JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is by a defeated defendant the 1st defendant in a suit for money based on a promissory note. The court below, on a consideration of the evidence before it, has decreed the suit. The 1st defendant has come up in appeal. 2. The background facts leading to the suit and the appeal are briefly as follows: The plaintiff, his brothers and brother inlaw together owned certain properties in Purathur Village, comprised in R.S. 8/1A1, 8/1A2 and 8/1A3. Pappu Manjuran, the 1st plaintiff had powers of attorney from his brother Abraham Tharakan and his brother inlaw M. V. Thomas. On the basis of the rights which had vested in the above persons under the various documents executed in their favour (an enumeration of which is given in Ext. B-7, dated 2nd January 1979 as document Nos. 12, 15, 16 and 18 of 1959, 354 of 1965 and 29 of 1969), they entered into an agreement Ext. B-1 on 25th July 1978. The admitted case is that, that agreement visualised two distinct portions to be performed within separate periods. One of the stipulations was that within a period of three months, the property in survey Nos. 8/1A1, 8/1A3 and one acre in 8/1A2, had to be transferred to the defendants on payment of a consideration of Rs. 4 lakhs. The remaining properties had to be transferred within an outer period of one year from the date of the execution of the agreement, on payment of balance consideration. It is agreed that on 21st October 1978 a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs was paid and the defendants were put in possession of the properties in R.S. 8/1A1 and 8/1A3 and one acre in 8/1A2. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants desired to have a larger extent in R.S. 8/1A2 and the buildings therein. The sale consideration for that area, which is outside the agreement, was fixed at Rs. 1,50,000. This property was given possession of to the defendants, and the consideration thereof was met by the execution of the promissory note Ext. A-1. 3. The main plea of the 1st defendant was that the composite agreement had to be executed by conveying the entirety of the property covered by the agreement, that the 1st plaintiff himself cancelled the agreement by his letter Ext. A-1. 3. The main plea of the 1st defendant was that the composite agreement had to be executed by conveying the entirety of the property covered by the agreement, that the 1st plaintiff himself cancelled the agreement by his letter Ext. B-10, dated 21st July 1979, that the enforcement of the agreement was thus rendered impossible by the 1st plaintiff's own action, and that the payment which could be contemplated under Ext. B-1 was therefore unenforceable. The circumstance under which the promissory note was executed according to the plaintiffs had been detailed in Para.2 of the plaint. The story of the 1st defendant in relation to the circumstances in which Ext. A-1 was executed, mentioned among other things, the fact that Pappu Manjuran wanted some documents to convince his own brothers about the realisation of a portion of the remaining consideration and that the promissory note was executed to please him and appease his brothers. 4. As noted earlier, the court below noted that though Ext. A-1 referred to cash as the consideration, it was not cash as such that constituted consideration. Even then a presumption was available, according to the court below, about the consideration. The specific consideration pleaded was then considered by that court and upheld. 5. There is oral and documentary evidence which would show that the consideration so pleaded, namely for putting the defendants in possession of an additional area uncovered by the agreement, and in relation to certain buildings therein, situate in R.S. 8/1A2, has been fully established. One important circumstance for evaluating the rival contentions is the series of correspondences which had been flowing from Pappu Manjuran to the 1st defendant starting from Ext. B-2, dated 28th June 1979. That letter specifically referred to the payment due under the promissory note for a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 and the non payment of the principal amount or even the interest. The letter reads natural and is a true reflection of the feelings of the 1st plaintiff. The distress felt by him in not getting the payment, and not having the sale transaction completed is indicated therein. The letter Ext. B-10, dated 21st July 1979 has already been referred to. It recapitulates the circumstances under which for the entirety of the period one year after the execution of the agreement, no step whatever had been taken by the defendants for having the sale deeds executed. The letter Ext. B-10, dated 21st July 1979 has already been referred to. It recapitulates the circumstances under which for the entirety of the period one year after the execution of the agreement, no step whatever had been taken by the defendants for having the sale deeds executed. Even in respect of the northern portion of, which possession had already been admittedly taken by the defendants as early as on 29th October 1978, no sale deed had been executed. This has been complained of in Ext. B-10 also. Another letter, two months later, was sent by the 1st plaintiff to the 1st defendant, while the former was undergoing treatment in the hospital at Velloor. Ext. B-9 refers to the promissory note, and the circumstances in which he had been compelled to effect an endorsement of the same in favour of the 2nd defendant. The embarrassing situation, it was alleged, was a making of the defendants. Demand for the money payable under the promissory note was again reiterated by Ext. B-6, dated 15th December 1980. That was by the 2nd plaintiff, who had become entitled to the rights under the promissory note on the basis of the endorsement. It is significant that all these letters remained without a reply from the 1st defendant. This cannot be treated as a simple faith the 1st defendant had in the plaintiff. He was a business man running saw mills and therefore familiar with business transactions. If the promissory note was executed in the circumstances indicated in his written statement, he would have demurred to the demand and resisted it immediately. He would have expounded the story and with all details then and there. That was not the conduct of the 1st defendant. The lawyer's notice Ext. A-5 was sent on 12th September 1981. Ext. A-11 is the reply dated 16th September 1981 of the 2nd defendant. Ext. A-11 contains specific and categoric admission of their having been put in possession of additional area in R.S. 8/1A2. Counsel for the appellant had a contention that this was a letter brought about under the influence of the plaintiff. We cannot accept that contention. The letter was sent direct to counsel for the 2nd plaintiff. Ext. A-11 contains specific and categoric admission of their having been put in possession of additional area in R.S. 8/1A2. Counsel for the appellant had a contention that this was a letter brought about under the influence of the plaintiff. We cannot accept that contention. The letter was sent direct to counsel for the 2nd plaintiff. The story that the plaintiff happened to know about the influence which the plaintiff exerted on the 2nd defendant, and to virtually pass on the blame to the 1st defendant, cannot be accepted, particularly having regard to the conduct of the 1st defendant throughout these proceedings. The oral evidence is also to the effect that when the defendants went to the northern property to take the yield from the coconut trees therein, they had felt a necessity to have an additional area in R.S. 8/1A2 and that as desired by them the transaction in relation to that property was finalised stipulating a consideration of Rs. 1,50,000, which was paid by the promissory note Ext. A-1. The presumption under S.118, is available in the circumstances. The story about the background in which Ext. A-1 was executed, according to the 1st defendant, does not command credibility. The conduct of the 1st defendant in not sending a single reply to the numerous letters sent by the plaintiff, will be a crucial indication of the weak stand of the 1st defendant. The admission in Ext. A-11 by the 2nd defendant in the circumstances, would be clearly indicative and clearly confirmative of the case of the plaintiff. The finding of the court below that the promissory note was supported by consideration, is perfectly justified and buttressed substantially by the massive evidence available in the case. There is hardly any ground for interference with that finding. The decree of the court below is accordingly affirmed. The appeal is dismissed with costs.