JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Two sisters are the contesting parties in this appeal. The suit was filed by the elder sister praying for a decree preliminarily defining her half share in the suit land detailed in Schedule (A) to the plaint, making allotment of her half share out of the suit land by deputation of a Civil Court Amin Commissioner, passing a final decree according to the report of the Civil Court Amin Commissioner, and putting the Plaintiff in separate possession over her share to be determined, declaring the deed of gift executed and registered on 23.10.1973 by the deceased father of Plaintiff and Defendant to be invalid, inoperative and not binding, for costs of the suit and other reliefs as available to her. 2. The factual position is almost accepted by the parties. The Plaintiff-Respondent and the Defendant-Appellant are the daughters of one Dwari Sahu, who died in the year 1974, Subsequently his widow Chakiri Bewa also died in or about the year 1975. The parties had a brother namely, Brunda Sahu. Brunda died issueless. His wife had died earlier. The death of Brunda was prior to the death of his parents. The Plaintiff and the Defendant belonged to a Hindu Mitakshara Joint Family and by operation of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short 'the Act') became entitled to the properties left by their father. The properties described in Schedule (A) were the ancestral 'joint family properties. A deed of gift was executed by the father of the parties on 23.10. 1973, in favour of Defendant-Appellant who was then a minor in respect of 1.48 acres of land. The Defendant-Appellant is physically handicapped. 3. So far as the case of the Plaintiff is concerned, it is avrered that there was no necessity for the gift and some persons including Mandar Sahu and Bibhisan Pradhan with the intention of grabbing the properties, prevailed upon late Dwari Sahu to execute the deed of gift which had no sanction in law and also was vulnerable on account of its execution at a time when late Dwari Sahu was mentally weak and feeble. In any event, after the death of Brunda Sahu, the brother of the parties, his interest in the joint family properties devolved on his mother Chakiri in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the gift of 1.48 acres of land out of the ancestral homestead properties was unauthorised, and a specific portion of the properties could not have been gifted. No right, title and interest in respect of the properties was conveyed by the deed of gift. In view of its illegality, the deed of gift was liable to be declared invalid, inoperative and not binding on the Plaintiff. The parties were entitled to equal share in Schedule (A) properties, and there having arisen dispute, the properties were to be partitioned as prayed for. 4. The stand of the Defendant-Appellant was that the deed of gift was actuated on account of love and affection of a father for a handicapped girl, and the motivation was justifiable and the gift was reasonable. The gift had been acted upon with the consent of the mother, and there was no illegality attached thereto. 5. The learned trial Judge framed two main issues which read as follows: (1) Did Dwari execute the deed of gift in favour of the Defendant out of his free will and without any influence? (2) Is the gift otherwise invalid? On consideration of the statements of the witnesses in Court, the learned trial Judge came to hold that the deed of gift was executed consciously and was on account of an intentional act without any influence as alleged. But he held that the deed of gift was invalid. For coming to this conclusion he came to hold that had there been a partition at the time when Brunda died, only one-third interest of the properties would have been given to the father, and two-thirds would have been allotted to Brunda and his mother. He also came to hold that on the death of Brunda, his mother became entitled to 2/3rd shares of the properties. Though he held that a Hindu father could make a gift of a reasonable portion of his property to his daughter, yet the properties in question being better lands and homestead in nature could not be treated to be reasonable. Though he held that a Hindu father could make a gift of a reasonable portion of his property to his daughter, yet the properties in question being better lands and homestead in nature could not be treated to be reasonable. He held that a father had no right to make a gift though a coparcener could in certain cases transfer his undivided coparcenary interest for consideration. He, however, made an exception as indicated above by observing that a father could make a gift of a reasonable portion of property to his daughter. With these observations, he held that the deed of gift was invalid and the Plaintiff was entitled to half share in the properties, a division was to be made according to the shares and as far as practicable the properties covered by the deed of gift were to be allotted to the Defendant besides what she may be entitled otherwise towards her share; on failure of the parties to make a partition within a month any of the parties may approach the Court to make the decree final by getting the lands divided through a Commissioner the costs of whose appointment was to be borne equally by the parties and the parties were to bear their respective costs. 5. In appeal, it has been strenuously urged by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the approach of the learned trial Judge was erroneous. He overlooked the position that a sole surviving coparcener has an unlimited power to deal with ancestral properties in any manner he desires. In support of this contention strong reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Jata Swain and Another Vs. Natabar Das and Others. It was also submitted that undisputedly a Hindu father has power of making gift of a reasonable portion of ancestral property to a daughter, and what is reasonable would depend on the circumstances of each. In the instant case admittedly the Defendant was physically handicapped and the father being conscious that it may not be possible for her to get a life partner, gifted a portion of the property so that the lure of property may attract a bridegroom. In the instant case admittedly the Defendant was physically handicapped and the father being conscious that it may not be possible for her to get a life partner, gifted a portion of the property so that the lure of property may attract a bridegroom. On behalf of the Respondent it has been urged that by operation of the provisions of the Act, all the properties of Brunda devolved by way of succession on his mother, who acquired right, title and interest over the properties left by her deceased son. Therefore, without her consent the deed of gift as executed was inoperative and invalid. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in Kastura Sahuani Vs. Das Seth and Another, for the purpose. It was therefore urged that the suit has been rightly decreed on the terms as done and no interference is called for. 7. On consideration of the rival submissions, I find that the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that by operation of the provisions of Section 6, proviso, on the death of Brunda his properties devolved on his mother is correct. Section 6 of the Act so far as it is relevant for our purpose reads as follows: 6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. When a male 'Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary 'property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. x x x x. On a plain reading of the provision, it appears that when a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the Act, having at the time of his death in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, it devolves by survivorship. By operation of the proviso, it devolves by testamentary or intestate succession and not by survivorship if a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule is surviving. By operation of the proviso, it devolves by testamentary or intestate succession and not by survivorship if a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule is surviving. In the instant case it has to be held that the property devolved on the mother. Class I of the Schedule clearly indicates that the heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule take the property simultaneously and to the exclusion of all other heirs as provided in Section 9. Admittedly in the instant case mother was the only heir in terms of Class I of the Schedule. Therefore, the submission that the father could have made a gift of the ancestral property with any hindrance does not stand to reason. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that a sole surviving coparcener has unlimited power of disposition of coparcenary property cannot be disputed as a proposition of law. Law relating to such right of disposition has been settled beyond any shadow of doubt by the Supreme Court in Surjit Lal Chhabda Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay. But the position is different here. 8. The other question relates to reasonableness of the gift and the right to make it, As accepted by the parties, and as rightly observed by the learned trial Judge a Hindu father could make a gift of a reasonable amount of property in favour of a daughter. It is an accepted position in Hindu Law that a Hindu father or any other managing manager has power to make gift within reasonable limits of ancestral property for pious purposes. In Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh and Another Vs. Malappa, the apex Court examined the question relating to power of making such gift, and held that it was competent to a father to make a gift of immovable property to a daughter if the gift is of on extent having regard to the properties held by the family. The expression 'pious purposes' was examined in the aforesaid case by the Court and also in Kamala Devi Vs. Bachu Lal Gupta, This Court in Tara Sahuani and Others Vs. Raghunath Sahu and Another, also has accepted the position that a Hindu father could make a gift of a small portion of ancestral immovable property to the daughter if the extent of the gift is reasonable and particularly if she is in poor circumstances. Bachu Lal Gupta, This Court in Tara Sahuani and Others Vs. Raghunath Sahu and Another, also has accepted the position that a Hindu father could make a gift of a small portion of ancestral immovable property to the daughter if the extent of the gift is reasonable and particularly if she is in poor circumstances. In the instant case, admittedly the Defendant-Appellant was physically handicapped. It is natural for a worried father to make provision for a daughter whom he would like to see settled in life, and to get over the expected hurdles in getting a life partner. The extent of property gifted cannot be termed as very high and unreasonable. What is reasonable would depend on the facts and circumstances of-each case. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, I am inclined to accept that the quantum of property gifted was reasonable. The learned trial Judge erred in holding the same to be unreasonable. 9. In conclusion, the gift is held to be valid though as indicated above, the share of Brunda devolved all Chakiri, the mother, on account of acceptance of the position that the same Was by a Hindu father to a daughter for pious purposes, and was within reasonable limits. As a consequence, the property covered by the gift deed has to be kept out of the arena of consideration of the lands available for partition. The Plaintiff and Defendant would be entitled to share the remnant equally, As directed by the learned Subordinate Judge, the parties may amicably divide the property within two months, and on failure to do so, either of them may approach the trial Court to make the decree final by getting the land divided through an Amin Commission, the costs of whose appointment shall be borne equally by them. The decree is modified as stated above and the appeal is allowed. In view of peculiar nature of the case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed and decree modified. Final Result : Allowed