CHANDRAKANTHARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS matter has come up before us on account of the order dated 1-8-1985 made by the learned Single Judge as similar petition raising same question of law had earlier been referred to a Division bench. We may at this stage itself submit that the petition referred earlier has since been disposed of by a Division bench of this Court by its order dated 7-1-1987. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this Writpetition may be briefly stated and they are as follows:- petitioner admittedly is the purchaser of 20 guntas of land in survey No. 72/2 of tayalur Amanikere village, Mulbagal Taluk, kolar District of Karnataka State. The said land was so purchased by a sale deed executed by the third respondent, holder of a minor village office. By virtue of it, that land was in his possession. The sals deed is dated 21-9-1965. The said sale deed has been annexed to the Petition as annexure 'a' and is in Kannada. The recitals therein indicate that it was inam land and on account of accute poverty and drought which existed in the district at the relevant time, the holder of the village office could not maintain his family by cultivating the land attached to the office which had since been abolished and therefore he was selling the same to the petitioner for valuable consideration. However, the third respondent-vendor and holder of inferior village office, filed an application to restore the land, which he had alienated, in the year 1981. The application was made before the Tahsildar, mulbagal Taluk, Kolar District who is respondent-2 in this proceeding. Admittedly, the petitioner was notified of the application. In the course of the impugned order, it is observed that he filed a statement admitting having purchased the land in question knowing it to be an illegal transaction and that he was willing to surrender the land to the Government. In the light of that admission, the order was passed restoring the land to the original baravardars subject to the conditions prescribed under Section 7a of the karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act. In the light of that admission, the order was passed restoring the land to the original baravardars subject to the conditions prescribed under Section 7a of the karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has epproached this Court under Article 226 enter alia contending - that the order is liable to be set aside in the light of the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Lakshmana Gowda v State of karnataka and others (1981 (1) Kar. L. J. P. 1 ). Petitioner also has further contended that the opportunity given to him was not adequate and that some subordinate official of the Taluk Office at Mulbagal obtained petitioner's signature and therefore procedure followed by the Tahsildar in passing an order under Section 7a was contrary to law. In that circumstance, he has prayed for setting aside the order and grant such other reliefs which this Court may in the circumstances of the case. ( 3 ) WE have heard Mr. Pap! Reddy inregard to the contentions advanced by him. Identical - contentions were advanced before the Division Bench in Writ petitions 34413 to 34415 of 1982 disposed of on 7-1-1989. In the said decision, prem Chand Jain, C. J. , as he then was, examined the contentions similar to the one raised before us and other contentions and having analysed in detail, the earlier judgment of this Court in Lakshmana gowda's case supra, came to the conclusion that those contentions were liable to be rejected. One of the questions decided in Lakshmana Gowda's case was that a holder or the authorised holder, if he alienated after the Principal Act came into force and before it was re-granted to him under Section 5 or 6 of the Principal act, the alienee acquired-title to that land on such re-grant to his alienor. In other words, if the alienation of the service inam land had taken place prior to re- grant, alienee of such land would get his title perfected by virtue of subsequent re-grant made in favour of the alienor. Undoubtedly, that was the declaration of law. But then in that case, the effect of the amendment brought about by amendment Act No. 13/1978 resulting in certain changes in the various provisions of the karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961, as originally enacted was not noticed. Undoubtedly, that was the declaration of law. But then in that case, the effect of the amendment brought about by amendment Act No. 13/1978 resulting in certain changes in the various provisions of the karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961, as originally enacted was not noticed. Sub section (3) of Section 5 authorised the Deputy Commissioner to regularise any sale which by the operation of law was declared to be void if the alienee paid 15 times the assessment of the service inam land which he had purchased from the holder of the inferior village office. In the instant case, the petitioner has not claimed any benefit of an order passed under that provision. In other words, between 1965 and 1981, he has done nothing to enjoy the land which he took possession of subsequent to the execution of sale deed as at Annexure 'a'. In the latter - Division Bench case in the case of Hanumaiah and others v State of karnataka and others rendered in Writ petitions 34413 to 34415 of 1982, the division Bench examined in detail the ruling of this Court in Lakshmana Gowda's case. In para 6 of the latter judgment, the Division Bench of this Court has ruled as follows :-"6. With reference to the law laid down in LAKSHMANA GOWDA's case (supra) - it is contended that subsequent regrant in favour of the vendor, who is the holder of the inferior village office would enure to his benefit and entitle the vendee i. e. , unauthorised holder who is evicted, to claim title. Two factors mitigate against this submission. Firstly, on the day the land was sold it had vested in the State government and the vendor had no title and secondly the amended section 7 has taken away the right of unauthorised holder to claim re-grant in any circumstances. In this situation it is not possible to confer title on the unauthorised holder by invoking equity or the principle of 'feeding the grant by estoppel'. What is taken away by the legislature cannot be conferred by the court. To accede to the petitioners' contention would be to extend the benefit under the old provision notwithstanding its deletion from the statute. Such a thing is impermissible as is made clear by the following enunciation in LAKSHMANA GOWDA's case : "55. What is taken away by the legislature cannot be conferred by the court. To accede to the petitioners' contention would be to extend the benefit under the old provision notwithstanding its deletion from the statute. Such a thing is impermissible as is made clear by the following enunciation in LAKSHMANA GOWDA's case : "55. From the ratios of the said decisions of the Madras High Court with which we are in respectful agreement, it would follow that a prohibited alienation of a Service Inam Land would be null and wholly void and not merely voidable at the option of the government and the alienee of such land would not get any title to, or interest in it and further such alienee could not claim the benefit of the doctrine of feeding the estoppel which was given statutory recognition in section 43 of the Transfer of Property act because that section would not apply to transfers forbidden by law on the ground of public policy. " (Emphasis added ). Thus, it is seen that the contention advanced before us had also been advanced before the earlier Division Bench and it was rejected and the reasons given for so rejecting are set out in the judgment a portion of which we have extracted above. ( 4 ) WE are not only bound by thatexposition of law, but we find no reasons to disagree with the same. Therefore, by virtue of any re-grant made in favour of third respondent, the petitioner did not acquire any title that would stand our scrutiny and therefore the contention must fall to the ground. ( 5 ) IN fact there is no material placed before this Court that there was a regrant in favour of the third respondent at any point of time before he approached for restoration of this land which resulted in the impugned order. ( 6 ) THE only other contention which survives for consideration is whether the opportunity given was sufficient and adequate and whether as alleged, petitioner's signature was obtained fraudulently by seme official resulting in the admission noticed in the impugned order by the second respondent-Tahsildar. Though Mr. Papireddy, learned Counsel, denied petitioner having made any concession by admission before the Tahsildar, the fact nevertheless remains that no official as such has been named who obtained signature of the petitioner fradulantly mis-representing facts. Though Mr. Papireddy, learned Counsel, denied petitioner having made any concession by admission before the Tahsildar, the fact nevertheless remains that no official as such has been named who obtained signature of the petitioner fradulantly mis-representing facts. Nor has he stated the time or the place and the circumstances under which such signature was obtained. In the absence of proper pleadings and impleading of necessary parties, this Court is unable to investigate such vague allegations, when the events have taken place in the year 1981-82. However, in the light of the assertion made before us from the Bar we are bound to state this. Assuming, but not conceding that such a thing had taken place, in the latter judgment of 7-1-1987, the effect of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 5 and the importance of the definition of 'unauthorised holder' which includes the alienee, the petitioner is left with no remedy in equity. He acquires no title under the sale deed of 1965 and he has no legal right to have the same regularised in terms of sub-section (3) of Sections of the Act as it stood originally resulting in his losing locus standi to be an aggrieved person. To that extent the correctness or otherwise of the impugned order, a purchaser of land the land which is ab initio void cannot be clothed with rights when the law declares to the contrary. For the above reasons, we feel the questions raised in this Petition have stood covered by the decision rendered by this Court on 7-1-1987 in Writ Petitions 34413 to 34415 of 1982 and for the reasons we have given. In the result, Petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Writ petition dismissed. --- *** --- .