This is an appeal from the decree passed by the Assistant District Judge, Dhubri in Title Suit No. 36 of 1979 decreeing the suit for specific performance of contract for sale of the suit premises. 2. Facts giving raise to this appeal may shortly be stated. On 20. 2. 77, the plaintiff Motilal Jain entered into an agreement with the defendant No. 1 Ambika Prasad Ram (since deceased) for the purchase of the suit premises for Rs. 25,000/-. The term of the agreement was that the plaintiff would pay a sum of Rs. 17,000/-as an advance, and that the defendant No. 1 would execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff Motilal on receipt of the balance of Rs 8,000/- within 5 months from 20. 2. 77. The plaintiff paid Rs 17.000/- as agreed upon. As an evidence of the agreement to sale, the defendant No. 1 executed an unregistered deed dated 22. 2. 77, Ext. 2. In pursuance of the agreement, the plaintiff offered the balance of Rs 8,000/- to the defendant No. 1 and asked him to execute the sale deed In his favour. The plaintiff sent pleader's notices namely, notice dated 4. 4. 78 (Ext. 3), notice dated 26. 11. 78 (Ext.4) and notice dated 15. 3. 78 (Ext.5) asking the defendant No. 1 to receive the balance amount of Rs 8,000/- and execute the sale deed. The defendant refused to accept the money and to execute the sale deed. Therefore, the suit was instituted on 10. 8. 79. The trial Court decreed the suit. Henc. this appeal. 3. Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the plaintiff has failed to prove the execution of the deed (Ext. 2), and that the trial Court has wrongly given the finding that the defendant No. 1 has not taken steps for sending the document (Ext. 2) for examination by a hand writing expert. The contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee is that the order sheets indicate that the defendant No. 1 took steps by filing an application for sending the document for examination by the expert, but the plaintiff did not produce the original document. As the original document was not available the matter was kept pending for consideration until the original document was produced. 4. The document, Ext. Bhattacharjee is that the order sheets indicate that the defendant No. 1 took steps by filing an application for sending the document for examination by the expert, but the plaintiff did not produce the original document. As the original document was not available the matter was kept pending for consideration until the original document was produced. 4. The document, Ext. 2, shows that there are four attesting witnesses, namely Ahindia Nath Choudhury (PW 2), Jugal Kishore Jain, Niranjan Kumar Saha (PW 4) and Sushil Kumar Jain. The signatures of the defendant No. 1 Ambika and the plaintiff Motilal also appeared on the deed, Ext. 2. The evidence of PW I Motilal Jain (the plaintiff) is-Ext. 2 (1) is the signature of the defendant Ambika; Ext. 2 (2) is the signature of PW 2 Ahindra Choudhury; Ext. 2 (3) is the signature of Jugal Kishore Jain; Ext. 2 (4) is the signature of PW 4 Niranjan Kumar Saha, Ext. 2 (5) is the signature of Sushil Kumar; and Ext. 2 (6) is his signature. The evidence of PW 2 Ahindra is thus. Ext. 2 (2) is his signature and Ext. 2(1) is the -signature of the defendant Ambika. The deed of agreement was read over to the defendant Ambika Prasad. The other witnesses signed the deed in his presence. The evidence of PW 4 Niranjan Saha is that the deed Ext. 2 was typed by him at the direction and instruction of the plaintiff Motilal and the defendant Ambika. The witnesses and parties signed the deed in his presence. The Ext. 2 (4) is his signature and Ext. 2 (1) is the signature of the defendant Ambika who signed the deed in his presence. The plaintiff Motilal also signed the deed. He also translated the contents of the deed in Bengali and read it over to the defendant Ambika. 5. As regards the opinion of the expert, the opinion of the expert as to the identity of the hand writing is admissible under section 45 of the Evidence Act. In Sashi Kumar Banerjee vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 524, the Supreme Court has held that the expert's evidence as to the hand writing is evidence and it can rarely, if ever, takes the place of substantive evidence. In Sashi Kumar Banerjee vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 524, the Supreme Court has held that the expert's evidence as to the hand writing is evidence and it can rarely, if ever, takes the place of substantive evidence. In Shrichand vs. State of Maharastra, AIR 1967 SC 450 , it has been held that exami­nation by hand writing expert is not necessary in every case of disputed hand writing and no adverse inference can be drawn for not obtaining expert's opinion in all the case?. In State of Gujrat vs. Vinaya Chandra, AIR 1967 SC 778 , the Supreme Court has further held that the opinion of the hand writing expert is relevant in view of the section 45 of the Evidence Act, but that too is not conclusive-The sole evidence of an hand writing expert is not normally sufficient for recording a definite finding about the disputed writing. Hand writing of a person can be proved by other means also. 6. Coming to the case on hand, the PWs referred to above have stated that the documents were signed by the parties in their presence. It also appears from the evidence discussed above that before the document was signed by the defendant Ambika, it was read over to him. In other words, there is evidence that the defendant Ambika, after knowing the contents thereof, signed the deed (Ext. 2). Therefore, the document has been proved, and as such no adverse inference can be drawn for not obtaining the opinion of the expert in this case in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the above cited cases. 7. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance. 8. Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to b; performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. 9. In the plaint, the plaintiff has not stated that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 9. In the plaint, the plaintiff has not stated that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As regards the question about the lack of pleading, it is not desirable to place undue importance on the form Instead, substance of pleadings should be considered. In Ramesh Chandra vs. Chunilal, AIR 1971 SC 1238 , the Supreme Court has held: "Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straight-jacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned." Therefore, the set of words 'has always been ready and willing' used in section 16 (c) are not always required to be re-written in the plaint/ It is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of pleadings to examine the question, i.e. facts aid circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the plaintiff. 10. Coming to the case on hand, in the present case, right to sue or cause of action accrued on 21.7.77. But the suit was filed on 10.8.79 after 2 years of the accrual of the cause of action. The last notice Ext.4 asking the defendant to receive the balance amount of Rs.8,000/-and to execute sale deed was issued on 26.11.78 and the suit was filed after about a year of the last notice. The suit was not filed immediately after the accrual of the cause of action or immediately last notice Ext.4. Considering over all facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that nothing can be inferred from the plaint as to the 'readiness and willingness'. That apart, assuming that it can be inferred from the plaint regarding 'readiness and willingness' there is no evidence to prove the averment. For these reasons, the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance. 11. The next question which arises for consideration is as to what relief the plaintiff is entitled to. The plaintiff has, as an alternative to specific performance prayed for Rs. 38,036/- as compensation. Out of Rs.38,036/-,Rs.l7,000/-is the sum paid in advance. Rs. 10.000/-is difference of the raise of the prove and Rs. 8,000/-for repairing of the floor, etc. With regard to the raise of tie price a id repairing, there is no evidence 01 record to prove the repairing and amount of the price raised. 12. 38,036/- as compensation. Out of Rs.38,036/-,Rs.l7,000/-is the sum paid in advance. Rs. 10.000/-is difference of the raise of the prove and Rs. 8,000/-for repairing of the floor, etc. With regard to the raise of tie price a id repairing, there is no evidence 01 record to prove the repairing and amount of the price raised. 12. In the case of claim far compensation, the plaintiff mast satisfy the Court both as to the facts of damage and as to its amount with reasonable certainity. In other words, if the plaintiff fails to prove damage, his suit must fail, and if the fact of damage is proved but no evidence is given as to its amount, then it would be difficult to assess the damages. However, in the cases where difficulty arises in assessing damages for want of evidence the plaintiff will be entitled to an award for nominal damages. The reason is simple. If there is damage, in fact, the law presumes or implies pecuniary loss. Considering the above principle, if a nominal damages of Rs. 1000/- is awarded to the plaintiff, it would meet the ends of justice for the breach of the contract. 13. In respect of Rs. 17,000/- which had been paid as an advance, the appellants who are the legal heirs or legal representative of the defendant Ambika are liable to pay the same. As regards the interest on Rs.17,000/-, the plaintiff has claimed at the rate of 18 per annum, but there is no material as to how he is entitled to 18%. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, if 6% per annum is allowed, it will be just and reasonable, from the date of the accrual of the cause of action on 21.7.77 to the date of filing of the suit on 10.8.79 and further interest at the rate of 6% from the date of institution of the suit to date of the decree, that is, to say - from 21.7.77 to 25.7.81 amounting to Rs. 4,094/-. It is, therefore, ordered and decreed that the heirs or legal representatives of the defendant appellant Ambika Prasad Ram shall pay to the plaintiff respondent Motilal Jain an amount of Rs.22,094/- (Rs.l7,000+ 1,000 +4, 094) with costs. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The decree of the trial Court is modified to the extent indicated above. It is, therefore, ordered and decreed that the heirs or legal representatives of the defendant appellant Ambika Prasad Ram shall pay to the plaintiff respondent Motilal Jain an amount of Rs.22,094/- (Rs.l7,000+ 1,000 +4, 094) with costs. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The decree of the trial Court is modified to the extent indicated above. No costs for this appeal.