SHAMSUDDIN AHMED, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 8th Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 952 of 85 reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 206 of 1983. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-appellant Hindusthan Commercial Company instituted a suit for possession of the disputed property being premises No. 20, Mayfair Road (formarly 19, Mayfair Road, Calucutta ). Their case was that one Smt. Bani Lahiri was the owner of the property. She demised the suit property in favour of the defendant/ respondent by a registered deed of lease dt. 24-11-62 for a period 21 years commencing from 31-10-62. The monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 1,000. 00. The plaintiff company purchased the suit property from said Bani Lahiri by a registered kobala dt. 25-1-82 and became the absolute owner of the suit premises. Because of the purchase the lease aforesaid stood assigned in their favour for the remaining period of the term. They sent a notice of attornment to the defendant which was duly complied with and the defendant continued to pay lease rent to the plaintiff company. The lease stands determined by efflux of time. The plaintiff served a notice Calling upon the defendant to deliver vacant and peaceful possession. The defendant having failed they instituted a suit for possession and mesne profit at the rate of the rent. ( 3 ) THE defendant-appellant contested the suit. His contention was that the suit is not maintainable. Defendant stated that in terms of the said registered lease he was authorised to opt out of the deed of lease by serving a notice after expiry of 5 years from the commencement of the lease. He claimed that he exercised such option by a written notice addressed to the landlady and is in possession of the suit property as a monthly tenant governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. It was further contended that the ex-landlady accepted rent from the defendant as a monthly tenant. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the cases made out by both the parties the Ld. Subordinate Judge framed three issues, one of them related to the maintainability of the suit. The other two issues related to the entitlement of the plaintiff to get relief in the suit. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the cases made out by both the parties the Ld. Subordinate Judge framed three issues, one of them related to the maintainability of the suit. The other two issues related to the entitlement of the plaintiff to get relief in the suit. ( 5 ) THE Ld. Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. He took note of the Deed of lease Ext. 1 and also took note of clause 3 (1) of the lessor's covenant that the lessee of the said lease deed empowering the lessee to exercise option after expiry of 5 years from the date of commencement of the lease, to terminate the tenancy created thereunder by giving one Calendar month's notice in writing to the lessor of his intention to do so. The Ld. Subordinate Judge on an analysis of the evidence disbelieved the defendant's case that he has exercised such an option. On this finding alone the Ld. Judge concluded that the defendant was a tenant under the lease and since the lease has expired and stood determined by efflux of time he decreed the suit. ( 6 ) THE Ld. Judge of the court of appeal took a contrary view. According to him it is admitted by the parties that Bani Lahiri was the previous owner in respect of the disputed property and the parties executed the deed of lease Ext. 1. The defendant contended that notwithstanding the execution of such a lease deed the defendant is governed by the Premises Tenancy Act. It was contended by them before the first appellate Court that it would appear that defendant was in possession of the suit property since 1947-48 and during the subsistence of his tenancy Bani Lahiri became the owner around November 1961. She wanted to enter into a lease of agreement with the defendant. This case of the defendant that he was staying as a monthly tenant in the suit premises since 1947-48 was not pleaded in his written statement. But while deposing as a witness on commission in answer to question 7 he stated that he was a monthly tenant in the suit premises since 1947-48. At the time of hearing of the appeal, the defendant-appellant filed an application under 0. But while deposing as a witness on commission in answer to question 7 he stated that he was a monthly tenant in the suit premises since 1947-48. At the time of hearing of the appeal, the defendant-appellant filed an application under 0. 6 R. 17, C. P. C. for amendment of the written statement and wanted to incorporate his case that he was a tenant in the suit premises even before Bani Lahiri became the owner of the property. Her father Tapan Mohan Chatterjee was the owner of the house and one Mr. Md. Ali who latter became Prime Minister of Pakisthan after partition of India was a tenant in the premises. After the premises was vacated by Mr. Md. Ali the defendant was inducted as a monthly tenant there in the year 1947. This will be evident by the records of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation when Bani Lahiri became the owner of the suit premises the defendant was in possession of the same as a monthly tenant. It was sought to be contended that accordingly his monthly tenancy still continues as it has not been determined in accordance with the provisions of the Premises Tenancy Act, in spite of the execution of the deed of lease Ext. 1. The prayer for the said amendment was rejected by the appellate Court by order No. 12 dt. 30-5-86 on the finding that the Id. Advocate for the plaintiff-respondent submitted before the Court that the amendment is redundant as the plaintiff does not dispute or suggested to the trial Court that the defendant was not in occupation in respect of the suit premises as a monthly tenant since 1948-49. It was also submitted before the Id. Judge by the plaintiff-respondent that even thought this case was not pleaded by the defendant the plaintiff-respondent has accepted the position that the defendant was in occupation as a tenant in the suit premises since 1947-48. It was also submitted that since evidence on the point is already on record they will not raise any objection as to that part of the evidence of the defendant that he was a tenant in the suit premises from before the date of the lease. Accordingly, they submitted that no amendment was necessary. Accepting that position the Id. Appellate Court rejected the application. Accordingly, they submitted that no amendment was necessary. Accepting that position the Id. Appellate Court rejected the application. The position as it now stands on admission that the plaintiff-appellant has accepted the position that the defendant was a monthly tenant in the suit premises since 1947-48, and on the date of the lease he was in possession of the property as such tenant. ( 7 ) ON the footing of the fact that he was a monthly tenant in the disputed property from before the lease the defendant-appellant submitted before the first court of appeal that his tenancy cannot be converted into a tenancy governed by the deed of lease Ext. 1 and the contract of lease is void, because of the fact that the deed was executed in violation of the express provision of law as well as it is contrary to the Public Policy. It was also contended that in terms of the provisions of the Premises tenancy Act which governs the monthly tenancy the tenancy can be determined and khas possession recovered only in terms of S. 13 of the WBPT Act. The lease has enlarged the power of the landlord lessor to evict him from the suit property in derogation to the provisions of S. 13 of the said Act. Accordingly, the lease deed is a void document. It was also submitted before the Id. First appellate Court that the public policy is to grant more and more protection to the tenant being weak and vulnerable part of the community. The deed is a method to take away protection of the tenant by inducing him to enter into a lease of the kind like Ext. 1 and accordingly the said lease must be treated as void and the tenant cannot be evicted on the expiration of the period contemplated by the said lease. ( 8 ) IT was also contended before the Id. first appellate Court that in terms of the paragraph 3 (1) of the deed of lease he was empowered to give a notice to the landlord intimating that he intends to opt out of the terms of the lease and at such a notice the lease shall stand determined and it shall be deemed that it was never executed or acted upon. Since the notice has been served it is deemed that the lease was never executed and accordingly his right of monthly tenancy is surviving. He cannot be evicted on expiry of the term of the lease. The Id. first appellate Court has accepted the contention of the appellant that the lease is a void document as it was executed in violation of the express provisions of law as well as against public policy. The Id. first appellate Court also analysed the evidence and came to a finding that the Id. trial Judge was wrong in holding that no notice contemplated by S. 3 (1) of the lease deed was sent by registered post to the landlady. Basically, on these two findings the Id. Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. ( 9 ) MR. Mitra, Id. advocate appearing for the appellant submitted that since the property was demised to the defendant for a period of 21 years under the deed of lease dt. 24/11/1962 Ext. 1 and the lessor Smt. Bani Lahiri sold the suit property to the appellant in 1982 and the defendant having attorned the tenancy in favour of the appellant and having paid rent to him against receipt describing the rent paid by him as lease rent, the defendant cannot now say that he is not a tenant in terms of the lease agreement, Ext. 1. His tenancy having determined by a notice and the terms of the lease having expired the defendant has no defence against delivery of possession Mr. Mitra submitted that the defence case as pleaded should not be accepted as the same is inherently improbable. He stressed that it is not a normal conduct of a human being to give away his right to continue as a tenant for 16 years and invite the peril of being evicted on a suit u/s. 13 (1) of the Premises Tenancy Act Mr. Mitra also submitted that the conduct of the defendant from the date of receipt of the letter of attornment Ext. 8 and the defendant's communication to the plaintiff never contended that it was a monthly tenant and not governed by the lease. Accordingly, the Id. appeal Court has come to a wrong conclusion. With regard to the finding of the Id. 8 and the defendant's communication to the plaintiff never contended that it was a monthly tenant and not governed by the lease. Accordingly, the Id. appeal Court has come to a wrong conclusion. With regard to the finding of the Id. appellate Court that a notice in terms of paragraph 3 (1) of the lease dt. 5/10/1967, Ext. A Mr. Mitra contended that the Id. Judge failed to take note that only an alleged receipt of posting Ext. B has been produced. No acknowledgement receipt vas produced by the defendant. According to Mr. Mitra Ext. B is a spurious document on the face of it and it would be seen from Exts. 3 (a) and 2 that Ext. B is a manufactured one. He also contended that even if it is accepted that Ext. A was duly sent to the then landlady Bani Lahiri even then it is not a notice in compliance of paragraph 3 (1) of the deed of lease as it is defective and not a Calendar month's notice. Mr. Mitra further submitted that an appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of the fact by disbelieving a witness believed by the trial Court. Mr. Mitra referring to the evidence of D. W. 2 Bani Lahiri submitted that the Id. first appellate Court has made an error in law in not relying on the evidence of D. W. 2. She was not cross-examined by the plaintiff and accordingly there was no scope for the Court to go into the reasons why her evidence should not be believed. Mr. Mitra referred to clause 6 of the deed of lease which provided for the service of notice on the parties to the lease. It was contended that in terms of the said clause the despatch of notice dt. 5/10/1967 has not been proved and the said letter is a spurious one. He also contended that service of a notice is not complete unless it has reached the addressee. The giving of a notice is not complete by mere despatch. One cannot contract out of the settled provisions of law and on this submission Mr. Mitra contended that the appellate Court has committed an error giving rise to a substantial question of law. ( 10 ) MR. Ghosal Id. Advocate appearing for the defendant respondent supported that the finding of the Id. One cannot contract out of the settled provisions of law and on this submission Mr. Mitra contended that the appellate Court has committed an error giving rise to a substantial question of law. ( 10 ) MR. Ghosal Id. Advocate appearing for the defendant respondent supported that the finding of the Id. first appellate Court and disputed the submissions made by Mr. Mitra. ( 11 ) FROM the submission made by both the parties it appears to us that paragraph 3 (1) of the deed of lease is very much relevant in determining the merit of this appeal. It runs thus "provided always that it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the parties hereto as follows (1) that the lessee shall have the right at any time after the expiry of 5 years from the date of commencement of this lease to terminate the tenancy hereby created by giving one Calender month's previous notice in writing to the lessor of his intention to do so and upon the expiry of such notice this lease shall stand determined and all provisions, stipulations, covenants and agreements contained herein shall become void and ineffective as if this lease had never been granted without, however, prejudice to any rights and remedies which either party may have against the other in respect of any antecedent breach, non performance or non-observance of any of the covenants and conditions herein contained. "this clause speaks of giving one Calendar month's previous notice in writing to opt out of the lease. A mode of giving a notice has been provided by the lease deed itself clause 6 of the deed runs thus Any notice required to be given or served pursuant to any of the provisions of this lease by law shall be sufficiently given to or served upon the lessor if despatched by a prepaid envelope by registered post addressed to the lessor at No. 33, Macleod Street, Calcutta 16 aforesaid and shall be sufficiently given to or served upon the lessee if despatched in a prepaid envelope by registered post addressed to the lessee at his address at No. 20, Mayfair Road, Cal 19 aforesaid. "one of the defences raised by the defendant is that he exercised his option under clause 3 (1) and gave a notice to the lessor Bani Lahiri. "one of the defences raised by the defendant is that he exercised his option under clause 3 (1) and gave a notice to the lessor Bani Lahiri. The trial Court found that no such notice was ever despatched while the appellate court on analysis of the evidence on record held that the letter has been duly despatched. In this context the evidence of d. w. 2 Bani Lahiri has assumed importance. Bani Lahiri was cited as a witness by the defendant. she did not turn up on a date fixed for the hearing, the defendant filed an application for adjournment on the ground that Bani Lahiri had not turned up. It was found that the summons on her has not been served, suddenly she appeared and was examined by the defendant. She stated that she had got the summons and her husband had informed her the date of hearing. She admitted that she had leased out the property to the defendant and stated that she did not receive any registered letter dt. 5-10-67 from the defendant to the effect that he was henceforth to be a monthly tenant. In cross-examination by the plaintiff she stated that the defendant possessed the suit premises under lease and not monthly tenancy. It has been urged by Mr. Mitra that there is no scope to discard the evidence of this witness to the effect that she did not receive any notice in terms of clause 3 (1) of the deed of lease and the notice dated 5-10-67. ( 12 ) MR. Mitra contended that there is no scope to go into the question if the lease deed in favour of the plaintiff was bad in law for being in violation of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act or for being against the public policy. No such defence was taken by the defendant in their written statement. Moreover, it would appear that the defendant was being treated as a lessee in all connected correspondences even, then he never raised any objection and did not clearly claim to be a monthly tenant governed by the WBPT Act. Letter of attornment, Ext. 8 dt. 28-1-82 clearly stated that the property is held under the lease dated 24-11-62 and asked the lessee to pay the lease rent to the plaintiff purchaser. In his reply Ext. 5 (b) dt. Letter of attornment, Ext. 8 dt. 28-1-82 clearly stated that the property is held under the lease dated 24-11-62 and asked the lessee to pay the lease rent to the plaintiff purchaser. In his reply Ext. 5 (b) dt. 3-3-82 this defendant did not dispute the subsistence of the lease and continued to pay lease rent to the plaintiff. In his reply the defendant never referred to the letter dt. 5-10-67 exercising his option for being treated as a monthly tenant. Ext. 6 series will show that the receipts granted by the defendant clearly shows that they received the amount as lease rent. On this background Mr. Mitra argued that the defence case that the defendant has exercised his right of option in terms of clause 3 (1) of the lease deed is an after thought. The documents referred to by Mr. Mitra was put to the defendant while he was being examined as D. W. 1. It would appear from the covering letters of the payment of rent by cheque that he has described the same as only rent but the defendant in their receipts described the same as lease rent. Some of the receipts will also show the date of the deed of lease against which the payment is made. The defendant in his cross-examination stated that he had sent the amount as monthly rent but the defendant granted him receipt as lease rent. He had no scope to do anything in the matter. Thus submission of Mr. Mitra has little bearing on the appeal itself. To determine the nature and character of the lease we have to revert back to the deed of lease under which the plaintiff claims that the defendant is a tenant. It is established that in terms of clause 3 (1) of the deed of lease the option was exercised by the defendant, these receipts will have little bearing. The defendant claimed that in a letter subsequently sent under certificate of posting he has made it known to the defendant that he is governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Ptemises Tenancy Act. These documents have duly been considered by the Id. first appellate Court and he has arrived at his conclusion in respect of these documents. This court in second appeal has little scope of reassessing the same. ( 13 ) WE will now consider the submission of Mr. These documents have duly been considered by the Id. first appellate Court and he has arrived at his conclusion in respect of these documents. This court in second appeal has little scope of reassessing the same. ( 13 ) WE will now consider the submission of Mr. Mitra that this particular deed of lease cannot be treated as bad for violation of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act or for being in derogation to the public policy. On a close scrutiny of the deed of lease it will appear that it was executed on 24-11-62. It stipulated that the defendant will hold the disputed property for a term of 23 years commencing from lst Nov. , 62 and terminating on 31-10-83. Under the lease the lessee agreed to pay monthly rent reserved by the lease on the day and in the manner provided by the deed itself without any reduction whatsoever. It was stipulated that if the monthly rent reserved by the deed of lease or in or in part thereof be in arrear for 60 days next after the date on which it is required to be paid or if there shall be a breach of any other covenant the lessor at any time thereafter shall have a right of reentry. This provision itself is contrary to the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act inasmuch as under the provisions of S. 13 (1) and S. 13 (4) no premises tenant cannot be evicted on the ground of arrears in payment of rent subject to the compliance of certain obligations contemplated by law therein. this provision is clearly against the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act which is enacted for protecting the rights of the tenant who are deemed to be a weaker section of the community. We have already indicated that the defendant was a monthly tenant in the disputed premises on the date when the lease was executed. There was no express surrender of the monthly tenancy held by the defendant on the date on which he executed the deed of lease. Mr. Mitra submitted that it must be presumed that the tenancy was impliedly surrendered. Mr. Mitra placed his reliance on, AIR 1957 AP 619 , 55 Cal WN 518 : ( AIR 1952 Cal 196 ). There was no express surrender of the monthly tenancy held by the defendant on the date on which he executed the deed of lease. Mr. Mitra submitted that it must be presumed that the tenancy was impliedly surrendered. Mr. Mitra placed his reliance on, AIR 1957 AP 619 , 55 Cal WN 518 : ( AIR 1952 Cal 196 ). These two decisions are in respect of leases covered by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. It would appear on the facts of these two cases that the tenant was a lessee governed by the T. P. Act before entering into another lease governed by the same Act did not express the surrender of the earlier lease. In these circumstances it was presumed that the earlier lease has been impliedly surrendered. This principle cannot be made applicable on the facts of this case. Firstly because the earlier tenancy is governed by the provisions of the WBPT Act which provides for certain provisions for the protection of the tenant. It lays down that no decree for recovery of possession of any premises governed by the provisions of the WBPT Act shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in the section itself. It is true that S. 13 does not provide that a tenant has no right of surrender of his tenancy. But in the context of the provisions of S. 13 such a surrender made by the tenant has to be strictly construed. There must be some indication to show that the tenant has voluntarily surrendered his tenancy. On the facts of the case it does not appear probable as to why the tenant would surrender his monthly tenancy and enter into a deed of lease which is only for 21 years and thereafter he was bound to deliver possession of the landlord on expiry of the said term. Whereas as in the case of a tenancy governed by S. 13 the tenancy can only be determined under the provisions of S. 13 itself we are not aware whether any ground contemplated by S. 13 of the WBPT Act was available to the landlady Bani Lahiri. Nothing appears from the deed of lease itself. Whereas as in the case of a tenancy governed by S. 13 the tenancy can only be determined under the provisions of S. 13 itself we are not aware whether any ground contemplated by S. 13 of the WBPT Act was available to the landlady Bani Lahiri. Nothing appears from the deed of lease itself. Deed of lease does not state that the defendant was in the premises as a monthly tenant and has surrendered his tenancy and is entering into the deed of lease nor there is any indication that the lessee is in possession of the property in question. We have also indicated earlier that the lease was executed on 24-11-62 but was given effect to from 1st November, 62. If the case of implied surrender has to be accepted then it has to be presumed that even before the date of execution of the deed of lease the defendant impliedly surrendered his tenancy with effect from 31-10-62. We cannot come to that conclusion because such a case was never disclosed by the plaintiff or the landlady concerned. Accordingly, during the subsistence of the right of a monthly tenancy of the defendant the deed of lease was executed between it and its erstwhile landlady Bani Lahiri. The deed in question is certainly contrary to the provisions of the WBPT Act. We do not say that no deed of lease can be entered into between the landlord and his tenant if the tenant is already in occupation of the premises as a monthly tenant. But in giving effect to such a lease it must be clearly understood that a tenant has surrendered his monthly tenancy before entering into the lease. There being no element to establish this. We are unable to agree with Mr. Mitra that the monthly tenancy must be presumed to be impliedly surrendered. ( 14 ) WE have noted that the Id. first appellate Court also treated the deed of lease as a document contrary to public policy. The State Policy is to protect the rights of the weaker section of the community. It was contended by Mr. Ghosal that by inducing the defendant to enter into a lease agreement with the landlady the tenant has to act against his interest and such an action at the instance of landlady is contrary to be enunciated by policy. The State Policy is to protect the rights of the weaker section of the community. It was contended by Mr. Ghosal that by inducing the defendant to enter into a lease agreement with the landlady the tenant has to act against his interest and such an action at the instance of landlady is contrary to be enunciated by policy. Since we have already found that the deed of lease is contrary to the provisions of the WBPT Act it is not necessary to come to the conclusion that it is also against public policy but as on the facts of the case we clearly see that the term of the deed of lease is contrary to the public policy. Accordingly, we hold that on expiration of the term contemplated by the lease the present landlord cannot recover possession of the property from the defendant. In doing so, he is to take appropriate of action as contemplated by S. 13 of the WBPT Act. ( 15 ) WE may now consider the submission made by Mr. Mitra in respect of service of notice Ext. A on landlady Bani Lahiri. In going into this question we have to take note of the clause 6 of the deed of lease. We have already quoted the same. It provides for the manner of giving or serving of notice required to be given or served by the deed of lease. It lays down that it shall be sufficiently given or served upon the lessor if despatched by a prepaid envelope by registered post addressed to the lessor at 33, Macleod St. the first appellate Court has found that it has been duly registered and has placed his reliance on the registration receipt proved by the defendant on his behalf. The Id. trial Judge did not rely on the document, Ext. A and the registration receipt. The Id. first appellate Court took into consideration the finding of the trial court and came to the view that the trial Court has relied on materials which are not connected with the receipt itself and has accordingly come to an erreneous finding. On consideration of the total evidence placed by the parties on this point the Id. first appellate Court came to a finding that the notice was duly registered. We have no scope in second appeal to come to a contrary finding. On consideration of the total evidence placed by the parties on this point the Id. first appellate Court came to a finding that the notice was duly registered. We have no scope in second appeal to come to a contrary finding. This being a question of fact in arriving at his conclusion the Id. first appellate Court did not take into consideration the provisions of clause 6 of the deed of lease. This clause has assumed more importance because of the evidence of D. W. 2 Bani Lahiri the landlady. We have already indicated under what circumstances Bani Lahiri was examined. Mr. Mitra relying on the provisions of S. 154 of the Evidence Act as well as on decisions reported in, AIR 1977 SC 170 and AIR 1934 Patna 533, submitted that since Bani Lahiri was not declared hostile and was not cross examined on behalf of the defendant her evidence cannot be discarded and the Court is bound to accept the same, the appeal Court made an error in law in holding that the evidence of Bani Lahiri cannot be relied on. Bani Lahiri as D. W. 2 stated that she did not receive the notice Ext. A, Clause 6 of the deed of lease clearly provides that it is not incumbent on the party giving notice to prove the receipt of the same. It shall be presumed to be duly given or served if it is registered at the address given in cl. 6. On the facts accepted by the first appellate Court it is clear that such a registration addressed to Bani Lahiri at the proper, address has been proved by the defendant accordingly, we accept the finding arrived at by the first appellate Court that the notice contemplated by clause 3 (1) of the deed of lease has duly been given by the defendant to the then landlady. As a result, the lease deed has ceased to have any effect on and from that date as contemplated in the notice, Ext. A itself. ( 16 ) MR. Mitra referring to Ext. A submitted that clause 3 (1) clearly provides for a Calendar month's notice. The notice Ext. A is not a notice of a Calendar month. Notice dt. 5-10-67 Ext. A purports to terminate the lease on 24-11-67. A itself. ( 16 ) MR. Mitra referring to Ext. A submitted that clause 3 (1) clearly provides for a Calendar month's notice. The notice Ext. A is not a notice of a Calendar month. Notice dt. 5-10-67 Ext. A purports to terminate the lease on 24-11-67. The deed of lease was executed on 24-11-62 and it was clearly stipulated that the tenancy would be in respect of English Calendar month and clause 3 (l) provides for one Calendar month's notice for termination of the lease. Referring to a decision reported in, (1957) 61 Cal WN 127, Mr. Mitra contended that a Calendar month means a month commencing from the 1st day of the month to the last day of the same. The notice Ext. A not being a Calendar month's notice is not a compliance of clause 3 (1) of the deed of lease. It will appear that the notice under clause 3 (1) is not a notice contemplated by any provision of law. It is an agreement between the parties. In the context of the facts of this particular case we have no doubt that the parties intended that a notice of a month has to be given in exercising option under clause 3 (1 ). The Calendar month referred to in the clause does not mean strictly a month according to the English Calendar. In this view, we are not in agreement with Mr. Mitra on this point as well. Moreover, as we have already held that the deed of lease cannot be acted upon, the question of serving a notice under clause 3 (l) has lost some of its importance. ( 17 ) MR. Mitra submitted that since the defendant did not plead that the lease in question is against the public policy, the first appellate Court was not correct in arriving on a decision on the said point. Mr. Mitra placed his reliance on, AIR 1930 PC 57 (1); 1953 SCR 789 : AIR 1953 SC 235 ). It will appear that we could have accepted the submission of Mr. Mitra if it was not accepted by the plaintiff in the first appellate Court the fact that the defendant was a monthly tenant in the said premises on the date when the deed of lease was executed. It will appear that we could have accepted the submission of Mr. Mitra if it was not accepted by the plaintiff in the first appellate Court the fact that the defendant was a monthly tenant in the said premises on the date when the deed of lease was executed. This fact having been admitted the other question automatically follows as a point of law which could be taken into consideration. Accordingly, we do not find that the conclusions arrived at by the first appellate court are not consistent with the pleadings of the parties. In view of what has been stated above, we are unable to hold that a substantial question of law as contemplated by S. 100 of the CPC could be made out by the appellant in this case. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. ( 18 ) HARIDAS DAS, J:- I agree. Appeal dismissed.