In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the report of the inquiry submitted in Civil Rule No 895/85/21/86 which has been disposed of on 8.6.89. 2. The facts in Civil Rule No. 895/85/21/86 (which we refer to as the "first writ petition") may be shortly stated. Sometime in 1984, Shri Abujam Tombikanta Singh, the petitioner in the first writ petition, was recommended by the Manipur Public Service Commission (MPSC) for appointment to the post of Manipur Civil Service (MCS) by treating bin as a member of Scheduled Caste. Subsequently, the District Magistrate cancelled the certificate issued in favour of Tombikanta Singh. Tombikanta Singh, there­fore, filed the writ petition claiming that he belongs to the Scheduled Caste specified as 'Lois' in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. In view of the observation made by this Court in the order dated 10.10.85. the State Government appointed an Inquiry Officer to make an enquiry into the question as to whether or not Tombikanta Singh belongs to Scheduled Caste. The report of the Inquiry Officer was produced before the Court as directed by the Court. The Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that Tombikanta Singh belongs to 'Lois' which is recognised as Scheduled Caste in Manipur. This Court passed an order on 8.6.89 accepting the report and directing the respondents therein to appoint Tombikanta Singh to the post of MCS as recommended by the MPSC and disposed of the writ petition. 3. After the disposal of the first writ petition, one Govinda Singh, an Ex-general Secretary of the All Manipur Scheduled Caste Students Union, filed the present writ application being Civil Rule No 1409/89 (PS)/810/89 (which we shall refer to as the 'second writ petition') for quashing the enquiry report produced before this Court in the first writ petition. 4. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents, has contended that the petitioner was not a party in the first writ petition and, therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable. The submission of Mr. Nilamani Singh is that it would amount to rehearing the whole matter and reviewing of the earlier order, and as such, only the person who was a party to the first writ petition can seek review. 5. The submission of Mr. Nilamani Singh is that it would amount to rehearing the whole matter and reviewing of the earlier order, and as such, only the person who was a party to the first writ petition can seek review. 5. At this stage it would be helpful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 . In that case, on a writ petition filed for cancellation of an order of allotment passed by the Director Rehabilitation in favour of some persons, the High Court cancelled the order of allotment although those persons in whose favour the allotment was made were not party to the writ proceedings. Subsequently, the allottees who were not made party find a petition under Article 226 for impleading them as party to the writ petition and rehearing of the whole matter. The High Court allowed the petition. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that the second writ petition filed by the allottees was maintainable and the High Court has not acted without jurisdiction in reviewing its previous order at the instance of the persons who were not party to the previous writ proceedings on the ground that their interest were sought to be affected by the decision of the High Court. It has a so been held that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution of India to preclude, a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice and palpable errors committed by it. In entertaining the second writ petition, the High Court thereby did what the principles of natural justice required it to do. 6 The above decision of the Supreme Court answers the question as to the maintainability of the second writ petition, i.e. the second writ petition filed by Govinda Singh cannot be rejected at the threshold or at the point of beginning without hearing the merits of the case merely because he was not a party in the first writ petition. 7. Mr. T.N. Singh, the learned counsel for the present writ petitioner, has contended that the Court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the question as to whether 'Abujam' or 'Chakppa' community is Scheduled Caste. 8. 7. Mr. T.N. Singh, the learned counsel for the present writ petitioner, has contended that the Court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the question as to whether 'Abujam' or 'Chakppa' community is Scheduled Caste. 8. In B. Basavalingappa vs. D. Munichlnnappa, AIR 1965 SC 1269 , the election of the returned candidate was challenged on the ground that he was not a member of any of Scheduled Caste mentioned in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. The returned candidate claimed that he belonged to Scheduled Caste listed as 'Bhovi' in the Older. It was contended that the returned candidate was a 'Voddar' by caste and that 'Voddar' caste was not Scheduled Caste specified in the Order and subsequently, he could not stand for election from a scheduled caste constituency. The Supreme Court has held that it is not open to any one to make any modification in the Order by producing evidence to show (for example) that, though the caste 'A' alone Is mentioned in the Order, caste 'B' also a part of that caste 'A' and, therefore, must be deemed to be included In caste 'A'. The Supreme Court also pointed out that whenever one caste has another name it has been mentioned in brackets after it in the Order, Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be open to give evidence that 'Voddar' caste was the same as the 'Bhovi' caste specified in the Order for Voddar caste is not mentioned in the brackets after the Bhovi caste in the Order. However, in that case, the evidence was allowed to be led to identify the caste specified in the Order because the Order referred to a Scheduled Caste known as Bhovi as it was before 1956 in Mysore hut there was no caste specifically known as Bhovi in the State of Mysore before 1956 and the only coarse open to the Court was to find out which caste was meant by Bhovi. 9. A similar point came up before the Supreme Court for considera­tion in Bhaiya Lal vs. Harikishan, AIR 1965 SC 1557 . In that case also the election of the returned candidate was challenged on the ground that he belonged to Dohar caste and was not a Chamar. While dealing with that point, it has stated by the Supreme Court: ..... A similar point came up before the Supreme Court for considera­tion in Bhaiya Lal vs. Harikishan, AIR 1965 SC 1557 . In that case also the election of the returned candidate was challenged on the ground that he belonged to Dohar caste and was not a Chamar. While dealing with that point, it has stated by the Supreme Court: ..... the plea that the Dohar caste is a sub caste of the Chamar caste cannot be entertained in the present proceedings in virtue of the Constitution Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950". Reference was made to Article 341 of the Constitution and it was stated : ''It is thus clear, that in order to determine whatever or not a particular caste is a scheduled caste within the meaning of Article 341, one has to look at the public notification issued by the President in that behalf. In the present case the notification refers to Chamar, Jatav or Mochi and so in dealing with tae question in dispute between tae parties, the enquiry which the Election Tribunal can hold is whether or dot the appellant is not a Chamar as such, he can claim the same status by reason of the fact that he belongs to the Dohar caste which is a sub-caste of the Chamar ' caste cannot be accepted. It appears to us that an enquiry of this kind would riot be permissible having regard to the provisions contained in Article 341." Emphasis added) 10. The decisions in the above cited cases Wire followed by the Supreme Court in Parsram vs. Shivchand, AIR 1969 SC 597 . 11. Before dealing with the merits of the case, it may be mentioned here that in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, for the State of Manipur, 'Lois' is specified, in the Order as Scheduled Caste. As already stated, the Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that Tombikanta Singh belongs to 'Lois'. On 5.1.90, in the second writ petition, while pissing order for handing over a copy of the report to the counsel for the petitioner, the Court made the following observation : ''We make it clear that while passing the order on 8.6.89 we had not said anything about Abujam sub clan to be a Scheduled Caste community of Manipur. That apart, whether the petitioner belongs to Loi community or not is a pure question of fact. That apart, whether the petitioner belongs to Loi community or not is a pure question of fact. Even if, the same is disputed we are of the tentative view that this Court may not be proper forum to decide the question", (emphasis added) 12. Coming to the case on hand, as already stated; this Court accepted the report of the Inquiry Officer that Tombikanta Singh belongs to Sche­duled Caste listed as 'Lois' in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. In Basavallngappa's case ( AIR 1965 SC 1269 1, the Supreme Court has held that it is not open to any one to make any modification in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 by producing evidence to show, for example, that, though caste 'A' alone is mentioned in the Order, 'B' caste is also a part of the class 'A' and therefore, 'B' must be deemed to be included in class 'A'. As earlier stated, this Court has not said that 'Abujam' sub-clan is a Scheduled Caste. The decision of the Supreme Court in Basavalingappa's case supports the observation, in Bhaiya Lal's case ( AIR 1965 SC 1557 ), the Supreme Court has held that the enquiry which can be held is whether or not a particular person is a Chamar, Jatav or Mochi. Therefore, an enquiry can be held whether or not Tombikanta Singh, the petitioner in the first writ petition, is a Loi. We accepted the report of the Inquiry Officer that Tombikanta Singh is a Loi which is one of the entries in the Order. This Court has not s id that Abujam or Chakpa is Scheduled caste as the enquiry to that effect is not open to this Court in view of the above decisions of the Supreme Court. In that view of the matter, we do not find any material to review the order passed in first writ petition. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.