JUDGMENT E.J. Bellie, J. 1. First defendant is the appellant in this second appeal. The suit was filed on the allegations that the plaintiff is a cultivating tenant of the suit land having taken it on lease from the first defendant and the first defendant purporting to have leased it to the second defendant is trying to unlawfully evict him and therefore an in junction be granted restraining them from interfering with the plaintiff's possession. 2. As against this the first defendant is contending that the plaintiff has been given only the right to take the usufructs of the cocoanut trees for a period of two years commencing from 16-2-1979 on payment of Rs. 175 per year and the lease time having been over on 15-2-1981, the plaintiff has no right to take the usufructs. It is further contended that the allegation that the plaintiff is a tenant in respect of the land is false. It is also contended that having taken advantage of the first defendant being away at Madras, the plaintiff is causing trouble to the first defendant's sister who has raised chilly and brinjal crops. Second defendant has adopted the written statement of the first defendant. 3. The trial Court (Additional District Munsif Cuddalore) on consideration of the evidence adduced held that the plaintiff is not a tenant in the land and as contended by the defendants, but he had only the right to take usefructs of the coconut trees for a period of two years under an agreement Ex. A 2, and therefore no question of granting in junction against the defendants arises. Thus holding, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 4. The plaintiff appealed. The appellant Court (Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore) did not agree with the findings of the trial court and instead held that the plaintiff is a cultivating tenant under Ex.A 2, and therefore he is not entitled to be evicted from the land and hence the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for. Accordingly the appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit as prayed for. 5. Accordingly the appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit as prayed for. 5. In this second appeal the main point that arises for consideration is whether under Ex.A 2, agreement, the plaintiff is a cultivating tenant as pleaded by him or he had only the right to take the usufructs of the coconut trees standing thereon for two years and thereafter he will have no right in the land as contended by the defendants. Apart from Ex.A 2, there is no other document under which the plaintiff claims to be in possession of the land. Therefore we have to see what is the nature of right the plaintiff has under Ex.A 2. The recitals are clear in stating that the plaintiff will have the right to take the usufructs of the cocoanut trees in the land for two years on payment of Rs. 175 per year. In the recitals itself the document has been described as 'coconut trees lease chit'. From these recitals by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the document is a lease deed of the land, and it can only be said that it is a document that gives right to take the usufructs of the coconut trees in the land. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly held that the plaintiff had the right to the usufructs of the coconut trees for two years and thereafter he has no right whatsoever in the land, and the first appellate court is in error in holding to the contrary. 6. Mr. K. Sengottian, learned Counsel for the appellant first defendant, has in support bf his contention that Ex.A 2 is not a lease deed of land but it is only a document that has given right to take the usufructs of the trees for two years only, has relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Govindasami Vanniar v. Mahalakshmi Animal 76 L.W. 378 ; (1963) 2 M.L.J. 137, in which case also the agreement gave right to collect the produce from the trees. It was held that what was leased was only the usufructs from the trees and no interest in the land. As regards the right to use the land for the purpose of collecting the produce from the trees it was held that right was only a licence. It was held that what was leased was only the usufructs from the trees and no interest in the land. As regards the right to use the land for the purpose of collecting the produce from the trees it was held that right was only a licence. Certainly the plaintiff will have right to walk through the land to collect the produce from the trees but that right is only incidental to the right to collect the produce and that right cannot be said to be an interest in the land. It was brought to my notice an earlier Division Bench ruling in Venugopal Filial v. Thirunavukkarasu and Ors. 61 L.W. 514 : (1948) 2 M.L.J. 155 ., wherein of course it was held that the right to tap the cocoanut trees and obtain toddy is in the nature of immovable property because it is a benefit which arises out of the land and the right conveyed by the agrcement would be in the nature of lease hold right. This ruling has been referred to and discussed in the above said Division Bench ruling relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant first defendant, i.e., Govindasami v. Mahalakshmi Animal (1948) 2 M.L.J. 195 : 76 L.W. 378, and after referring to some Supreme Court decisions the learned Judges came to the conclusion, as stated above, that the right to collect the produce from the trees is not a lease of the land. Therefore we have to necessarily follow the said later decision relied on for the appellant first defendant i.e., Govindasami v. Mahalakshmi Ammal (1948) 2 M.L.J. 195 : 76 L.W. 378. Both sides have further relied on some judgment rendered by single Judge but in view of the Division Bench ruling in Govindasami v. Mahalakshmi Ammal 76 L.W. 378 (1963) 2 M.L.J. 137, it is not necessary to refer to those decisions. 7. Thus considering I am clearly of the view that under Ex.A 2, the plaintiff has only to collect the produce of the trees and he has no other right in the land and as such his plea that he is a cultivating tenant cannot be countenanced. Hence I cannot agree with the findings of the first appellate Court, and the judgment of the trial Court must be held to be correct. Hence I cannot agree with the findings of the first appellate Court, and the judgment of the trial Court must be held to be correct. Accordingly the second appeal is allowed and the judgment of the first appellate Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial Court is restored. The first respondent shall pay the costs to the appellant first defendant.