JUDGMENT : Heard learned Attorney-General for the appellants and Sri Harish N. Salve, learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. The controversy before the High Court of Gauhati in the proceedings from which the appeal arises was whether the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, (the `Act') stood extended to and was in force in the State of Mizoram. That question has been answered by the High Court in the affirmative and in favour of the appellant. The High Court by its judgment dated 11-1-1990 in Civil Rule No. 442 of 1988 has held that the said Act came into force in that State from 16-8-1944. 3. The High Court, after declaring so, however, proceeded to make certain other observations as to the manner in which the appellant should go about its business in assessing, levying and collecting excise duty from the respondent under the `Act'. Those observations are at paragraphs 8, 10 and a portion of paragraph 11 which read : "8. We do not propose to express any opinion on the certificate given by the Commissioner of Excise and Taxes, Mizoram, Aizawl in view of the orders which we propose to pass in the present petition. We leave it to the learned Trial Court to decide this point." "10. In view of the orders passed by this Court in MA (F) No. 7 of the 1988, we deem it fit and proper to direct the present petitioners to go and appear before the learned Court to obtain necessary orders." "11. ...... and direct the present petitioners to obtain necessary orders from the learned Trial Court in the pending trial suit. Steps may be taken for realising the duty due under the Act. We make it clear that if any such proceeding is started, the respondents shall be given reasonable opportunity of being heard and that too after the matter is disposed of by the learned Trial Court." The need for making and the context in which the observations in paras 10 and 11 were made appear to be that the respondent had sought a declaration as to the non-applicability of the said Act to the State of Mizoram in Title Suit No. 9/87 on the file of Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Aizawl; and had also sough and obtained certain interlocutory directions seeking to interdict proceedings against it under the `Act'. 4. 4. Learned Attorney-General submitted that the High Court, after having come to the conclusion that the Act was in operation in the State, should have left matters at that and allowed the parties to work out their rights and obligations accordingly. The observations made in paragraphs 10 and 11 extracted above, learned Attorney-General says, proceed on the pre-supposition that some interlocutory orders were operating against the appellant in the civil suit and that, accordingly, those orders constituted and impediment in the way of the authorities effectuating the provisions of the Act against the respondent. It was submitted that whatever directions the Trial Court had chosen to issue at the interlocutory stage had come to be set aside by this Court by its order dated 29-4-1988 in S.L.P. No. 5579/88 and that the High Court, in making the observations in paragraphs 10 and 11 virtually permitted itself to sit in judgment over the effect the order dated 29-4-1988 of this Court had on the interlocutory orders of the Trial Court in the suit and implied the possibility that the interdiction still operated against the appellant. Learned Attorney-General says that there was no occasion for the High Court to make these observations limiting the powers of the authorities under the `Act' and that, at all events, in view of the order dated 29-4-1988 made by this Court it was neither necessary nor appropriate to place any limitations on the authorities on the basis of what the High Court considered to be the subsisting effect of the interlocutory orders in the suit. Learned Attorney-General further urged that the observations of the High Court in para 8 of its judgment were again not only inconsistent with its own pronouncement on the principal question that arose in the case but also a timorous view to take of the effect of some certificate issued by the Commissioner of Excise and Taxes of the Government of Mizoram to the effect that the Act was not in force in the State and that the High Court's own pronouncement that the `Act' was so in force had on overriding effect on the said certificate. 5. 5. Sri Salve, however, sought to maintain that the order dated 29-4-1988 made by this Court in S.L.P. No. 5579/88 did not have the effect of neutralising the orders of the Trial Court in the suit and that the High Court was justified in drawing the attention of the appellant to the risks in proceeding against the respondent on the ground alone that the High Court had decided the point as to the applicability of the Act in its favour. Sri Salve submitted that, independently of the question whether in the light of the judgment of the High Court anything really survived in the suit or not, the orders made in the suit could not simply be ignored in the manner in which appellant sought to do. 6. On a consideration of the matter, we are of the view that the question whether the interlocutory order in the suit was overborne by this Court's order dated 29-4-1988 or not was not a matter of concern in the writ petition in the High Court and that, that question would require to be considered in the forum before it was sought to be raised. It is quite possible that the order dated 29-4-1988 had the effect of neutralising the order in the suit. It was not necessary for the High Court to have gone into that question as it is not for us to do that here either. The observations of the High Court in paragraphs 10 and 11 of its judgment excerpted above were therefore unnecessary for the purposes of the case before it. The High Court came to the conclusion that the Act stood extended to and remained operative in the State of Mizoram. That was sufficient to dispose of the controversy before it. We, accordingly, delete the said observations in paragraphs 10 and 11 form the judgment of the High Court. The certificate dated 7th August, 1987, issued by the Commissioner of Excise and Taxes, Government of Mizoram, Aizawl, it is hardly necessary to emphasise, would not survive after the judgment of the High Court was rendered. The observation of the High Curt in para 8 of its judgment implying that matter had to be clarified only in the suit is wholly erroneous. Accordingly, the observations of the High Court in para 8 of the judgment are also deleted. 7. The observation of the High Curt in para 8 of its judgment implying that matter had to be clarified only in the suit is wholly erroneous. Accordingly, the observations of the High Court in para 8 of the judgment are also deleted. 7. Sri Salve stated that the respondent had filed a special leave petition of its own assailing the order dated 11-1-1990 of the High Court to the effect that the Act was in force in Mizoram. That special leave petition will be considered on its merit when it gets listed. 8. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.