This is an appeal from a decree of the Assistant District Judge(1),Gauhati passed in T.S. No 76 of 1973 dismissing the suit for eviction. 2. The plaintiff Tilokchand instituted the suit against the defendant Madanlal praying for a decree for eviction of the defendant and other persons bound by the decree from the suit premises by removing a flourmill and other structures constructed by the defendant, arrears of rent and compensation. 3. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that he is the absolute and sole owner of the godown and gaddi-house described in the Schedule to the plaint (which I shall refer to as the "suit premises" whenever necessary). The defend­ant Madanlal rented the suit premises from the plaintiff. At the relevant time the rent was Rs. 600/- per calendar month (the British Calendar) payable in the 1st week of the succeeding month. The defendant failed to pay rent for the month of April 1972. Tae plaintiff rented the defendant the godown for storing goods and the gaddi-house for official work of the business. But the defendant had in contravention of the terms of the tenancy and without the permission of the plaintiff, set up a flourmill inside the godown causing damage to the godown. In spite of protest of the plaintiff the defendant had constructed a tin roofed first floor on the gaddi-house by removing the tin-sheets and has been using the first floor for his residence. The suit premises are bonafide required by the plaintiff for re-construction and for his own occupation and for occupation of the members of the family and for running business of his own and his sons. The plaintiff has no other land of bis own in Gauhati whereas the defendant has lands and houses in Gauhati. The defendant resisted the suit denying the averments made in the plaint except those which are specially admitted in his written statement. The defendant has also taken an objection as to the non-joinder of necessary parties. 4. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions are formulated for consideration: 1) Whether the suit is not maintainable for non-joinder of necessary parties? 2) Whether the defendant is a defaulter? 3) Whether the defendant uses the suit premises for a purpose other than that for which the premises were leased? 4. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions are formulated for consideration: 1) Whether the suit is not maintainable for non-joinder of necessary parties? 2) Whether the defendant is a defaulter? 3) Whether the defendant uses the suit premises for a purpose other than that for which the premises were leased? 4) Whether the defendant has altered the character and nature of the suit premises without consent of the plaintiff? And 5) Whether the suit premises are bona fide required by the plaintiff for reconstruction and for his own occupation and occupation of the mem­bers of his family and for running business for himself and his sons? 5. As regards the first question relating to the non-joinder of necessary parties, the case of the defendant is that the suit premises are coparcenary properties of the joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu law of which the plaintiff is a member or the Karta. But the suit has been instituted by the plaintiff in his own name, and not as the Karta, or with­out making other members as parties in the suit. That apart, the plaintiff rented the suit premises to the defendant along with Satyanarayan and Hari Prasaa. Satyanarayan and Hariprasad have not been made as parties in the suit. 6. The partition deed dated 7.4.51 (Ext. 4) indicates that on partition the suit premises was allotted to the plaintiff Tilokchand on behalf of self and as the Karta of his undivided Hindu family. However, in the Jamabandi (Ext.8), Municipal Holding Register (Ext. 11) and the order of OSD of the Gauhati Municipal Corporation (Ext. 5) the name of Tilokchand appears. In his evidence, the plaintiff has stated that the suit land belongs to him although in the cross-examination he has stated that the suit premises are ancestral properties. Whether the suit premises belong to plaintiff Tilokchand or to the joint Hindu family cannot be decided effectively in the absence of other alleged members of the family. However, I am dealing with the question as to nonjoinder of parties assuming that the suit premises are the coparcenary properties of the joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu law, as alleged by the defendant. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff rented the suit premises to the defendant. However, I am dealing with the question as to nonjoinder of parties assuming that the suit premises are the coparcenary properties of the joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu law, as alleged by the defendant. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff rented the suit premises to the defendant. The defendants' case is that the plaintiff rented the suit premises to the defendant Madanlal together with Satyanarayan and Hari Prasad. The evidence of the defendant Madanlal (DW 1) is that the plaintiff Tilokchand rented the suit premises for the flourmill and residential purpose. The agreement was made with Tilokchand. As Tilokchand refused to accept rent offered, he sent it by money order and also deposited rent in the Court. In the application for deposit of rent, he recognised Tilokchand as the landlord. The rent receipts, Exts. Ka to Pa show that the rent was paid to Tilokchand and Tilokchand issued the receipts. I shall discuss the value of evidence later in this judgment. But, from the pleading as well as from the evidence above, it clearly shows that the plaintiff Tilokchand has been receiving the tent and the plaintiff Tilokchand was acknowledged as the landlord, although the case of the defendant is that the defendant and two others are tenants under the plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the tenancy is not disputed. The question is whether the suit is to be filed by all the co-owners. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant, the question of title to the lease property is irrelevant. When the rent was paid to the plaintiff Tilokchand and he was acknowledged as the landlord, there is no necessity to establish that the plain­tiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of eviction under the Rent Control Act as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time acknowledged landlord (see Ram Pasrichand vs. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2355 and Kanta Goel vs B.P.Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599 ). In Pal Singh vs. Sundar Singh, AIR 1989 SC 758 , the Supreme Court reiterated that the ratio of the decision in Kanta Goel (supra) where the Supreme Court has clearly held that when the co-owner did not object to the eviction one co-owner could maintain an action for eviction even in the absence of other co-owners. In Pal Singh vs. Sundar Singh, AIR 1989 SC 758 , the Supreme Court reiterated that the ratio of the decision in Kanta Goel (supra) where the Supreme Court has clearly held that when the co-owner did not object to the eviction one co-owner could maintain an action for eviction even in the absence of other co-owners. In the present case, the other members of the joint family of the plaintiff did not object to the claim for eviction made by the plaintiff herein. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the ratio of the cases cited above will apply in the present case and suit will be maintainable even in the absence of all the owners in the eviction proceeding. 7. The next question which arises for consideration is whether Satyanarayan and Hariprasad are necessary party in the suit. It has already been concluded that the rent was received by the plaintiff Tilokchand and he was acknowledged as the landlord. However, the Exts. Ka, Kha, Ga and Gha show that the receipts were issued in the name of "Satyanarayan Hariprasad" by the plaintiff for the periods from 22. 12. 54 to 31.11.55, from 1.5.56 to 31.12.56, from 1.6.57 to 31.3.58 and from 1.4.58 to 31.12.58 respectively. The other rent receipts, Exts. Nga to Pa reveal that the receipts were issued in the name of "Madanlal Hariprasad". The evidence of the plaintiff is that he issued the receipts in the name of Satyanarayan Hariprasad as desired by the defendant. The question then is who actually paid the rent. The case and evidence of the plaintiff is that the rent was paid by Madanlal. The evidence of the defendant Madanlal (DW 1) in this regard is thus. The agreement for taking the house on lease was made with Tilokchand. He deposited the rent in the Court. In the application for deposit of rent he recognised the plaintiff as landlord. Hariprasad is his son. At present, Satyanarayan has no relation with the mill. Madanlal Satyanarayan was the owner of the mill till 31.12.58. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is concluded that the rent was paid by the defendant or was payable by the defendant. Hariprasad is his son. At present, Satyanarayan has no relation with the mill. Madanlal Satyanarayan was the owner of the mill till 31.12.58. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is concluded that the rent was paid by the defendant or was payable by the defendant. Section 2 (f) of the Act defines 'tenant' to mean "any person by whom or on whose behalf rent is payable for any house......" Therefore, a tenant is the person who is liable to pay rent or the person on whose behalf rent is payable. It has already been concluded that the defendant paid the rent or the defendant was the person liable to pay rent. In that view of the matter, the defendant is the tenant, and Harinarayan and/or Satyanarayan are the persons bound by the decree, if at all they are in possession of the suit premises. Therefore, the suit is maintainable even in the absence of Harinara­yan and/or Satyanarayan to this eviction proceeding. 8. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the defendant is a defaulter. The case of the plaintiff is that "the monthly rent of Rs. 600/- being payable in every month by the first week of next English Calendar month". But the defendant had not paid rent for the month of April 1972. He came to know later on that the rent has been deposited in the Court. However, he never received any notice of deposit. The case of the defendant is that the defendant offered rent for the month of April, but it was refused by the plaintiff stating that the defendant should pay rent at the Rs. 1200/- per month. The defendant refused to pay the demand of Rs.1200/-and deposited the rent (Rs.600/-) for the month of April in the Court. 9. Under the State Rent Control Act, one of the grounds for eviction is where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight of its falling due. However, where the landlord refuses to accept lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant may, within a fortnight of it! becoming due, deposit in the Court the amount of such rent together with the process fees for serving a notice upon the landlord. The question which, therefore, arises is when the rent become payable. Exts. However, where the landlord refuses to accept lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant may, within a fortnight of it! becoming due, deposit in the Court the amount of such rent together with the process fees for serving a notice upon the landlord. The question which, therefore, arises is when the rent become payable. Exts. Ka to Pa show that the rent was not paid monthly, but the rent was paid sometimes for 2 or 4 months at a time and at other times for 8 or 9, or 11 or 12, months at a time. There was no objection when rent of several months was given at a time. It has been contended on behalf of the defendant that, having regard to the conduct of the parties in payment and receipt of rent of several months at a time, the rent was payable at the convenience of the defendant. The explanation of the plaintiff in his pleading is that, although the rent was payable monthly on expiry of each month, the defendant was always irregular in payment of rent and the receipts were issued to the defendant or to his men whenever the rent was paid. A question whether a tenant was a "habitual defaulter" arose before the Supreme Court in S.P. Deshmukh vs. Shah Nihal, (1977)3 SCC 515 : AIR 1977 SC 1985 . The Supreme Court answered in the following words : "Normally, a monthly tenant is under an obligation to pay rent from month to month but this obligation is subject to a contract to the contrary. Such a contract need not be reflected in a formal document and can be spelt out from the conduct of the parties spread over a fairly long period of time." At this stage it will be helpful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rashik Lal vs. Shah Gakuldas, (1989) 1 SCC 542 . In that case, the rent was paid at varying interval of 3 or 4 months, and the accumulated rent was accepted by the landlord without any objection in any point of time. It was asserted by the tenant that the rent was payable at his convenience. In that case, the rent was paid at varying interval of 3 or 4 months, and the accumulated rent was accepted by the landlord without any objection in any point of time. It was asserted by the tenant that the rent was payable at his convenience. On that facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court has held that : "The crucial test to determine whether the tenant was a "habitual defa­ulter" is the conduct of the landlord in receiving the rent offered belatedly. If he receives the same under a protest and warns the tenant to be regular in payment in the future, he cannot be assumed to have agreed to a modified agreement in this regard. But if he, without any objection and without letting the tenant know his though process, continue to receive rent at intervals of several months, he cannot be allowed to spring a surprise on the tenant by suddenly starting a proceeding for eviction. Having lulled the tenant in the belief that things were all right, the landlord was under a duty to serve him with a notice demanding regular payment, if he wishes to insist upon it." Turning to the present case, the plaintiff received the rent and continued to receive the rent, as already stated, from the year 1954 till 1972 at inter­vals of several months without any objection. The pleading of the plaintiff also indicates that the rent was received whenever it was paid. There is no material to show that the plaintiff demanded the payment of rent regularly from month to month. Keeping the decisions in the above cited cases in view, I am of the opinion that the rent was payable at the convenience of the defendant-tenant, although the rent was normally payable from month to month. 10. Coming to the question of offer of the rent for the month of April by the defendant and refusal of the rent offered by the plaintiff, Mr.Sarma, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the State Rent Control Act has given a host of facilities to the tenant, but it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. Therefore, the tenant has to prove strictly that he made offer of the rent in time and that the offer was refused by the landlord and there­after he deposited the rent in the Court in accordance with law. In support of his contention, Mr. Sarma has drawn my attention to a series of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court. But, in this case, the question of offer of rent by the tenant and refusal of the offer by the landlord has little importance in view of the fact that the rent was payable at the convenience of the tenant. However, I shall examine if the defendant has proved the offer of the rent for the month of April and the refusal to accept the rent offered by the plaintiff and whether the deposit was made in accordance with law. The evidence of the defendant is that he offered rent for the month of April to the plaintiff and the plaintiff refused to accept the rent offered and demanded a higher rent of Rs.I200/- for the month of April and onwards. On refusal to accept the rent offered, he sent the rent for the month of April by money order. Ext 'Cha' indicates that a sum of Rs. 600/- was sent as a rent for the month of April, 1972 on 2.5.72, and the money order was returned on 22.5.72. Before the return of the money order the rent for the month of April was deposited on 8.5.72. As stated earlier, prior to April 1972, the rent was payable at the convenience of the defendant. Suddenly the mode of payment of rent was changed by the defendant in the month of May for the payment of rent of the month of April. The plaintiff in the cross-examination has stated that he demanded Rs. 1200/- a month, but the defendant neither paid that rent nor did he refused to pay. Therefore, the factum of demand of higher rent of Rs.1200/- a month was there. Considering the payment of rent on 11.3.72 for the months from 1.12.71 to 31.3.72 before the expiry of March 1972 the demand for enhanced rent was made from the month of April 1972 and onwards. The defendant was conscious or aware that a dispute might arise and, therefore, the defendant was to take care of the payment of rent. Considering the payment of rent on 11.3.72 for the months from 1.12.71 to 31.3.72 before the expiry of March 1972 the demand for enhanced rent was made from the month of April 1972 and onwards. The defendant was conscious or aware that a dispute might arise and, therefore, the defendant was to take care of the payment of rent. Otherwise, there was no need for offering and depositing the rent for the month of April as the rent was payable at the convenience of the tenant. The circumstances corroborate the evidence of the defendant that he offered the rent in the 1st week of May 1972. In that view of the matter, the defendant has proved that he offered the rent for the month of April in time and the plaintiff refused to accept the rent offered. As regards the deposit, Mr. Sarma, the learned counsel for the appell­ant, has drawn my attention to Ext. 9 the order sheets of the Assistant District Judge (1) Gauhati in Misc Case No 36 of 1972. The order dated 25.11.72 reads : "No steps taken. So the case is dismissed for want of steps." I am of the view that there is no provision under the Rent Control Act to dismiss such an application. It appears from the records that the process fee was paid. The order dated 18.8.72 in Ext 9 reads : "Notice has not been served after service. So await till 27.9.72." On 27.9.72 an order was passed to take steps within 7 days. The order does not show that the notice was returned unserved. The order also does not show that direction to take steps was made in presence of the defendant. For the reasons stated, the order dated 25.11.72 is of no consequence. 11. As regards the questions (3) and (4) relating to improvement, altera­tion, etc. no issue has been framed in this regard. The trial Court has also not given any finding. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the case may not be sent back on the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. As regards the questions (3) and (4) relating to improvement, altera­tion, etc. no issue has been framed in this regard. The trial Court has also not given any finding. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the case may not be sent back on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is well settled that when the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival cases and led all the evidence not only in support of their cases but also in refutation of the case of the other side, it cannot be said that absence of a specific issue is fatal to the case. Therefore, I am of the view that if there are sufficient material on record, appellate Court can decide the matter instead of remanding the case to the lower Court. 12. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff rented the godown and the gaddi-house to the defendant,the godown for storing goods and the gaddi-house for official work of the business. But the defendant without permission of the plaintiff set up a flourmill inside the godown causing damage to the godown. In spite of the protest of the plaintiff, the defendant also constructed a tin roofed first floor on the gaddi-house by removing tin sheets and after the construction of the first floor, the defendant has been using it for his residence. The case of the defendant is that, at first, the defendant rented the godown from the plaintiff for running flourmill and thereafter the defendant rented the other premises for residential purpose. The improvement, alteration or erection was made with the consent of the plaintiff. Ext. 'Pha', the Municipal holding Register of the year 1956-57 shows the existence of the mill house in the suit land. The evidence of the defendant is that they installed the mill in the year 1955 and permission was obtained in the year 1956 in the name of Lakshmi Flour Mills. Ext. Ha is the licence dated 25.5.56 granted by the Municipality for running a flour mill to the defendant for the owner of the Lakshmi Flour Mills. Ext Kaka the extract from the trade licence register oftheGauhati Municipality, reveals that the licence of the flourmill was renewed for the year 1960-61. Ext. Ha is the licence dated 25.5.56 granted by the Municipality for running a flour mill to the defendant for the owner of the Lakshmi Flour Mills. Ext Kaka the extract from the trade licence register oftheGauhati Municipality, reveals that the licence of the flourmill was renewed for the year 1960-61. The bills for supply of electricity energy to the flourmill and the receipts for the payment of the bills which are on records supports the fact that the mill was installed in the year 1955. The notice of eviction under section 106, TP Act, although it was not required, shows that the plaintiff considered the running of the mill as manufacturing purpose. Therefore, a six month notice was issued. The running of the mill was to the knowledge of the plaintiff and from the year of running of the mill till the institution of the suit, the plaintiff received the rent without any objection all along. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is concluded that the lease was for running of the flourmill. As regards the alteration of the suit premises, the factum of alteration, improvement or erection of the two storeyed building (which I shall refer to as the "construction") is not disputed. The question is whether the construction was with the consent of the plaintiff. The evidence of the plaintiff is that the construction was made without his permission or consent. Construction was made in spite of objection. The plaintiff raised the objection verbally. The evidence of the defendant is that the construction was with the permission or consent of the plaintiff and during the course of the construction, the plaintiff frequently came and looked into the works and gave suggestions regarding the works. The evidence of PW 2, an employee of the Gauhati Municipal Corpo­ration, is that the suit holding is in the name of the plaintiff Tilokchand in the register and in the register the existence of a two- storeyed building was shown. The receipts of rent without any objection are relevant. The evidence of PW 2 and the receipts of the rent without objection corroborate the evidence of the defendant that the construction was made with the permission and/or consent of the plaintiff-landlord. For these reasons it is held that the purpose of construction and the construction was made with the consent or permission of the plaintiff-landlord. 14. The evidence of PW 2 and the receipts of the rent without objection corroborate the evidence of the defendant that the construction was made with the permission and/or consent of the plaintiff-landlord. For these reasons it is held that the purpose of construction and the construction was made with the consent or permission of the plaintiff-landlord. 14. The contention of the plaintiff is that although the plaintiff knew the construction before the institution of the suit, the plaintiff is not debarred from instituting the suit for ejectment. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagat Ram Sethi vs. Rai Bahadur, AIR 1972 SC 1727 , in which it has been held : “We concur in the view of the High Court that mere inaction on the part of the lessor did not entitle the lessee to resist the suit on the ground of estoppel. The lessee bad the right under S. 108 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act to remove the constructions while he was in possession. There was no provision in that Act which debarred the lessor from deter­mining the lease under S. Ill merely because construction had been made by the lessee, even to the knowledge of the lessor, and from instituting the suit for ejectment." The principle in above decision shall not be applicable to the present case as the construction was made with the consent or permission of the plaintiff-landlord. 15. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the suit premises are bona fide required by the plaintiff-landlord for the purpose of re-construction and for his own occupation and for occupation of the members of the family and for running business of his own and his sons. 16. Under section 5 (c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, a tenant can be evicted "where the house is bona fide required by the landlord cither for purposes of repairs or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court." 17. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that there is no material and evidence on the record to show that the plaintiff-landlord has means or funds for re-construction, and that he has taken other steps in that regard and, therefore, the plaintiff has failed to prove the bona fide require­ment. The learned counsel has referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Panchmal Narayan vs. Basthi Shenoy, AIR 1971 SC 942 and has relied on the following observations : "No doubt, as to whether the landlord's requirement is reasonable and bona fide has to be judged by the surrounding circumstances, which will include his means for re-construction of the building, and other steps taken by him in that regard." The observations made in the above quoted passage have to read in the context of that case and the scheme of the Mysore Rent Control Act. 18. The expression 'bona fide' means 'honest' in the context. The bona fide requirement under the Act is to be inferred from the facts and circums­tances of each case. The Court has to take into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely having sufficient means or funds of the landlord for re-construction and also the existing condition of the building, its age and situation. In a sense, if the building happens to be dilapidated, it may be one of the circumstances for bona fide requirement of the landlord, though that by itself in the absence of any means or funds of the landlord for re-construction would not be sufficient. In other words. a landlord having means or funds for re-construction after demolishing the building by itself may not be sufficient to establish his bona fide requirement if the building happens to be of a very recent construction. Sufficient funds or means and other steps such as sanctioned plans from the concerned authority may be relevant factor for establishing bona fide requirement, if there is no oblique motive. What is to be established is the honest requirement in the circumstances. 19. Coming to the case on hand, the case of the plaintiff is that the suit premises are bona fide required by the plaintiff for re-construction and for iris own occupation and for occupation of the members of the family and for running business of his own and his sons. 19. Coming to the case on hand, the case of the plaintiff is that the suit premises are bona fide required by the plaintiff for re-construction and for iris own occupation and for occupation of the members of the family and for running business of his own and his sons. Three sons and one unmarried daughter of the plaintiff have grown up and one of the sons of the plaintiff has married and has two children. The plaintiff with his grown up family members has been residing in a rented house paying heavy rent and the rented house has no sufficient accommodation for residence of the growing family of t le plaintiff. The plaintiff has no other house or land at Guwahati besides the suit premises whereas the defendant has lands and houses in Guwahati for residence and running business. The evidence of the plaintiff is that the suit premises are required for his own use, and that the suit premises require repairs for being used as residence of his family and for business. Rented house in which he has been living is not sufficient for his family except the suit premises. He has no other land or house at Guwahati other than the suit house. His family consist of himself, his wife, one son and two daughters. Therefore, there is variance between the pleading and evidence. In his evidence the plaintiff has not stated the require­ment of the suit premises for re-construction and as such, the requirement for re-construction is not required to be dealt with. That apart, the plaintiff has not shown why his building other than the construction made by the defendant, requires re-construction after demolishing it and his means or funds for re-construction and other steps taken in that regard. As regards tie requirement of the plaintiff for his own occupation, as already stated, there is variance between the pleadings and evidence and at the same time it cannot be ignored that the plaintiff demanded higher rent of Rs. 1200/- from the month of April 1972 onwards and the defendant refused to pay the enhanced rent about which it has already been discussed above. The Court is to take into account all the surrounding circumstances. Therefore, the mere statement that the suit premises are required for his own use is not enough for proving bona fide requirement on facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is to take into account all the surrounding circumstances. Therefore, the mere statement that the suit premises are required for his own use is not enough for proving bona fide requirement on facts and circumstances of the case. The defendant's having other houses may be relevant for the purpose of ascertaining compa­rative hardship of the defendant and plaintiff, if the defendant is to be evicted, and not for bona fide requirement of the plaintiff. For these reasons, the plaintiff has failed to prove the bona fide requirement either for re-construction and/or for his own occupation and/or for occupation of the members of the family and/or doing business of his own or t is sons. Therefore, there is no material to interfere with the findings of the trial Judge. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.