SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition is preferred under Section 115 of the c. p. code, against the order dated 16-10-1981 passed by the learned second additional district judge, belgaum in h. r. c. revision No. 62/1980. That revision petition was filed under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') before the district judge, belgaum against the order dated 18-6-1980 passed in h. r. c. No. 3/1979 and the same came to be decided by the additional district judge, belgaum. The learned munsiff allowed the petition and ordered for eviction of the petitioner- herein, who was the respondent in h. r. c. no. 3/1979. The learned second additional district judge, bclgaum, has affirmed the order of eviction passed by the learned munsiff. ( 2 ) THIS petition has been referred to adivision bench on the ground that it involves interpretation and applicability of Section 45 of the act. ( 3 ) WE have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the respondents. ( 4 ) HAVING regard to the contentions urged on both sides the following points arise for consideration:1 whether the present petition is not maintainable in view of the Provisions contained in Section 45 of the act? 2. Whether the only course open to the respondent is to execute the order of eviction passed in h. r. c. No. 2/1971? 3. Whether there was no offer made by lakshman in terms of the order passed in the previous proceeding? 4. Whether the finding recorded by the court below that the respondents have proved that they require the premises for their bona fide use and occupation calls for interference? 5. Whether the petitioner has proved thesubsequent events as alleged by him? ( 5 ) POINT No. 1 : the premises in question forms part of c. t. s. No. 4906/1946 (house No. 899/7), tanjali galli, belgaum. It is a residential premises. The petitioner is a tenant of the premises. Lakshman the father of respondents 2, 4 and the grandfather of respondents 1 (a), 1 (b), 1 (c), 1 (d), 1 (e) and the husband of respondent-3 was the landlord of the premises. He filed h. r. c. No. 2/1971 for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the premises was required by him for his bona fide use and occupation as he required additional accommodation. He filed h. r. c. No. 2/1971 for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the premises was required by him for his bona fide use and occupation as he required additional accommodation. The court at the first instance rejected the petition. However, the district judge allowed it on a condition that another alternative accommodation should be provided and the same should be got allotted from the rent controller. That order of the district judge was confirmed by this court in c. r. p. 1137/74 decided on 28th may, 1975. This court held thus:"on the question of comparative hardship, there cannot be any other opinion from the one reasonably reached by the learned district judge. After all this is not a case where the tenant is evicted without giving him any alternate accommodation. may be as contended by learned counsel for the tenant that the alternate accommodation offered by the landlord is not exactly of the same as the one occupied by the tenant, but having regard to the nature of the building, it is impossible for the landlord to offer similar premises in the first floor. It is seen that the tenant though resides in the first floor, has his bath-room in the ground floor. Therefore, it is better that he comes down for residence also, to the ground floor. The learned district judge has directed the eviction only on the condition that the landlord puts the tenant in occupation of the alternate accommodation, after obtaining necessary allotment order from the rent controller. That condition is also reasonable and is in the interest of the tenant. I, therefore, see no reason to disturb the order of eviction made by the appellate judge. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. No costs in the circumstances. "in terms of the aforesaid order it is the case of the respondents that lakshman offered the alternative accommodation but the same was not accepted by the petitioner/tenant and therefore the order could not be executed and the possession of the premises could not be obtained; that thereafter lakshman died and they require the premises in question for their bona fide use and occupation therefore, it is their case that they have filed the present petition for eviction. The courts below have held that the respondents have proved that they require the premises in question for their bona fide use and occupation. The courts below have held that the respondents have proved that they require the premises in question for their bona fide use and occupation. The learned district judge has also overruled the contention that the present petition is not maintainable having regard to the order passed in the previous petition filed by lakshman for eviction of the petitioner/tenant. ( 6 ) SRI ajit gunjal, learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant submits that as Sri lakshman predecessor in title of the respondents had filed a petition for eviction and obtained an order of eviction; that as the respondents claim through lakshman the Provisions contained in Section 45 of the act are attracted; therefore, the present proceeding is not maintainable. ( 7 ) SECTION 45 of the act reads thus:"45. Decisions which have become final not to be re-opencd:- the court or the controller shall summarily reject any application under this act which raises, between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, substantially the same issues as have been finally decided in a former proceeding under this act or under any of the enactments repealed by Section 62. "it is clear from the aforesaid provision that it incorporates the principles contained in Section 11 of the C. P. C. ( 8 ) WE have to find out whether the issues involved in both the proceedings are substantially the same. For the purpose of deciding this point the pleading and the points raised in the previous proceeding are necessary. The petitioner/tenant has not produced the pleadings of the previous proceeding nor has he produced the judgment of the munsiff court and that of the district court. No doubt the judgment of this court passed in c. r. p. No. 1137/1974 has been produced. In the absence of the pleadings and the points raised for determination in the previous case, it will not be possible to decide whether the issues involved in the present case are substantially the same as those involved in the previous proceeding. The Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh v Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810 , while dealing with the case under order 2, Rule 2 of the C. P. C. has held that in order to appreciate the plea under order 2, Rule 2 of the C. P. C. it is necessary to go through the pleadings of the previous proceeding. The Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh v Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810 , while dealing with the case under order 2, Rule 2 of the C. P. C. has held that in order to appreciate the plea under order 2, Rule 2 of the C. P. C. it is necessary to go through the pleadings of the previous proceeding. The same principle applies to the case on hand because the court is required to find out whether the issues involved in the previous proceeding were substantially the same as those involved in the present proceeding. The Supreme Court has held thus:"without placing before the court the plaint in which those facts were alleged, the defendant cannot invite the court to speculate or infer by a process of deduction what those facts might be with reference to the reliefs which were then claimed. It is not impossible that reliefs were claimed without the necessary averments to justify their grant. From the mere use of the words 'mesne profits' therefore one need not necessarily infer that the possession of the. Defendant was alleged to be wrongful. It is also possible that the expression 'mcsnc profits' has been used in the present plaint without a proper apprecialien of its significance in law. What matters is not the characterisation of the particular sum demanded but what in substance is the allegation on which the claim to the sum was based and as regards the legal relationship on the basis of which that relief was sought. It is because of these reasons that we consider that a pica based on the existence of a former pleading cannot be entertained when the pleading on which it rests has not been produced. "in addition to this, it may also be pointed out that it is not in dispute that the previous proceeding was filed by lakshman for possession of the schedule premises under Section 21 (l) (h) of the act for his personal bona fide use and occupation. The present proceeding is filed by the respondents after the death of lakshman under Section 21 (l) (h) of the act. The present proceeding is filed by the respondents after the death of lakshman under Section 21 (l) (h) of the act. It is specifically pleaded by them thus:"the petition premises in possession of the opponent is required for the personal use and occupation reasonably and bona fide for the petitioners and they intend to occupy the same for their residence since the area in their possession is not sufficient for the accommodation of the entire family. "thus, the petition for eviction filed under Section 21 (1) (h) of the act relates to the bona fide requirement of the respondents/landlords. The requirement of late lakshman and the requirement of the respondents/landlords cannot be held to be the same. Therefore in order to apply Section 45 of the act apart from the fact that the proceedings must have been between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, the issues arising in both the proceeding must be substantially the same and must have been finally decided in the former proceeding. As the bona fide requirement of lakshman for his personal use and occupation cannot be considered to be the same as that of the respondents/landlords requiring the premises for their personal use and occupation it is not possible to hold that the requirements of Section 45 of the act are satisfied in the instant case. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant has also placed reliance on a decision of this court in the Gataveera Sangha v R. M. Shenoy, ILR 1987 kar. 940. No doubt in that decision it has been held that Section 45 will be a bar only when an issue has been tried and a finding is recorded and not otherwise. The words "finally decided" indicate that such decision should be a judicial determination on the matter in issue what has not been so determined cannot operate as a bar. In that decision it has not been considered as to whether the reasonable and bona fide requirement of one person or the previous landlord can be the same or substantially the same requirement of the succeeding or successive landlords. In that decision it has not been considered as to whether the reasonable and bona fide requirement of one person or the previous landlord can be the same or substantially the same requirement of the succeeding or successive landlords. If the contention of Sri ajit gunjal, learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted once a petition for eviction under Section 21 (1) (h) of the act is filed and it is rejected no successor can file such petition because such an issue has already-been raised and decided. Therefore, if such an interpretation is placed on Section 45 of the Act, it will not only affect the right of a landlord but will also result in miscarriage of Justice and will create serious anamoly. Therefore, we are of the view that a finding whether in the negative or in the affirmative recorded in a petition filed under Section 21 (1) (h) of the act on the ground that the premises is reasonably and bona fide required for use and occupation of the previous landlord cannot operate as a bar in a subsequent proceeding instituted by a successor landlord acquiring title either by succession or transfer, for possession of the premises on the ground that he reasonably and bona fide require the premises for his use and occupation. Reasonable and bona fide requirement of one person cannot be the same as the reasonable and bona fide requirement of another person even though the said person is successor-in-title of the premises. Again even if the proceeding is between the same parties, it will depend upon whether the proceeding is founded on the same or substantially the same facts leading to substantially the same issues. In many cases, it may so happen that the proceeding may be instituted on the same ground, i. e. , reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord, but the facts and circumstances leading to the ground may be quite different. In such a case, issues cannot be sub-stantially the same. Consequently in such a case, Section 45 of the act will not be attracted because the Section docs not incorporate all the aspects of Section 11 of the c. p. code as contained in the explanations thereto. In such a case, issues cannot be sub-stantially the same. Consequently in such a case, Section 45 of the act will not be attracted because the Section docs not incorporate all the aspects of Section 11 of the c. p. code as contained in the explanations thereto. Therefore, in the case of a petition under Section 21 (l) (h), it will not be possible to hold that the issues as to the reasonable and bona fide requirement involved in a previous proceeding would be substantially the same in a subsequent proceeding as long as the landlords arc different or even if the proceeding is between the parties under whom they or any of them claim as the issues will not be substantially the same. Accordingly, point No. 1 is answered in the negative. ( 10 ) POINT No. 2: the order of eviction passed in the previous proceeding was obtained by lakshman. He offered an alternative accommodation which was not accepted before Sri lakshman died. Therefore,' he could not execute the order. As the order of eviction was for possession of the premises for use and occupation of Sri lakshman and it was ordered in that proceeding that an alternative accommodation should be made available to the petitioner-tenant, it is not possible to hold that such an order comes in the way of the present respondents- landlords to file a fresh proceeding seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the ground that they reasonably and bona fide require possession of the premises. Even otherwise, we are of the view that no injustice whatsoever is caused to the petitioner-tenant as both the courts below have held that the respondents-landlords require the premises reasonably and bona fide for their use and occupation. Therefore, the contention that the respondents are required to execute the order of eviction obtained by lakshman and they are not entitled to file a fresh proceeding for eviction cannot be accepted. Accordingly point No. 2 is also answered in the negative. ( 11 ) POINT No. 3: there is a finding of fact recorded by the two courts below that Sri lakshman offered an alternative accommodation which was not accepted by the petitioner-tenant. This finding is a finding of fact. Therefore, we do not see any justification to interfere with the same. Point No. 3 is answered accordingly. ( 11 ) POINT No. 3: there is a finding of fact recorded by the two courts below that Sri lakshman offered an alternative accommodation which was not accepted by the petitioner-tenant. This finding is a finding of fact. Therefore, we do not see any justification to interfere with the same. Point No. 3 is answered accordingly. ( 12 ) POINT No. 4: both the courts below have on the basis of the evidence on record come to the conclusion that the respondents/landlords have proved that they reasonably and bona fide require the premises for their use and occupation. This finding is a finding of fact. However, Sri ajit gunjal, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the two courts below have merely placed reliance on the evidence placed in the previous proceeding and they have not made independent approach to the case. The contention is not well founded. In para-11 of the judgment, the learned district judge has considered the evidence on record and has independently come to the conclusion that the respondents have proved that the premises in question is reasonably and bona fide required by them for their personal use and occupation. We do not think it necessary to repeat that evidence once again. This petition is filed under Section 115 of the c. p. code. The jurisdiction of this court in such a petition is very much limited. When the finding recorded by the lower court is based on the evidence on record, it is not open to this court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C. P. C. to reappreciate the evidence on record and come to a different conclusion. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of this court in Nagaraju v Mahalingappa, 1990 (1) kar. L. j. sh. N. 45 : ILR 1990 kar. 1515. That was a case in which an order of injunction was issued ignoring the statutory Provisions. Therefore this court held that in such a situation interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C. P. C. was warranted. In para-9 of the judgment this court held thus:"it is an established Rule that an interim order passed in exercise of discretion by the court of first instance, the appellate and the revisional court should not lightly interfere with it. In para-9 of the judgment this court held thus:"it is an established Rule that an interim order passed in exercise of discretion by the court of first instance, the appellate and the revisional court should not lightly interfere with it. But this Rule is applicable to cases where the discretion is exercised judiciously on taking into consideration all the relevant and essential facts and the law governing the same. If the courts below fail to take into account all the essential facts and fail to apply the law governing the subject and pass an order of temporary injunction it would not be a case of exercise of discretion judiciously. Therefore, even if there is a concurrent finding, the revisional court can interfere to set right the miscarriage of justice. No doubt in the instant case both the courts have on currently held against the defendants; but both the courts below have failed to take into consideration the relevant Provisions of law and the government order issued under Section 51 of the Indian electricity Act, which go to the very root of the matter. Therefore, the exercise of discretion is not judicious. In such a case, interference under Section 115 of C. P. C. becomes necessary, as otherwise the illegality committed by the courts below not only results in miscarriage of Justice but also causes inordinate delay in the execution of the work of the nature in question by the public utility concern for the benefit of the general public. "therefore, it is not possible to apply the ratio of the said decision to the facts of this case because the district judge has recorded a finding of fact that the respondents have established that they reasonably and bona fide require the premises for their use and occupation. Hence, point No. 4 is answered in the negative and against the petitioner. ( 13 ) POINT No. 5 :- it is a settled position of law that subsequent events can be taken into account if the same go to the very route of the relief sought for by the landlord in a petition filed under Section 21 (l) (h) of the act. But what is necessary for the tenant is to prove the subsequent events. No doubt in an application filed for appointment of a commissioner, the petitioner has pleaded thus:"3. The respondent nos. 1 to 4 viz. But what is necessary for the tenant is to prove the subsequent events. No doubt in an application filed for appointment of a commissioner, the petitioner has pleaded thus:"3. The respondent nos. 1 to 4 viz. Krishnabai and sons filed an eviction petition against my father in h. r. c. No. 3/79 which has given rise to this crp, under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. Suffice it to mention that krishnabai and her sons were residing in three rooms situated just behind the two rooms in question now in our occupation. Krishnabai received rent from us either directly or through her sons and Advocate till the end of may, 1984. In the meanwhile she left and so also her sons, belgaum for good and settled down permanently in inchalakaranji in kolhapur district, maharashtra state. In fact, the notice on krishnabai was served on her inchalakaranji address. She and her sons had kept the three rooms in their possession vacant. The rent sent by us by m. o. to her at her inchalakaranji address came to be refused by her. 4. The said three rooms occupied by her and her sons are now occupied by one bhima appaji chavan and the members of his family and his brother babu and his children. There are in all 6 members in the said premises. Ever since they occupied the same they have been in collusion with their relation nagesh gundu hulji residing in the opposite house and some rowdies, making the life of the member of our family and other tenants miserable, contending that they have agreed to purchase the entire building from krishnabai and her sons and have paid Rs. 11,000/- as advance and that the tenants including us should pay exhorbitant rent and further attorn to them failing which should forthwith vacate the premises in their occupation. In fact one of the tenants on the ground floor by name kulkarni was paying a rent of Rs. 35/- per month and his rent is now raised to Rs. 200/- per month on condition that no receipt would be issued. But we refused to recognise them as our landlords or their unauthorised occupation and demand. In fact one of the tenants on the ground floor by name kulkarni was paying a rent of Rs. 35/- per month and his rent is now raised to Rs. 200/- per month on condition that no receipt would be issued. But we refused to recognise them as our landlords or their unauthorised occupation and demand. Consequently they have been every day harassing us by blocking our way to the bath room, latrine and free movement and further threatening that we would soon be assaulted and are using filthy language etc. We complained to the police on many occasions and eventually a case is now filed against them at cr. No. 236/85 on 9-8-1985 of which a true copy is herewith produced as annexure-a. Their women folk began to harass our women folk. Consequently another complaint was lodged at cr. No. 237/85 against the women folk. The said cases are now pending. The grouse has also taken ugly turn in that we are kannadigas and lingayats and tanaji galli is predominently occupied by maratha and marathi speaking people. We requested in the meanwhile the police to give us protection which was given for some time. This provoked the marathi people to carry on as antipropaganda against us. Annexure-B is the true copy of the item published in ranzunjar marathi daily dated 5-8-1985. In the circumstances we feel our live are in danger, and it is necessary that this Hon'ble court be pleased to appoint a commissioner to immediately visit the said building to ascertain as to who are in actual possession of the premises formerly occupied by krishnabai and her sons so as to enable us to take further action against the said persons in this Hon'ble court. It is also manifest that the h. r. c. petition filed against us under Section 21 (l) (h) has become infructuous and is liable to be dismissed on the ground that they do not any longer require it. We are willing to bear the expenses of the commissioner in this behalf. If no prompt action is taken, it is not unlikely that some untoward incident may happen causing irreparable loss and untold hardship and injury to us. We are willing to bear the expenses of the commissioner in this behalf. If no prompt action is taken, it is not unlikely that some untoward incident may happen causing irreparable loss and untold hardship and injury to us. " ( 14 ) THE respondents in their counter affidavit have stated thus:"the averments made in paras-3 and 4 of the affidavit to the effect that krishnabai has left the premises with her sons and settled down permanently in ichalakaranji, that the three rooms in their possession are vacant and the m. o. sent to krishnabai was refused etc. , are false. The same are denied. That it is also not correct to state that one bheema appaji chavan and the members of his family, with their brother and children is residing in the said rooms. Further it is false to state that the said persons in collusion with their relation nagesh gundu hulji, residing in the opposite house and some rowdies making the life of the member of petitioner's family and other tenants miserable contending that they have agreed to purchase the entire building and have paid Rs. 11,000/- as advance etc. It is false to state that one of the tenants on the ground floor who was paying rent of Rs. 35/- is now paying Rs. 200/ -. The petitioner has falsely stated that these respondents are harassing him and his family by blocking their way to bathroom, latrine etc. The complaints to the police are concocted and only with a view to harass these petitioners. The application for appointment of commissioner is made at this late stage, just to drag on the matter and the main proceedings. It is humbly submitted that the respondents are very much staying in the aforesaid three rooms and the same is insufficient for their living and they have been trying for eviction since 1971. " thereafter the petition has been pending for nearly five years. The petitioner had not taken any step to prove the averments made in the petition nor did he seek an order on his application filed for appointment of a commissioner. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the petitioner has failed to prove the subsequent events alleged by him. Therefore, the same cannot be made a basis for setting aside the order of eviction. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the petitioner has failed to prove the subsequent events alleged by him. Therefore, the same cannot be made a basis for setting aside the order of eviction. Accordingly, on point No. 5 it is held that the petitioner has failed to prove the subsequent events alleged by him. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the petition fails and the same is dismissed. However,the petitioner is granted time to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the schedule premises till the end of september, 1990 on condition that he files an undertaking before this court on or before the end of this month with a copy to the otherside that he will voluntarily vacate and deliver vacant possession of the schedule premises to the respondents; that he will not cause damage to the schedule premises, that he will not induct third party into the premises, that he will pay the amount for his use and occupation of premises during the period of his occupation at the same rate at which he is paying the rent till now. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .