K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Appeal is preferred against the Judgment and Decree dated 14th December 1979 passed in O. S. No. 879/1977 by the learned VII Additional Civil Judge bangalore City. ( 2 ) THE appellants are the plaintiffs. The respondent is the defendant in this Judgment, the appellants will be referred as the plaintiffs and the respondent as the defendant. ( 3 ) THE suit premises is a Municipal Site bearing No. 25, measuring 350 sq. yards situate on Sree jayachamarajawadiyar Road, 39th Division, Bangalore city (formerly bearing S. No. 34/9 of Mavalli Village, kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore and since converted) bounded on the North and East by smt. Rajamma's property; West by Sree Jayachamarajawadiyar road, and South by Adagodi Papiah's property; together with the buildings and structures erected thereon for use as a petrol and lubrication service station with drive-ways including footpath cutting and paving situate at J. C. Road in the Registration Sub-District of Bangalore City District, Bangalore bearing Survey no. 34/9, Municipal No. 25. ( 4 ) THE suit was filed for a decree to direct the defendant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the entire schedule premises; to pay to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 500/- on account of mesne profits, and further to direct an enquiry into future mesne profits and payment thereof to the plaintiffs and to pay cost of and incidental to the suit and such other reliefs as the Court may feel appropriate to grant in the circumstances of the case. ( 5 ) THE suit was filed on the basis that the schedule premises was leased to Esso (predecessor of the defendant) on 20th February 1968 under a Registered lease Deed marked as Ex. P-1 effective from 1-12-1967 for a period of 10 years on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,200/- with a clause of renewal at the instance of the lessee on the same terms and conditions contained in the Lease deed; that subsequent to the lease deed there was an oral agreement between the parties as per Ex. P-2 agreeing that the lessee shall deposit a sum of Rs. 72,000/- with a lessor which shall be adjusted towards the rent to be paid by the lessee to the lessor under the agreement: that as per the terms of the lease contained in Ex. P-2 agreeing that the lessee shall deposit a sum of Rs. 72,000/- with a lessor which shall be adjusted towards the rent to be paid by the lessee to the lessor under the agreement: that as per the terms of the lease contained in Ex. P-2, the lessee - the defendant failed to deposit a sum of Rs. 72,000/- in order to enable it to have the lease renewed for a further period of 10 years and therefore, the lessee was not entitled to renewal of the lease, hence, the lease came to an end, on the expiry of the fi'rst period of 10 years that from the expiry of first period of 10 years, the possession of the lessee became unlawful hence, the lessee was entitled to pay damages for the use and occupation of the suit premises. On these averments the plaintiffs sought for the aforesaid reliefs. ( 6 ) THE defendant in its written statement did not dispute that the suit schedule premises was leased to esso as per the terms contained in Ex. P-1. However, it disputed that the term as contained in Ex. P-2 did not become part of the lease deed and as such the plaintiffs could not claim benefit of the same and could not insist that the defendant should deposit a sum of rs. 72,000/- before claiming or for the purpose of claiming, a renewal; that the defendant had invoked the clause for renewal of the lease as per the terms contained in Clause 6 of the lease deed Ex. P-1 and as such they were entitled to renewal. It was also further contended that Ex. P-2 being an unregistered document it could not have the effect of altering the terms of the registered document, therefore, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree as prayed for in the plaint. ( 7 ) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as 7 issues which are as follows:1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the payment of Rs. 72,000/- as advance was a condition of the earlier lease agreement and that defendant is bound to pay the amount of deposit even or the renewal of the lease? 2. Whether the tenancy has come to an end by efflux of time? 3. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the payment of Rs. 72,000/- as advance was a condition of the earlier lease agreement and that defendant is bound to pay the amount of deposit even or the renewal of the lease? 2. Whether the tenancy has come to an end by efflux of time? 3. Whether the defendant proved that it has exercised its right of option for the renewal of the lease and therefore entitled to continue in possession of the suit premises? 4. Whether the plaintiffs prove that defendant is not entitled to renewal of the lease without depositing a sum of Rs. 72,000/- as alleged? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to eviction of defendant from the suit premises? 6. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits and if so, at what rate and from what date? 7. What relief? ( 8 ) ON the basis of the evidence on record, the trial Court has answered issues 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 against the plaintiffs and issue No. 3 in favour of the defendant and has accordingly dismissed the suit. Hence the appeal. It may also be pointed out here itself that it was also argued before the trial Court under issue No. 7 on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 5 (2) and 7 (3) of the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in india) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 'esso acquisition Act') that the defendant was not liable to be ejected and the defendant was entitled to continue in occupation of the premises irrespective of the fact whether the option of renewal exercised was valid or not. The trial Court held that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of Section 5 (2) of the Esso Acquisition act and as such it was entitled to continue the lease. Of course, the trial Court made it clear that the point was an additional point and the decree dismissing the suit did not rest upon it. ( 9 ) IN support of the case the plaintiffs examined the husband of the first plaintiff as P. W. 1 who was the General Power of Attorney Holder of the plaintiffs and also one more witness Sri K. Jayaprakash as P. W. 2 and produced 15 documents marked as Exs. P-1 to p-15. ( 9 ) IN support of the case the plaintiffs examined the husband of the first plaintiff as P. W. 1 who was the General Power of Attorney Holder of the plaintiffs and also one more witness Sri K. Jayaprakash as P. W. 2 and produced 15 documents marked as Exs. P-1 to p-15. Defendant examined one Sri A. M. Sait representative of the defendant as D. W. 1 and produced four documents marked as Exs. D-1 to D-4. ( 10 ) HAVING regard to the contentions urged on both the sies following points arise for consideration:1. WHETHER the proviso to Section 31 of the karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') was attracted to the lease in question? 2. Whether the defendant could continue in possession of the premises without obtaining a renewal of lease from the plaintiffs? 3. Whether a decree for eviction could be passed in a case like this in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in SHIVA RAO vs CECILIA pereira (ILR 1987 KAR 450), equivalent to AIR 1987 SC 248 ? point NO. 1 ( 11 ) SECTION 31 of the Act reads thus: "31. Exemption in respect of certain buildings nothing contained in this Part shall apply to a non-residential building the monthly rent of which exceeds five hundred rupees or the annual rental value of which exceeds six thousand rupees. Provided that the exemption under this section shall not apply:- i) to any building taken on lease by a public authority or by an educational institution; or ii) to any building occupied by more than one tenant each paying monthly rent exceeding five hundred rupess or an annual rent not exceeding six thousand rupees. " the premises in question at the time when it was leased was an open site and it was leased for non-residential purpose and the rent agreed under Ex. P-1 was Rs. 1,200/- per month. " the premises in question at the time when it was leased was an open site and it was leased for non-residential purpose and the rent agreed under Ex. P-1 was Rs. 1,200/- per month. Therefore, the case of the plaintiffs is that as the lease was in favour of Esso which was neither an educational institution nor a public authority as that expression is defined under the Act, the lease was exempted from the purview of Part V of the Act; as such the parties were governed by the terms of the lease deed and their rights and obligations were not in any way affected by the provisions contained in Part V of the Act; that as the defendant did not have the lease renewed on the expiry of the first period of 10 years, the lease came to an end and it was also terminated by notice, hence the possession of the defendant became unlawful and as such the plaintiffs were entitled to have the reliefs prayed for in the plaint. ( 12 ) IN this regard, it is relevant to notice that during the subsistence of the first 10 years of the lease, esso Acquisition Act came into force on 13-3-1974. Section 3 of the Esso Acquisition Act, on and from the appointed day, transferred and vested in the Central government the right, title and interest of Esso in relation of its undertakings in India. Sections 4 and 5 of the Esso Acquisition Act which are relevant for our purpose are as follows:"section 4; (1) The undertakings referred to in section 3 shall be deemed, save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), to include all assets, rights, powers, authorities and privileges and all property, movable and immovable, cash balances, reserve funds, investments and all other rights and interest in, or arising out of, such property as were, immediately before the appointed day, in the ownership, possession, power or control of Esso, in relation to its undertakings in India, and all books of account, registers, records and all other documents of whatever nature relating thereto and shall also be deemed to include all borrowings, liabilities and obligations of whatever kind then subsisting of Esso in relation to its undertakings in india. (2) The undertakings referred to in sub-section (1) shall not include the following, namely: (a) any share held by Esso in the equity capital of Esso standard or Lube India; (b) any trade mark, and any right or Esso to use any trade mark in India, specified in the Fist Schedule; (c) all patents and designs registered in India in the name of Esso. (3) Unless otherwise expressly provided by this Act, all deeds, bonds, agreements, powers of attorney grants of legal representation and other instruments of whatever nature in relation to the undertakings of Esso in India, subsisting or having effect immediately before the appointed day, and to which esso is a party or which are in favour of Esso shall be of as full force and effect against or in favour of the central Government and may be enforced or acted upon as fully and effectually as if in the place of Esso the Central government had been a party thereto or as if they had been issued in favour of the Central government. (4) If, on the appointed day, any suit, appeal or other proceeding of whatever nature in relation to the undertakings of Esso in India, which have been transferred to and vested in the Central Government under section 3, is pending by or against Esso, the same shall not abate, be discontinued or be, in any way, prejudicially affected by reason of the transfer of the undertakings of Esso or of anything contained in this act, but the suit, appeal or other proceeding may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the Central government, or, where any undertaking is directed under Section 7 to vest in any Government company, against the concerned government Company. Section 5; (1) Where any property is held in India by Esso under any lease or under,any right of tenancy, the Central Government shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to have become the lessee or tenant, as the case may be, in respect of such property as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to the Central Government, and thereupon all the rights under such lease or tenancy shall be deemed to have been transferred to and vested in the central Government. (2) On the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in sub-section (1), such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by esso immediately before the appointed day. "sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Esso Acquisition act explains what includes the right, title and interest of Esso in relation to its undertakings in India. Subsection (3) of section 4 specifically, among other things, provides that all 'deeds', 'agreements', "other instruments of whatever nature1 (these expressions are wide enough to take into their fold the lease deed subsisting in favour of Esso on the date of vesting) in relation to the undertakings of Esso in India subsisting or having effect immediately before the appointed day to which esso is a party, shall be of as full force and effect against or in favour of the Central Government and may be enforced or acted upon as fully and as effectively as if in the place of Esso, the Central Government had been a party thereto or as if they had been issued in favour of the Central Government. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 further provides that the pending proceedings of whatever nature against Esso in India shall not abate and be continued against the Central Government or against Government Company if any undertaking of esso in India after vesting in Central Government is directed to vest in the Government Company. Subsection (1) of section 5 specifically deals with leases or any right of tenancy in favour of Esso in India. It provides that any property held in India by Esso under the lease or under any right of tenancy, the Central government shall, on and from the appointed day be deemed to have become the lessee or tenant as the case may be in respect of such property as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to the Central Government and thereupon all the rights under such lease or tenancy shall be deemed to have been transferred to and vested in the Central Government. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 even enables the central Government to exercise the right of renewal of lease or tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which the Esso was entitled to have the renewal of lease or tenancy before the date of vesting. The combined effect of Section 3, sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of Section 4 and Section 5 of the Esso acquisition Act is that from the date of vesting for all intents and purposes in relation to undertakings of esso in India, the Central Government takes the place of Esso in India. In the deeds, agreements, bonds, lease deeds or instruments of any nature in favour of Esso or to which Esso is a party, subsisting or in force, and legal proceedings pending, instituted by or against Esso, on the date of vesting, in place of the Esso, the Central government is substituted by a legislative decree. The instrument and the legal proceedings will have to be enforced and continued, as the case may be, as if the instruments were in favour of the Central Government or to which the Central Government is a party, as if the legal proceedings were instituted by or against the central Government, as the case may be. The transfer to, and vesting in, the Centra! Government the right, title and interest of Esso in relation to its undertakings in India -is so complete that even the services of existing employees of Esso are statutorily transferred to the central Government or Government Company, as the case may be. The transfer to, and vesting in, the Centra! Government the right, title and interest of Esso in relation to its undertakings in India -is so complete that even the services of existing employees of Esso are statutorily transferred to the central Government or Government Company, as the case may be. ( 13 ) THE contention of Sri V. Krishna Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs is that admittedly the lease was taken by Esso and not by the Central Government; that the provisions contained in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 4 and sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Esso Acquisition Act only make the Central government a successor from the date of vesting; that whereas the schedule premises was taken on lease by the Esso long prior to the date of vesting, hence for the purpose of the proviso to Section 31 of the Act, though the Central Government has become a successor-in-interest of the Esso, it cannot be construed to be the person or authority who had taken the schedule premises on lease; that the proviso to Section 31 of the Act is attracted only if the premises is taken on lease by the Public Authority or an educational institution and not to a case where the public authority or an educational institution becomes a successor-in-interest either by a legislative decree or by an act of parties. It appears to us that it is not possible to accept these contentions. The effect of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 4 and Section 5 of the Esso Acquisition act has already been pointed out by us. These provisions are clear enough to hold that for all purposes the central Government must be deemed to be the lessee from the date of vesting. The words "taken on lease" occurring in clause (i) of the proviso to Section 31 of the Act cannot be construed so narrowly so as to exclude the successor-in-interest of the original lessee. The object of the proviso is to apply the provisions of Part V of the Act to lessees who are public authorities and the educational institutions. Whether the building is taken on lease directly by a public authority or by an educational institution or whether a public authority or an educational Institution becomes a lessee as a successor-in-interest, it makes no difference. Whether the building is taken on lease directly by a public authority or by an educational institution or whether a public authority or an educational Institution becomes a lessee as a successor-in-interest, it makes no difference. In both the cases, the building continues to be taken on lease and the succesor-in-interest of the original lessee also becomes a lessee and it must also be deemed to have taken the building on lease. In addition to this, sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Esso Acquisition act specifically makes this position clear by using the words "be deemed to have become a lessee or tenant, as the case may be". Therefore, we are of the view that no sooner the lease came to be vested in the central Government it became a lease obtained by the central Government and the building became the building taken on lease by the Central Government. As per the definition of the expression "public authority" as contained in clause (p) of Section 3 of the Act means the State or the Central Government or a local authority or a corporation established by a Central Act or a Karnataka act or a Government Company. After the Central government became successor in interest by reason of the Esso Acquisition Act, the defendant also became the successor in interest by reason of the Notification dated 14th March 1974 bearing No. G. S. R. 131 (E) issued by the Central Government published in Gazette of india, dated 14th March 1974 in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Esso acquisition Act. The Esso Standard Refining Company of India Limited in turn has merged with the defendant under the order dated 12th July 1974 bearing No. G. S. R. 320 (E) published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary dated 15th July 1974 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 396 of the companies Act read with the Notification of the Government of India bearing No. G. S. 443 (E) dated 18th october 1982 issued by the Company Law Board. The order is known as "lube India Limited and Esso Standard amalgamation Order, 1974. " Therefore, even after the central Government ceased to be the successor, the defendant became the successor-in-interest. The order is known as "lube India Limited and Esso Standard amalgamation Order, 1974. " Therefore, even after the central Government ceased to be the successor, the defendant became the successor-in-interest. The defendant being a Government Company, it is a "public authority" as per the definitfon of that expression which is reproduced above. Therefore, before the expiry of the first period of 10 years of the lease, the lease came to be vested in the public authority and as such clause (i) of the proviso to Section 31 of the Act was attracted. Consequently, the exemption of the lease from Part V of the Act became unavailable. The result was that before the expiry of the period of 10 years of lease, Part V of the Act became applicable. Therefore, even if the defendant failed to comply with one of the terms of the lease as contained in Ex. P-2, to enable it to obtain renewal of the lease, it was entitled to continue as a tenant, under the provisions of the act and was entitled to the protection afforded by section 21 (1) of the Act. Hence the absence of the renewal of lease did not in any way affect the possession of the defendant. It is also relevant to notice that section 31 itself came to be struck down by this Court on 1-7-1986 in H. PADMANABHA RAO vs STATE OF karnataka This Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in RATTAN ARYA vs STATE OF tamil NADU. Following the decision of the Supreme court, it was held thus:"though the original classification was made on a rational basis and it had nexus to the object sought to be achieved, by efflux of time, not only the classification has become unreasonable but it has also ceased to have nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Section 31 of the Act is liable to be struck down on the ground that it is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. "after quoting the relevant portion of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Rattan Arya's case this Court held as follows:"value of a non-residential premises has increased manifold in the last 25 years. Therefore, there can be least doubt that if in 1961 a person paying a rent of more than Rs. "after quoting the relevant portion of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Rattan Arya's case this Court held as follows:"value of a non-residential premises has increased manifold in the last 25 years. Therefore, there can be least doubt that if in 1961 a person paying a rent of more than Rs. 500/- for a non residential buidling belonged to economically stronger section, at present a person who requires a small non-residential building for even carrying a petty business would be required to pay rental of more than rs. 500/- for a premises whose rental value was Rs. 100/- or Rs. 150/- in 1961. The facts relating to the rentals paid by some of the petitioners originally and at present, extracted earlier clearly indicates the escalation in rents between 1961 and 1986. In view of nonvariation of the classification in Section 31 of the Act, the very persons for whose benefit the Section was enacted in the year 1961 stand deprived of the said benefit. It is for this reason it can safely be said that though the original classification was made on a rational basis and it had nexus to the object sought to be achieved, by efflux of time not only the classification has become unreasonable but it has also ceased to have nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Applying the ratio in Rattan Arya's case Section 31 of the Act is liable to be struck down on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the result, we make the following order: (i) Rule made absolute. (ii) Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent control Act is declared void as offending article 14 of the Constitution. (iii) A Writ of Mandamus shall issue to the State not to enforce the provisions of Section 31 of the Act. (iv) No costs. "thus with effect from 1-7-1986 Section 31 of the Act has ceased to be on the statute. Therefore, as on today there is no provision in the Act which takes away the premises in question from the purview of the Part V of the Act. As to what would be its effect will be considered while considering Point No. 3. Accordingly, point No. 1 is answered as follows: the proviso to Section 31 of the Act came to be attracted to the lease in question with effect from 13th March 1974. As to what would be its effect will be considered while considering Point No. 3. Accordingly, point No. 1 is answered as follows: the proviso to Section 31 of the Act came to be attracted to the lease in question with effect from 13th March 1974. POINT No. 2 ( 14 ) THE answer to this point becomes necessary in the event the finding recorded by us on Point No. 1 is held to be not correct and it is further held that the proviso to Section 31 of the Act was not attracted to the lease in question. Therefore, on that basis, we proceed to answer this point. No doubt Clause 6 of the lease deed Ex. P-1 provides for renewal of the lease on the same terms and conditions as contained in the lease deed provided the lessee exercises the right of renewal by demanding renewal two months before the expiry of the lease. The contention of the plaintiff is that one of the terms of the lease was to deposit a sum of Rs. 72,000/- in advance being the rent for five years as agreed to by the parties under Ex. P-2 and as the defendant failed to comply with the same, it was not entitled to a renewal of the lease. In addition to this, there was no renewal in the eye of law because the renewal was not only required to be obtained but it was also required to be registered. The learned trial Judge has held that Ex. P-2 required to be registered and as such it was inadmissible; that as Ex. P-2 was not registered and an unregistered document, could not alter the terms of registered document, therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to enforce it. No doubt the learned trial Judge has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in SAJJANSA vs DHONDUSA AND OTHERS and also a decision of the High Court of Calcutta in durga PRASAD SINGH vs RAJENDRA BAGCHI 14. 1. It appears to us that the learned trial Judge has not viewed the point in the right perspective. It is relevant to notice that Ex. P-2 does not purport to alter the terms of the lease. It only provides for payment of the rent in advance. In fact, the defendant acted upon Ex. P-2 and deposited a sum of Rs. It appears to us that the learned trial Judge has not viewed the point in the right perspective. It is relevant to notice that Ex. P-2 does not purport to alter the terms of the lease. It only provides for payment of the rent in advance. In fact, the defendant acted upon Ex. P-2 and deposited a sum of Rs. 72,000/- in respect of the first period of 10 years of the lease under Ex. P-3. In our view, the case falls within the proposition laid down in SMT. GIRIBALA DASI vs kalidas BHANJA AND OTHERS! In that case, it has been held thus:"where a person agrees to grant a lease to another but subsequently informs the latter that he cannot grant the lease until he has paid off certain debt on the property and the latter consents to such proposal and attaches a condition precedent to the agreement, to grant the lease, it must be fulfilled before the agreement to grant the lease can be enforced; no new additional consideration is necessary to support the later agreement. "in this case, as already pointed out, the clause contained in Ex. P-2 does not either enhance the rent or enlarge the period of lease. It also does not reduce any one of them. It only provides that the lessee shall deposit a sum of Rs. 72,000/- which shall be adjusted towards the rent to be paid by the lessee to the lessor. Agreement thus, in effect, provides for payment of rent in advance covering the period of 5 years. Such an agreement not having the effect of altering the terms of the lease does not require registration. When it does not require registration and the parties have treated it as one of the terms of the lease, there is no reason whatsoever for the learned trial Judge to hold that it alters the terms of the registered document and as such it cannot form part of the lease unless it is registered. This finding of the trial Court is set aside. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, in the event, it is held that the proviso to Section 31 of the Act was not attracted to the lease in question in spite of the coming into force of the Esso Acquisition Act, it would become necessary for the defendant to seek renewal. This finding of the trial Court is set aside. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, in the event, it is held that the proviso to Section 31 of the Act was not attracted to the lease in question in spite of the coming into force of the Esso Acquisition Act, it would become necessary for the defendant to seek renewal. The defendant has exercised the option by a written request made as per Ex. P-4 to the 1st plaintiff to renew the lease on the same terms and conditions. However, the plaintiffs replied by Ex. P-5 that as per the promise, 5 years rental was payable in advance and as the same had not been done, the plaintiffs wanted the confirmation regarding the deposit of advance rental before they could think of renewing the lease. The defendant again wrote back as per Ex. P-6 clarifying that Ex. P-2 related only to the initial period of 10 years and it was not the intention of the defendant to promise payment of advance rental for the renewal of the lease for the next period of 10 years from 1-12-1977. The plaintiffs did not agree. They issued a notice as per Ex. P-9 terminated the tenancy and called upon the defendant to quit the suit schedule premises by the end of November 1977. Ex. P-2 dated 7-1-1969 reads thus:"we refer to the lease agreement dated 20-2-1968 entered into by the Company with you regarding ESSO retail outlet at J. C. Road, bangalore and confirm that we have agreed to add the following clause in the said agreement. Lessee shall deposit a sum of Rs. 72,000/- with the lessor which shall be adjusted towards the rent to be paid by the lessee to the lessor under this agreement. "thus the original lessee agreed to add the aforesaid clause to the agreement. As per that clause, it was incumbent upon the lessee to deposit a sum of Rs. 72,000/- with the lessor which was to be adjusted towards the rent to be paid by the lessee to the lessor under the agreement. 15. 1. When this was the condition for the first period of 10 years, it was also required to be complied with for the renewal period of 10 years on the expiry of the first period of 10 years. The defendant did not agree to do so. 15. 1. When this was the condition for the first period of 10 years, it was also required to be complied with for the renewal period of 10 years on the expiry of the first period of 10 years. The defendant did not agree to do so. In addition to this, it was also necessary for the defendant to obtain a fresh lease deed for the renewal period of 10 years. A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time express or implied or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised or of money, a share of crop, service or any other thing and of value. The lease is not a mere contract but it is a transfer of an interest in a land and creates a right in them. Therefore, as the period of renewal of the lease was for 10 years, it was all the more necessary for the defendant to have the fresh lease deed executed and registered. However, in the light of the finding recorded on Point No. 1, the defendant was entitled to continue in possession of the premises without obtaining the renewal of lease from the plaintiffs as the provisions of Part V of the Act became applicable to the lease in question on and from 13-3-1974 before the expiry of the period of first 10 years. As such failure to comply with the condition as contained in ex. P-2 and to have the renewal of the lease obtained did not affect the continuation of the defendant in possession of the suit schedule premises. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly. POINT No. 3 ( 16 ) 1. The contention of Sri V. Krishna Murthy, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants is that the decision in H. SHIVA RAO AND ANOTHER vs cecilia PEREIRA AND OTHERS is not applicable to the case on hand as the case on hand is governed by the terms of the lease to which Part V of the Act are not applicable; that as the defendant failed to obtain the renewal of the lease, in terms of the lease deed, the plaintiffs terminated the tenancy by issuing a notice as per Ex. P-9 and called upon the defendant to quit the suit schedule premises by the end of November 1977. P-9 and called upon the defendant to quit the suit schedule premises by the end of November 1977. Therefore, from 1-12-1977, the possession of the defendant became unlawful as the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased to exist. Therefore, the extended definition of the word 'tenant' as contained in Section 3 (r) of the Act on the basis of which the decision in Shiva Rao's case has been rendered, cannot be made applicable. 16. 2. It is not possible to accept these contentions. The decision in Shiva Rao's case not only rested on the extended definition of the word 'tenant' as contained in the Act but it was also rendered on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act occurring in Part V of the Act. In Shiva Rao's case a decree for ejectment was passed by a Civil Court under the provisions of the transfer of Property Act as the premises concerned therein was situated within the area to which the provisions of Parts IV and V of the Act were not applicable. But during the course of execution, the Corporation limits of Mangalore City corporation were extended by 3 K. Ms. Consequently, the area where the suit premises was situated was brought under the purview of the Act. Consequently parts IV and V of the Act became applicable. Hence it was contended by the tenant against whom a decree for ejection was passed and was put into execution, that on the application of Parts IV and V of the Act, the decree became inexecutable inasmuch as the judgment debtor continued to be the tenant of the premises. Therefore, he could not be dispossessed except in execution of the order passed under any one of the provisos to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act by the Court specified under the Act. The Supreme court upheld the contention of the Judgment-debtor (tenant ). The Supreme Court considered the effect of the definition of the word 'tenant' and the non-obstente clause contained in Section 21 (1) of the Act and held as follows:"4. The Supreme court upheld the contention of the Judgment-debtor (tenant ). The Supreme Court considered the effect of the definition of the word 'tenant' and the non-obstente clause contained in Section 21 (1) of the Act and held as follows:"4. It was held by this Court in MANI subrat JAIN vs RAJA RAM VOHRA (1980) 2 SCR 141 ( AIR 1980 SC 299 ) dealing with Section 2 (1) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction act which defines 'tenant' more or less in similar term as the present Act that in view of such a definition of the 'tenant' in Rent control Act, the fact that by the time the act came into force a decree or other process extinguished the tenancy under the general law of real property does not terminate the status of a tenant so long as he continues in possession and his possession cannot be terminated except as provided for in the Rent control Act. It is well settled legal principle that Rent Control legislations being beneficial to the tenant have to be given a liberal interpretation. While ordinarily substantive rights should not be held to be taken away except by express provision, or clear implication in the case of Rent Control Act, it being a beneficial legislation the provision which confers immunity to the tenant against eviction by the landlord though prospective in form operates to take away the right vested in the landlord by a decree of a Court which has become final, unless there is express provision or clear implication to the Country. 5. It has to be borne in mind that Rent control legislations are beneficial to the tenant and restrictive of the rights of the landlords - these legislations were passed to meet the problem of shortage of accommodation in cities and towns. Whether that is the best way to meet the problem of finding habitats for growing number of people is another issue. Whether or not the problem could not be met by another way is also another question. Courts must find out the literal meaning of the expression in the task of construction. In doing so, if the expressions are ambiguous then the construction that fulfils the object of the legislation must provide the key to the meaning. Whether or not the problem could not be met by another way is also another question. Courts must find out the literal meaning of the expression in the task of construction. In doing so, if the expressions are ambiguous then the construction that fulfils the object of the legislation must provide the key to the meaning. Courts must not make a mockery of legislation and should take a constructive approach to fulfil the purpose and for that purpose, if necessary, iron out the creases. 6. xxx xxx xxx 7. For the respondent it was submitted the provision of the Section in question should not be read so literally as to rob th decreeholder of his vested rights - permitting Peter to rob for feeding Paul was not social justice, it was urged. Where in a society of acute shortage of accommodation adjustment of rights between the parties is the purpose, we must ask ourselves two questions - does the argument of the appellant on the construction of the section further the purpose of the legislation, and secondly, whether the construction canvassed by the appellant does violence to the language or is contrary to the literal meaning. In our opinion, the answers to the first question is in the affirmative and to the second in the negative. If so, in our opinion, it must be so read, and the appeal must succeed. "as far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it has already been held that though initially the lease was exempted from the purview of Part V of the Act as it was executed in favour of ESSO, but subsequently on the coming into force of Esso Acquisition Act on and from 13-3-1974,clause (i)of the proviso to Section 31 of the Act came to be attracted. Consequently the exemption of the lease from the purview of Part V of the Act became unavailable and the lessee became entitled to the benefit of the protection afforded by section 3 (r) and sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the act. Consequently, the suit for ejectment and for future mesne profits could not have been instituted and maintained in a Civil Court. Consequently, the suit for ejectment and for future mesne profits could not have been instituted and maintained in a Civil Court. ( 17 ) THUS it is clear that Shiva Rao's case is applicable to the case on hand inasmuch as on the application of Parts IV and V of the Act, no decree for ejection passed against a tenant in possession of a premises prior to the application of Parts IV and V of the Act can be executed after the application of parts IV and V of the Act and the tenant cannot be dispossessed from the premises in execution of such a decree. ( 18 ) IN addition to this, alternatively it is also relevant to notice that with effect from 1-7-1986, section 31 of the Act has ceased to be on the statute because it has been struck down by this Court in h. Padmanabha Rao's case. Therefore, irrespective of the finding recorded on Points 1 and 2, the provisions contained in Part V of the Act have become applicable on and from 1-7-1986. Once Part V of the Act becomes applicable, the decree of a Civil Court directing ejection of a tenant from the premises cannot be executed as per the decision in Shiva Rao's case The appellate court is required to take into consideration the subsequent development in law and apply the same to the case involved in the appeal. Looked from this angle also, the decision in Shiva Rao's case applies to the case on hand squarely. Hence Point No. 3 is answered in the negative. ( 19 ) LASTLY it is contended by Sri V. Krishna Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants that the relief relating to future mesne profits is not covered either by the decision of the Supreme Court in Shiva rao's cases or by the provisions of Part V of the Act, therefore, the decree for future mesne profits may atleast be passed. The trial Court has held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to enquiry into future mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12 C. P. C. As the possession of the defendant is continued to be that of a tenant because the provisions of Part V of the Act became applicable to the lease in question with effect from 13-3-1974 as pointed out under Points Nos. 1 and 2, the defendant was and is liable to pay only the rent and not the mesne profits. Hence the contention is rejected. ( 20 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. ( 21 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the fact that the plaintiffs have to lose only because of the subsequent development in law, we are of the view that it is just and proper to order the parties to bear their respective costs throughout. Accordingly, the parties are ordered to bear their costs throughout. --- *** --- .