S. K. MOOKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) IN the present Second Appeal, I have been asked to decide a very short point, viz. , whether the lower appellate court was right in affirming the decree granted by the Trial Court, in the suit of the respondents-landlords, for eviction of the appellant, on the ground of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs/respondents filed the suit for eviction on different grounds, including the ground, as referred to above. The trial court, having negatived the grounds of subletting and default, granted a decree on the aforesaid ground and the same had been affirmed by the lower appellate court. ( 3 ) FROM the submissions made by Mr. Poddar, on behalf of the appellant, and Mr. Ghosh, on behalf of the respondents, I have been invited to decide whether the decree is sustainable in the context of the following: (a) There is no finding as to the condition of the building which is proposed to be rebuilt. (b) The estimate proved on behalf of the plaintiffs relates to the ground floor only and there is no estimate for a four-storied building. (c) The validity of the plan was upto 15th July, 1972. (d) There is no evidence that construction without vacation is not possible. (e) Photocopy of the F. D. R. and the letter from the brother have been considered as sufficient materials or evidence to prove the means of the plaintiff. (f) Ownership of the premises has not been proved. (g) The payment of cost was made just prior to the filing of the suit. ( 4 ) AS regards clause (a), it appears that the courts below had answered the said point by holding that it was not necessary for the landlord to prove that the condition of the building was such that it required immediate demolition and in coming to such a finding relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. P. N. Shenoy v. P. W. Shenoy reported in AIR 1971 SC 942 . The courts below applied the said principle after having factually found upon consideration of averments in the plaint and the evidence of P. W. 1. The courts below applied the said principle after having factually found upon consideration of averments in the plaint and the evidence of P. W. 1. which remains uncontradicted, that the building was old and dilapidated and could not be put t6 more profitable use except by demolition and reconstruction and particularly because of absence of contrary suggestion to P. W. I. The principles of law laid down in the case of Biswa Bhusan v. Kusum reported in 1981 (1) CLJ1 and in the case of Laxmipati v. Rajendra reported in 69 Calwn 1063, following the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1974 SC 471 , applies with full force to sustain the finding of the courts below on the point. This, clearly being a finding of fact, and there having been no substantial error of law in arriving at the said finding, does not deserve interference in Second Appeal. ( 5 ) AS regards (b), the same assumes importance only for the purpose of judging the property of the finding of the court of appeal below relating to the means of the plaintiffs and as such I propose to deal with (b) and (c) together. The trial Court has found that construction has to be started with the ground floor and has also found, considering the amount covered by the fixed deposit receipts, Exhibit S series, the rents lying in deposit in court, the total monthly income of some of the plaintiffs and the wife of the plaintiff No. 4 which amounts to 14 thousand rupees approximately, the monthly income of P. W. 1. and plaintiff No. 5 to the tune of Rs. 1800/- per month and initial finance of Rs. 24, (00/- available from plaintiff No. 2 with a written assurance to continue remittance of further finance after the construction starts, the market credit as evidenced from the testimony of P. W. 6, who agreed to supply building materials to the tune of Rs. 1 lakh, and Exhibit 94 a written assurance from another supplier of building materials, that the plaintiffs had sufficient means to build and rebuild as proposed. 1 lakh, and Exhibit 94 a written assurance from another supplier of building materials, that the plaintiffs had sufficient means to build and rebuild as proposed. The lower appellate court has also dealt in details with the sources of finance for carrying on the construction in question and upon consideration thereof, and, particularly, the admission made by D. W. 2 to the effect that she had no personal knowledge about the means of the plaintiffs, has affirmed, the said fin4ngs of the trial court. The points raised to assail such findings on the question of means, on behalf of the appellant, before me to the effect that photocopies of the F. D. R. s cannot be marked as an exhibit and the assurance embodied in the letter of the brother taken into consideration by the lower appealable court does not form relevant material for a decision on the question of means, according to me, do not have any substance as the marking of the protocopy of the fixed deposit receipts, as exhibits, had been done after the formal proof thereof was dispensed with and the court of appeal below was right in applying the principles laid down in the case of State of West Bengal represented by L. A. COLLECTOR, Burdwan v. Chinta Haran Mondal reported in 86 CWN page 325 in rejecting the said contention made on behalf of the defendant, the appellant before me. ( 6 ) AS regards the letter from the brother, even ignoring the same, the finding as regards the sufficiency of the means available to the plaintiff made by the lower appellate court on other materials cannot be shaken or disturbed, particularly, in view of the admission of D. W. 2 as made in the cross-examination. In such a state of facts the principles laid down in the case of Mattulal v. Radhelal reported in AIR 1974 SC 1596 and Krishnapada v. Tejpal reported in 75 Calwn 687 becomes applicable and obviates the necessity of interference with such a finding in the instant Second Appeal. ( 7 ) AS regards (c) Mr. Ghosh, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has already pointed out from the records that the validity of the plan had been extended for a further period of 5 years with effect from 12. 12. ( 7 ) AS regards (c) Mr. Ghosh, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has already pointed out from the records that the validity of the plan had been extended for a further period of 5 years with effect from 12. 12. 1971 and it is well-established in law that the existence of a valid plan merely serves as a relevant piece of evidence showing the bona fides of the plaintiff. The lower appellate court has rightly held that the lapsing of the plan appears to be inconsequential and the requirement of a sanctioned plan is merely a matter of prudence and not a rule of law. The reasonings of the lower appellate court do not suffer from any perversity or substantial error. ( 8 ) AS regards (d) above, there is already a finding of fact by the trial court that the building and rebuilding cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated. Such a finding is justified in view of the evidence of P. W. 1. on that issue which remains uncontradicted. ( 9 ) ON the dispute about ownership, as mentioned in clause (f) above, it is well-established that in the matter of a decree for eviction on the ground of requirement for building and rebuilding such ownership need not be proved. Reference may be made to the case of Biswanath Gupta v. Narendra K. Tandon and Ors. reported in 78 CWN page 849. Apart from that, the lower appellate court has factually found, upon consideration of the evidence of P. W. 1. which remains unchallenged in cross examination, that the contention of the defendant about failure of the plaintiffs to prove their title was without foundation. In my view, this factual conclusion does not call for any interference as the same had been rightly arrived at and the principle of law also relating to suit under section 131 (1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act has also been correctly applied. ( 10 ) LASTLY, I have to deal with the contention of the defendant/appellant as noted in clause (g) above. It is admitted that prior to the filing of the suit the costs as directed by the learned Munsif, while permitting the plaintiffs to withdraw the earlier suit, had been paid. ( 10 ) LASTLY, I have to deal with the contention of the defendant/appellant as noted in clause (g) above. It is admitted that prior to the filing of the suit the costs as directed by the learned Munsif, while permitting the plaintiffs to withdraw the earlier suit, had been paid. In my view, that is a sufficient compliance as, even if, the same is treated as an irregularity that was a curable irregularity. ( 11 ) SINCE all the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant fail, the appeal must fail also and the same is dismissed. ( 12 ) IN the facts of the case, however, each party will bear his own costs. Appeal dismissed.