JUDGMENT - MANOHAR SUJATA, J.:---This is a reference under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 relating to assessment years 1958-59 to 1965-66. 2. One Bhagubhai Mafatlal settled some of his properties on trust under a deed of trust dated 6-4-1944. One of the beneficiaries under this deed of trust was his son Hemant. Under the deed of trust the trustees were, inter alia, required to apply the net income of the accumulated trust fund for the support, maintenance, education and advancement of Hemant in such manner as to enable Hemant to live, as far as possible, with the same comforts, and to enjoy life in the same manner as he had been accustomed to, in the life time of the settlor. The trustees, under the deed of trust, are given absolute discretion to pay the whole or any part of the income of the trust fund to Hemant during his life-time or for any period or periods during his life time. The trust also provides that all monies shall be applied by the trustees in their absolute discretion, and their action shall not be questioned by any party in any manner. It is also provided that the trustees shall not be accountable or reasonable for the amount so expended or applied by them or the manner in which and the purpose for which the same is applied by them. 3. For the assessment year 1957-58, which was the first year of assessment under the Wealth Tax Act, Hemant, in the status of an individual, submitted before the Wealth Tax Officer that his beneficial interest in the trust fund was indeterminate. Hence no wealth tax, in respect of his beneficial interest under the trust, should be levied in his hands as an individual. He submitted that wealth-tax was leviable in respect of the whole trust property in the hands of the trustees of the trust. The Wealth Tax Officer, however rejected this contention of Hemant. He held that Hemant had a life interest in the trust fund. He further held that the assessee being the sole beneficiary for life, the present value of his life interest was includible in his net wealth. 4. Being aggrieved by this order of the Wealth Tax Officer, Hemant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that Hemant had no interest in the full income of the trust fund. 4. Being aggrieved by this order of the Wealth Tax Officer, Hemant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that Hemant had no interest in the full income of the trust fund. The trustees had an absolute discretion in applying the income. Hence it could not be said that the assessee had a life interest in the income of the trust fund. He held that the interest of Hemant under the said trust deed was indeterminate and not assessable to wealth-tax in his hands, this order is dated 24-6-1959. 5. The revenue filed an appeal against this order before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 17-10-1962 upheld the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 6. In the meanwhile, for the assessment years 1958-59 to 1961-62, the Wealth Tax Officer completed the original assessment of the trust, hereinafter called "Hemant Bhagubhai Trust". For the purposes of wealth tax, the Wealth Tax Officer took into account the total value of the trust property as reduced by the value of Hemant's beneficial interest in the said property. The latter was separately assessed to wealth tax by him in Hemant's hands. 7. For the assessment years 1962-63 to 1965-66, in the wealth tax assessment of the trustees of the said trust, the Wealth Tax Officer included the value of the trust property without reducing it by the value of the beneficial interest of Hemant therein. For these same assessment years, the Wealth Tax Officer, while assessing Hemant, included the value of his beneficial interest in the trust property as part of Hemant's wealth. Hemant as well as trustees being aggrieved by the orders passed by the Wealth Tax Officer for the assessment years 1962-63 to 1965-66 filed appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the beneficial interest of Hemant in the trust property was indeterminate. He, therefore, excluded the value of his interest from the net-wealth of Hemant in his assessments for all these years. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, however, confirmed the assessment of the trustees in respect of the whole value of the trust property for these years. 8. By notices dated 16-2-1963 the Wealth tax Officer re-opened the assessment of the trustees for the assessment years 1957-58 to 1959-60 under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act as then in force. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, however, confirmed the assessment of the trustees in respect of the whole value of the trust property for these years. 8. By notices dated 16-2-1963 the Wealth tax Officer re-opened the assessment of the trustees for the assessment years 1957-58 to 1959-60 under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act as then in force. Similarly by notices dated 16-10-1964 the Wealth Tax Officer also re-opened the assessment of the trustees for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act as then in force. One re-assessment the Wealth-tax Officer included the full value of the trust property in the net wealth of the trust for these years. 9. In appeals by the trustees for the assessment years 1958-59 to 1961-62 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the contention of the trustees that the re-assessments under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act were not valid. He also held that Hemant's interest in the trust property was indeterminate and not taxable in his hands. He confirmed the assessment of the trustees in respect of the entire value of the trust property. 10. The revenue filed appeals against the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner excluding the value of the beneficial interest of Hemant from his net wealth. The trustees on the other hand filed appeals against the inclusion of the entire value of the trust property in their net wealth. They also challenged re-assessment under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act. 11. The Tribunal by a common order has held that the re-assessment proceedings under section 17(1)(b) of the assessment years 1958-59 to 1961-62 are invalid and without jurisdiction. The Tribunal has further held that the beneficial interest of Hemant in the trust property is not includible in the net wealth of Hemant but that the entire trust property including the beneficial interest of Hemant in it, is liable to wealth-tax in the hands of the trustees. From this judgment of the Tribunal the following questions have been referred to us for determination: (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the entire value of the trust property was liable to be included in the net wealth of the trustees? From this judgment of the Tribunal the following questions have been referred to us for determination: (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the entire value of the trust property was liable to be included in the net wealth of the trustees? (2) If not, what part of the trust property, if at all, was liable to be assessed in the hands of the trustees and in the hands of the assessee? (3) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of the A.A.C. dated 24-6-1959 constituted information within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 for the purpose of the re-assessment of the trustees for the years 1959-60 to 1961-62? (4) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of the Tribunal dated 17-10-1962 constituted information within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, for the purposes of the re-assessment of the trustees for the years 1958-59 to 1961-62? (5) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Hemant held any interest in the trust property, the value whereof was liable to be included in his net wealth for the years under reference? 12. Section 21(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 provides, inter alia, that where the assets chargeable to tax under the Act are held by any trustee appointed under a trust declared by duly executed instrument in writing, the wealth tax shall be levied upon and recoverable from the trustee in the like manner and to the same extent as would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person for whose benefit the assets are held. Under section 21, sub-section (4), where, however, the shares of the persons for whose benefit such assets are held are indeterminate or unknown, the wealth-tax shall be levied upon and recovered from the trustee in the like manner and to the same extent as would be leviable upon and recoverable from an individual for the purposes of this Act. 13. Under section 21, sub-section (4), where, however, the shares of the persons for whose benefit such assets are held are indeterminate or unknown, the wealth-tax shall be levied upon and recovered from the trustee in the like manner and to the same extent as would be leviable upon and recoverable from an individual for the purposes of this Act. 13. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Commissioner of Wealth-tax, A.P. v. Trustees of H.E.H. Nizam's Family (Remainder Wealth) Trust)1, reported in 1977(108) I.T.R. 555, there is now no doubt that section 3 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 must yield to section 21 in so far as section 21 makes special provisions for the assessment of trustees of a trust. Therefore, whenever an assessment is made in respect of a trust, it must be made in accordance with the provisions of section 21. Hence section 21 has to be applied in the present case. 14. The question is whether, in the present case, the interest of Hemant in the trust fund under the trust deed is indeterminate and hence attracts the application of section 21, sub-section (4), or whether his interest can be valued for the purposes of Wealth-tax under section 21(1). 15. The provisions of this very trust deed were construed in connection with the levy of income tax in the case of (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Hemant Bhagubhai Mafatlal)2, reported in 1982(135) I.T.R. 768. Under the proviso to section 41(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, where any income is not specifically receivable for the benefit of any one person or where the individual shares of the persons for whose benefit such income is receivable are indeterminate or unknown, income tax is to be levied as provided therein. This High Court, after examining the terms of this trust deed, came to the conclusion that the trustees were under no legal obligation to pay the entire net income of the trust to Hemant or to apply the same in its entirety for the benefit of Hemant. The trustees had a discretion to apply the whole or any part of the income for the benefit of Hemant although this discretion ought to be exercised by them fairly and judicially and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The trustees had a discretion to apply the whole or any part of the income for the benefit of Hemant although this discretion ought to be exercised by them fairly and judicially and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The Court further observed that the discretion which was granted to the trustees under the trust deed was absolute. The trustees were not accountable to anyone including the assessee, for the manner in which they disbursed the income. The Court held that the income of the assessee, namely Hemant as an individual under the trust, was indeterminate. Therefore the entire income of the trust was to be assessed in the hands of the trustees under the proviso to section 41(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. 16. These findings of the Division Bench would equally apply to the wealth tax assessment of the trustees and Hemant. Since the beneficial interest of Hemant in the trust property is held to be indeterminate, the provisions of section 21(4) of the Wealth Tax Act are attracted. 17. It was, however, submitted by Mr. Jetly, learned Advocate for the respondents, that although in income tax proceedings our High Court has held in the above case that the interest of Hemant was indeterminate, another Division Bench of this High Court in Wealth Tax Reference No. 6 of 1964 pertaining to the same trust deed for the assessment year 1957-58 has held that Hemant's interest in the trust income is liable to be included in his assessment for wealth tax for the year 1957-58. This is a judgment dated 6th December, 1973 by Vimadalal and Desai JJ., in W.T.R. 16 of 1964, (Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Seth Hemant Bhagubhai)3. We have seen this judgment which is a very short judgment of half a page. The question which was referred to the Division Bench was: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee's interest in the trust deed dated 6th April, 1944 is liable to be included in the assessment to wealth tax for the year 1957-58 ?" It seems that the Counsel for both sides stated before the Division Bench that the question was concluded by the decisions of the Supreme Court in 1973(88) I.T.R. 417, (Purshottam M. Amarsay and another v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Bombay City II)4, and 1970(77) I.T.R. 505 (Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat v. Arundhati Balkrishna)5. Both Counsel submitted before the Bench that in view of these decisions the question must be answered in the affirmative. The Court accordingly answered the question in the affirmative. The terms of the trust deed, therefore, were not analysed or construed by the learned Judges. 18. We have seen the decision of the Supreme Court in 1973(88) I.T.R. 417, in the case of Purshottam M. Amarsay and another v. Commissioner of Wealth tax, Bombay City II. In that case, under a trust deed executed by the settlor, the trustees were to apply the net income of the trust fund for the separate maintenance and advancement in life and otherwise for the benefit of the settlor and his wife in such a manner as to enable the settlor to live as far as possible with the same comforts and to enjoy life in the same manner as he was accustomed to. The Reference initially came up before the Bombay High Court (vide 1969(71) I.T.R. 180)6. The question before the Bombay High Court was whether the life interest of the assessee in the trust fund was an asset within the meaning of section 2(e) of the Wealth Tax Act so as to be includible in the net wealth of the assessee. The Court held that the definition of "asset" in section 2(e) was wide enough to cover such an interest. It was then submitted before the Bombay High Court that in that event, the assessment should be made under section 21(4) of the Wealth tax Act, inasmuch as the interest of the assessee was indeterminate. The Court said that on this aspect there was no considered order of the Tribunal. It therefore, declined to go into this aspect of the question and said that this question should be pronounced upon by the Tribunal and a clear cut finding be given. This view of the Bombay High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court in appeal in 1973(88) I.T.R. 417 above. The decision of the Supreme Court in the above case therefore does not consider whether the interest of the assessee in the trust is indeterminate for the purpose of section 21, sub-section (4) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. 19. The other authority on which reliance was placed by the Division Bench in W.T.R. 16 of 1964 is Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat v. Arundhati Balkrishna, reported in 1970(77) I.T.R. 505. 19. The other authority on which reliance was placed by the Division Bench in W.T.R. 16 of 1964 is Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat v. Arundhati Balkrishna, reported in 1970(77) I.T.R. 505. This judgment also does not deal with section 21, sub-section (4) of the Wealth Tax Act. It is concerned with the question whether the payments made to the assessee under the trust deed could be considered as assets within the meaning of section 2(e) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. In these circumstances we prefer the considered decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Hemant Bhagubhai Mafatlal, reported in 1982(135) I.T.R. 768, in respect of this very trust to the judgment in W.T.R. 16 of 1964 which proceeds on a concession. Our Court, in the case reported in 135 I.T.R. 768, has held that the interest of Hemant in the trust is indeterminate. In view of this, section 21(4) of the Wealth Tax Act is attracted in the present case. The trustees are therefore liable to pay wealth tax on the value of the corpus of the trust fund as per the provisions of section 21(4) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. 20. The other aspect of this reference relates to the reopening of the assessment of the trustees for the assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62 by the Wealth Tax Officer under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act. It is necessary to note that (1) for the assessment year 1958-59, the original order of assessment is dated 3-4-1959. By a notice dated 16-2-1963 this assessment was reopened by the Wealth Tax Office. (2) For the assessment year 1959-60, the original assessment order is dated 24-2-1960. This was re-opened by notice dated 16-2-1963 issued by the Wealth Tax Officer. (3) For the assessment year 1960-61 the original assessment order is dated 20-3-1961. It was reopened by notice dated 16-10-1964. (4) For the assessment year 1961-62 the original assessment order is dated 12-1-1962. It was re-opened by a notice dated 16-10-1964. 21. Under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act as applicable at the relevant time, "if the assessing officer........ (3) For the assessment year 1960-61 the original assessment order is dated 20-3-1961. It was reopened by notice dated 16-10-1964. (4) For the assessment year 1961-62 the original assessment order is dated 12-1-1962. It was re-opened by a notice dated 16-10-1964. 21. Under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act as applicable at the relevant time, "if the assessing officer........ has, in consequence of any information in his possession, reason to believe, .........that net wealth chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any year........" he may at any time within 4 years of the end of that assessment year serve on such person a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 14 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such net wealth. We have therefore to consider whether the provisions of section 17(1)(b) are attracted here. 22. Now, in the assessment proceedings in respect of the same assessee, for the year 1957-58, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed an order dated 24-6-1959 in which he held that the beneficial interest of Hemant in the trust property was not includible in the net wealth of Hemant; and that the value of the entire trust corpus was includible in the net wealth of the trustees. According to Mr. Jetly, this order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dated 24-6-1959 constitutes "information" within the meaning of that term in section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act. In view of this order of 24-6-1959 he submits that the Wealth-tax Officer was entitled to re-open the assessments of the trustees for the assessment years 1958-59 to 1961-62. Mr. Jetly also submits that from the said order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner appeals were preferred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal's order dated 17-10-1962 which upheld the findings of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner also constitutes "information" entitling the Wealth-tax Officer to re-open assessments for the assessment years 1958-59 to 1961-62. 23. Now, under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act, in order that the assessing officer may re-open an assessment, it is necessary (1) that he should have any information in his possession and (2) this information must have come in his possession after he made the original assessment. Unless both these requirements are satisfied, he cannot re-open an assessment. 23. Now, under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act, in order that the assessing officer may re-open an assessment, it is necessary (1) that he should have any information in his possession and (2) this information must have come in his possession after he made the original assessment. Unless both these requirements are satisfied, he cannot re-open an assessment. The first question therefore, which we have to consider is whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dated 24-6-1969 constitutes information. 24. Information can be either relating to facts or law. There are a number of decisions on what constitutes such information. These pertain to a similar provision in the Indian Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court in the case of (Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v. A. Raman and Co.)7, reported in 1968(67) I.T.R. 11, has held that the expression "information" must mean instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or particulars, or as to law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment. This definition was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of (Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi)8, reported in 1979(119) I.T.R. 996. In that case the Supreme Court was required to consider whether the opinion of an internal audit party of the income-tax department on a point of law can be regarded an information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as then in force. The Court was required to consider when instruction or knowledge as to law can be considered as information. The Court said that in every case a declaration or exposition to be law, must be a pronouncement from a formal source, either legislative or judicial. A statement by a person or body incompetent to create or define the law cannot be regarded as law. It said, "It is law, we must remember, which, because it issues from a competent legislature or a competent judicial or quasi judicial authority, influences the course of the assessment and decides any one or more of those matters which determine the assessee's tax liability". 25. In the present case therefore we have to consider whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dated 24-6-1959 in respect of the assessment year 1957-58 constitutes information as to law in this sense. 25. In the present case therefore we have to consider whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dated 24-6-1959 in respect of the assessment year 1957-58 constitutes information as to law in this sense. There is no doubt that the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is an order from a quasi judicial authority which is binding on both the sides. In fact an appeal lies from this order at the instance of either party before the Tribunal. It is therefore a formal expression of the position as to law qua the assessee and the revenue. There is no reason therefore why it should not qualify as "information as to law" within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act. 26. A Division Bench of this Court of which one of us was a party, (S.P. Bharucha and Sugla, JJ., in I.T.R. 11/76 in the case of (Commissioner of Income Tax v. Impaco Limited)9, judgment dated 19th September, 1989 was required to consider whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in income-tax proceedings can constitute information as to law. The Division Bench has held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner hearing an appeal under the Income Tax Act is a competent judicial authority empowered to decide a question of law between the contending parties. His findings influenced the assessment of the assessee's tax liability. Hence his order can constitute information as to law. The Court kept open the question whether an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under the Wealth-tax Act would have the same position. It seems that the Division Bench kept this point open because of a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of (Shranik Kasturbhai and others v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat II)10, reported in 1974(95) I.T.R. 326. We have seen this decision of the Gujarat High Court. In our view this judgment does not affect the status of Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order under the Wealth Tax Act in any way. 27. In the case of Shranik Kasturbhai and others v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat, reported in 1974(95) I.T.R. 326, the question was whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in Wealth Tax proceedings was bad in law for want of notice and opportunity of hearing to the Wealth Tax Officer. 27. In the case of Shranik Kasturbhai and others v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat, reported in 1974(95) I.T.R. 326, the question was whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in Wealth Tax proceedings was bad in law for want of notice and opportunity of hearing to the Wealth Tax Officer. The Gujarat High Court held that the Wealth Tax Officer does not have a right to be heard as a matter of course before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. But this want of opportunity would not render the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner bad in law. This decision of the Gujarat High Court was upheld in appeal by the Supreme Court in the case of (Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Gujarat II v. Shranik Kasturbhai (HUF))11, 1987(165) I.T.R. 661. We do not see how this decision of the Gujarat High Court can deprive the decision of an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under the Wealth Tax Act from the character of "information as to law". The powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under the Wealth Tax Act under section 23(5) are as wide as the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 251(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner under the Wealth Tax Act can also, in disposing of an appeal, pass such orders as he thinks fit which may include an order enhancing the assessment or penalty. An appeal lies from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under the Wealth-tax Act to the Tribunal both at the instance of the assessee and the department. The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in a wealth tax proceeding is binding on the parties unless reversed by a higher authority. It is as such a quasi judicial pronouncement on law which will affect the assessment of the assessee as an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under the Income Tax Act. 28. In our view therefore the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order dated 24-6-1959 constitutes information within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act. 29. It is as such a quasi judicial pronouncement on law which will affect the assessment of the assessee as an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under the Income Tax Act. 28. In our view therefore the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order dated 24-6-1959 constitutes information within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act. 29. In the case of (Jawahar Lal Mani Ram v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.)12, reported in 1963(48) I.T.R. 837, the Allahabad High Court also held that a judgment of the Income tax Appellate Tribunal or even of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in an appeal from the assessment order taking a different view on the facts of the case constitutes information within the meaning of section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. We do not see why a similar pronouncement on law cannot constitute information on a question of law as well. 30. Rajasthan High Court in the case of (Manaklal Porwal v. Commissioner of Income tax)13, reported in 1985(155) I.T.R. 155, has also held that an order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in income-tax proceedings constitutes information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Income tax Act, 1961 on the basis of which re-assessment proceedings can take place. The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of 24-6-1959 therefore does constitute "information". 31. As far as the assessment year 1958-59 is concerned, the original assessment order was made on 3rd April, 1959 prior to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order for the year 1957-58 which is dated 24-6-1959. The reopening of assessment for the assessment year 1958-59 is therefore, clearly as a result of fresh information which came to the hands of the Wealth Tax Officer after his original assessment order. On this basis he was therefore entitled to reopen the assessment. 32. For the next three assessment years 1959-60 to 1961-62, however, the orders of assessment initially made by the Wealth Tax Officer were all subsequent to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order for the assessment year 1957-58 dated 24-6-1959. The Wealth Tax Officer was in possession of information in the form of Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order of 24-6-1959 when he made the original assessments. He cannot therefore be considered to have acquired any fresh information after making the original assessments for these three years. 33. The Wealth Tax Officer was in possession of information in the form of Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order of 24-6-1959 when he made the original assessments. He cannot therefore be considered to have acquired any fresh information after making the original assessments for these three years. 33. Our attention is drawn to the observations in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order in the case of the trustees of the said trust for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60. (page 49 of the paper-book), to the effect that the Wealth Tax Officer mentioned in an office note that "if the appellant's claim was upheld in appeal, the assessment order which was going to be passed by him would not be in order". This clearly indicates that the Wealth Tax Officer was aware of the view taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in his order of 24-6-1959. In any view of the matter there is no material before us which would indicate anything to the contrary. In these circumstances it is not possible for us to hold that the Wealth Tax Officer came into possession of any fresh information after the original assessment orders for these assessment years which would entitle him to reopen assessment for these three years (1959-60 to 1961-62). 34. Mr. Jetly, however, submitted that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order of 24-6-1959 was upheld in appeal by the Tribunal by its order dated 17-10-1962. This order of the Tribunal is subsequent to the dates of the original assessments for these three years. The order of the Tribunal therefore can constitute fresh information on a point of law coming to the hands of the Wealth Tax Officer after the original assessments. Mr. Jetly therefore submitted that re-opening of assessments for these three years is also valid in law. 35. There is no doubt that a Tribunal's order would constitute information as to law as much as an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal is a higher authority competent to determine the disputes between the assessee and the revenue. Its pronouncements would carry more weight and would be binding on the parties. In the present case, however, the information as to the question of law contained in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order is identical with the information contained in the Tribunal's order. The Tribunal is a higher authority competent to determine the disputes between the assessee and the revenue. Its pronouncements would carry more weight and would be binding on the parties. In the present case, however, the information as to the question of law contained in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order is identical with the information contained in the Tribunal's order. When the information on a question of law was already available to the Wealth Tax Officer, a subsequent pronouncement of a higher authority which merely confirms this information cannot constitute any fresh information. 36. In the case of the trustees of this very trust reported in 1983(140) I.T.R. 471, (Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I v. Seth Hemant Bhagubhai Trust)14, a Division Bench of this Court was required to consider a situation where in the wealth tax assessment of the beneficiary Hemant for the assessment year 1957-58 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had held in 1959 that the trust was assessable and not the beneficiary (the same order of 24-6-1959 which constitutes information in the present case). For the assessment year 1962-63 the Income Tax Officer held in the income-tax proceedings that the trust was not taxable in respect of the entire income, but the entire income was taxable in the hands of Hemant. In appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in income tax proceedings by his order of 17-9-1966 held that the beneficiary cannot be taxed in respect of the entire income. He could be assessee only on the basis of actual receipt from the trust and the balance had to be assessed in the hands of the trustees. In other words the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in income-tax proceedings subsequently took a view similar to the view taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in Wealth tax proceedings on 24th June, 1959. The assessment for the year 1962-63 was sought to be reopened on the basis of the information in the form of Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order of 17-9-1966. The Court held that the re-opening of the assessment of the trust for assessment year 1962-63 was not in consequence of any fresh information received by the Income Tax Officer, but was as a result of a mere change of opinion on his part on the same facts. The Court held that the re-opening of the assessment of the trust for assessment year 1962-63 was not in consequence of any fresh information received by the Income Tax Officer, but was as a result of a mere change of opinion on his part on the same facts. The Court said that the same information in the form of Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order of 24th June, 1959 was already available to the Income Tax Officer. A subsequent order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner giving the same information cannot entitle the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment. 37. In the present case also the Wealth Tax Officer when he assessed the assessee for the years 1959-60 to 1961-62 had before him the view taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, a higher authority, in proceeding for the assessment year 1957-58. He however, chose to take a different view. Subsequently he ought to re-open the proceedings on the basis of the Tribunal's order which took the same view as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. This would not, in our view, amount to reopening an assessment on the basis of any fresh information as to law. It is possible that the Wealth Tax Officer may have taken a chance in ignoring the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as an appeal was pending from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order before the Tribunal at the time of his making the original assessments for these three assessment years. That, however, does not entitle him to reopen assessments after the receipt of the Tribunal's order on the ground that although he had information as to law in the form of a higher authority's order in his possession, he waited for its confirmation by the Tribunal before acting on it. Section 17(1)(b) is not attracted in such a situation. In our view therefore it was not open to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessments for the years 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62. 38. In the premises the questions referred to us are answered as follows: Question No. 1 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 does not arise in view of our answer to question No. 1. Question No. 3 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 4 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 does not arise in view of our answer to question No. 1. Question No. 3 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 4 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. For the assessment year 1958-59 however, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order of 24-6-1959 constitutes fresh information. Question No. 5 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----