JUDGMENT - S.M. DAUD, J.:---This appeal takes exception to the acquittal of Respondents 1 to 8---Nos. 2 to 8 therefrom constituting the management of Respondent 1 Institution in a College of which the appellant was serving as a Lecturer in Mathematics. 2. The 1st Respondent runs a College known as Shivaji College at Barshi in which the appellant was employed as a Lecturer in Mathematics. Alleging that his services had been wrongly terminated and his salary wrongly withheld, the appellant filed an appeal to the University College Tribunal. The Tribunal on 8th August, 1979 directed the Respondents to reinstate the appellant and pay him 50% of the salary payable. The Tribunal granted two months to the respondents to comply with the order. Far from so doing, the respondents approached the High Court by way of a writ petition. The High Court on 3rd October, 1979, rejected the petition in limine. Not satisfied, the Management went further and sought to obtain Special Leave from the Supreme Court to appeal against the order rejecting their petition. The Supreme Court rejected the SLP on 8th December, 1980. In the meantime, one Patil, possibly a person who had been appointed in place of the appellant, instituted a suit seeking an injunction against his termination and compliance with the order passed by the Tribunal. This suit was filed on 6 October, 1979 and the Management was noticed to show-cause against the prayer for a temporary injunction. The trial Court eventually on 3 May, 1980 dismissed the said suit. The dismissal of the suit was impugned by way of an appeal to the District Court on 19 June, 1980. Initially an injunction against the implementation of the Tribunal's direction was granted. But on 27 March, 1981, the District Court dismissed the appeal. Patil went in Second Appeal to the High Court and obtained an interim injunction on 9 April, 1981. The High Court dismissed this Second Appeal on 28 July, 1981. On 6 August, 1981, the Management resolved to implement the Tribunal's order, and on 13 August, 1981, appellant was reinstated. Some part of the backwages were paid to him. For the balance he had to move the University Tribunal again. This Tribunal on 5th September, 19784 found that a balance of Rs. On 6 August, 1981, the Management resolved to implement the Tribunal's order, and on 13 August, 1981, appellant was reinstated. Some part of the backwages were paid to him. For the balance he had to move the University Tribunal again. This Tribunal on 5th September, 19784 found that a balance of Rs. 6000/- remained to be paid ton the appellant and this sum was to be paid to him by the Director of Higher Education, Pune, who was to adjust the amount against the grant payable to respondent 1. 3. The complaint out of which this appeal has arisen was filed on 16 November, 1979. It ascribed to the respondents the commission of an offence punishable under section 42-F(1)(a) of the Shivaji University Act, 1974. The College run by the 1st respondent is within the Shivaji University area. The aforementioned provision, to the extent relevant, reads thus :--- "If the Management fails, without any reasonable excuse, to comply with any direction issued by the Tribunal under section 42-D, within the period specified in the direction, or within such further period as may be allowed by the Tribunal, the Management shall, on conviction, be punished---, (a) for the first offence, with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees; Provided that, in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the Court, the fine shall not be less than one hundred rupees.........." Appellant's case was that there was no excuse whatsoever for the Management to delay complying with the direction given by the Tribunal on 8 August, 1989. Many of the defences raised by the respondents were negatived by the learned Magistrate Barshi. He was however, of the view that complainant had to establish "who were in charge and responsible to the society, by leading positive evidence". Besides the complainant's bare words,---so opines the Magistrate---no documentary evidence had been led by him to show which particular accused was responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the Society. It was only after evidence to this effect had been adduced that the concerned offender could be held guilty. In the absence of such clear evidence, the Magistrate observed, that he was left with no alternative but to record a verdict of acquittal. 4. Appellant takes exception to the reasoning of the learned Magistrate. Mr. It was only after evidence to this effect had been adduced that the concerned offender could be held guilty. In the absence of such clear evidence, the Magistrate observed, that he was left with no alternative but to record a verdict of acquittal. 4. Appellant takes exception to the reasoning of the learned Magistrate. Mr. Mandlik representing respondents 1 to 8 submits that the pending litigation was the reason for the non-compliance with the direction of the Truibunal's order made on 8 August, 1979. Therefore, the points for determination would be--- (1) Whether the pending litigation and the non-calculation of the arrears payable to the appellant constituted a reasonable excuse for the failure of the Management to comply with the Tribunal's direction made on August 1979? (2) Whether the reason given by the J.M.F.C. for acquitting Respondents 1 to 8 is correct ? My findings, for reasons given below, are--- (1) Not so. (2) No so. 5. The factual data has been set out at great length and to briefly recapitulate, the Tribunal's order was made on 8 August, 1979. It was to be complied with in 2 months time---these two months to be reckoned as from 8 August, 1979. The show-cause in Patil's suit may be assumed to have been served upon the Management on 6 October, 1979. Patil as also the Management, were unsuccessful in their efforts to foil the success obtained by the appellant vide the Tribunal's order dated 8 August, 1979. The Management did not obtain an extension of time for complying with the Tribunal's direction by moving the Tribunal for that purpose. Mr. Mandlik says that the Tribunal was informed of the show cause notice received by the Management vis-a-vis the suit instituted by Patil and the interim relief claimed therein. In so far as the Respondents 1 to 8 are concerned, the whole show was over on 8 December, 1980 when the Supreme Court refused to grant Special Leave upon the petition moved for that purpose by it. According to Mr. Mandlik even on 19 December, 1980, the District Court had passed an interim order with the consent of the appellant to stay the operation of the Tribunal's order. But the appeal was dismissed on 27 March, 1981. At least by that date, the respondents should have known that there was no reason to defer compliance. According to Mr. Mandlik even on 19 December, 1980, the District Court had passed an interim order with the consent of the appellant to stay the operation of the Tribunal's order. But the appeal was dismissed on 27 March, 1981. At least by that date, the respondents should have known that there was no reason to defer compliance. It is said that Patil preferred a Second Appeal and on 9 April, 1981, the High Court granted a stay of the Tribunal's order. On 29 July, 1981, the 2nd Appeal was dismissed. There was no reason for the Management to stay its hands as from 27 March, 1981 onwards. The truth seems to be that the Management and Patil were working in tandem to frustrate the order obtained by the appellant from the University Tribunal. Protracting a litigation does not constitute 'reasonable excuse' within the meaning of section 41-F(1) of the Act. On the contrary it amounts to wilful evasion, if not refusal, to comply with the direction of the Tribunal. 6. In so far as the reason which appealed to the J.M.F.C. is, concerned, it is, on the face of it wrong. Respondents 2 to 8 constituted the Management and the burden lay upon them to show that some or all of them were inert and that the affairs of the Institution were in fact being run by either one of them or a Manager on whom the responsibility had been delegated. The burden of proof has been wrongly cast upon the appellant. He could not have proved the negative, viz. that some only from out of the many appointed to manage the affairs of Respondent 1, were attending to the management. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the appeal success. 7. Having found respondents 2 to 8 guilty of the offence punishable under section 42-F(1)(a) of the Act, the question now is about the sentence. The offence took place years ago and no purpose will be served by imposing upon respondents 2 to 8 any sentence. The fact of conviction will suffice to serve the ends of justice and hence the order : ORDER The appeal is allowed. The acquittal of Respondents 2 to 8 is reversed and they stand convicted under section 42-F(1)(a) of the Act. The fact of conviction will suffice to serve the ends of justice and hence the order : ORDER The appeal is allowed. The acquittal of Respondents 2 to 8 is reversed and they stand convicted under section 42-F(1)(a) of the Act. Having regard to the long passage of time, which constitute a special and adequate reason for not imposing a sentence, I desist from the imposition of a sentence. Appeal allowed. -----