JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---In my opinion, the point which arises for decisions in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has already been decided by the Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Dharmadhikari and Chaudhary, JJ. Dharmadhikari J., delivered the concerned judgement in Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1981 (Prabhulal Chhogalala Mandore v. Bastiram Himatram Bhutada and another)', on 11th of September, 1989: 1990(1) Bom.C.R. 529 ). The facts leading to this petition, however, have got to be stated. 2. The respondent as a landlord filed a suit, being Regular Civil Suit No. 221 of 1971 against two brothers hereinafter referred to as "defendants" Nos. 1 and 2. The suit was filed on two grounds, namely, that defendant No. 1, who was the original tenant, had illegally sublet the suit premises consisting of four rooms to defendant No. 2 and further that defendant No. 1 was guilty of arrears of rent, deserving a decree of eviction under section 12(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as "the Bombay Rent Act", as it then stood. 3. The trial Court rejected the claim of the respondent, hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff" for possession on the ground of arrears of rent. This was done not merely on merits but also by nothing that the case for default was not pressed in the trial Court on behalf of the plaintiff. The trial Court, however, held that defendant No. 1, the original tenant, had illegally sublet the suit premises to defendant No. 2. Hence the suit was decreed on the ground available to a landlord under section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act. 4. This decree for possession was challenged by the defendants in an appeal, being Cavil Appeal No. 62 of 1977, which was heard and dismissed by the learned Appellate Judge, namely the Assistant judge of Nasik, by his judgement and order dated 31st of January 1980 while doing so the learned Appellate judge confirmed the finding of sufbletting and negative the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff regarding the arrears of rent. It is this decree confirming the degree off the trial Court which is the subject matter of challenge in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitutions of India. It is this decree confirming the degree off the trial Court which is the subject matter of challenge in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitutions of India. During the pendency of this petition, the ordinal defendants, namely the petitioners in this petition, expired and their legal representative have been brought on record for the sake of convenience. However reference is being made in this judgement to the parties as the plaintiff and the defendants. 5. As already mentioned above, the question which arises in this petition is already concluded by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court referred to above. however, I am taking the liberty of mentioning in this judgment as to how and what question arises because with great respect, these details have not been mentioned in the judgment of the Division Bench. It may be that the details have not been mentioned in the judgment of the Division Bench because the Division Bench was dealing with the reference made to it by Tated, J., and in all probability all the relevant facts and details were in the judgment of Tated,J. 6. The provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, as they stood from time to time, ought to be necessarily noted. Pilor to May 1959, subletting was prohibited and under section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act, subletting was available as a ground to a landlord for claiming eviction of the tenant from the tenanted premises. However, by an ordinance, which was subsequently replaced by Bombay Act No. 49 of 1959 , all sub-tenancies, which were subsisting on 14th of May, 1959 were made legal. The effect was that the landlord could not claim possession of the tenanted premises form the tenant on the ground that before 14th of May, 1959 the suit premises had been sublet. The language of section 13(1)(e), as it stood prior to the amendment of 1959 was as follows:--- "(e) that the tenant has, since the coming into the operation of this Act, sublet .........." After the amendment of 1959, Clause (e) reads as follows:--- "(e)" that the tenant has since the coming into operation of this Act, unlawfully sublet........" The prohibition against subletting continued after May 1959 and, therefore, any subletting after the amendment of 1959 would be unlawful and that continued to provide a ground for eviction of the tenant. 7. 7. We must now notice some relevant provisions of Maharashtra Act, No. 18 of 1987, which is called the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Act, 1986 by which the principal Act was amended on a large scale. This Act came into force on 1st of October, 1987, Prior the amendment of 1987, the word "tenant" meant any person by whom or on whose account rent was payable and included such sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title under a tenant before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, Act No. 18 of 1987, hereinafter referred to as "the Amending Act"., Introduced certain words in section 5(ii)(a) which have the effect of bestowing legal tenancies as all these persons who had been otherwise illegally inducted as sub-tenants before the 1st day of February, 1973. The effect of the amendment is to modify the definition of "tenant" contained in section 5(11)(a) to the extent it is relevant, as follows:--- "(ii) tenant means any persons by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes--- (a) such sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title under a tenant before the 1st day of February, 1973". 8. Section 14 of the Amending Act further provided for the amendment of section 14 of the principal Act, as a result of which section 14(i) after the amendment reads as follows:--- "14 (i) when the interest of a tenant of any premises is determined for any reason, any sub-tenant to whom the premises or any part thereof have been lawfully sublet before the 1st day of February, 1973 shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions as he would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued." 9. A cognate amendment was also made in section 15 of the principal Act by section 15 of the Amending Act. A cognate amendment was also made in section 15 of the principal Act by section 15 of the Amending Act. As a result, sub-section (2) of section 15 of the principal Act stands amended of follows:--- "15(2) the prohibition against the sub-letting of the whole or any part of the premises which have been let to any tenant, and against the assignment or transfer in any other manner of the interest of the tenant therein, contained in sub-section (1), shall, subject to the provisions of this sub-section, be deemed to have had no effect before the 1st day of February, 1973 in any area in which this Act was in operation before such commencement:" 10. The sum total of the effect of these amendments was to legalise all sub-tenancies which had been created against the prohibition before 1st of February, 1973. If, therefore, a sub-tenancy had been created before 1st of February, 1975 it would not be an illegal subletting and, therefore, would not be a ground for eviction of the tenant under section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act. 11. It has already been mentioned above that the amendment came into force on 1st of October, 1987. The question is whether the amendment is retrospective. It has already been noted that the suit in the present case, being Regular Civil Suit No. 221 of 1971, was filed by the plaintiff in the year 1971, obviously after the cause of action had arisen. This must necessarily mean that the sub-tenancy by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 had taken place some time in or prior to 1971. The question is whether the amendment which came into force on 1st October, 1987 would save the tenant from the decree of eviction which has been passed prior to the amendment. 12. Section 25 of the Amending Act is as follows:--- "25, Nothing contained in the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall be deemed to authorise the re-opening of any suit or proceeding for the eviction of any person from any premises to which the principal Act applies as if such proceeding had been finally disposed of before the commencement of this Act. Explanation---For the purpose of this section, suit of proceeding, as the case may be, shall not be deemed to have been finally disposed of, if in relation to that suit or proceeding, any appeal or proceeding is pending, or, if the period of limitation for preferring an appeal or proceeding, as the case may be, had not expired before the commencement of this Act." 13. The word "proceeding" to be found in section 25 of the Amending Act is the subject matter of interpretation. The question is whether the word "proceeding" includes proceeding by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India pending in the High Court. The earlier question and this question have been both answered in the affirmative by the Division Bench to whose judgment I have already made a reference earlier. The Division Bench, with great respect, in an elaborate judgment has considered several relevant judgments, both of this Court and the Supreme Court. The Division Bench also noted the difference of opinion between Sharad Manohar, J., and Daud, J., and referring judgment of Tated, J., and after doing this, it held that the word "proceeding" used in section 25 of the Amending Act must necessarily include the proceeding by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 14 of its judgment, the Division Bench held that if the word "proceeding" mentioned in section 25 of the Amending Act is construed with the object of the legislation, a liberal construction will have to be put on the said word and so construed, it will include in its import even the proceeding instituted under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Since in the case before the Division Bench the premised had been sub-let by the petitioner prior to 1st of February, 1973, it was held that subletting was not illegal. The writ petition was, therefore, allowed and the decree for eviction passed by the authorities below was set aside. In the case before the Division Bench, the suit had been filed in the year 1974. The cause of action, therefore, must have arisen in or prior to the year 1974. 14. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench, Mr. In the case before the Division Bench, the suit had been filed in the year 1974. The cause of action, therefore, must have arisen in or prior to the year 1974. 14. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench, Mr. Angal, the learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff respondent was naturally unable to persuade me to take view that the amendment could not be said to be retrospective. It was, however, suggested that in the case before the Division Bench, the cause of action had arisen in the year 1974 and the Amending Act has made sub-tenancies prior to 1st of February, 1973 legal and, therefore, by a legal fiction, the illegal subtenancy on which the suit before the Division Bench was based was converted into legal sub tenancy. The facts in the present case, however, show that the suit for eviction was filed long before the Legislature bestowed legality on illegal sub-tenancies. The suit was filed in the year 1971. The cause of action had already accrued in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendants and the amendment could not have the effect of divesting of a right which had already vested in the landlord. 15. The argument is unacceptable because it cannot be disputed that a law can divest a person of the right vested in him provided, of course, it is done in clear language or by necessary implication. The language of the Amending Act in its various sections leaves one in no doubt that notwithstanding the fact that a cause of action has arisen on any day, all sub-tenancies created despite the prohibition before 1st of February, 1973 stood legalised. No other meaning, according to me, is possible. Further, in view of the language contained in section 25 of the Amending Act, it is clear that irrespective of the data on which the suit was filed, if the suit or proceeding as mentioned in section 25 of the Amending Act is pending, then the illegally attaching to a sub-tenancy created before 1st of February, 1973 stands removed by virtue of the provisions contained in Maharashtra Act No. 18 of 1987. 16. Before parting with this judgment, I must also make a reference to the attempt made by Mr. Angal to support the decree of eviction on the ground of default in the payment of arrears of rent. Mr. 16. Before parting with this judgment, I must also make a reference to the attempt made by Mr. Angal to support the decree of eviction on the ground of default in the payment of arrears of rent. Mr. Angal wanted to persuade me that despite the concurrent findings of the two Courts below, defendant No. 1, namely the original tenant, was guilty of arrears of rent, deserving a decree of eviction under section 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act, as it then stood. I have not allowed Mr. Angal to argue this point for two reasons. In the first place, as I have already mentioned earlier in this judgment, the ground for eviction on the basis of arrears of rent was given up in the Court of first instance and was not agitated in the manner in which it is sought to be agitated now before me. Secondly, at the time of the final hearing of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Advocate for the plaintiff respondent cannot be allowed to argue a point of which notice has not been given to the Advocate for the petitioner tenant. It may be that the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not strictly applicable to proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution. But an elementary rule of fair hearing must necessarily include the requirement that the opposite party must have notice of any point which is likely to be argued by one party in appeals, cross objections are filed under the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On principles analogous to the said provisions, the Court must insist that the respondent shall give notice to the Advocate for the petitioner that he will support the decree or the order on grounds which have been held against him in the Court of courts below. Such a notice has not been given on behalf of the respondent to the petitioner, Mr. Angal suggests that when this matter was heard before another Single Judge he has raised this point and, therefore, the other side had notice of the same I am reluctant to accept this as proper and adequate notice as required by any fair rule of hearing. 17. Angal suggests that when this matter was heard before another Single Judge he has raised this point and, therefore, the other side had notice of the same I am reluctant to accept this as proper and adequate notice as required by any fair rule of hearing. 17. It is advisable that the rule of fair hearing which I have discussed in the preceding paragraph should be given some formal status. The High Court should make a rule requiring that in civil revision applications and petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the respondents shall within a specified period, after rule has been served, give notice to the petitioners that the respondents would be supporting the orders or decrees of the Courts below on grounds which have been held in the Courts below against the respondents. The Register is here by directed to bring this part of the judgment to the notice of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 18. In the result, the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (B) of paragraph VI of the petition, but there will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----