K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) I. A. II is allowed. Delay in filing the application is condoned. I. A. III is allowed. The order dated 28-2-1990 is re-called, writ appeal is restored. It is also heard for final disposal. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 7th November, 1985 passed in Writ petition 11238 of 1984. The appellant was the petitioner. The respondents in this appeal were also the respondents in the Writ Petition. Therefore, in this appeal, the appellant will be referred to as the petitioner. ( 2 ) IN the writ petition the petitioner sought for quashing the order dated 23-6-1984 passed by the Tahsildar, Bailhongal in WTN/misc/sr-197. By the aforesaid impugned order, the Tahsildar held that the alienation of the land bearing Survey No. 187/2, measuring 13 acres 21 gunlas situated at Anigoal village governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') made on 4-12-1982 under a registered sale deed was invalid, inasmuch as, it was opposed to the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act and as such the transferee was liable to be evicted as an unauthorised occupant of the land. Accordingly, he declared the alienation as invalid and directed the Revenue Inspector, bailhongal to obtain possession of the land immediately from the petitioner and further directed the petitioner to vacate the land in question and hand over possession of the same to the Revenue Inspector. ( 3 ) THE learned Single Judge held that the alienation effected in favour of the petitioner on 4-12-1982 was invalid because, it was opposed to the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by Act No. 13 of 1978. Accordingly, confirmed the order of the Tahsildar and dismissed the writ petition. ( 4 ) IT is contended by Sri C. R. Patil, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by Karnataka Act 13 of 1978 are not applicable to a case wherein the rcgrant has taken place earlier to the coming into force of the Karnalaka Act 13 of 1978 and it is applicable to a case wherein regrant takes place on or after the com ing into force of the Karnataka Act 13 of 1978. It is also further contended that if it is held that sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act covers the case in which the regrant had taken place prior to the coining into force of the karnataka Act 13 of 1978 it would amount to giving retrospective effect to sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act and it would also result in taking away the vested right of the regrantee to sell the land as at the time when the regrant took place, the Karnataka Act 13 of 1978 was not in force and as such there was no embargo placed oil the right to alienate the regranted land. In support of these contentions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the following three decisions of this Court rendered by the learned single Judge: 1. Malanaik Doddnaik Patil v The Assistant Commissioner, Bailhongal and another, W. P, No. 3713 of 1986, DD: 19-4-1989; 2. Ramanagouda Shiddanagouda Patil v The Tahsildar, Belgaum, W. P. No. 14998 of 1989, DD: 8-9-1989; 3. Tukaram Pundalik Patil and Others v The Tahsildar and Others, W. P. No. 16123/1989, DD: 13-9-1989. ( 5 ) IT is neither possible to accept the contentions urged by Sri C. R. Patil, learnedcounsel for the appellant nor the interpretation placed on sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act in the aforesaid decisions. ( 6 ) WE would like to make it clear at the outset that a mere fact that a statute drawscerta in facts from a time antecedent to its passing, it does not become retrospective. At page 387 of "craies on Statute Law", Seventh Edition, dealing with the subject retrospective enactments, it has been observed thus: "a statute is to be deemed to be retrospective, which lakes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. But a statute "is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. " (emphasis supplied) sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, as amended by Karnataka Act 13 of 1978 is not retrospective merely because it covers the regrants made prior to coming into force of karnataka Act 13 of 1978. " (emphasis supplied) sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, as amended by Karnataka Act 13 of 1978 is not retrospective merely because it covers the regrants made prior to coming into force of karnataka Act 13 of 1978. However, sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the Act, as amended by Karnataka Act 13 of 1978 and as interpreted by a Division Bench of this court in Lakshmana Gouda v State of Karnataka and Others, 1981 (1) Kar. L. J. 1 :ilr 1980 Kar. 892 do not cover the alienations made prior to 7-8-1978. In the above decision, it has been held as follows: "87. In the-light of the above principles of statutory construction, we hold that sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Principal Act should be construed as being applicable only to transfers made subsequent to 7-8-1978 and not to transfers which had taken place prior to that date and that sub-section (3) occurring in that section should be construed as having reference to amended sub-section (3) and nol to original sub-section (3) of that section. " therefore, it is clear that sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by Karnalaka Act 13 of 1978 will cover only the alienations made after 7-8-1978 even though the regrant has taken place earlier to that date. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the cases in which regrants had taken place prior to 7-8-1978, and alienation of such lands takes place subsequent to 7-8-1978 are not covered by sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by karnataka Act 13 of 1978. Further it does not also amount to giving retrospective effect to the said provisions. A vested right can also be taken away by the statute. ( 7 ) IN addition to this, it is also relevant to notice that sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by Karnataka Act 13 of 1978 use the word 'regranted' which means the regrant which had taken place earlier to 7-8-1978. As far as the alienation of the regrantcd land is concerned, there is a prohibition for alienating the same from 7-8-1978 for a period of 15 years. As far as the alienation of the regrantcd land is concerned, there is a prohibition for alienating the same from 7-8-1978 for a period of 15 years. Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act makes such al ienations null and void and the lands so transferred, as penalty, are liable to be forfeited to and vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and any person in possession there of shall be summarily evicted therefrom by the Deputy Commissioner and the lands shall be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the disposal of unoccupied unalienated lands subject to the proviso thereto. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, no doubt the regrant took place prior to 7-8-1978 but the alienation has taken place on 14-12-1982, long after the coming into force of Karnataka act 13 of 1978; such alienation is null and void. Therefore, the order passed by the 1st respondent is correct Consequently it follows that the decision of the learned Single judge dismissing the writ petition docs not suffer from any infirmity. As such it docs not call for interference. ( 9 ) IN the light of these conclusions, we would now consider the afore said threedecisions rendered by Balakrishna, J. In Malanaik Doddnaik Patil v The Assistant Commissioner, Bailhongal and another, W. P. No. 3713/1986, DD: 19-4-1989, the regrant order was passed on 31-12-1974. However, an application for permission to alienate the land was made on 19-11-1985 and the same was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner having regard to the provisions contained in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by karnataka Act 13 of 1978. In this regard, Balakrishna, J. observed thus: "it is significant to note that at that time the amended Act of 1978 was not in existence. The Principal Act of 1963 was in force. According to condition No. 5 of the order of regrant, the occupancy of the land was not transferable without previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner and except on payment of Nazarana amount equal to fifteen times the new assessment and cess thereunder. If the petitioner had made an application for previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner for the purpose of alienation of the land prior to 1978, the position would not have offered any scope for controversy. If the petitioner had made an application for previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner for the purpose of alienation of the land prior to 1978, the position would not have offered any scope for controversy. However, the application was made by the petitioner on 19-11-1985 which is subsequent to the coining into force of the amendment. However, a reference to the amended provision of law as it stands even in 1978 would throw sufficient light on the question whether the amendment is prospective or retrospective. The relevant provision of law in this regard is Section 5 (3) of the Act which provides: "the carriage of the right of the land, as the case may be, regranted under sub-section shall not be transferable otherwise than for a period of 15 years from the karnataka Village Offices Abolition (Amended) Act, 1978. " 2. The provision itself is self-explanatory and the only meaning that could be construed from this provision of law is that the period of prohibition against alienation begins from the date of commencement of Section 1 of the Karnataka village Offices Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1978. Beyond doubt, the provision has only a prospective effect and therefore, it has to be held that the impugned order docs not stand legal scrutiny. " in Ramanagouda Shiddanagouda Patil v The Tahsildar, Belgaum, W. P. No. 14998/1989, DD: 8-9-1989 the regrant of the land had taken place on 11-2-1972, prior to the coming into force of Kaniataka Act 13 of 1978 but the application for permission lo alienate was filed on 14-8-1989, long after the coming into force of Karnataka Act 13 of 1978. Therefore, it was rejected by the Tahsildar. The validity of the same was challenged before this Court in W. P. No. 14998/1989. After quoting sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by Karnataka Act 13 of 1978, Balakrishna, J. observed thus: "3. From the above provisions, it would be seen that all that was required was the sanction from the Deputy Commissioner for alienation of the regranted land. In the instant case, the application for permission to alienate was made subsequent to 1978 and to be precise on 14-8-1989. From the above provisions, it would be seen that all that was required was the sanction from the Deputy Commissioner for alienation of the regranted land. In the instant case, the application for permission to alienate was made subsequent to 1978 and to be precise on 14-8-1989. It is my impression that subsequent to the introduction of the amendment in 1978 to the Kaniataka Village Offices Abolition act, 1961, Section 5 (3) came to be amended and prohibition was imposed rigidly on alienation of the regranted lands for a period of 15 years. Under the new provisions, there is no scope for grant of sanction for alienation of the land relaxing the rule of prohibition. This must have caused difficulty to the Tahsildar, in granting permission for alienation of the land. 4. xx xx xx. 5. xx xx xx. "6. The reasoning of the Tahsildar is that consequent to the amendment of the act in 1978 bringing into force the prohibition for a period of fifteen years, permission for alienation cannot be granted. It is not possible to accept the reasoning adopted by the Tahsildar and the order passed on such reasoning would not be tenable for the reason that it is the provision of law which existed prior to the amendment when the order of regrant was made, that should be taken into consideration. So long as that right to make an application under Section 5 (3) of the act emanated from the order of regrant made on 11-2-1972 existed, power to grant such permission also co-existed. It is not as if the respondent is not empowered by the staiute to consider the application on merits. Since it is the question of exercising statutory discretion in the matter of grant of permission to alienate the regranted land, it would be desirable to leave the discretion to the authority itself. " consequently, the writ petition was allowed; the order of the Tahsildar was quashed and the Tahsildar was directed to consider the application afresh. In T. P. Patil and Others v The Tahsildar, Athani and Another, W. P. No. 16123/1989, DD: 13-9-1989 also the regrant was made prior to coining into force of karnataka Act 13 of 1978. " consequently, the writ petition was allowed; the order of the Tahsildar was quashed and the Tahsildar was directed to consider the application afresh. In T. P. Patil and Others v The Tahsildar, Athani and Another, W. P. No. 16123/1989, DD: 13-9-1989 also the regrant was made prior to coining into force of karnataka Act 13 of 1978. An application seeking permission to alienate the land was made on 9-8-1989 before the Tahsildar, Athani who rejected the same by his order dated 19-8-1989 on the ground that in the light of the Karnataka Act 13 of 1978, such permission could not be granted. The validity of the said order was challenged in the aforesaid writ petition by T. P. Patil. The writ petition was allowed following the decision in Malanaik Doddnaik Patil's case, W. P. No. 3713/1986, DD: 19-4-1989 referred to above. ( 10 ) THUS from the a fore said three decisions, it is clear that a Division Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmana Gouda's case, 1981 (1) Kar. L. J. page 1 had not been brought to the notice of the Court and the learned Single Judge had also proceeded on the basis that the provisions would not apply to the case where the regrant had taken place earlier to 7-8-1978 and would govern only such cases where regrant takes place after 7-8-1978. This reasoning is not only opposed to the very contents of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by Karnataka Act 13 of 1978 and is also opposed to the Division Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmana Gouda's case, 1981 (1) Kar. L. J. page 1. Therefore, we hold that the decisions in: 1. Malanaik Doddnaik Patil v The Assistant Commissioner, Bailhongal and another, W. P. No. 3713/86, DD: 19-4-1989; 2. Ramanagouda Shiddanagouda Patil v The Tahsildar, Belgaum, W. P. No. 14998/1989, DD: 8-9-1989; and 3. Tukaram Pundalik Patil and Others v The Tahsildar and Others, W. P. No. 16123/1989, DD: 13-9-1989, do not lay down the law correctly. As such the same are overruled. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed. --- *** --- .