JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - This is an application by the tenant under Articles 226 and 227 at the Constitution of India for the quashing of the appellate judgment dated 29-1-1983 in House Rent Control Appeal No. 5 of 1981, in exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction. 2. The case of the opposite party No. I-landlady in brief is as follows: The premises in question consisted of one shop room and a godown located on plot No. 99 in the daily market area of Rourkela town. Walls of the shop room originally were of wooden planks and (the roof was made of tiles. In 1975, asbestos sheets replaced the tiles. Ramdhin, the husband of the landlady, constructed the shop room as well as the godown and carried on business in spice till his death sometime in the year 1965. His widow, the landlady, carried on the business for sometime. Kuseswar, the younger brother of Ramdhin, let out the premises to the tenant since 2-11-1968 on a monthly rent of Rs. 141.00 as the power-of-attorney-holder of the landlady. Rent was being paid regularly till 1975 whereafter, the tenant stopped paying rent. After some improvements were made to the premises, he started paying rent till 2-9-1976 after which there was no payment and a claim was raised and steps were taken to grab the premises as the tenant's own. 3. The tenant-Petitioner denying the relationship of landlord and tenant averted that the land on which the premise stood was lying vacant till 1965. It was under the occupation of a distant relation of Kuseswar. He was a hawker in readymade garments in Rourkela and subsequently switched over to grocery business. He obtained the land and made a kuchha construction thereon and carried on business in grocery under the name and style of Ganesh Bhandar Grocery and Kirana Merchant. He paid tax to the tax contractor and to the N.A.C. He also paid ground rent to the N.A.C. The tenant took Kuseswar on his request as a sleeping partner in the grocery business. Dissension arose between them sometime later and document was executed dissolving the partnership. Later on he came to learn that he had been deluded and the document executed by him was a lease deed. Dissension arose between them sometime later and document was executed dissolving the partnership. Later on he came to learn that he had been deluded and the document executed by him was a lease deed. The tenant specifically challenged the authority of Kuseswar either to let out the premises to him if that was a fact or to institute the proceeding in respect of the premise in question. 4. It is worthwhile to mention here that Kuseswar claiming the property on which the premises stood to be his own had filed H.R.C. Case No. 24 of 1976 seeking eviction of the tenant Petitioner. Notice had been issued by his lawyer as per Annexure-1 dated 26-10-1976 claiming the property to be his own. The tenant had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between Kuseswar and himself. That case was allowed to be withdrawn on application of Kuseswar by order dated 6-1-1979, passed by the Controller. Kuseswar also filed Money Suit No. 54 of 1977 in the Court of the Munsif, Panposh for realisation of arrears of rent which is said to be still pending disposal. After withdrawal of H.R.C. Case No. 24 of 1976, H.R.C. Case No. 11 of 1979 was initiated in the name of Chameli Devi as the landlady through Kuseswar, her power-of-attorney-holder. The power-of-attorney was exhibited in the Court below as Ext. 1 and has been annexed to this writ application as Annexure-7. 5. Having regard to the pleas taken by the tenant refuting the allegation that Chameli was the owner of the premise and Kuseswar was her power-of-attorney-holder in respect of the premises, an application was filed by him before the House. Rent Controller for examination of Chameli as a witness. On behalf of the landlady, it was undertaken in the objection that she would appear and be examined as a witness before the Contractor. But she did neither appear nor examine herself as a witness. This conduct of the landlady has been used, as the trump card by the tenant-Petitioner. 6. On a consideration of the evidence, the Controller held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the landlady and the Petitioner. He believed the story as set forth by the tenant and dismissed the application. This conduct of the landlady has been used, as the trump card by the tenant-Petitioner. 6. On a consideration of the evidence, the Controller held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the landlady and the Petitioner. He believed the story as set forth by the tenant and dismissed the application. The appellate authority reversed the decision of the Controller in H.R.C. Appeal No. 5 of 1981 as per Annexure-10 holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant was established. The Petitioner was a wilful defaulter. He did not record a finding in favour of the landlady on the plea of bona fide requirement for personal use on which the eviction was also sought. 7. Mr. S. Misra-2 has strenuously urged that the appellate authority has not considered several relevant pieces of evidence slurred-over certain aspects which militated against the case of the landlady and on a superficial consideration of the evidence, recorded a finding that tile Petitioner had been inducted as a tenant in respect of the premises. It has been argued that Kuseswar had himself claimed the premises to be his own in the year 1976 not only in the notice issued by his lawyer as per Annexure-1 but also in H.R.C. Case No. 24 of 1976, vide copy of the application Annexure-2. The power-of-attorney as per Annexure-7 does not relate to the premises in question. Admittedly, there was another shop room in the market which originally belonged to Ramdhin and where admittedly Kuseswar was carrying on business. The power-of-attorney related to the said shop room. Claim of ownership by Kuseswar in the Lawyer's notice and the application in H.R.C. Case No. 24 of 1976 militated against the version relating to the power-of-attorney, as has been urged in the present proceeding. No reference was made to Chameli either in the notice or in the earlier proceeding. The lease deed, Annexure-II, made no reference to Chameli. From the document one gathers the impression that. Kuseswar was the owner. Though the appellate Court noticed the fact that undertaking had been given to produce Chameli, no adverse inference was drawn from the non-production. Mr. P.K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the landlady has submitted that the findings are pure questions of fact and this Court while exercising certiorari jurisdiction, is incompetent to re-appreciate the reassess the evidence and interfere with the findings howsoever erroneous the finding might he. Mr. P.K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the landlady has submitted that the findings are pure questions of fact and this Court while exercising certiorari jurisdiction, is incompetent to re-appreciate the reassess the evidence and interfere with the findings howsoever erroneous the finding might he. The findings recorded by the appellate Court are based on evidence. 8. No doubt, a finding can be reached ignoring the unfavourable aspects, if the evidence is marshalled towards a particular end. The appellate Court has) no doubt, reached the findings on the evidence. But there were various aspects which went abegging for answer. Let us deal with the power-of-attorney, Annexure-V, first. 9. It was in relation to a shop of spices. It was granted by Chameli. "My shop of spices situated at Daily Market, Rourkela". There is evidence that there are two shops. The land on which the shop stood had description by plot number, Khata number etc. The description of the land is missing from Annexure-7. It authorises Kuseswar to carry on business in the shop and do sundry acts in relation to the shop business. It does not authorise him to liquidate the business and set out the premises. It is well settled that a power-of-attorney must be strictly Construed. Bowstead on Agency has this to say: Power-of-attorney must be strictly perused and are construed as giving only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication. See also Poorna Chunder v. Prosunno, (1881) 7 Cal. 253. In Solema Bibi and Others Vs. Hafez Mahammad Hossein and Others, it was held, tat in the absence of an express power to mortgage, it was difficult to so that the terms of the ammukhtearnama could be construed as a power for giving mortgage. The same view has been taken in D.H.M. Framji v. The Eastern Union Bank Ltd. AIR 1951 P&H 371 . In the last case, it has been held that the operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals. It, therefore, follows that apart from absence of any specific reference to e premises in question, the power-of-attorney did not authorise Kuseswar to grant lease of the premises to the tenant. 10. It has been urged by Mr. In the last case, it has been held that the operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals. It, therefore, follows that apart from absence of any specific reference to e premises in question, the power-of-attorney did not authorise Kuseswar to grant lease of the premises to the tenant. 10. It has been urged by Mr. P.K. Misra for opposite party No. 1 that the authority of the agent may be express or implied (Section 186 of the Contract Act) but what authority was really conferred and what was not are questions which concern the principal and agent alone. Third persons are only to rely on the apparent state of the things which indicate the character which the principal has given to his agent, or in which he holds himself out. Even if the agent had no authority, it could later on be ratified. The questions of authority are, therefore, matters between the principal and the agent. Third party has no locus standi to reason how and why. Section 188 of the Contract Act defines the extent of the authority of the agent by stating that an agent having authority to do an act has authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary to do such act, namely, such acts, unless contrary is expressed as are naturally and ordinarily done in such a case and which are reasonably necessary and proper to be done in the case in order to, carry out into effect the main authority conferred. It further states that an agent having authority to carry on business has authority to do every lawful thing necessary for the purpose or usually done in the course of conducting such business. Mr. S. Misra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has urged that the various clauses of the power-of-attorney granted authority to Kuseswar to do such acts as were usually done in the course of conducting the business. It did not authorise him to close down the business and let out the shop room., Section 189, however, authorises the agent in an emergency to do such acts for, the purpose of protecting his principal from loss as would be done by a person of ordinary prudence, in his own case, under similar circumstances." However, a power-of-attorney must be strictly construed as giving only such authority as it confers expressly or by necessary implication. these aspects are, however, not much relevant because we are not engaged in resolving the dispute between the principal and the agent. We are not determining to what extent the principal is bound by the acts of the agent. The power-of-attorney is being considered against the background of the probability of the story as put forward by Kuseswar. 11. If the premises belonged to Chameli and were let out to the Petitioner, how was it that as late as in 1976 a lawyer's notice was issued as per Annexure-1 arid a proceeding under the House Rent Control Act was instituted by Kuseswar claiming the premises as his own. If in 1975, the tiles gave way to asbestos sheets through repairs undertaken by Kuseswar how was it that in the lawyer's notice the premises in question were described as having country tile roof. If the lease was granted in November, 1968, how was, it that municipal tax was collected from the tenant-Petitioner in 1967? How could the landlady referred to only one shop in the power-of-attorney when according to the case, she bad two shops? The power of-attorney, therefore, militated against her case that she had two shops. These were the aspects which could be answered only by Chameli. Though an undertaking was given on behalf of the landlady that she would appear and depose, she" did not. It has been urged that she was withheld. Adverse inference was, therefore, available to be drawn. For the non-examination of the landlady, the lower appellate Court disbelieved her case of bona fide requirement for Personal use. That was not the only consequence that flowed from her non-examination. It could he urged that adverse inference was available to be drawn that bad she been produced and examined, she would have disowned Kuseswar, the power-of-attorney's story of lease in favour of the Petitioner and her ownership of the premises. There were various aspects of the execution of the power-of-attorney which were placed before the lower appellate Court but were ignored by it while drawing adverse inference. Drawing of adverse inference was in the discretion of the appellate Court. Applying the principle of law laid down in Chinta Narayanamma v. Kholli Sahu and Ors. 51 (1982) CLT 159, it rejected the story of bona fide requirement for personal use, but did not consider the impact of her non-examination on the other questions. Drawing of adverse inference was in the discretion of the appellate Court. Applying the principle of law laid down in Chinta Narayanamma v. Kholli Sahu and Ors. 51 (1982) CLT 159, it rejected the story of bona fide requirement for personal use, but did not consider the impact of her non-examination on the other questions. What would have been its conclusion it is not for us to hazard. But in our view the aforesaid features were not considered while recording findings. It merely noted certain facts. But, what impact the facts had on the case in general, it did not consider. If the landlady's case is disbelieved on the aforesaid aspects, the story of execution of the sale deed by the tenant, the panchayatnama and the oral evidence would recede to the background. If, however, on appreciation of the aforesaid materials, findings are recorded against the tenant, the features noticed just above would bolster the case of the landlady. 12. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellate authority having ignored and slurred over certain material features of the case has rendered the appellate judgment vulnerable to interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction. Hence, we quash the appellate judgment as per Annexure-10 and remit the matter to it for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the appellate Court on 18th of June, 1990, when further direction regarding hearing of the appeal shall be given. There would be no order as to costs. B.L. Hansaria, C.J. I agree. Ordered accordingly.