Judgment L.P.N.Shahdeo, J. 1. The original writ application has been filed for quashing the order dated 29-11-86 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla where by he has ordered confiscation and sale of the truck bearing no. BRV 4971. 2. It appears that Sessai P. S. Case No. 59/86 under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act was registered against three persons i.e. the driver and the ration shop owners on the allegation that the foodgrains were being removed in the truck illegally from the ration shop and in consequence thereof the foodgrains and the truck involved were seized and F. I. R. was lodged on 17-9-86. On 18-9-86 the police officer sent the seizure list of the foodgrains to the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla, who initiated a case 43 R 15 of 1986-87 under Section 6-A of the E. C. Act and by the order dated 29-10-86 the seized foodgrains and the truck were ordered to be confiacated as a result of that proceeding. 3. It appears that the truck involved in this case was seized on 7-10-86 and not on the dated of the occurrence. On 14-10-86 the petitioner filed an application before the Special Judge, Reachi, for release of the truck and an order was passed on 27-10-86 directing the Public Prosecutor to intimate the court as to whether any confiscation proceeding has been started or not and, thereafter the impugned order was passed. 4. Mr. P. K. Banerjee, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the truck involved in this case cannot be sold until conclusion of the criminal trial. In support of his contention he has relied upon a ruling reported in 1978 BLJR 717 (Bishwanath Singh and others v. State of Bihar.) 5. In this case the confiscation of the truck in question is not in dispute. The only dispute is that a simultaneous order for confiscation as well as sale of the said truck, cannot be passed together unless the criminal trial is concluded as no such provision has been made under the Essential Commodities Act as has been specifically made so far the food-grains are concerned. 6. In the ruling referred to above, it has been laid down, after discussion, that there is no provision for return of the price of the vehicle under the E. C. Act has been made, and such provision is made in respect of foodgrains only. 6. In the ruling referred to above, it has been laid down, after discussion, that there is no provision for return of the price of the vehicle under the E. C. Act has been made, and such provision is made in respect of foodgrains only. It, therefore, follows that while the essential commodities seized may be sold to the Government, the vehicle which is confiscated under Section 6-A of the Act, cannot be sold unless criminal prosecution is finally disposed of. It has been held that the word disposal under Section 6 or Section 6-A as amended by the aforesaid Ordinance, does not mean and include final disposal by auction sale. It has been found that, no doubt, the Ordinance also amends Section 6 (c) of the Act but it does not make any provision in sub-section (2) thereof for the payment of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. Substentially, sub-section 2 of Section 6-A remains the same as in the original Act. It is, therefore, obvious that it was not the intention of the makers of the Ordinance to make any change with regard to the law in respect of confiscation of vehicles and sale thereof. 7. Therefore, in view of the ruling referred to above, the confiasction of the vehicle and simultaneous sale of the same before conclusion of the criminal trial, is not permissible. 8. From the impugned order, it appears that not only the vehicle has been confiscated but also has been ordered to be sold. It appears, that the vehicle in question has been ordered to be released by this court on 19-12-86 on security to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla. 9. It was submitted by Mr. Banerjee, with reference to paragraph 7 of this writ application, that the case, at the time when this writ application was filed, was pending but he does not know about the present position of the case. Therefore, the impugned order which was passed at a time when the criminal case was pending, cannot sustain in law in view of the Division Bench decision of this court referred to above. 10. In the result, this writ application is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla dated 29-11-86 is quashed. Therefore, the impugned order which was passed at a time when the criminal case was pending, cannot sustain in law in view of the Division Bench decision of this court referred to above. 10. In the result, this writ application is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla dated 29-11-86 is quashed. However, it is made clear that this order is valid if the criminal case is pending at present and if that case has already been disposed of, the Deputy Commissiner, Gumla, shall be entitled to pass necessary orders in accordance with law.