Judgment S. P. Rajkhowa J: 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and dated 24th June, 1986 passed by Sri A.K. Biswas, Asst. District 2nd court, Howrah dismissing the Title Suit no. 84 of 1983. 2. The plaintiff appellant filed the aforesaid suit for eviction of the defendant/respondent from the suit property and for khas possession. 3. The plaint case in• brief is that the plaintiff along with the proforma defendants purchased the property comprised in Municipal holding no. 55 and 148 J. N. Mukherjee Road (formerlv 61. Old Choosuri Road, P. S Golabari at present Thana (Malipanchghora) Salkia District Howrah by various deeds in definite shares which have been tabulated in the 1st para of the plaint. The plaintiff has held more then 50% of the share in the land of the said holdings and the plain riff alone purchased the structures and machineries etc. that stood on the holdings for valuable considerations. The plaintiff is occupying the share of the proforma defendants as a tenant under the proforma defendants for which they are realising rents from the plaintiff The vendors of the plaintiff and the proforma defendants by a deed of lease dated 20.9.52 had leased out the said holdings in favour of M/s. Imperial Jute Press (P) Ltd. for short TJP. having its head office at 12, Dalhousie Square, East, Calcutta-1 for a period of 31 years and the said company during the tenure of the lease granted licence to the defendant for a period of one year, from 1.7.78 to 30.6.79 in respect of the three god own nos. 7A, SA and 9A standing on the said holdings for the purpose of pressing jute, caddies, hessian rags etc. on agreed licence fees. Subsequently, such licence was also granied for the period from 1 7.79 to 306.80. After the expiry of this period no further licence was granted. Such licence at all material times was approved by the Calcutta Hydraulic Press Association, for short C.R P.A. On expiry of such licence on 30.6.80 the said I.J.P. through their learned Advocate Sri B.B. Koley by a letter dated 11.8.80 demanded hack possession of the suit property from the defendant as the defendant failed to vacate the suit proper to on the expiry of 30.6.80. I.J P. by a deed of surrender dated 10.9.80 surrendered the lease in favour of the plaintiff and the proforma defendants who had by then become the owners/landlords of the suit property. In view of this, the defendant approached and requested the plaintiff to allow some time to vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the suit property and allow him temporary baling opera1 ions as per the rules and regulations of C.H.P.A. Such agreements were made on or about 10.9.80. According to Such arrangements the defendant could carryon temporary being operations as a licensee under the plaintiff. It was agreed by and between the plaintiff and the defendant that the latter would pay to the former initially a sum of Rs.40,000/- towards licence fee for use and occupation of the suit property commencing from 109 so at the rate approved and charged by the CHPA from time to time. The defendant by four different cheques of Rs. 10,000/each had already paid Rs. 40.000/- to the plaintiff as per aforesaid arrangements. The defendant has been carrying on baling and pressing of jute, caddies etc. and the plaintiff is also entitled to recover from the defendant such pressing charges and licence fees at the scheduled rate prescribed CHPA. The plaintiff through his Advocate Sri Subrata Kr. Banerjee revoked and determined the licence with the expiry of March 1983 as per letter dated 21.283 which was duly received by the defendant. In spite of the receipt of the letter determining the licence, the defendant continued to use and occupy the suit property wrongfully. Hence the plaintiff filed the suit for eviction of the defendant and for khas possession. 4. Defendant no. 1 had contested the suit by filing a written statement denying all the material allegations brought by the plaintiff. Defendant no. 1 has contended inter alia that the answering defendant was inducted in the year of 1965 in respect of godown no. 9A with Darwan quarters (one room) for Facility of baling and pressing agreement by the then landlord UP. The Tenacy was taken and baling charges were being paid as per rates fixed by the CHPA. There was no connection with the CHPA with regard to the Tenancy as the rent was realised by the landlord UP. Subsequently other god owns were also taken. The answering defendant held godown no. 8 all along under UP. The Tenacy was taken and baling charges were being paid as per rates fixed by the CHPA. There was no connection with the CHPA with regard to the Tenancy as the rent was realised by the landlord UP. Subsequently other god owns were also taken. The answering defendant held godown no. 8 all along under UP. After the present plaintiff became landlord, the answering defendant was also given godown no. 8A. This defendant discontinued the baling and pressing agreement with CHPA from 1st July 1979 whereupon the UP sent a letter through an Advocate Sri B. B. Koley on 2nd September. 1980 and sought to make out a case that along with the baling agreement the tenancy of the defendant also expired with 30th June 1980 and asked the defendant to vacate the premises or otherwise to send the dispute to arbitration in terms of the Clause of the agreement with the CHPA. The defendant sent a letter through his Advocate Sri Ganesh Prasad Das on 20th Septemher 1980 by registered post with acknowledgement due to Sri B. B. Koley. Advocate of the UP in which it was specifically stated that the defendant was in occupation of four godowns and for such occupation, the charges were paid to U.P. Sri .B B. Koley also sent a letter dated 12/15th September IYSO admitting the position that his letter dated 11.8 80 was written on nOli ('Sf fncruf1J. Under the circumstances the answering defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. On the above pleadings. the following issues were settled 1. Is the suit maintainable? 2. Has the plaintiff any cause of action to bring the suit? 3. Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit property and khas possession from the defendant? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree for a sum of Rs. 1,20,681.66p. on account of arrear of licence fees from 10.9.80 to 31.3.83 ? 5. Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree for a sum of Rs. 17,975.00 as pressing charges for the period 1.6.82 to 2.11 82 ? 6. J s the defendant a tenant in respect of the suit property? 7. To what other relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 6 The learned trial judge dismissed the suit on contest with cost to defendant no. 17,975.00 as pressing charges for the period 1.6.82 to 2.11 82 ? 6. J s the defendant a tenant in respect of the suit property? 7. To what other relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 6 The learned trial judge dismissed the suit on contest with cost to defendant no. I and ex-parte without cost to the rest of the defendants, holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to get a decree for eviction as the defendant is the tenant in respect of the suit properly. Similarly he held that the plaintiff is riot entitled to get any decree on account of arrear pressing charges. Hence the appeal. 7. The prime consideration before us is whether the defendant/respondent is a tenant or a licensee under the plaintiff/appellant. Legal brains not only in our country but also in other parts of the globe have been greatly exercised in determining wJ1ether a given case comes within the ambit of lease or licence, in view of the fact that the border line between these two is very thin. Learned counsel on both sides have therefore, cited a plethora of decisions before us. We prepose to make discreet uses of the reported decisions as far as practicable. Without mincing words, we would like to say at the outset that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, reported in AIR 1959 SC 1262 provide us with a good guidance as it still holds the field In this reported case, the Supreme Court has observed that where the question is whether the document is a lease or a licence, it is the substance of the agreement that matters and not the form, for otherwise clever drafting can camouflage the real intention of the parties. Thus observing, the Supreme Court has formulated the following propositions in order to ascertain whether a document is a lease or a licence : (1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or a lease the substance of the document must he preferred to the form: (2) The real test is the intention of the parties whether they intended to create a lease or a licence: (3) If the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease but, if it only permits another to make use of the property of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence, and (4) If under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is considered to he it tenant, hut circumstance may be established which negative the intention to create a lease. 8. While setting forth the above propositions, the Supreme Court has also observed that at one time it was thought that the test of exclusive possession was infallible and if a person was given exclusive possession of a premises it would conclusively establish that he was a lessee. But the Supreme Court goes on to say that there was a change in the outlook and the recent trend of judicial opinion is reflected in Errington v. Errington (1952) 1 All ER 149, wherein Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the subject has summarised the result of his discussion thus :"The result of all these cases is that although a person who is let into exclusive possession is, 'prima facie' to be considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy". The learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to .1960 (1) All ER 348, Isaac v. Hotel de Paris Ltd. Lord Denning, presiding over Privy Council, observed in this case that the relationship between the parties was that of licensor and licensee even though "there was exclusive possession by the appellant and acceptance of the amount of the rent by the respondent Company, the circumstances and conduct of the parties showing that all that was intended was that the appellant should have a personal privilege of running a night bar at the P. Hotel with no interest in the land at all. This change and trend of judicial opinion are reflected in later decisions of the Supreme Court, Such as AIR 1968 SC 175 , B M. Lal v. Dunlop Rubber Co. and AIR 1988 SC 1845 Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. M/s. Chokosiri & Co. It has been held in Club Walla's case ( AIR 1965 SC 610 ) that the intention has 10 be ascertained from the provisions of the agreement. In absence of formal document, intention is to be gathered from the surrounding circumstances and if the document is of no help. then from the conduct of the parties, A lease as defined in s. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, is a transfer of a right to enjoy the premises and a licence as difined in s. 52 of the Indian Easement Act is a privilege to do some thing on the premises which otherwise would be unlawful. Bearing in mind the tests propounded by the apex Court to be applied to ascertain whether an agreement is a lease or a licence and also bearings in mind the definitions of these two terms as discussed above, we propose to have a close look at the pleadings of the parties, and the evidence adduced by them, documents in particular. 9. The plaintiff has stated in para 3 of the plaint that the vendor of the plaintiff and the proforma defendants by deed of lease dated 20.9.1952 had leased out the suit holding in favour of I.J.P. having its head office at 12, Dalhousie Square East, Calcutta-1 for a period of 31 years and the said I.J.P. during the tenure of lease granted licence to the defendant for a period of one year, i.e. from 1.7.1978 to 30.6.1979 in respect of the three godowns vs. godown nos. 7A. 8A and 9A standing on the said holdings (hereinafter referred to as the. suit property) for the purpose of pressing jute, caddies, hessian, rags etc. on agreed license fee. Subsequently, such licence was also granted for the period from 17.1979 to 30.6.1980. But after the expiry of 1 his period no further licence was granted. In the paragraphs following para 3. suit property) for the purpose of pressing jute, caddies, hessian, rags etc. on agreed license fee. Subsequently, such licence was also granted for the period from 17.1979 to 30.6.1980. But after the expiry of 1 his period no further licence was granted. In the paragraphs following para 3. the plaintiff has stated that on expiry of the licence on 30.6.1980 I.J.P. through their learned Advocate Sri B.B. Kaley by a letter dated 11.8.1980 demanded back possession of the suit property from the defendant, as the defendant failed to vacate the suit property on the expiry of 306 1980. Subsequent thereto I.J.P. by a deed of surrender dated 10.9.80 surrendered the lease in favour of the plaintiff and the proforma defendants who had by then become the owners/land/order of the suit property. In view of the aforesaid notice of demand and in view of the aforesaid surrender, the defendant approached and requested the plaintiff to allow some time to vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the suit property and allow him temporary baling operations as per the rules and regulations of CHPA and that agreement was made on or about 10.9.80 and according to such agreement the defendant could carryon temporary baling operations as a licence under the plaintiff. It was further agreed by and between the plaintiff and the defendant that the defendant would pay to the plaintiff initially a sum of Rs. 40,000/- towards licence fee for the use and occupation of the suit property by the defendant commencing from 10.9.80 at the rate approved by the CHPA from time to time. As per this agreement, the defendant by four different cheques of Rs. 10,000/- each had already paid Rs. 40,000/- to the plaintiff. The above pleading have been denied by the defendant in para 9 and in subsequent paragraphs of the written statement. According to the defendant it is absolutely false that IJP during the tenure of the lease granted license to the defendant for a period of one year from 1.7.1978 to 30.6.1979 or that subsequently licence was granted for the period from 1.7.1979 to 30.6 ]980. Defendant also denied any agreement with the plaintiff to carry on temporary haling operations as a licensee but has stated in the paragraph 12 of the written statement that it is substantially correct that the defendant by four different cheques paid Rs. Defendant also denied any agreement with the plaintiff to carry on temporary haling operations as a licensee but has stated in the paragraph 12 of the written statement that it is substantially correct that the defendant by four different cheques paid Rs. 40.000/- to the plaintiff but that it was not on account of alleged licence fees but purely on account of rent. The learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the contradictory statement of the defendant in the written statement in para 19 the 1st sentence of which runs as follows: "That the answering defendant was indl1cted in the year 1965 in respect of godown no. 9A with Darwan quarter". But the said paragraph ends with the following sentence "After the present plaintiff became landlord the defendant was also given godown no. 9A which this defendant is in possession". From the records it is seen that the plaintiff became owners in 1978. So there is apparent contradiction in the contentions of the defendants. May be that there is something wrong somewhere. Exhibit 22 is a letter dated 26th August, 1970 from CHPA to the defendant regarding baling arrangements. By this letter, the CHPA confirmed the arrangements arrived at with the defendant for baling during the season 1970-71. It is seen from this letter that the defendant had undertaken not to pack directly in any other Press House during the year in question. Clause 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) of this letter are very much reproduce below. "3(a) During the continuance of this agreement/contract, expressly subject to and conditional upon the terms mentioned herein you will be entitled to use a portion of the Press House and godowns on payment of a fee at the rate of Rs. 20/- for ground from and Rs. 15/- for upper floor per 100 sq. ft. per month amounting to Rs. 1995/- per month. You will vacate the same on the date of expiry of this contract if not renewed, this condition being the very essence of this facility placed at your disposal". "3(b) During the continuance of this agreement/contract you will be entitled to store Jute, Jute Cuttings, Jute Rejections, Caddis, Hemp, Hemp Nets, Hessian Rags, Aloe Fibre, Cotton, Cotton Waste, Silk, Silk Waste, Hosiery, Wool, Goat Hair and Old Gunny Bags and no other articles except with the written permission of the Press House, in the said Press House's godown. "3(b) During the continuance of this agreement/contract you will be entitled to store Jute, Jute Cuttings, Jute Rejections, Caddis, Hemp, Hemp Nets, Hessian Rags, Aloe Fibre, Cotton, Cotton Waste, Silk, Silk Waste, Hosiery, Wool, Goat Hair and Old Gunny Bags and no other articles except with the written permission of the Press House, in the said Press House's godown. ' "3(c) On the faith of the representation that you shall pack a minimum of number of bales you will be entitled to. us during the continuance of this agreement/contract for every 12,000 pucca bales of Jute and/or any other commodity mentioned in paragraph 3(b) above, a god own space of 10,000 sq. ft. i.e. 5000 sq. ft. upper floor and 5000 sq. ft. ground floor (which will vary proportionately) for storage and assorting kutcha and/or pucca bales of the commodity packed on payment of the fee at the rate mentioned in 3(a) above. 10 The arrangements made in exhibit 15 are on the same line a, in exhibit 22. Clause 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) of exhibit 15 are verbatim reproduction of Clauses 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) of exhibit 22. The message given to the defendant in exhibit 15 and exhibit 22 are crystal clear and leaves no ambiguity as to the intention of the parties concerned. It is stated in clear terms that the agreement is subject to and conditional upon the terms mentioned therein and that the defendant shall be entitled to use a portion of the Press House and godowns on payment of a fee (stress is ours). The fee was fixed at the rate of Rs. 10/- per 100 sq. ft and the fee could vary depending upon the total space occupied for a particular year. The terms and conditions, especially those contained in Clause 3(a) and 3(c) make it quite clear that the arrangement regarding the godowns was inextricably connected with 1he agreement for baling and that the extent of the godown space to be made available depended upon the extent of the user of the baling facility. Thus the agreements regarding baling and the user of godown space were not totally separate arrangements as sought to be made out by the learned Advocate for the respondent. Thus the agreements regarding baling and the user of godown space were not totally separate arrangements as sought to be made out by the learned Advocate for the respondent. For availing of the baling facilities in a proper way, the customer required some covered space for keeping the raw materials and the finished products and it is because of this that the user of god own space was made available to him. Thus the availability of godown space and the extent thereof were conditioned upon and ancillary to the booking of baling facilities and extent 1 hereof. 11. The details of godwns for baling operations during various seasons and the license fees to be paid by the defendant have been clearly stated in the exhibits 22, 22(a), 22(b), 22(c), 22(d), 22(e) and (f) which are the arrangements made by the CHPA with the defendant and the defendant had confirmed those arrangements. The parties had therefore, no doubt at all in their minds as to their intentions as to the user of the godowns. The learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to exhibit which is a receipt given by the plaintiff to the defendant as showing receiving rent for July and August 1979 from the defendant. He has given much stress on the word 'Rent' used in exhibit F and from this use of the word 'Rent" he has submitted that this is a clear indication of the suit property being tenanted to the defendant by the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the appellant has joined issue in this regard with the learned counsel for the respondent and has referred to AIR 1963 SC 1459 , State of Punjab v. British India Corporation Ltd. in which it has been observed that the word 'Rent' in its wider sense means any payment made for the use of land and building and thus includes the payment by a licemee in respect of the use and Occupation of any land and building. In its narrower sense it means payment made by tenant to landlord for property demised to him. After surveying the broad spectrum of the case before us we hold the view that the word 'Rent' used in exhibit F is to be taken in its wider sense to mean payment of license fee by the defendant. In its narrower sense it means payment made by tenant to landlord for property demised to him. After surveying the broad spectrum of the case before us we hold the view that the word 'Rent' used in exhibit F is to be taken in its wider sense to mean payment of license fee by the defendant. Reference may be made in this connection to a large number of-receipts issued in favour of the respondent by the appellant's predecessor against payment of "license Fees" For occupation of the godowns (Ex 9 to 9(m) and against payment for use of the godowns (Ex g to g(52)). It is significant that the respondent went on accepting such receipts without any protect over such a long period or time. It appears that defendant has been in occupation of the suit property since before plaintiff came into the picture and has been continuously occupying the premises since 1965. P. W. 2 Sudhirlal Banerjee, Accountant of the IJP has stated in his cross• examination that the lock and key of the godowns; were with defendant no. 1 and the use of the godown was under the control of the defendant no. 1. Thus it is clear from the evidence on record that the defendant has been in exclusive possession of the suit premises. At the same time, we find that this exclusive possession of the defendant has not created any interest in his favour in the suit property. He has been simply using the suit property as a licensee and the licence was renewed from year to year upon conditions as stipulated in the agreements as per exhibit 15 and exhibit 22 series. The control and possession of the defendant over the suit premises were restricted in such a way that on violation of the conditions imposed, the defendant was liable to be ousted from the suit premises at once without any notice. 12. The defendant was never left in darkness as to his status as a licensee in respect of the suit property. He was simply enjoying a privilege to use the suit premises without accrual of any interest in it. His continued long occupation does not make any difference. 12. The defendant was never left in darkness as to his status as a licensee in respect of the suit property. He was simply enjoying a privilege to use the suit premises without accrual of any interest in it. His continued long occupation does not make any difference. By applying the tests propounded by the Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. (supra) we have no hesitation in coming to a definite finding that the defendant was nothing but a licensee in respect of the suit premises. 13. Sri Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has added a new dimension to the arguments of both sides by raising an issue which was not raised before the trial court. He has challenged the title of the appellant to the suit premises. Although title had not been challenged in the trial court, yet as it is a question of law, we have allowed Sri Dutra to address us on this point to which learned Counsel for the appellant has also made his submissions. We would, therefore, deal with the question of title of the appellant to the suit premises. 14. Section 116 of the Evidence Act enjoins that "No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property: and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time that such license was given. But relying on a decision of this Court as reported in 1985 (II) ILR Calcutta 5/9 and relying on AIR 1982 SC/2/3 Sri Dutta has submitted that the title of the plaintiff may be challenged in a case where the premises were in possession of a tenant, but the property changes hands and the tenant remains in possession. The learned counsel for the respondent has further argued that the plaintiff is not sole lessor and that other three proforma defendants are also the owners of the suit land and the structures. The learned counsel for the respondent has further argued that the plaintiff is not sole lessor and that other three proforma defendants are also the owners of the suit land and the structures. Conceding for the sake of argument that the plaintiff is a part owner of the suit premises, the learned counsel argues that on the whole the plaintiff is nothing hut a co-sharer in respect of the suit property and he cannot get recovery of the suit godowns when the other owners have not joined with the plaintiff. He goes on to submit that the proforma defendants who are the other owners of the suit property, in about only 1985 let out their share of land to the plaintiff as per exhibit 3, 3(a), 3(b) i.e. long after institution of the suit on 13th September, 1983 and therefore, according to the learned counsel, on the day of institution of the suit, the plaintiff was neither the sole owner of the land nor of the structures. Countering these arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondent, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the plaintiff as part owner of the suit property is competent to bring a suit without joining the other co-sharers a plaintiffs and has relied upon a decision of t his Court reported in 71 CWN 17. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that according to the provision of s. 108 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act, when the lessee IJP has failed to remove the structures before surrender of the lease on 10th September 1980, the same would automatically vest in the lessor Although the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted his points of view in a subtle way, we are not convinced with his line of argument. The proforma defendants may be co-owners in respect of the suit property. But even though they were arrayed as parties to the suit, they have not come forward to challenge the title and ownership of the plaintiff. In this connection the evidence of PWI Indar Chand Mahnot, an employee of the plaintiff firm, is worth mentioning. He has inter alia stated that the plaintiff company holds more than 50% share in the suit land. There are structures on the land and the plaintiff alone is the owner of the structures. In this connection the evidence of PWI Indar Chand Mahnot, an employee of the plaintiff firm, is worth mentioning. He has inter alia stated that the plaintiff company holds more than 50% share in the suit land. There are structures on the land and the plaintiff alone is the owner of the structures. The plaintiff is occupying the share of the proforma defendants as a tenant under them for which the proforma defendants are realising the rent from the plaintiff and that plaintiff company purchased the structures and machineries etc. from UP. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant has cited Terunnanse v. Terunnanse, (1978) 1 All ER 651 which was a case on the point of license. The Privy Counsel held in that case that for the purpose of estoppel it would not be necessary to consider what the appellant's title truly was, for estoppel depended on what title the appellant was apparently claiming and whether, by conduct, the respondent acknowledged it. In the case before us we have seen that the defendant had admitted the plaintiff as its landlord as per para 11 of the written statement and, therefore, in our opinion, the defendant is estopped from questioning the title of the plaintiff. 15. In view of our above discussions we hold that the learned trial judge erred in law in holding that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff. Our definite finding is that the defendant was nothing but a licensee under the plaintiff. The defendant shall be deemed to be a tresspasser in respect of the suit property on and from the date of revocation of the licence. We come to the logical conclusion that the impugned judgment and decree cannot be sustained in law and, therefore, we hold the view that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for and we order that the appeal be and the same is allowed on contest. The impugned judgment and decree are set aside. The suit stands decreed. The defendant/respondent is directed to give vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff/appellant within 8 (eight) weeks from this nay and till the expiry of the said eight weeks the decree pas-ed in this appeal shall not be executable. It is also decreed that the respondent shall pay the sum of Rs. 1,20,681.66p. The suit stands decreed. The defendant/respondent is directed to give vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff/appellant within 8 (eight) weeks from this nay and till the expiry of the said eight weeks the decree pas-ed in this appeal shall not be executable. It is also decreed that the respondent shall pay the sum of Rs. 1,20,681.66p. on account of arrear licence fees for the period from 10th September 1980 to 31st March 1983. The respondent shall also pay a sum of Rs. 17,975/- as pressing charges for the period from 1st June 1982 to November 1982. It is further decreed in a preliminary way that the respondent shall pay damages to the appellant equivalent to the amount of licence fee from April 1983 till ejectment from the suit property. The plaintiff/appellant shall pay additional court fees on account of the amount to be assessed as such damages by the learned court below on the appellant's applications for making such assessment and making the decree for future damages final. The respondent shall pay the cost of both the suit and the appeal. Certified copies, if applied for, must be supplied by the office as early as possible. S. S. Ganguly. J : I agree. Appeal allowed with costs; Suit decreed with arrear licence fees and damages.