M. K. MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) PIJUS Kanti Ghosh, the respondent No. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the 'workman') was an employee of the General Electric Company of India Limited ('company for short), the petitioner No. 1 herein. The company dismissed him from its services on October 26, 1981. The respondent No. 3 thereafter raised an industrial dispute in respect of his dismissal and ultimately the Government of West Bengal by its order dated December 27, 1983 referred the following issue to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, for adjudication:"whether the dismissal of Sri Pijus Kanti Ghosh with effect from 26. 10. 1981 is justified? What relief, if any, is he entitled to?" ( 2 ) BEFORE the Tribunal the respondent No. 3 filed an application under Section 15 (2) (b) of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes (Second Amendment) Act, 1980 ('act' for short) praying for grant of interim relief to the workman which was opposed by the company. After hearing the parties, the learned Tribunal, by his order dated 16. 3. 1988 allowed the said application and directed the company to pay to the workman, at the rate of 50% of his monthly wages for the first 90 days from the date of hisdismissal and thereafter 75% for the subsequent period till the disposal of the reference, subject to his giving a written undertaking duly supported by an affidavit that the amount to be received by him on account of interim relief will be repaid by him to the company if the case was decided ultimately against him. Aggrieved by the above order, the Company and one of its shareholders have filed the instant writ petition. ( 3 ) IN the writ petition various grounds were taken challenging the order granting interim relief to the workman including vires of the Act. At the time of hearing, however, Dr. Pal appearing for the writ petitioner, in his usual fairness, did not agitate those grounds except one. The ground so agitated, was that the Tribunal could have at best granted interim relief to the workman from the date of the reference and not from the date of his dismissal. According to Dr. At the time of hearing, however, Dr. Pal appearing for the writ petitioner, in his usual fairness, did not agitate those grounds except one. The ground so agitated, was that the Tribunal could have at best granted interim relief to the workman from the date of the reference and not from the date of his dismissal. According to Dr. Pal, the Tribunal assumed jurisdiction to decide the reference on and from the date it was made and consequently it could not have granted interim relief under Section 15 (2) (b) of the Act from a date anterior to it. Dr. Pal submitted that the opening words of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 made the position abundantly clear. To appropriate the above contention of Dr. Pal, it will be profitable at this stage to refer to Section 15 (2) of the Act. The said section so far as it is relevant for our present purpose reads as under:-"15 (2) - Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court or Tribunal under Sub-section (1) of Section 10, it shall,- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . (b) after hearing the parties to the dispute, determine, within a period of sixty days from the date of order referring such industrial dispute or within such shorter period as may be specified in such order, the quantum of interim relief admissible, if any: provided that the quantum of interim relief shall, in the case of discharge, dismissal or retrenchment of a workman from service or termination of service of a workman, be equivalent to the subsistence allowance admissible under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969 (West Bengal Act XXXVIII of 1969)" ( 4 ) THE above sub-section unmistakably casts an obligation upon the Tribunal to determine the interim relief admissible to the workman with utmost dispatch but it is silent as to the date or event from which the interim relief would be admissible. Consequently, being a piece of labour and welfare legislation, it has to be interpreted keeping in view the colour, content and context of the statute. It cannot be gainsaid that Section 15 (2) (b) was brought into the Statute Book to ameliorate the sufferings of an indignant workman, who has not only lost the sources of his income but also has to fight his cause against the employer. It cannot be gainsaid that Section 15 (2) (b) was brought into the Statute Book to ameliorate the sufferings of an indignant workman, who has not only lost the sources of his income but also has to fight his cause against the employer. As Section 15 (2) (b) has to respond to such urgent social and economic demand, it is the bounden duty of the Court to give it a liberal and beneficial interpretation, subject to the limitation of its language. In the case of Jindal Limited v. Appellate Authority , the Supreme Court observed as follows:"in construing a social welfare legislation, the Court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction; and if a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfills the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed. When, however, the language is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequence, for, in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the Legislature and not for the Courts to consider. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are two methods of construction. In their anxiety to advance beneficent purpose of legislation, the Courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none". ( 5 ) AS already noticed, Section 15 (2) (b) has not laid down the date or event from which the interim relief would be admissible to the workman and consequently interpreting the language of the Section in the light of the above quoted observations of the Supreme Court, it can be legitimately said that interim relief can be granted to a workman from the date of his dismissal. ( 6 ) THE same conclusion is reached through a different route. It is trite law that interim relief is granted by the Court in aid of the main relief. If, therefore, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction and authority to ultimately hold that the dismissal is unjustified and to grant him relief with effect from the date of his dismissal, it can legitimately grant interim relief from that date. It is trite law that interim relief is granted by the Court in aid of the main relief. If, therefore, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction and authority to ultimately hold that the dismissal is unjustified and to grant him relief with effect from the date of his dismissal, it can legitimately grant interim relief from that date. ( 7 ) FOR the foregoing discussion, I reject this petition with costs, which is assessed at 50 gms. (Rs. 850. 00 ). ( 8 ) SINCE the reference is long pending, the learned Tribunal is directed to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible preferably within 3 months from the date of communication of this order.