with corresponding provisions of old Code of Criminal Procedure. In paragraph 14 of its judgement the Supreme Court indicated the implications of change of language in S. 439 of the Code from the corresponding provisions of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. It was observed : "from the above change of language it is difficult to reach a conclusion that the Sessions Judge or the High Court need not even bear in mind the guidelines which the Magistrate has necessarily to follow in considering bail of an accused. It is not possible to hold that the Sessions Judge or the High Court, certainly enjoying wide powers, will be oblivious of the considerations of the likelihood of the accused being guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Since the Sessions Judge or the Court will be approached by an accused only after refusal of bail by the Magistrate, it is not possible to hold that the mandate of the law of bail under S. 437, Cr. P. C. for the Magistrate will be ignored by the High Court or by the Sessions Judge. " ( 7 ) IT was urged that under S. 439 of the Code the Sessions Judge or High Court has to bear in mind the considerations whether the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment of life. P. C. for the Magistrate will be ignored by the High Court or by the Sessions Judge. " ( 7 ) IT was urged that under S. 439 of the Code the Sessions Judge or High Court has to bear in mind the considerations whether the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment of life. In other cases the bail has to be granted unless there may be some ground for refusing bail like the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as its investigation etc. It was pointed out by Sarvasri Dixit and Sengar that the provision of cl. (i) of Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 437 has been borrowed in S. 10 of the Act. Hence while considering the application for bail in cases covered by the Act the only consideration should be whether there appears reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. ( 8 ) MY attention was also drawn to the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Sub-Secs. (1), (6) and (7) of S. 437 of the Code. Under Sub-Sec. (1) of the Code the discretion has to be exercised at the initial stage. Sub-Section (6) says that if in cases triable by a Magistrate the trial is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence then such person shall be released unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs. Under Sub-Section (7) such question of exercise of discretion arises at the conclusion of the trial and the Court on examination of the material on record is satisfied that there are reasonable ground for believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocates also argued that the first proviso to S. 10 of the Act relaxes the restriction imposed by Sub-S. (1) of S. 10 of the Act and places the Scheduled offence on a general footing. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocates also argued that the first proviso to S. 10 of the Act relaxes the restriction imposed by Sub-S. (1) of S. 10 of the Act and places the Scheduled offence on a general footing. The other proviso provide similar restriction on bail, as are contained in clause (ii) of Sub-Section (1) of S. 437 of the Code. ( 10 ) IN order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant and the learned Advocates who addressed this Court it is necessary to peruse the S. 10 of the Act which reads as under : "10. Special provisions regarding bail.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person accused or convicted of a scheduled offence shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond, unless - (a) the prosecution has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail, and (b) where the prosecution opposes the application for bail, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence; provided that a person, accused of a scheduled offence, who has been in custody for a total period of one hundred and eighty days, may be released on bail, a subject to such condition as the Court may think fit to impose; provided further that no such person, as is referred to in the preceding proviso, shall be so released - (i) if he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more; or (ii) if he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence; or (iii) if he has committed a breach of any of the conditions of the bail subject to which he was released. ( 11 ) A reading of sub-cl. (b) of S. 10 of the Act with Sub-S. (1) of S. 437 of the Code makes it clear that the provisions of Sub-S. (1) of S. 437 of the Code have been borrowed. The proviso to S. 10 does not say that bail cannot be granted within 180 days. On the other hand the proviso states that after the expiry of 180 days the Court may release the accused on such conditions as it deems fit. The proviso to S. 10 does not say that bail cannot be granted within 180 days. On the other hand the proviso states that after the expiry of 180 days the Court may release the accused on such conditions as it deems fit. Thus there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the State that in no case bail can be considered within 180 days of the arrest of the accused of a scheduled offence. A plain reading of S. 10 of the Act states that within 180 days of arrest the courts have to be satisfied that whether there appears reasonable ground for believing that accused has been guilty of scheduled offence. ( 12 ) IF the Court comes to the conclusion that there is sufficient reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty of a scheduled offence than such person shall not be released on bail. No other consideration should prevail at the time of consideration of bail within 180 days of the arrest. However, after 180 days of arrest the court has to consider the various factors which may impel it in refusing bail like the gravity and circumstance in which the offence is committed; the position and status of the accused with reference to victim and witnesses etc. as enumerated above. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that the considerations which may impel the court to refuse the bail in case in which ordinarily bail has to be granted, cannot be exhaustively set out. The bail may be refused in cases covered by second proviso, even before or after expiry of 180 days from the arrest of the accused of scheduled offence. ( 13 ) THUS on considering the rival contention I find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the State that in no case bail can be considered within 180 days of the arrest. So the bail in this case has to be considered on the ground whether there appears reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty of scheduled offence. If 180 days have passed after arrest the accused may be released on such conditions as this court may feel expedient to impose. So the bail in this case has to be considered on the ground whether there appears reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty of scheduled offence. If 180 days have passed after arrest the accused may be released on such conditions as this court may feel expedient to impose. It has to be refused if the accused has been convicted as stated in Clauses (i) or (ii) of second proviso or has committed only breach of conditions of bail. ( 14 ) APPLICANT Kamal Singh was arrested at the spot on 10th of August, 1989 while running away with the looted scooter. He and his companion had allegedly looted Rs. 125/- also from the person of the victim after threatening him with a knife and a country made pistol. On arrest two live cartridges were also recovered from his possession. 180 days have elapsed after the arrest of this applicant by now. There is no indication that he was arrested or convicted earlier also in connection with any other offence. Considering the circumstances of the case he is entitled for bail. ( 15 ) LET the applicant Kamal Singh involved in case Crime Nos. 202, 203 and 204 of 1989 under Ss. 392/307, I. P. C. and S. 25 and 4/25, Arms Act, P. S. Jagdishpura, District Agra, be released on bail on his furnishing two sureties for Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousands only) and a personal bond each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Judge (Dacoity Affected Area), Agra. Order accordingly. .