MURLIDHER RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition under Articles 228 and 227 of the Constitution of india, is filed by tenant of premises no. 48, Old No. 1/3 Linden Street, palmgrove Road, Austin Town, Bangalore. Respondents 1 an. d 2 are father and son ; Respondents 3 and 4 are the other sons of respondent-1; they are the owners; it is stated in the order that it is a joint family property. Premises was leased to petitioner in 1969. It is a residential building. It is the case of the owners that though the leasing of the premises was illegal, in the sense, that vacancy had not been intimated and the leasing was not through the instrumentality of the Rent Controller, it was regularised under Section 31-B and 31-C of the Act. Sab-Section (2) of Section 31-C provides that on an order of regularisation being passed under sub-section (1) of Section 31-C the tenant shall be deemed to be an allottee under section 5 of the karnataka Rent Control Act. Sub-Section (3) of Section 31-C reads thus :~" (3) The prvoisions of sub-section (3) of Section 4 and Section 10a shall not apply when an order under sub-section (1) is made". ( 2 ) SUB-SECTION (3) of Section 4deals with conviction of landlord who has contravened sub-section (1) and (2) of section 4. In other words, with the regularisation, the landlord, who would otherwise be liable for conviction gets an immunity and in law he is treated as having not contravened the provisions of section 4. Further, the tenant, after regularisation cannot be proceeded with under section 10-A of the Karnataka Rent Control Act i. e. , eviction by the controller of an occupant in contravention of section 4. Thus by regularisation the landlord and tenant are the beneficiaries and both stand to gain for getting exemption from penal consequences. The illegal act, done jointly gets legalised. Such being the legal position, the respondents landlords sought eviction of tenant-petitioner under section 21 (1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control act for their bona fide use arid occupation in H. R. C. 3078/88 before the court of Snail Causes at Bangaloreand the same is pending. The illegal act, done jointly gets legalised. Such being the legal position, the respondents landlords sought eviction of tenant-petitioner under section 21 (1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control act for their bona fide use arid occupation in H. R. C. 3078/88 before the court of Snail Causes at Bangaloreand the same is pending. At ihis stage the owners have filed a petition before the rent Controller seeking summary eviction of the tenant under Section 21a of the Act The Rent Controller inspite of the objections has allowed that petition and has directed eviction of the tenant. it is this order that is challenged in this Writ Petition. ( 3 ) THE questions that crop up forconsideration are : (1) Whether the Rent and Accommodation controller has competency and jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the landlord to evict his tenant under Section 21a (1) or (2) of the Act ? (2) Whether the order of the Rent controller is arbitrary and capricious ? ( 4 ) TO appreciate the severalpoints that arise for consideration it becomes necessary to refer to some of the important provisions of the Act. THE non-obstante clause in section 21 (1) reads thus :- 21 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant ; provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :-" (Italic words is mine) ( 5 ) UNDER this clause no order forrecovery of possession of any premises in favour of landlord against a tenant can be made by any Court or authority, except on grounds provided in clauses (a) to (p) of that Section by the Court. Obviously therefore an order of eviction in favour of landlord and against a tenant can be passed only by the Court and not by any other Authoritythe jurisdiction being exclusive. Obviously therefore an order of eviction in favour of landlord and against a tenant can be passed only by the Court and not by any other Authoritythe jurisdiction being exclusive. Among the several grounds for eviction, one ground which needs a mention, in the context of the facts of this case, is clause (p) which reads thus :-" (P) that the tenant whether before or after the coming into operation of this Part has built, or acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a suitable building,"on 20th August 1976 section was amended so as to enable an allottee tenant to seek summary eviction of his tenant, through the Prescribed Authority i. e. . Controller, if the allottee- tenant having constructed or acquired a house is not in a position to vacate the allotted house within one year from 20-5-1s76 and shift to his own house or having vacated the house seeks possession of his own house. The eviction or the tenant r,e. , allotteetenant's tenant shall be done after summary enquiry and by the use of force, if necessary and the Controller shall put the allottee-tenant in possession of his own building. The expression ' his own building" occurring in clauses (a), (b) and {c} refer to the building of allottee-tenant. On putting the allottee-tenant in possession of his own building the scheme is complete and the allotted house occupied by the allottee since vacated becomes available to the Rent Controller proceeding under Part II. On a piain reading of section 21 and 21-A it becomes manifest that they operate in two different situations: Under Section 21 the order of eviction is in favour of landlord against his tenant to be passed by the Court; Under Section 21-A the act of eviction is resorted to, if necessary, by force, by the Prescribed authority who will, after evicting the tenant put the allottee-tenant in possession of "his own building". The order of eviction passed by Court is revisable under Section 50 whereas the order of eviction passed by the controller is final and it can only be challenged in Writ Jurisdiction. That such is the intention of these provisions is made clear in Mohamed Kaleemulla v House Rent and Accommodation controller (1 988 (2) Kar. L. J. 269 : ilr 1988 Karnataka 2609 ). That such is the intention of these provisions is made clear in Mohamed Kaleemulla v House Rent and Accommodation controller (1 988 (2) Kar. L. J. 269 : ilr 1988 Karnataka 2609 ). In coming to such conclusion I relied upon Bench decisions of this Court in Srinivas vakil and others v State of Karnataka and others (1979 (2) Kar. LJ. Sh, N. 104 (DB) : AIR 1980 Karnataka 44) dr. R. Rajasekhar v Narayan (1987 (2) kar. L. J. Sh. N. 325 : I. L. R. 1987 Karnataka 757) and the submission made by the High Court Government Pleader, who clearly stated that there is no provision in the Act enabling the controller to pass an order of eviction in favour of landlord against his tenant, ( 6 ) THIS brings me to consider thescope of Section 21a (1) (a) and 21-A (2 ). These provisions read thus:21-A (1) (A) notwithstanding anything in this Act, on and from the date of coming into force of this Section, any person who is in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the controller, shall, within one year from the said date vacate such building if he owns in his name or in the name of any member of his family, a residential building in the same city, town or village (hereinafter referred to as 'his own building') :21-A (2) notwithstanding anything in this Act, any person who being in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment bf the Controller acquires or constructs on or after the 20th day of August 1976 either in his own name of any member of the family a residential building in the same city, town or village shall within such time as may be prescribed vacate the building of which he is the tenant (emphasis added) ( 7 ) IT is manifest that both theseprovisions apply to allottee-tenants who are in occupation of allotted premises. The distinctive features in the above two sub-sections are emphasised to understand the different scopes and the purposes for which they are enacted. Under clause (a) the allottee-tenant shall vacate the alloted premises within one year from 20-8-1976 i. e. , before 20-8-1977 if he owns in his name or in the name of member of his family a residential building, called as ' his own building". Under clause (a) the allottee-tenant shall vacate the alloted premises within one year from 20-8-1976 i. e. , before 20-8-1977 if he owns in his name or in the name of member of his family a residential building, called as ' his own building". Sub-Section 2 of Sec. 21-A refers to a situation where the allottee-tenant acquires or constructs a residential building on and after 20-8-1976, that is to say any time thereafter, a residential building in his name or in the name of member of his family, he shall vacate the allotted premises within such time as may be prescribed. Clause (a) speaks owning a house on 20-8-1976 and sub-sec. (2) covers the cases of allottee-tenants acquiring or constructing a building after 20-8-1976. The earlier provision refers to the existing situation on 20-8-1976 and the latter provision is intended to meet a situation that may arise in subsequent period. The prescribed period for vacating the allotted house under sub-section (2) is prescribed by Rules. The State Government has framed Rule 8a of the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Rules 1961, which is published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 19th February 1981. The said rule reads thus :-"8a. Period for vacation of residential building in certain cases: any person who being in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the House Rent Controller acquires or constructs either in his own name or in the name of any member of his family a residential building in the same City, Town or village, shall. vacate the building of which he is such tenant:- (a) within a period of one year, from the date of commencement of this ruie where the acquisition or construction is on or after the twentieth day of August 1976, but before the date of commencement of these rule : or (b) within 30 days from the date of acquisition or construction where such acquisition or construction is on or after the commencement of this rule". (emphasis added) the above Rule also makes it clear that an allottee tenant shall vacate the building within one year from the date of commencement of this Rule i. e. , 19 2-1981 where acquisition or construction is on or after 20th of August, 1976 but before 19-2-1981 or within 30 days from the date of acqu isition or construction where such acquisition or construction is on or after commencement of this Rule i. e. 19-2-1981. ( 8 ) THE above discussion makes it clear that entire Section 21a only refers to the allottee tenant visa-a-vis his tenant and it provides a machinery to evict the allottee tenant's tenant and secure the possession of his own building. The statement of Objects and Reasons in support of the Second amendment Bill, 197o. which was r. 36 enacted in L. A. Bill No, 61/76 makes this position clear. It reads thus :" (B) to make it compulsory for persons occupying Rent Controller allotted premises who own residential houses of their own in the same urban area to vacate the rented premises within a period of one year, and to correspondingly enable such persons to recover possession of their houses by a fast summary procedure". (emphasis added) ( 9 ) IN view of this object it is crystal clear that the Act was enacted to enable allottee-Tenants to recover possession of their house by summary eviction. It was not intended to enabe the owners or the landlords to seek eviction of their tenant by summary eviction as a parallel remedy or as a supplement to Sec 21 of the K. R C. Act. The Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to pass eviction order in favour of landlord against his Tenant. But Mr. U. L. Narayana Rao, learned counsel for respondents R-1 to R-4 owners and Mr. T. R. Subbanna High court Govt. Advocate who appeared on behalf of Rent and Accommodation controller submitted that the machinery provided in Clause (c) of Section 21a can be invoked by the landlord to seek summary eviction of his tenant. Both of them heavily relied upon the following statement in the judgment of Justice Doddakale Gowda in Dr. P. Rajashekar v S. Narayan (1987 (2) kar. L. J. Sh. N. 325 : l. L. R. 1987 Kar. 757 ). Both of them heavily relied upon the following statement in the judgment of Justice Doddakale Gowda in Dr. P. Rajashekar v S. Narayan (1987 (2) kar. L. J. Sh. N. 325 : l. L. R. 1987 Kar. 757 ). The sa id observation reads thus :-"machinery provided under subsection (1) of Section 21a can conveniently be adopted to give effect to sub-section (2) of Section 21-A or supplanted by rules of natural justice. Undisputedly, petitioner has been heard and an enquiry has been held before passing impugned order. Hence, contention that in the absence of clause similar to clause (c) after sub-section (2) comprehending acquisitions of the type referred to therein no eviction could have been ordered is devoid of merit". It is clear the effect of the observation was that the machinery provided in clause (c) authorising the prescribed authority to evict such other person if necessary by use of force and restore possession to the allottee tenant can be availed of even in cases coming under sub-section (2) of Section 21a. This only means that an allottee-tenant who has acquired or constructed a building on or after 20th of August, 1976 either in his own name or in the name of the member of the family having vacated the building within the period prescribed may initiate action before the prescribed authority to seek possession of "his own building" by evicting the tenant through the prescribed authority if necessary by using force. The above observation of the learned Judge cannot be understood to enable the landlord who does not come in the picture in the context of Section 21a to seek a summary eviction of his tenant. The landlord is not a person who is in occupation of the house on allotment by Rent Controller and who has acquired or constructed a building of his own after 20th of August, 1976 and who has vacated the same within the prescribed period to enable him to move the prescribed authority and seek possession of his own building. The various clauses in sub-section (2) make it clear that it has no application to the landlord at all. The seeking of possession of his own building in clause (c) of Section 21a refers to the allottee-tenant who owns a residential building or hasconstructed or acquired his own building. The various clauses in sub-section (2) make it clear that it has no application to the landlord at all. The seeking of possession of his own building in clause (c) of Section 21a refers to the allottee-tenant who owns a residential building or hasconstructed or acquired his own building. Therefore, it appears to me that the above observation of the learced Judge cannot be understood as enabling a landlord to move the machinery of the prescribed authority i. e. Rent Controller to recover possession of his tenanted building, otherwise, the words "person who being in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the Controller" in 21-A (2) become redundant. It is to put such applicant in possession of his own building that the machinery is provided under clause (c) of Section 21a of the act. The above observation of Mr. Doddakale Gowda, J. , lays down that the procedure and machinery provided in clause (c) can be availed of by the allottee-tenants in either situations i. e. as covered by clause 21 -A 1 (a) or 21a (A) (2), extracted above. ( 10 ) AS laid down by the Supreme court in M/s. Amarnath Om Prakash and others v State of Punjab and others (A. I. R. 1985 S. C. 218) judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret words of statutes : their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. ( 11 ) IN State of Andhra Pradesh v krishnaiah Naidu {a. I. R. 1989 Andhra pradesh 309) a Bench of that High court observed thus :"a decision is an authority for the proposition it decides. A decision ought not to be read as a statute and principles inferred which were neve: intended to be enunciated". ( 12 ) IF tha above principle is borne in mind the observations of the learned judge quoted above cannot be understood as providing a machinery to the landlord to seek eviction of his tenant as a supplemental provision to Section 21 of the Act. ( 12 ) IF tha above principle is borne in mind the observations of the learned judge quoted above cannot be understood as providing a machinery to the landlord to seek eviction of his tenant as a supplemental provision to Section 21 of the Act. The Act never intended to confer jurisdiction on Courts under section 21 and on the Rent Controller under Section 21a for passing eviction orders in favour of landlord or owner. ( 13 ) IN interpreting the above section of the Act, which is a social welfare legislation one has to bear in mind the following observations of the supreme Court in Kehar Singh and others v The State (Delhi Admn.) (A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 1883) :"during the last several years, the 'golden rule' has been given a go by. We now look for the 'intention' of the legislature or the 'purpose' of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deam it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out of the frame work of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the pro. visions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the pro. visions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences. " ( 14 ) KEEPING in mind these observations and the objects for which the amendment Act was enacted it becomes clear that sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21a are intended to enable the allottee-tenant who has constructed his own building or acquired a house at two different periods as mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) to get his tenant evicted after summary enquiry through the prescribed authority viz, the Rent controller so that he can acquire possession of his own building through that instrumentality. The mischief it sought undo was allottee-tenants enriching themselves by leasing out the house which they have constructed or acquired and continue to stay in an allotted house, comparatively at a cheaper rate of rent. It was intended to put an end to the 'abuse' of allotment. ( 15 ) IN view of my conclusion the ruling cited by Sri. U. L. Narayana Rao in Nathuram Weljibhai Vyas v Mrs. Laxmibai Lunkaran\i Chandak (1983 income Tax Reports 948) will be of no assistance to support his contention. The said rniing lays down that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. As I have come to the conclusion that Section 21a does not confer jurisdiction on the Rent Controller to entertain a landlord's petition for summary eviction of his tenant any further reference to the said judgment would be unnecessary. ( 16 ) BY the impugned order the rent Controller while ordering tne tenant to vacate the premises has directed the landlord to report vacancy under Section 4 of the Karnataka Rent control Act 1961. Under Section 21-A (c) the Controller has to put the allottee-tenant in possession of his own building. The allottee-tenant, who has moved the machinery is not required to report vacancy under Section 4 of his own building because he secures possession through the prescribed authority (Rent Controller ). Under Section 21-A (c) the Controller has to put the allottee-tenant in possession of his own building. The allottee-tenant, who has moved the machinery is not required to report vacancy under Section 4 of his own building because he secures possession through the prescribed authority (Rent Controller ). Obviously in ordering eviction the rent Controller has usurped the powers of the Court under Section 21 of the karnataka Rent Control Act. He has directed the tenant to hand over possession to the landlord who in turn is directed to resort vacancy under section 4 of the Act. The order is not only illegal, but, it speaks of more than what the eyes can see. It is arbitrary and leans in favour of collatral considerations. ( 17 ) I have come across two cases of this officer (this writ petition and w P. No. 19141 of 1989 ). In the other case the officer was directed to file an affidavit. His conduct and functioning do not appear to be straight. The administration is required to take immediate action. Copy of this order and the order in W. P. No. 19141 of 1989 be sent to the Chief Secretary govt. of Karnataka for prompt action, ( 18 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the rent and Accommodation Controller could not have entertained the petition of the landlord and passed an order purporting to do so under Section 21a of the Act. The Rent Controller has misconstrued the provisions of law and has assumed jurisdiction which was. not vested in him. The landlord having initiated action under Section 21 (1) (h) has invoked a machinery which he could not have done and therefore he is liable to pay costs to the petitioner. ( 19 ) IN the result, I make the following order: writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Rent Controller is quashed. Advocate fee Rs. 2,000/-, to be paid by R-1 to R-4. Writ petition allowed with costs. --- *** --- .