JUDGMENT Roy, J.: 1. This appeal, which has been directed against an order dated 3rd October 1988, filed by the Vinay Kumar Vijay Kumar Ganodia, on the basis or the leave as received from this Court, is really one of the rarest of the rare cases relating a proceedings arising out or an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, from reasons more than one. In fact, by the said order dated 3rd October 1988, a learned single Judge of this Court refused the prayer of the appellant before us in this appeal, to have his representation allowed and to add him in the concerned proceedings. The Respondent Canton Carpentary Works (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the said Company), at all material timesowned and still owns Premises Nos. 12, 14 and 16, Radhanath Chaudhury Road, Calcutta-700 015 and there is no doubt that various certificate proceedings, on different accounts, as initiated by the Certificate officer concerned, under the provisions of Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), were and are pending. 2. It appeared to us that the proceeding of the concerned certificate cases, which are at least 20 in number, were duly served on the said Company and consequently on Respondent Writ petitioner No.2 Mr. J.C. Walkin. Managing Director of the said Company, on the basis of the certificate proceedings as initiated. It has been alleged that the Certificate officer concerned had attached the right, title and interest of the said Company in respect or one of the premises as mentioned hereinbefore viz. Premises No. 14, Radhanath Chaudhury Road, Calcutta 700 015 (hereinafter referred to as the said premises), including a building standing thereon and the machinery attached thereto. There is also no doubt that diverse proceedings took place against such action of the Certificate officer and ultimately, by an order dated 18th September, 1985, a Division Bench of this Court, presided over by M. M. Dutta, J. (as His Lordship then was), by consent of the parties, was pleased to pass an order directing that the said premises to be sold in auction by the Certificate officer concerned, after complying with the necessary formalities under the said Act. 3. 3. The public auction as directed, was admittedly held by the Certificate officer concerned on 18th November, 1985 and it would appear that in the said auction, the appellant in this appeal, was declared and found to be the highest bidder and the bid amount was for Rs. 44 lakhs. Since he was the highest bidder, his bid was accepted by the Certificate officer concerned. The appellant in this appeal has stated that he duly deposited the bid amount, which again was received by the Certificate officer concerned on or about 17th December, 1985, and thereafter, one Nando Kumar Kandoy moved this Court, challenging such certificate sale and ultimately, he agreed to purchase the said premises for 46 lakhs and on the basis thereof, another learned Judge of this Court dealing with the matter, on 20th December, 1985, directed the said Shri Kandoy to deposit Rs. 12 lakhs by 24th December, 1985 and the balance thereafter and the Certificate officer concerned was also directed to confirm the sale and he was further given some directions in the matter, till the disposal of the writ petition, apart from directing that in default of any of such payments as aforesaid, the order as made, would stand vacated. 4. The appellant in this appeal has stated that the amount as mentioned herein before, was not deposited by Shri Kandoy and consequent thereto, the interim order as made, stood vacated and consequently the sale in favour of the appellant in this appeal, stood confirmed. It would further appear that on application being made by the said Shri Kandoy and the Canton Carpentary Works (P) Ltd. Workers Union who are also appearing in this appeal as Respondents and also as appellants in Appeal No. 234 of 1989 and such prayers for addition, were allowed and ultimately, an order was made, for maintenance of status quo for sometime. 5. It would appear that being aggrieved by such order, the said Company preferred an appeal and a Division Bench, again presided over by M.M. Dutta, J. (as His Lordship then was), was pleased to dispose of the appeal by directing that the added Respondent Union, whose particulars we have indicated earlier, would be at liberty to pray for stay before the concerned appellant authority under the said Act consequently, modified the order after vacating the order of maintenance of statue quo, which was issued earlier. 6. 6. There is no doubt that the Union concerned, preferred such an appeal before the Additional District Magistrate (J) South 24-Parganas, Alipore. under Section 51 of the said Act and against the order dated 18th November, 1985, passed by the said Certificate officer, for sale of the said premises, the Additional District Magistrate concerned, was pleased to pass an order on 3rd April 1986, allowing the appeal and consequently set-aside the auction sale, with further directions that the said premises, including the buildings, plant and machinery and other assets of the said Company, be put up for reauction in accordance with law. 7. Being aggrieved by such order, the said Canton Carpentary Works (P) Ltd. Mazdoor Sangh, who are appellants in Appeal No. 234 of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the said appellant Union), preferred a revisional application to this Court, since they claimed to be one of the certificate holders against the said Company and in that proceedings, the appellant in this appeal was impleaded as a party Respondent. The said proceedings, numbered as C.O. No. 3644 of 1986. was heard by a Division Bench presided over by Chittatosh Mookerjee, C. J. (as His Lordship then was) and by their judgment dated 18th September, 1987, the said Division Bench was pleased to modify the order of the learned Additional District Magistrate and directed that in the event the said Company deposits with the Certificate officer concerned, within a period of two months, the entire certificate dues, including interest as accrued upto that date, the order as made by the learned Additional District Magistrate would stand affirmed and if such dues were not paid within the time as stipulated, his order would stand set aside and the order as made by the Certificate officer concerned, would be confirmed. It has been stated before us that even after such order and also deposits of the dues of the concerned certificate cases, the Certificate officer had not taken expeditious steps for recovery of the premises in question. It has been stated before us that even after such order and also deposits of the dues of the concerned certificate cases, the Certificate officer had not taken expeditious steps for recovery of the premises in question. The appellant in this appeal has also stated that during the pendency of the proceeding in this Court, the said Company has agreed to sell the said premises in two lots i.e. one lot to one M/s. Triotrend (P) Ltd. and the second lot to M/s. Manick Chand Damani and he has further alleged that the said Company has entered into two separate agreements dated 23rd September, 1986 and 9th October, 1986 respectively, although this Court never thought it fit to have the said premises sold by private treaty and it was Indicated and intended that the same should be sold in public auction and in accordance with law. The certificate cases in which the order as indicated hereinbefore, was made, were (1) Case No. 25-WL/78-79 and (2) Case No. 64-WL/81-82. 8. It was also the case of the appellant in this appeal that since the deposit of the sums covered by the concerned certificate and as directed by this Court, were not made, the order of the learned Additional District Magistrate stood confirmed or affirmed and as such, the said premises was required to be reauctioned by the Certificate officer, in accordance with law. It is true that the appellant in this appeal took refund of the amount as deposited by him, which was lying on deposit with the Certificate officer concerned. But, he has claimed that he has not been paid the poundage and other dues as yet. Appearing for the said Company, Mr. Bachawat of course, claimed and indicated that for such failure of payment of poundage and other dues, another writ petition, as obtained by the appellant in this appeal is pending. It was the further allegation of the appellant in this appeal that he was always diligently trying to get the necessary informations regarding the reauction of the said premises, so that he would be in a position to bid for the same at the appropriate time. It was the further allegation of the appellant in this appeal that he was always diligently trying to get the necessary informations regarding the reauction of the said premises, so that he would be in a position to bid for the same at the appropriate time. But, only on 29th September, 1988, for the first time, he was informed that the said Company has filed a writ proceedings, as mentioned earlier, in this Court, without impleading him as a party Respondent, even though at all material times he had and still he has a subsisting claim, not only as the highest bidder for the said premises, but also for non-receipt of poundage and other dues, and the learned trial Judge by an order dated 2nd August, 1988, was pleased to appoint Mrs. Chhabi Bhattacharyaya, a learned Advocate of this Court, as Receiver with the initial remuneration of 100 G. Ms., to be paid by the said Company at the first instance. The said learned Judge, it has been stated by the order in question, was also pleased to direct M/s. Triotrend (P) Ltd. to hand-over a pay order of Rs.3,083,612.89P. to the learned Receiver, within a week and also directed that the said Receiver should open an account with a Nationalised Bank and deposit the pay order as mentioned above, in that account and hold the same free from lien, subject to further orders of the Court. The said learned Judge further directed the Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd. (subsequent purchaser) for whom Mr. Aninda Kumar Mitra is now appearing to pay Rs. 61 Lakhs by pay order on a Nationalised Bank to the learned Receiver on the date of bearing and directed the matter be appear under the heading" for further orders" on 7th September, 1988. The said learned Judge further directed the said Company to serve signed copy of the order as made on the learned Receiver and within three days from the date, and also recorded that in default, the order as made, will stand vacated. It would also appear that even though the proceedings was directed to appear on 7th September, 1988, on 2nd September, 1988, i.e. much before the date as fixed, the learned Judge was pleased to record that the subsequent purchaser, for whom Mr. It would also appear that even though the proceedings was directed to appear on 7th September, 1988, on 2nd September, 1988, i.e. much before the date as fixed, the learned Judge was pleased to record that the subsequent purchaser, for whom Mr. Bidyut Banerjee was appearing at the relevant time, had handed over to the learned Receiver in Court on that date a pay order Rs. 31 Lakhs on Vaishaya Bank Ltd C.R. Avenue and the said learned Receiver was directed to deposit the said pay order in the account opened by her in the United Bank of India, High Court Branch, Calcutta and a part from that, the learned trial Judge directed that the learned Receiver will be entitled to deduct out of the sale proceeds by way of her remuneration and hold the balance sums subject to further orders of the Court. It was also directed that the said learned Receiver and the said Company should have the conveyance executed in favour of M/s. Triotrend (P) Ltd within a month from the service, since they have paid the full purchase price and further directed the matter to appear in the list again on 3rd October, 1988, under the heading "for further orders". It would also appear that on 3rd October, 1988, the matter appeared before the learned trial Judge and it was recorded that the subsequent purchaser had already paid Rs. 31 Lakhs to the learned Receiver by pay order on 2nd September, 1988 and on 3rd October, 1988, they have further handed over to the learned Receiver, another pay order dated 1st October, 1988 on the said Vaishaya Bank Ltd. for a sum of Rs.30 lakhs in Court towards the balance purchase price. The learned Receiver was also directed to deposit the concerned pay order in her account as mentioned earlier, with a further direction that she will be entitled to deduct 5% of the sale proceeds by way of her remuneration and hold the balance sum subject to further orders of the Court. It was also recorded by the learned trial Judge that since the subsequent purchaser, for whom Mr. Bidyut Banerjee appeared, had paid the entire purchase price, the learned Receiver should execute the conveyance in favour of the said subsequent purchaser and the other purchaser viz. It was also recorded by the learned trial Judge that since the subsequent purchaser, for whom Mr. Bidyut Banerjee appeared, had paid the entire purchase price, the learned Receiver should execute the conveyance in favour of the said subsequent purchaser and the other purchaser viz. M/s. Triotrend (P) Ltd. and the learned Receiver was further directed to deliver possession of the said premises to the subsequent purchaser in the course of the day i.e. 3rd October, 1988. It was directed by the learned trial Judge that the matter would again appear in the list, remarked as "for further orders" on 11th October, 1988 and it was indicated further that all parties and the learned Receiver should act on the basis of Counsel’s endorsement. The learned Receiver has admitted before us that immediately on receipt of the order. She has withdrawn her entire remuneration, which amounts to about Rs. 3,24,188/-. 9. It would appear that on 3rd October, 1988, the learned trial Judge not only made an order as indicated hereinbefore, but by another order the application for intervention, which was filed by the appellant before us, was also rejected Mr. Aninda Mitra and so also the other learned Advocates opposing this appeal. Stated on a reference to the memo of appeal that since the grounds as taken therein, relates to the first order as made on 3rd October, 1988, the particulars whereof; we have indicated earlier, and not really against the order rejecting the application for intervention, so this appeal would not be maintainable. In fact, it was claimed that even no requisition for drawing up the subsequent order as mentioned above, was put in. Both the orders of 3rd October, 1988, were produced before us and we have looked into the contents of them. 10. In this appeal, on 4th October, 1988, a Bench presided over by Suhas Chandra Sen, J., on oral prayers gave the appellant in this appeal, leave to prefer the appeal and made an order in terms of prayer (a) of the application as ultimately filed, apart from directing, stay of the order as impugned. 10. In this appeal, on 4th October, 1988, a Bench presided over by Suhas Chandra Sen, J., on oral prayers gave the appellant in this appeal, leave to prefer the appeal and made an order in terms of prayer (a) of the application as ultimately filed, apart from directing, stay of the order as impugned. It was also directed by such Bench, that the learned Receiver as already appointed by the learned trial Court, should not take any steps in pursuance of the order as made, which admittedly meant the order dated 3rd October, 1988, whereby the learned Receiver was directed to deliver possession to the subsequent purchaser, for whom Mr. Aninda Mitra has appeared now and thereafter, by a subsequent order dated 21st December, 1988, the said Bench allowed the appellant in this appeal, to take steps for amendment of the notice of motion, for impleading all the parties and further directed that Mr. C.K. Deora, and Advocate of this Court, to be appointed Special Officer along with Mrs. Chhabi Bhattacharyaya, Advocate, will act as Joint Officers in the matter and they will keep the money deposited in short-term fixed deposits with any Nationalised Bank, renewable from time to time, till further orders of the Court. By the said order, it was also recorded that the question of remuneration of the Special Officers, will be decided at the time of final hearing, apart from indicating that all further dealings with the money, will be done jointly by the said Special Officers. Ultimately of course, one of the said Special Officers, Mr. Deora, has been discharged and the learned Receiver as indicated hereinbefore, is at present the sole Receiver and it is needless to point out, that she is continuing her office in terms of the order as indicated above. 11. After placing the relevant facts, some particulars whereof, we have indicated earlier, Mr. P.K. Ghosh, being lead by Mr. Joyanta Mitra and that too on being asked by us, firstly, submitted on the question of maintainability of the appeal, since the locus standi of the appellant, not only to prefer the appeal but also to maintain the same, was challenged. After placing the relevant facts, some particulars whereof, we have indicated earlier, Mr. P.K. Ghosh, being lead by Mr. Joyanta Mitra and that too on being asked by us, firstly, submitted on the question of maintainability of the appeal, since the locus standi of the appellant, not only to prefer the appeal but also to maintain the same, was challenged. Secondly, submissions were made regarding the propriety of the learned Trial Judge in ordering a private treaty between individuals to be given effect to, through a writ proceedings and thirdly, whether in making the order as impeached, the learned Trial Judge had acted bona fide, since by such order, on the basis of the claims and counter-claims as available, it was thought that the said learned Trial Judge has sought to frustrate the effect of the decision of the Bench presided over by Chittatosh Mookherjee, C. J. (as His Lordship then was). 12. While on the question of maintainability and locus standi, it was submitted that the appellant in this appeal, would have locus standi to maintain the appeal, since he was vitally interested in the said premises or for the purpose of the same in reauction, and as such, the rejection of his application for intervention, by the learned Trial Judge, was improper. It was claimed that because of such interest as existing, the learned Trial Judge should have allowed the application for intervention and in not doing so, the entire proceedings was vitiated. It was claimed that the learned Trial Judge failed to consider, while making the impugned order, that in the writ petition, there was no whisper regarding the earlier proceedings including the Division Bench judgment as mentioned above and on the basis of the challenge, which was only against the show-cause notice, as to why warrant of arrest for committing the offence by the authorities of the said Company, to civil imprisonment, should not be issued, in terms of Section 29 of the said Act, for dishonestly transferring, cancelling and removing the portions of the immovable properties and machineries of the said Company and refusing or neglecting the payment of Government dues covered by the different certificates as indicated in the concerned notice, the learned Trial Judge, in any event, had no jurisdiction or authority to have such a sale, through private treaty, confirmed or given effect to. On behalf of the appellant in this appeal, the notice of the day fixed for settling a sale proclamation, which was under Rule 46 of the Rules, framed under the said Act, for a total amount of Rs.25,014,539.15P. plus interest and costs, was referred to and relied on and on the basis of the concerned challenge, it was further sought to be supplemented that the order as made by the learned Trial Judge, was unauthoriscd and while making such order, the said Judge had exceeded the power, competence and jurisdiction. It was further pointed out and that too, on a reference to the prayers of the writ petition, that even though the said Company had asked for stay of the proceedings as mentioned hereinbefore, but really and in any effect, order had been obtained for sale of the said premises and as such, the said order was made, not only in wrong premises but also on consideration of facts, which were not due and proper. It was further submitted that while making the impugned order, the provisions of the said Act have been sought to be bye passed. 13. It was further submitted that while making the impugned order, the provisions of the said Act have been sought to be bye passed. 13. To establish that the appellant in this appeal had locus standi to maintain the writ petition or to show his interest, reference was made firstly, to the Division Bench Judgment of this Court dated 18th September, 1987, the particulars whereof, we have indicated earlier and indicated that on the facts and circumstances and the evidence as was available before them, the said Bench was pleased to hold that the Additional District Magistrate (J) committed an error apparent on the face of the records, by directing that the certificate sale held on 18th November, 1985, could be unconditionally set-aside, apart from indicating that in view of the undisputed liability of the said Company, to pay the subsistence allowance, which was being sought to be recovered by the impugned proceedings, the said Additional District Magistrate, committed an error apparent on the face of the records, by not imposing upon the said Company, an obligation to deposit upto date dues as the conditions for setting aside the sale and further observed, that upon perusal of the impugned order of the said Additional District Magistrate, it would appear that although the said Company did not itself file any application for setting aside the sale, in appeal, they had appeared and upon the grounds taken by them, the said Additional District Magistrate had set aside the sale. On the basis of the submissions as made before them. the Division Bench concerned also indicated that the order for setting aside the sale, primarily would be for the benefit of the said Company and neither the Additional District Magistrate concerned nor the said Bench has finally decided the question of locus standi of the workers union, who filed the appeal under Section 51 of the said Act and on those reasonings, it was observed that only upon the said Company depositing the certificate dues, the certificate sale could be set-aside and in default of such deposit, the certificate sale ought to be up-held. On the basis of the above observations by the said Division Bench, Mr. On the basis of the above observations by the said Division Bench, Mr. Joyanta Mitra claimed and contended that the effect of the order would be that for non deposit, the sale to be confirmed in favour of his client and in case, the necessary deposit was made or any part payment was made, then there should be a reauction, where his client, being the successful and the first bidder in the auction sale, should receive an opportunity to put forward his bid. Such being the position, Mr. Joyanta Mitra claimed that his client was never and still is not a rank of outsider. 14. In support of the submissions as indicated above, reference was firstly made to the case of (1) Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1628 , where the Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 10 of the Contract Act, had occasion to consider the effect of tenders called, for running restaurant and snack bars at Airport and also interpreted the terms of the contract and has observed that the tender Notice stated in clear terms that "sealed tenders in the prescribed form are hereby invited from Registered IInd Class Hoteliers, having at least 5 years experience for putting up and running IInd Class Restaurant and two Snack Bars at the Airport for a period of 3 years and that on a proper construction, what the notice required was that only a person running a registered and having at least 5 years' experience as such, should be eligible to submit a tender. This was a condition of eligibility and it is difficult to see how this condition could be said to be satisfied by any person, who did not have five years experience of running a IInd Class hotel or restaurant. The test of eligibility as laid down was an objective test and not a subjective one, apart from indicating that on the basis of such tenders as called for running the restaurant and snack bars, the authorities cannot accept lender of person, who does not fulfil the requisite qualifications. In fact, paragraph 9 of the said report, to which reference was made, indicates the question, whether the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents before the Supreme Court of India was invalid and liable to be set aside, at the instance of the appellant before them. In fact, paragraph 9 of the said report, to which reference was made, indicates the question, whether the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents before the Supreme Court of India was invalid and liable to be set aside, at the instance of the appellant before them. It was contended on behalf of the first and the 4th respondents that the appellant had no locus standi to maintain the writ petition, since no tender was submitted by him and he was a mere stranger. It was argued, that if the appellant did not enter the field of composition by submitting a tender, what did it matter to him, whose tender was accepted ; what grievance could he have, if the tender of the 4th respondents was wrongly accepted. The further point which was argued was that a person, whose tender was rejected, might very well complain that the tender of some one else was wrongly accepted, but, it was submitted that he could not be a person interested since he never tendered and was at no point of time in the field or put forward such a complaint. Such argument was observed by the Supreme Court to be misconceived and not be sustained and it has been observed that the grievance of the appellant, it may be noted, not that his tender was rejected as a result of improper acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents, but that he was differentially treated and denied equality of opportunity with the 4th respondents in submitting a tender. His complaint was that if it were known that non-fulfilment of the condition of eligibility would be no bar to consideration of a tender, he also would have submitted a tender and competed for obtaining a contract. But he was precluded from entering the field of consideration by reason of the condition of eligibility, while so far as the 4th respondent were concerned, their tender was entertained and accepted even though they did not satisfy the condition of eligibility and this resulted in inequality of treatment which was constitutionally impermissible. This was the grievance made by the appellant in the writ petition and there can be no doubt that if this grievance were well founded, the appellant would be entitled to maintain the writ petition. This was the grievance made by the appellant in the writ petition and there can be no doubt that if this grievance were well founded, the appellant would be entitled to maintain the writ petition. The question is whether this grievance was justified in law and the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondent was vitiated by any legal infirmity and it has also been observed that there can be no doubt that what para (1) of the notice prescribed was a condition of eligibility which was required to be satisfied by every person submitting a tender. The condition of eligibility was that the person submitting a tender must conducting or running a registered IInd Class hotel or restaurant and he must have at least 5 years experience as such and if he did not satisfy this condition of eligibility, his tender would not be eligible for consideration. This was the standard or norm of eligibility laid down by the 1st respondent and since the 4th respondents did not satisfy this standard or norm. It was not competent to the 1st respondent to entertain the tender of the 4th respondent. It is a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in (2) Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959)359 US 535: 3 L. Ed. 2nd 1012 where the learned Judge said: “An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged...... Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed... This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword. “This Court accepted the rule as valid and applicable in India in (3) A.S. Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 1975 (3) SCR 82 : (AIR SC 984) and in subsequent decision given in (4) Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, (1975) 3 SCR 619 : (AIR 1975 SC 331), Mathew, J., quoted the above-referred observations of Mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval. “This Court accepted the rule as valid and applicable in India in (3) A.S. Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 1975 (3) SCR 82 : (AIR SC 984) and in subsequent decision given in (4) Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, (1975) 3 SCR 619 : (AIR 1975 SC 331), Mathew, J., quoted the above-referred observations of Mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval. It may be noted that this rule, though supportable also as emanating from Article 14, does not rest merely on that article. It has an independent existance apart from Article 14. It is a rule of administrative law which has been judicially evolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary power by the executive authority. If we turn to the judgment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and examine it, we find that he has not sought to draw support for the rule from the equality clause of the United States Constitution but evolved it purely as a rule of administrative law. Even in England, the recent trend in administrative law is in that direction as is evident from that is stated at pages 540-42 in Prof. Wade's Administrative Law 4th Edition. There is no reason why we should hesitate to adopt this rule as a part of our continually expanding administrative law. Today with tremendous expansion of welfare and social service functions increasing control of material and economic resources and large scale assumption of industrial and commercial activities by the State, the power of the executive Government to affect the lives of the people is steadily growing. The attainment of socio-economic justice being a conscious end of State policy, there is a vast and inevitable increase in the frequency with which ordinary citizens come into relationship of direct encounter with State power-holders. This renders it necessary to structure and restrict the power of the executive Government so as to prevent its arbitrary application or exercise. Whatever be the concept of the rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his "The Law of the Constitution" or the definition given by Hayek in his "Road to Serfdom" and "Constitution of liberty" or the exposition set forth by Herry Jones in his" The Rule of Law and the Welfare State." there is, as pointed out by Mathew, J. in his article on "The Welfare State. Rule of Law and Natural Justice" in Democracy. Rule of Law and Natural Justice" in Democracy. Equality and Freedom "substantial agreement in juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found". It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial of some privilege on the facts before them the Supreme Court has also observed that admittedly the standard or norm was reasonable and non-discriminatory and once such a standard or norm for running a IInd Class restaurant should be awarded was laid down, the 1st respondent was not entitled to depart from it and to award the contract to the 4th respondents who did not satisfy the condition of eligibility. If there was no acceptable tender from a person who satisfied the condition of eligibility, the 1st respondent could have rejected the tenders and invited fresh tenders on the basis of a less stringent standard or norm, but it could not depart from the standard or norm prescribed by it and arbitrarily accept the tender of the 4th respondents. When the 1st Respondent entertained the tender of the 4th respondents even though they did not have 5 years experience of running a IInd Class restaurant or hotel. it denied equality of opportunity to others similarly situate in the matter of tendering for the contract. There might have been many other persons, in fact the appellant himself claimed to be one such persons, who did not have 5 years experience of terming a IInd Class restaurant, but who were otherwise competent to run such a restaurant and they might also have competed with the 4th respondents for obtaining the contract, but they were precluded from doing so by the condition of eligibility requiring five years' experience. The action of the Ist respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents, even though they did not satisfy the prescribed condition of eligibility, was clearly discriminary, since it excluded other persons similarly situate from tendering for the contract and it was also arbitrary and without reason. The acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents was, in the circumstances invalid as being violative of the equality clause of the Constitution as also of the rule of administrative law inhibiting arbitrary action. Then and secondly, reference was made by the appellant of this appeal, to the case of (5) Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, AIR 1976 SC 2602 , where the Supreme Court had occasion to consider Sections 4 and 117(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 and whether, the vesting under Section 4 would be absolute, including the further vesting in Gaon Sabba under Section 117(1), and has observed, that the estates first vest in the State under Section 4. The fulfilment of the purpose of the Act, the setting in which the cornerstone for the statutory edifice is laid and the categorical language used, especially “free from all encumbrances”, leave no doubt that this initial vesting is absolute and inaugurates the scheme of abolition. In Section 117(1) of the Act the expression 'vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation, while 'shall vest in the Gaon Sabba’ imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. The State has title to sustain the action of ejectment of the quondam Zamindar of the estate even in absence of Gaon Sabha. Aside from this, it can be said that the State is a person aggrieved and has the competence to carry an appeal against the dismissal of the suit even in absence of Gaon Sabha. Where a wrong against community interest is done, 'no locus standi' will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in court. Right of resumption of the Government from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be exercised in public interest will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. Where a wrong against community interest is done, 'no locus standi' will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in court. Right of resumption of the Government from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be exercised in public interest will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, It controlled by the State through directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to be divested without ado any time. Therefore, the State was entitled to appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant in this appeal, very heavily relied on paragraph 21 of the report, where it has been indicated that where a wrong against community interest is done, "no locus standi" will not always be a plea to non-suit and interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in Court and where the Supreme Court has also categorised the cases, where a person can be claimed to be or treated as a wrongdoer, whom the other person was chasing. On the basis of the above, it was claimed that the terms "locus standi" should be deemed to be and considered now as a broad concept. While on the point, further reference was made to the case of (6) Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 578 and more particularly to the observations that in order to have the locus 8tandi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person" . The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him and thus, it was claimed that there cannot be any doubt in the facts and circumstances of this case, that the appellant in this appeal, was certainly an aggrieved person or could be deemed to be such, and so his locus standi to maintain the writ proceedings cannot be questioned or could not be allowed to be questioned. 15. 15. Section 3 of the said Act, amongst others give definitions of "certificate debtor", "certificate holder" and "Certificate officer" and refers to the rules and forms contained in Schedule II or made under Section 39, Section 7, which deals with service of notice and copy of certificate on certificate-debtor, postulates that when a certificate has been filed in the office of a Certificate officer under Section 4 or Section 6, he shall cause to be served upon the certificate-debtor, in the prescribed manner, a notice in the prescribed form and a copy of the certificate and Section 8 prescribes, the effect of service of notice of certificate the effect that from and after the service of notice of any certificate under Section 7 upon a certificate-debtor - (a) any private transfer or delivery of any of his immovable property situated in the district in which the certificate is filed, or of any interest in any such property, shall be void against any claim enforceable in execution of the certificate; and (b) the amount due from time to time in respect of the certificate shall be a charge upon the immovable property of the certificate-debtor, wherever situated, to which every other charge created subsequently to the service of the said notice shall be postponed. On the basis of the contents of Section 8, it was claimed that even the transfer, which was sought to be given effect to through the blessings of the Court in this case, was thus, not proper and was void. Section 9 of the said Act make provisions for filing of petition, denying liability and Section 11 makes it clear, that a certificate filed under Section 4 or Section 6 may be executed by (a) Certificate officer in whose office the original certificate is filed or (b) the Certificate officer to whom a copy of the certificate is sent for execution under Section 12(i) and Section 12 makes provisions for transmission of certificate to another Certificate officer for execution. Section 13 indicates, as to when a certificate may be executed. Section 13 indicates, as to when a certificate may be executed. While Section 14 refers to the mode of execution as under: Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, a Certificate-officer may order execution of a certificate (a) by attachment and sale, or by sale (without previous attachment), or any property, or (b) by attachment of any decree, or (c) by arresting the certificate-debtor and detaining him in the civil prison, or (d) by any two or all of the methods mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c). While Section 20 states about the title of the purchaser and Section 22 postulates the cases where application can be made to set aside sale of immovable property on deposit, which are to the following effect: (1) Where immovable properly has been sold in execution of a certificate, the certificate-debtor, or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Certificate-officer to set aside the sale, on his depositing- (a) for payment to the certificate-holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, with Interest thereon at the rate of (six and a quarter) per centum per annum, calculated from the date of the (proclamation of sale) to the date when the deposit is made; (b) for payment to the purchaser, as penalty a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money, but not less than one rupee, and (c) for payment of the Collector (where the certificate is for a public demand payable to the Collector) such outstanding charges due to the (Government) under any law for the time being in force as the Collector certifies to be payable by the Certificate-debtor. (2) Where a person makes an application under Section 23 for setting aside the sale of the immovable property, he shall not, unless he withdraws that application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this section. While Section 23 make provisions for making application to set aside sale of immovable property on ground of non-service of notice or irregularity. We have made reference to the above provisions of the sections, since they were referred to and relied on by the appellant, apart from relying on the Rules which we indicate hereafter. 16. While Section 23 make provisions for making application to set aside sale of immovable property on ground of non-service of notice or irregularity. We have made reference to the above provisions of the sections, since they were referred to and relied on by the appellant, apart from relying on the Rules which we indicate hereafter. 16. Schedule-II Include the Rules made under Section 38 of the said Act and Rule 23 lays down that where the properly is immovable, no attachment need be made before sale and removable of attachment on satisfaction or cancellation of certificate has been dealt with in cases where (a) the amount due, with costs and all charges and expenses resulting from the attachment or any property or incurred in order to a sale, are paid to the certificate-officer, or (b) the certificate is cancelled in those cases the attachment shall be deemed to withdrawn and, in the case of immovable property, the withdrawn shall, if the certificate-debtor so desires, be proclaimed at his expense, and a copy of the proclamation shall be affixed in the manner prescribed by Rule 47(1). Rule 44 which deals with power to order sale of attached property indicates that any certificate-officer executing a certificate may order that any property liable to sale, or such portion thereof may seen necessary to satisfy the certificate, shall be sold. The proclamation of sale by public auction has been indicated in Rule 46 to the effect that (1) Where any immovable property, or any movable property exceeding forty rupees in value, is ordered to be sold by public auction, the Certificate-officer shall cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made in the language of the Courts of the district. (2) Such proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to the certificate-debtor, and shall state the time and place of sale, and shall specify as fairly and accurately as possible- (a) the properly to be sold ; (b) "where the property to be sold is an interest in an estate or in part of an estate paying revenue to the Government" the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate; (c) the amount for the recovery of which the sale is ordered, and (d) any other thing which the Certificate-officer considers it material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property. (3) Where a tenure, or a raiyati holding at fixed rates situated in an area in which Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, (VIII of 1885), is in force, is to be sold in execution of a certificate arrears of rent due in respect thereof, the said proclamation shall also state that the tenure or holding will first be put up to auction subject to registered and notified incumbrances, and will be sold subject to those incumbrances is the sum bid is sufficient to liquidate the amount specified in the certificate, and costs, and that otherwise it will, if the certificate-holder so desires, be sold on a subsequent day, of which due notice will be given, with power to annual all incumbrances. (4) Where an occupancy holding, situated in an area in which Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is in force, is to be sold in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect thereof, the said proclamation shall also state that the holding will be sold with power to annual all incumbrances; (5) Where the certificate-holder is a co-sharer landlord and the certificate is for his share of the rent only, the provisions of sub-rules (3) and (4) shall not apply. (6) For the purpose of ascertaining the matters to be specified in the proclamation the Certificate-officer may summon any person whom be thinks necessary to summon and may examine him in respect to any such matters and require him to produce any document in his possession or power relating thereto. (6) For the purpose of ascertaining the matters to be specified in the proclamation the Certificate-officer may summon any person whom be thinks necessary to summon and may examine him in respect to any such matters and require him to produce any document in his possession or power relating thereto. While Rule 47 prescribes the move of making proclamation to the effect that (1) every proclamation for the sale of immovable property shall be made at some place on or near such property by best of drum or other customary mode, and a copy of the proclamation shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and also upon a conspicuous part of the office of the Certificate-officer, (2) where the Certificate-officer so directs, such proclamation shall also be published in the Official Gazette or in a local newspaper, or in both; and the cost of such publication shall be deemed to be costs of the sale, (3) if a tenure, a raiyati holding at fixed rates or an occupancy holding situated in an area in which Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 (VIII of 1885), is in force, is to be sold in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect thereof, the proclamation shall also be published in the Malkachari or rent office of the estate and at the local thana, (4) Where property is divided into lots for the purpose of being sold separately, it shall not be necessary to make a separate proclamation for each lot, unless proper notice of the sale cannot, in the opinion of the Certificate-officer, otherwise be given and Rule 48 indicate. the time of sale by recording that sale in the case of property of the kind described in the proviso to Rule 15, no sale hereunder shall, without the consent in writing of the certificate-debtor, take place until after the expiration of a least thirty days in the case of immovable property, or of at least fifteen days in the case of movable property exceeding forty rupees in value, calculated from the date on which a copy of sale proclamation has been affixed to a conspicuous part of the office of the Certificate officer or in a case of immovable property in a conspicuous part of the properly whichever is later. 17. 17. Provided that if a tenure, a raiyati holding at fixed rates or an occupancy holding situated in an area in which Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is in force, is to be sold in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect thereof, the sale shall not; without the consent in writing of the certificate-debtor, take place until after the expiration of at least thirty days, calculated from (a) the date on which a copy of the sale proclamation has been affixed in a conspicuous part of the office of the Certificate officer, or (b) the date on which the sale proclamation has been published in the Malkachari or rent office of the estate and at the local thana, whichever is later. Rule 49 make provisions for purchase of property by the certificate-holder to the following effect: (1) No holder of a certificate in execution of which property is sold shall, without the express permission of the Certificate-officer, bid for or purchase the property. (2) Where a certificate holder purchases with such permission, the purchase-money and the amount due on the certificate may be set off against one another, and the Certificate-officer executing the certificate shall enter up satisfaction of the certificate in whole or in part accordingly. (3) Where a certificate-holder purchase by himself or through another person, without such permission, the Certificate-officer may, if he thinks fit, on the application of the certificate-debtor or any other person whose interests are affected by the sale, by order set aside the sale and the costs of such application and order, and any deficiency of price which may happen on the re-sale and all expenses attending it, shall be paid by the certificate-holder- (4) This rule shall not apply when the certificate-holder is the Central Government or (State Government) and Rule 52 which deals with restriction on bidding or purchase by officers says that no officer or other person having any duty to perform in connection with any sale shall, either directly or indirectly, bid for, acquire or attempt to acquire, any interest in the property sold. Rule 62 deals with sale of tenure or holding at fixed rates, subject to registered and notified incumbrances and Indicates that (1) when a tenure or a holding at fixed rates, situated in an area in which Chapter-XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 (VIII of 1885), is in force has been advertised under Rule 46 for sale in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect thereof, it shall be put up to auction subject to registered and notified incumbrances; and, if the bidding reaches a sum sufficient to liquidate, the amount of the certificate and the costs of the sale, the tenure or holding shall be sold subject to such incumbrances. (2) The purchase at such sale may, in manner provided by Section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and not otherwise, annul any incumbrance upon the tenure or holding, not being a registered and notified incumbrance. While Rule 64 deals with sale of occupancy-holding, with power to avoid all incumbrances stating that (1) when an occupancy-holding situated in an area in which Chapter-XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is in force, has been advertised under Rule 46 for sale in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect thereof, it shall be put up to auction and sold wish power to avoid all. incumbrances. incumbrances. (2) The purchaser at a sale under this rule may, in manner provided by Section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and not otherwise, annul any incumbrance on the holding and Rule 65 indicates that Rules 62 to 64 will not apply where the certificate-holder is a co-sharer landlord and the certificate is for his share of the rent only and Rule 66 deals with postponement of sale to enable certificate-debtor to raise amount due under certificate and indicates that (1) where an order for the sale of immovable property has been made, if the certificate-debtor can satisfy the Certificate officer that there is reason to believe that the amount of the certificate may be raised by the mortgage or lease or private sale of such property, or some part thereof, or of any other immovable property of the certificate-debtor, the certificate-officer may, on his application, postpone the sale of the property comprised in the order for sale, on such terms and for such period as he thinks proper, to enable him to raise the amount. (2) In such case the Certificate-officer shall grant a certificate to the certificate-debtor, authorising him, within a period to be mentioned therein and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 8 or Section 18, to make the proposed mortgage, lease or sale. Provided that all moneys payable under such mortgage, lease or sale shall be paid not to the certificate-debtor, but to the Certificate-officer: Provided also that no mortgage, lease or sale under this rule shall become absolute until it has been confirmed by the Certificate-officer, apart from the above Rules reference was made to Rules 71 and 72. Rule 7I deals with fresh proclamation before re-sale and indicates that every re-sale of immovable property, in default of payment of the purchase-money within the period allowed for such payment, shall be made after the issue of a fresh proclamation in the manner and for the period hereinbefore prescribed for the sale. While Rule 72 deals with bid of co-sharer to have preference layed down that where the property sold is a share of undivided immovable property, and two or more persons, of whom one is a co-sharer, respectively, bid the same sum for such property or for any lot, the bid shall be deemed to be the bid of the co-sharer. 18. 18. On a reference to the above Rules and interpreting and applying them to the facts of the present case, it was contended on behalf of the appellant in this appeal that those provisions were sought to be bye-passed, by having a private treaty legalised through the blessings of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which power, as stated earlier, the appellant of this appeal contended, the learned trial Judge had not only in respect of the 2 certificates concerned, but also in respect of the other certificates as mentioned in the impugned notice. 19. While on the question of jurisdiction of this Court, in the facts of the present case. or to have such a private treaty made effective through a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, reference was made to the case of (7) Anisminico Ltd. v. The Foreign Compensation Commission & Anr., (1969)1 All ER 208. On a reference to that determination, It was claimed that the decision of the learned trial Judge in this case was a nullity, because the action as sought to be given a stamp of legality, was without jurisdiction, the more so when by such action, when the necessary jurisdiction was not there the decision was made in a nullity. In that case, it has also been indicated that lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways and there may be cases where there may be an absence of the necessary formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the Tribunal having any jurisdiction embark on an enquiry, Or the Tribunal may in the intervening stage, while engaged on a proper enquiry, may depart from the rules of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong question; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. It was the specific submissions of the appellant in this appeal that in this case, admittedly the learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction and such jurisdiction as exercised, was with the statutory authority under the said Act and as such also the entire proceedings should be deemed to be a nullity. It was the specific submissions of the appellant in this appeal that in this case, admittedly the learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction and such jurisdiction as exercised, was with the statutory authority under the said Act and as such also the entire proceedings should be deemed to be a nullity. It was further pointed out that the views as expressed in the above case, have been followed in the case of (8) Shri M.L. Sethi v. Shri R.P. Kapoor, AIR 1972 SC 2379 , where dealing with "jurisdiction" under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it has been observed that the word is a verbal casts of many colours. Originally the word meant entitled to enter upon the enquiry question and in such primitive senses the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction has been reduced almost to vanishing points. Then, reference was also made to the case of (9) Official Trustee, West Bengal & Ors. v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 823 . where the Supreme Court was considering the powers of Court under Section 34 of the Trusts Act, 1882 and the effect of a clause in Trust, empowering the settlor to alter quantum of interest given to each beneficiary, 'by will alone' and the order made by a Court permitting the settlor to revoke that clause and to permit the said alteration being done by deed inter vivos. While considering the validity of the order it was held that the Court was not competent to pass such order and the Supreme Court has indicated that, a settlor of a trust reserved to himself the power to vary the terms and conditions of the Trust so far as they related to the quantum of interest given to each of the beneficiaries after the death of the settlor "by his instrument by will alone and in no other way or act". The settlor administered the trust property for sometime and thereafter thought of effecting by deed inter vivos certain changes in the trust. To enable him to do so he took out an originating summons on the original side of the Calcutta High Court under Chapter-XIII of the Original Side Rules of that court seeking primarily two reliefs viz. (1) to have the Official Trustee. To enable him to do so he took out an originating summons on the original side of the Calcutta High Court under Chapter-XIII of the Original Side Rules of that court seeking primarily two reliefs viz. (1) to have the Official Trustee. Bengal appointed as the Trustee in his place and (2) to empower him to alter the clause relating to variation of the quantum of Interest given to each of the beneficiaries by a deed inter vivos, What the settlor asked for was the court's permission to revoke the clause in the Trust deed empowering him to alter the quantum of interest given to each of the beneficiaries "by will alone" and in its place to confer upon him power to make the said alteration by deed inter vivos. The court in specific terms ordered the revocation and granted the authority sought for. On the question of the validity of the court's order it ha& been held that the said order was outside the jurisdiction of the Court. It was not merely a wrong order, or an illegal orders, it was an order which the court had no competence to make. It is not merely an order that the court should not have passed but it is an order that the court could not have passed and, therefore, a void order and the settlor had no power to appoint new trustees during his life time nor designate persons other than those already designated in the original Trust deed to act as trustees after his life time, apart from indicating that what is relevant is whether the court had the power to grant the relief asked for in the application made by the settlor. It cannot be disputed that if it is held that the court had competence to pronounce on the issue presented for its decision then the fact that it decided that issue illegally or incorrectly is wholly besides the point and before a court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide a particular matter it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit brought but must also have the authority to pass the orders sought for. It is not sufficient that it has some jurisdiction relation to the subject matter of the suit. It is not sufficient that it has some jurisdiction relation to the subject matter of the suit. Its jurisdiction must include the power to hear and decide the questions at issue, the authority to hear and decide the particular controversy that has arisen between the parties. On the basis of the effect of the observations as indicated above, it was further claimed that the judgment and order as impeached in this appeal, should thus be deemed to be or treated as a nullity. 20. It was further claimed on a reference to the writ petition and the prayers as made therein, that the order dated 2nd August, 1988 the particulars whereof, we have indicated earlier and whereby, a learned Advocate of this Court was appointed Receiver and M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. was directed to hand over a pay order of Rs. 3,083,612.89P. to the said Receiver was also without jurisdiction, since such order, was beyond the scope of the application. That being the position, the order as impeached, was further claimed to he a nullity and those submissions were sought to be supplemented and supported by the observations in the case of (10) Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 340 , where dealing with a decree passed with jurisdiction and observing the same to be a nullity, the Supreme Court has indicated that it is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and .wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. To establish that by the impugned order, the learned trial Judge really gave effect to a private treaty between two private individuals in a writ proceedings, reference was made to the affidavit of James Chow Wakin dated 29th November, 1988, where the deponent has stated and submitted that the present purchaser Trio Trend Private Limited and Super Solid Builders Private Limited agreed to purchase certain portion of the property and paid the entire consideration and deposited the amount with the learned Receiver by the order passed by the Hon'ble Justice Mrs. Pratibha Bonnerjea and not at the instance of the respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 duly submitted before the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta that one Manick Chand Damani was also willing to purchase the said property at a sum of Rs. 60 lacs and His Lordship was pleased to direct the respondent No.1 to inform the said Manik Chand Damani to attend the Court and to express his willingness to purchase the property but unfortunately the said Mr. Damani did not turn up. In all the cases the respondent No.1 never took any steps to sell the property at its own instance but on the contrary from time to time referred negotiation before the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta and tried to sell the property through the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta. The respondent company had or has reasonable belief that the price offered by M/s. Trio Trend Private Limited who is the tenant in respect of the portion going to be purchased by them and Super Solid Builders P. Ltd. have offered the actual valuation of the said premises and if the property is put for sale in auction the valuation of the said portion of the property cannot be exist more than Rs. 73 lacs. Apart from the valuation state and submit that no question for reauction can arise at all and the proceedings in which reauction was directed came to an end long before and the same have no existence at the present. 73 lacs. Apart from the valuation state and submit that no question for reauction can arise at all and the proceedings in which reauction was directed came to an end long before and the same have no existence at the present. Save as aforesaid each and every allegation made in the said paragraph is denied and disputed, apart from the submissions as indicated hereinbefore, it was claimed and contended that the interference as made by the learned trial Judge, was improper, irregular and a nullity since the certificate-holders were not duly impleaded and made parties. 21. We have indicated earlier the submissions made by the appellant in this appeal, on the question of locus standi and the maintainability of the appeal. It was further contended by him that such private treaty between the two individuals, as sought to be entered into or given effect to through the Court in its writ jurisdiction, was not only impossible, but the same was contrary to all norms even under the present Social Welfare system. It was further contended that if such effect as sought to be given in this case, to a private treaty between the two individuals, is allowed to be given effect to or acted upon, then the entire proceedings or the law relating to matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will be frustrated. While on his third submission as indicated earlier, the appellant in this appeal pressed the Division Bench judgment presided over by Chittatosh Mookerjee, C. J. (as His Lordship then was) and claimed that the learned trial Judge was bound by the said determinations and the effect of the said Division Bench judgment was totally misconstrued and misconceived and in passing the impugned order, on the face of the said Bench decision, the learned trial Judge had acted in gross violation of the powers of a learned Single Judge and against all existing norms and practice. 22. Mr. Aninda Mitra, who was assisted by Mr. Chatterjee, appearing for the subsequent purchaser viz. Super Solid Builders Ltd., referred to the face that the said Company had deposited with the Collector, the sums covered by the two concerned certificate cases and thus, there was no question or any occasion for the said premises to be reauctioned, in terms of the order of the learned Division Bench as referred to herein before. Super Solid Builders Ltd., referred to the face that the said Company had deposited with the Collector, the sums covered by the two concerned certificate cases and thus, there was no question or any occasion for the said premises to be reauctioned, in terms of the order of the learned Division Bench as referred to herein before. He further pointed out, on a reference to the affidavit of Beramala Dass, the Central Secretary of the Mazdoor Sangh, filed in December 8, 1988 in Matter No. 776 of 1988, that even though the said Company did not pay the subsistence allowance of the concerned 34 suspended workmen as alleged, under the proviso to Section 3 of the West Bengal Payment of Subsidence Allowance Act, 1969 or the Rules framed thereunder, necessary certificates, several in numbers, have been issued for the recovery of the arrears of subsistence allowance payable to the suspended 'workmen concerned from the said company. All those certificates, excepting Certificate No. 25-WL/78-79 for Rs.1,52,492.08 and Certificate No. 64-WL/81-82 for Rs.1,29,252,92, other certificates or non-payment or non-satisfaction thereof, could not be considered in the concerned writ proceedings, out of which the present appeal has been taken. In fact, he claimed that the total amount of certificate due under the two certificates as mentioned hereinbefore, would be about Rs. 2,80,745/- and the said amount, according to Mr. Mitra has been appropriately protected, on necessary deposits being made. To establish that such payments have been duly made, Mr. Mitra referred to the order dated 16th November, 1987, in Certificate Case No. 25-WL/78-79, to the following effect : Perused the marginal note. 23. In orchestration with the order of Hon'ble High Court or Mr. Justice Chittatosh Mookerjee and Mr. Justice Susanta Chatterjee in the Case i.e. Canton Carpentry Works Pvt. Ltd. a demand draft to the tune of Rs.2,80,745.00 (Rupees two lakhs eighty thousand seven hundred forty five) only is hereby sent to the R.O. 24. Perused also the challans showing payment or interest to the tune of Rs. 1,27,182.80 paise (Rupees one lakh twenty seven thousand one hundred eighty tow and paise eighty) only and the cost to the tune or Rs. 4938.10 (Rupees four thousand nine hundred thirtyeight and paise ten only). 25. Await confirmation of payment from R.O. i.e. Dept. of Labour Commissioner W.B. and credital challan from T. I-1 for interest and cost. 1,27,182.80 paise (Rupees one lakh twenty seven thousand one hundred eighty tow and paise eighty) only and the cost to the tune or Rs. 4938.10 (Rupees four thousand nine hundred thirtyeight and paise ten only). 25. Await confirmation of payment from R.O. i.e. Dept. of Labour Commissioner W.B. and credital challan from T. I-1 for interest and cost. In that view of the matter and more particularly on the pleadings appearing in this proceedings, it appeared that the appellant in this appeal has withdrawn the amount which was deposited by him, it was claimed and contended by Mr. Mitra that the entire proceedings as taken now by the appellant in this appeal was not only misconceived, but the same was mischievous too, apart from being made, in abuse of the process of the Court. It was further pointed out by Mr. Mitra, on a reference to the show-cause notice that the two certificates as concerned in this appeal, were not matters in issue in the show-cause notice and that being the position the steps as taken by the appellant in this appeal, was also improper. 26. Then, Mr. Mitra referred to Section 8 of the said Act, the provisions whereof, we have quoted earlier and claimed that on the basis of the same the said premises could be sold and such private transfer would not be prohibited under the Act. In support of such submissions, Mr. Mitra referred to the case of (11) Union of India v. Ratanlal Bhawalka & Ors., AIR 1978 Cal 164 , a single Judge judgment of this Court, where provisions of Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 and more particularly, Sections 4, 7 and 8 of the same were considered. It would appear from a reference to that case that the same had laid down that it is clear from Section 8(b) that the amount due in respect of the certificate shall be a charge upon the immovable property of the certificate-debtor wherever the property is situate. As soon as a certificate is issued and served, on and from the date of the service of the certificate under Section 7, immediately a charge is created on the immovable property of the certificate-debtor wherever the property is situated and it is not confined to the district where from the certificate proceedings have been started or served on the certificate-debtor. The effect of Section 8 is to give protection to the certificate holder in both types of cases in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 8. Both the sub-clause are not disjunctive but they are conjunctive. All soon as the notice is served the property is charged and the right of the certificate creditor is protected, apart from indicating that when a certificate duly made and filed in accordance with law has the force and effect of a decree. Non-service of the notice does not affect the validity of the certificate. Notice under Section 7 merely binds the immovable property of the debtor and prevents alienation and makes the certificate-holder simple mortgagee for all practical purposes. A private transfer is not absolutely void but void against any claim enforceable under this Act and there is no provision in the Act itself which gives relief or protection to a purchaser for value who has purchased for value without notice of the service under Section 7 of the said Act. As soon as a notice is served on the certificate-debtor the provision of Section 8 comes into operation automatically. As such whether the purchaser has purchased the property subsequent to the service of the notice under Section 7 whether without notice or not becomes immaterial. On the basis of the determinations, it was further claimed and contended by Mr. Mitra, that private transfer, as in this case, would not thus be prohibited under the said Act and the provisions of the Rules as framed under the said Act, would also empower the said Company to enter into or effect the same, as in this case, not only through the Court, but also through the powers as given to the Authorities under the said Act. There is no doubt that such power, to have a properly disposed of, for having the certificate dues satisfied, would certainly be with the certificate-debtor. but even then, we feel that such certificate-debtor should not be allowed to have a private sale, as in issue in the present case, confirmed or legalised through the High Court, in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If so advised, the said Company could have got the sale as sought to be effected in this case, entered into and confirmed before the Authorities under the said Act. 27. Thereafter, Mr. If so advised, the said Company could have got the sale as sought to be effected in this case, entered into and confirmed before the Authorities under the said Act. 27. Thereafter, Mr. Mitra claimed that even we accept the order as made and impeached in this appeal, to be a wrong one, but the exercise of the power so wrongly, would not make the order as made, without jurisdiction. It was his specific claim that even when such a wrong order is made by a Court having jurisdiction, the appeal Court will not be authorised to interfere with the concerned order and if at all, the appeal Court may interfere with an order made in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is without jurisdiction only. Mr. Mitra further claimed and contended that the points as sought to be urged in this appeal, were never agitated before the Certificate officer and regarding the availability of the same which according to Mr. Joyanta Mitra, made the order in a nullity, it was claimed that such points were also not taken earlier and if at all they have been taken in this appeal only and as such, the appeal Court will not also be empowered to consider those points. With due respect, we cannot agree with such submissions to Mr. Aninda Mitra. If the availability of alternative remedy or non-availability of the same is a matter in issue, the same can also be considered in an appeal even though such point was not agitated earlier as a point of law, In fact, it was claimed and further contended by Mr. Aninda Mitra that the appellant in this appeal did not make any appropriate application for the order, which he is praying now and on the basis of his application for intervention, the order as asked for now by the said appellant, cannot be made. 28. While on the question of the right of intervention of the appellant in this appeal. Mr. 28. While on the question of the right of intervention of the appellant in this appeal. Mr. Aninda Mitra claimed that the said appellant has really no locus standi to have his application for intervention allowed and maintained and he submitted that when the entire amount, covered by the two concerned certificates have been duly paid and admittedly, the said appellant has taken refund of the sum of Rs.45 lakhs as deposited by him, as purchase price from the Certificate officer, there was no cause for allowing him to intervene even though he has claimed not to have received poundage and other dues under the law and when such claim is in issue in another Writ proceeding, which is pending. It was further claimed that the heavy amount of Rs.61 lakhs as paid to the learned Receiver, affects either the owner or his client viz. the present purchaser, but such payment would not certainly prejudice anyone including the appellant in this appeal and that being the position, he will have no justification to have his claim considered on the basis of his application for intervention as filed. In fact, such application was claimed by Mr. Aninda Mitra, to be a misconceived and vexatious one. He admitted further that even though the learned Receiver has received her remuneration that would not also prejudice the appellant in this appeal and in that view of the matter, he cannot be allowed to urge such point of payment and/or excessive remuneration to the learned Receiver, as firstly, he has no interest and secondly, no such ground has been taken or agitated. Mr. Aninda Mitra further claimed that the appellant in this appeal, by his pleadings as disclosed in this proceedings, have tried and to some extent has been successful in prejudicing the Court and because of his conduct, be really deserves no sympathy of this Court. Mr. Aninda Mitra further pointed out that the first sale of the said premises was directed on 18th September, 1987, to be completed within two months time and within that time and more particularly on 18th November, 1987, the amount has been deposited and the refund of such amount has been taken by the appellant, although he has not specifically mentioned the date when he has withdrawn that money. He further claimed that as admittedly the appellant in this appeal, on his withdrawal, has received all the money as deposited by him he should not be allowed to have the process of this Court misused in be manner as he is trying to do. It was also contended that right of the appellant in this appeal, if any, has been lost, because he slept over the matter for two years and such conduct, would further establish, that he was not at all diligent. Mr. Mitra further contended that the conduct of the appellant in this appeal will have to be tested on the basis of the statements as made by him in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the petition filed on October 8, 1988, for intervention and it was his specific submission that he alleged willingness of the appellant in this appeal, as disclosed in paragraph 12 as mentioned above, which states that inspite of such willingness on the part of your petitioners to pay the total amount due in respect of the certificate including costs and interest, the respondent authorities with mala fide motive, issued the said Notice for a Sale proclamation without giving any opportunity to your petitioners. The respondents arbitrary and capriciously issued the said Notice without appreciating the facts in the premises, the said Notice dated January, 1988 is void ab initio and should be quashed and/or set aside, he will not be entitled either to intervene or to be added in the proceedings. Mr. Aninda Mitra further pointed out that there is no doubt or any dispute that the debts due on the two certificates as involved, have been duly satisfied and as such, he submitted that even on the basis of the Division Bench judgment as referred to hereinbefore, there would not be a case for reauction and as such also, the appellant in this appeal cannot claim any right to intervene or to be added as a party. 29. He further referred to the different provisions of the said Act, the particulars whereof, we have indicated earlier and applying them to the facts of the case before Division Bench. Mr. 29. He further referred to the different provisions of the said Act, the particulars whereof, we have indicated earlier and applying them to the facts of the case before Division Bench. Mr. Aninda Mitra claimed that the appellant in this appeal, has really misunderstood and misconstrued the effect of the said determination and there cannot be any question of reauction, even on the basis of the said Division Bench determination and really, such reauction was not at all intended by the Division Bench order. He, thereafter, referred to the order of the learned Additional District Magistrate (J), South 24-Parganas, Alipore, in Appeal Case No. 18 of 1985-86, which while allowing the appeal, directed the auction sale of the properties in question, to be set aside and that the certificate-purchaser will be entitled to refund of the purchase money according to law and thus directed the learned Certificate officer to put the properties to reauction according to law. It was further contended that the interpretation as sought to be given by Mr. Joyanta Mitra, of the Division Bench judgment as referred to hereinbefore, would lead to absurdity. 30. Mr. Aninda Mitra submitted that the determinations in the case of Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Supra), being a proceedings taken on the basis of a class action and not by any individual and by such proceedings, a wrong against the community was sought to be rectified, the said determination would not apply in this case. He submitted that the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. (Supra), would not also apply in this case, if paragraph 36 of the said report, which is to the following effect : It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) person aggrieved, (ii) stranger, (iii) busybody of meddlesome interloper, persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the past-time of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be more than spoking the vehicles of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold, is duly considered and construed and certainly on the basis of that determination, the appellant in this appeal, would not come in the category as Indicated therein, for maintaining his application for intervention and the said Appellant, according to Mr. Aninda Mitra, should be deemed to be, nothing but a busybody. Dealing with the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors. (Supra), Mr. Aninda Mitra claimed that the property in that case, for which tender was invited, was a public one and in fact for distribution of largess, there is no doubt that public has a right to participate, but such determination would certainly have any application in case of a private property of the present nature and more particularly when, the appellant in this appeal, has really got no concern and real interest in that property. 31. While on the question of locus standi, Mr. Aninda Mitra reiterated that the right to Participate in reauction being incohate right, the appellant before us had really no right in the instant case or the facts and circumstances are the same and particularly when, it was not their case that the said premises was sold, even though through the auspicious of this Court in its Writ proceedings at a lesser price. He pointed out that the entire area of land which was 69 cottahs, was sold for 61 lakhs and M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd., the clients of Mr. Roy Chowdhury, purchased 14.771 Cottahs for 12 lakhs. He pointed out that the entire area of land which was 69 cottahs, was sold for 61 lakhs and M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd., the clients of Mr. Roy Chowdhury, purchased 14.771 Cottahs for 12 lakhs. He further pressed paragraph 35 of the affidavit-in-opposition, which was filed in December, 1988 by Shri Beramala Dass, the General Secretary of Canton Carpentary Works (P) Ltd. Mazdoor Sangh, who are appellants in the other appeal, being Appeal No. 234 of 1989. for the purpose of indicating the claims of that Union and the valuation which they have made for the said premises and claimed that even at the price for which the same has been sold, the claim, at least of Rs. 61 lakhs of that Union, would be satisfied for the price which has been seemed through the disputed sale. 32. It was then contended and that too on a reference to the order made by A.K. Sengupta, J. on 2nd March, 1988, that the said learned Judge had also fixed the sale price of the said premises at Rs. 62 Lakhs and such price was fixed and by fixing such price, he directed the intending purchasers of the said premises to be ready and bring the money, but the said order could not be given effect to by the said learned Judge since the jurisdiction was changed thereafter and that being the position, the subsequent orders dated August, 1988, two orders, made on 2nd September, 1988, and the order dated 3rd October, 1988, were really passed with jurisdiction and not without jurisdiction, as alleged. In fact, Mr. Aninda Mitra claimed that the effect of the said order was that nobody could take away the money, meaning thereby the price as fixed and offend and in that way and manner, there was really protection given to all concerned and the money was absolutely secured. 33. Mr. Aninda Mitra further pointed out that in fact and in effect, the appellant before us, has not challenged the order dated 3rd October, 1988, by which his application for leave to be added and to intervene was rejected and that being the position, this appeal should also be treated as not bona fide and from the conduct of the appellant, it must be deemed to be a mala fide one. This was in fact, another limb of Mr. This was in fact, another limb of Mr. Aninda Mitra's argument for substantiating that the appeal was not maintainable. 34. Mr. Roychowdhury, appearing for the Respondent Trio Trend (P) Ltd., submitted that since 1977, his clients were tenants in respect of 14.771 Cottahs of land, including some structures, at a monthly rent of Rs. 8,000/- and they of course, entered into an agreement for sale with the said Company, for purchase of their holdings in 1986 and to establish that, he placed reliance on the letter dated 4th March, 1989 to them from M/s. Mukherjee & Biswas. Solicitors and Advocates, whereby they were informed that before A.K. Sengupta, J. it was indicated at the time or hearing on behalf of the said Company that his clients were interested to purchase certain portions of the said premises and had already entered into the necessary agreement and as such, their demarcated portions should be allowed to be sold on the basis of the price as agreed. Mr. Roychowdhury claimed and contended that his clients objected to the appointment of the Receiver, as made by the learned trial Judge and he made it specifically clear that his clients will have no interest in the proceedings, if it is made clear that the sale as directed, to be effected through the Receiver and by this Court now, should not include the portion which was or has been held by them. 35. Mr. Bachawat in his turn claimed that the appeal to be not maintainable, as the appellant before us, according to him, will not at all be affected by the order as made. While on the point, Mr. Bachawat referred to and relied on the determinations in the case of (12) Manindara Kumar Bose v. Biswanath Churiwalla & Ors., 89 CWN 1007, where. after quoting the observations of Lindley, L.J. in “re Securities Insurance Company", (1894) 2 Ch. 410 of the following effect: "I understand the practice to be perfectly well settled that a person who is a party can appeal (of course within the proper time) without any leave, and that a person who without being a party is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it, or is prejudicially affected by it cannot appeal without leave. It does not require much to obtain leave. It does not require much to obtain leave. If a person alleging himself to be aggrieved by an order can make out even a prima facie case why he should have leave he will get it but without leave he is not entitled to appeal", It has been indicated that the said dictum has been accepted by some of our Courts, apart from indicating that in the case of (13) The Province of Bombay v. Western India Automobile Association, AIR 1949 Bombay 141 Chagla, C. J. has observed that "But it is recognised that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal if he is affected by the order of the trial Court, provided be obtains leave from the Court of Appeal. Therefore, whereas in the case of party to a suit he has a right of appeal. In the case of person not a party to the suit who is affected by the order he has no right, but the Court of Appeal may in its discretion allow him to prefer an appeal" and such holdings and findings or applying those tests in this case, the appellant before us, cannot claim to be affected at all and as such, it cannot but be held that he has no right to maintain the appeal. For the purpose of establishing the object of the appellant before us, Mr. Bachawat referred to paragraph 18 of their petition before the learned trial Judge which states that your petitioner has been advised to intervene in the above application and to be added as a party so that your petitioner can being to the knowledge of this Hon'ble Court all the facts and circumstances which had taken place with regard to the sale of the said premises. It was his specific claim that such being the object and no appeal having admittedly been preferred from the order dated 3rd October, 1988, rejecting the application for intervention, this appeal was not also maintainable, the more so when, none of the rights of the appellant before us, have been affected. 36. It was Mr. It was his specific claim that such being the object and no appeal having admittedly been preferred from the order dated 3rd October, 1988, rejecting the application for intervention, this appeal was not also maintainable, the more so when, none of the rights of the appellant before us, have been affected. 36. It was Mr. Bachawat's further contentions that under the provisions of Article 226(1), which states that notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose and 226(3) which indicates that where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without - (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnish a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the Counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is to furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or. as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day stand vacated, the learned trial Judge had jurisdiction to make the order in the manner as has been done and if such view is accepted i.e. even such order was not without jurisdiction, this Court. as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day stand vacated, the learned trial Judge had jurisdiction to make the order in the manner as has been done and if such view is accepted i.e. even such order was not without jurisdiction, this Court. In appeal should not make any interference, however illegal or irregular the order as impeached, may be. In fact, by such submissions, he really agreed with the submissions as made by Mr. Aninda Mitra, the particulars whereof we have indicated earlier. It was his further submission that since the Courts have right to mould relief for the purpose of giving effective relief and assistance to the parties, in this case, the relief as prayed for by the said Company was appropriately moulded to make available to the parties, the necessary and effective relief. It was his submission that the certificate demands emanating from the two concerned certificates were required to be satisfied and by the sale of the said premises for the amount as indicated earlier, those two certificate demands or the demands arising out of those two certificate, have really been sought to be justified and such being the position, no interference should also be made by this Court. While on his submissions that relief can be appropriately moulded. Mr. Bachawat firstly, referred to the case of (14) M/s. Shiv Shankar Dal Mills etc. v. State of Haryana & Ors.etc., AIR 1980 SC 1037 . The dealers in that case had paid market fees at the increased rate of 3% (raised from the original 2 per cent) under Haryana Act 22 of 1977. The excess of 1 per cent over the original rate having been declared ultra vires by the decision of the Supreme Court, became refundable to the respective dealers from whom they were recovered by the market committee concerned. The demand for refund of the excess amounts illegally recovered from them not having been complied with they filed writ petitions under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution for a direction to that effect to the market committees concerned. The demand for refund of the excess amounts illegally recovered from them not having been complied with they filed writ petitions under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution for a direction to that effect to the market committees concerned. The Market Committees contended that although refund of the excess collections might be legally due to the dealers, many of them had in turn recovered this excess percentage from the next purchasers and on such basis it has been held that the procedure adopted in AIR 1976 SC 1152 in a similar situation may usefully be adopted and a scheme of refund by the market committees and redistribution to the next purchasers according to their claims has to be framed, apart from holding that Article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury, it is perfectly open for the court, exercising this flexible power, to pass such order as public interest dictates and equity projects and where public bodies under colour of public laws, recover people's moneys, later discovered to be erroneous levies the dharma of the situation admits of no equivocation. There is no law of limitation, especially for public bodies on the virtue of returning what was wrongly recovered to whom it belongs. Nor is it palatable to our jurisprudence to turn down the prayer for high prerogative writs, on the negative plea of “alternative resedue". Since the root principle of law married to justice, is ubi jus ibi remeduum. Then and secondly, reference was made by him to the case of (15) Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Madura Coals Ltd., 1987(2) CHN 349 , He made specific reference to paragraph 19 of that report which in the facts of that case indicates that the question having been raised for the first time in appeal cannot be considered and there was no material in that case to go into the question involved and the belated contention was contrary to the stand taken in the affidavit. The case was under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and the Court had the occasion to deal and with decide the question of "unjust enrichment by the assessee, and if and when the same can be extended in case of excise duly and the question or integrated price, if can be considered for the first time in appeal and the findings as indicated earlier were made rejecting the contention of integrated price. 37. Mr. Bachawat further submitted that under the Original Side Rules and the Rules framed by this Court for determinations of matters under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and more particularly under Rules 27, 30 and 53, which are quoted hereunder and in seriatim :- 27. No prayer for interim order shall be entertained in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without serving a copy of such petition along with all the annexures upon the Respondents to be bound by or affected by such interim order and without giving such party a reasonable opportunity to contest the same. Provided that if the respondent sought to be bound or affected by the interim order is the Andaman and Nicobar Administration or any person or authority ordinarily residing or having its office in the Islands, unless ten days' prior notice has been served upon such a respondent or anyone authorised by him to receive such notice along with a copy of such application or petition as the case may be, together with all documents in support thereof. Provided further that the Court may for reasons recorded, entertain the prayer for such interim order without such notice, in which case, a copy of the application along with all annexures in support thereof, shall forthwith be served by the petitioner, upon the Respondents against whom the interim order has been contained. 30 Every application for vacating and/or modifying any ex parte interim order shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be filed only upon previous notice to the petitioner in the writ petition and as and when an application is filed, it should forthwith be listed for hearing in the daily list under a special heading "Application for vacating ex parte interim order" and all endeavour should be made to dispose of such application at the earliest possible opportunity. 53. 53. Save and except as provided by these rules and subject thereto, the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings for issue of a writ; the learned Judge had jurisdiction to appoint a Receiver and even though such a Receiver is appointed and the appointment is not favoured by the Appeal Court, the Receiver can by asked to refund the money and as has been received on account of or by way of remuneration. He referred to the case of (16) Rokyabi v. Ismail Khan & Ors., AIR 1984 Karnataka 234, where provisions similar to Rule 53 of our Rules as quoted earlier, was considered and it was further considered whether Civil Procedure Code would be applicable in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that case, it has been observed that though the provisions of the C.P.C. are not made automatically applicable having regard to the Explanation to Sec.141 C.P.C. the provisions of the Rule made by the High Court under Article 226 and since the proceeding in that case were under Article 226 arises out of an application made under Section 48-A of K-L-R. Act, it is obvious that by virtue of Section 48-C of the Act, the concerned parties could make an appropriate application for an interim order of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver in respect of the lands which are the subject matter of the application made under Section 48-A of the Act. On the basis of such determinations, Mr. Bachawat contended that thus Civil Procedure Code would be applicable in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such, there was no illegality or any irregularity in the order appointing the learned Receiver. 38. On. a reference to the statements as made by the appellant before us, in his application and more particularly the statements as made in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 to 18, Mr. Bachawat claimed that the proceedings as sought to be initiated by the appellant before us, was nothing not a black-mailing and mala fide proceedings and in any event, there was no question or any right to have the said premises reauctioned. Bachawat claimed that the proceedings as sought to be initiated by the appellant before us, was nothing not a black-mailing and mala fide proceedings and in any event, there was no question or any right to have the said premises reauctioned. It was pointed out by him that either on the basis of the learned District Magistrate's order dated 3rd May, 1986 or more particularly when it has been recorded that it has already been seen that the property in question was sold by public auction without drawing up any sale proclamation which is a statutory requirement. This irregularity renders the sale void ab initio. 39. In the result, the Appeal succeeds. The auction sale of the properties is set aside. The Certificate Purchaser will be entitled to refund of the Purchase money according to law. The Id. Certificate officer is directed put the properties to reauction according to law, the appellant before us had no right as sought to be claimed now, the order as made was also not irregular. 40. While on the Court's power, in a case of the present nature and if we have the power to ask for refund of the money, which the learned Receiver has received on account of remuneration. Mr. Bachawat referred to the case of (17) in re: Mahaluxmi Cotton Mills Ltd. (In Liquidation), 66 CWN 747, which has indicated that the person to whom a Receiver owes money may apply in the suit in which the Receiver was appointed for a direction on the Receiver to make payments of his dues to him. It is up to the court either to adjudicate upon the rights of the properties on the application itself or to give leave to the applicant to sue the Receiver to establish his rights, if any, in that suit. Where the Receiver's liability is doubtful or debatable or depends upon investigation into complicated questions of fact the court in its discretion may choose the latter course. But that does not mean that the application itself is not maintainable and on that basis he claimed that if this Appeal Court wants, it can ask the learned Receiver to have the remuneration as received, to be refund. 41. Mr. But that does not mean that the application itself is not maintainable and on that basis he claimed that if this Appeal Court wants, it can ask the learned Receiver to have the remuneration as received, to be refund. 41. Mr. R.N. Das, appearing for the Respondent Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, placed the order dated 2nd March, 1988 as indicated earlier and which was made by A. K. Sengupta, J. and claimed that even on the basis of such order, the learned Court below had no jurisdiction to make the order as impeached in this appeal, more particularly when the said Court had neither any jurisdiction nor the said Company had any right to approach the said Court as there was ample and adequate alternative remedy under the said Act. He then referred to the grounds as taken in the writ petition and submitted that even on the ground as taken, the order for sale through the learned Receiver as was directed, was not proper and such order could not in any event be made in aid of the grounds as taken or the prayers as made In the writ petition. It was his further and specific submission that under Sec. 51 of the said Act, which make provisions for appeal, the learned Judge should not have interfered in the concerned proceedings, as those provisions for appeal and other proceedings as indicated therein, have not been taken. In fact, be claimed that Section 51 really provides for adequate, efficious and alternative remedy and the grounds as taken in support of the writ petition could have been taken and decided before or by the Certificate officer or competent authority, as the case may be. It was Mr. Das's specific submission and that too on a reference to the prayers in the writ petition that on the basis of such prayers, the learned Court below in any event, could not have directed the sale of the premises through the Receiver or in any manner whatsoever. In support of such submissions Mr. Das referred to the case of (18) Krishna Priya Ganguly etc. v. University of Lucknow & Ors. In support of such submissions Mr. Das referred to the case of (18) Krishna Priya Ganguly etc. v. University of Lucknow & Ors. etc., AIR 1984 SC 186 , where dealing with U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 and more particularly Section 28(5) and a Government order as indicated therein, so also the Rules made by Indian Medical Council for admission to Post-Graduate Course (1971), the Supreme-Court has observed that the High Court could not decide its own criterion and had no jurisdiction to introduce its notions in such academic matter and direct admission. In fact, it would appear that apart from the others, the High Court observed that the respondent appears to be a very dedicated worker having acquired a diploma and would have proved an invaluable asset to be Institution. We do not see any proper material for this conclusion to which the High Court has suddenly jumped apart from the fact that admissions were not to be given by the High Court according to its own notions. Finally, in his own petition in the High Court, the respondent had merely prayed for a writ directing the State or the college to consider his case for admission yet the High Court went a step further and straightway issued a writ of mandamus directing the college to admit him to the M.S. course and thus granted a relief to the respondent which he himself never prayed for and could not have prayed for. Such a gross discrimination made in the case of a person who had obtained lowest aggregate and lowest position seems to us to be extremely shooking. Although much could be said against the view taken by the High Court yet we would not like to any more then this that the High Court had made a very arbitrary, casual and laconic approach to the case and based its judgment purely on speculations and conjectures swept away by the diploma when in fact other candidates also had obtained diploma but that could not taken into consideration, because the rules did not so provide. 42. Mr. Das contended further that the submissions put forward by Mr. Bachawat, regarding the moulding of prayers, cannot be accepted in this case or the facts and circumstances of the same, since by such moulding, the nature and character of the proceedings have been sought to be changed, which is not permissible. 42. Mr. Das contended further that the submissions put forward by Mr. Bachawat, regarding the moulding of prayers, cannot be accepted in this case or the facts and circumstances of the same, since by such moulding, the nature and character of the proceedings have been sought to be changed, which is not permissible. It was then submitted by Mr. Das that the said Company came to this Court challenging the show cause notice and such challenge was not available to them, since they have not taken any point regarding the authority or jurisdiction of the authorities concerned, to issue such show cause notice. In support of his submissions or to supplement them, Mr. Das referred the observations in the case of (19) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shri Brahma Dutt Sharma & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 943 , where it has been indicated that where a show cause notice is issued to a Govt. servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the Govt. servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown, to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause is to afford opportunity of hearing to the Govt. servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Govt. to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the Govt. servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the Court before that stage would be premature. 43. On being asked, whether those points as sought to be urged by Mr. Das, were put forward or made known before the learned trial Judge, Mr. Das answered in the affirmative. Such fact, was of course, disputed by Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the said Company and he claimed that the Provident Fund Commissioner, has really accepted the order and they had not made any submissions before the appropriate Bench at the time of bearing or preferred any appeal. Das answered in the affirmative. Such fact, was of course, disputed by Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the said Company and he claimed that the Provident Fund Commissioner, has really accepted the order and they had not made any submissions before the appropriate Bench at the time of bearing or preferred any appeal. The points as indicated above, being really points of law and are available from the facts and circumstances on the records, we feel, they can be allowed to be argued and more particularly when, the contesting Respondent, even though has not filed any appeal, can be allowed to urge and agitate in this appeal, as, Respondent in the Appeal, either supporting or opposing the findings, if they are so advised. 44. Mr. P.K. Chatterjee, appearing for the Respondent Canton Carpentary Works (P) Ltd. Workers' Union, which according to him, represents about 120 employees of the total 210 employees of the said Company stated that the said Company had really their heydays and the total emoluments due to their employees would be about one lakh per month. It was submitted by him that the said Company has neither looked out nor closed their business officially and in accordance with law and as such, the above claim of the employees is a continuing and a recurring one and if the impugned order is allowed to subsist and is not set aside, those employees will be out in the streets, without following the due process of law, if that is at all permissible. In fact, he submitted, the attempt to have the said process in the dubious manner as involved, the said Company, has in fact tried and intended to frustrate the lawful demand/claim of their employees. It was pointed out by him that the amount involve on account of salary of the 120 employees would be about 40 lakhs upto September, 1988, have already become due and payable. This be claimed, was in addition to the claims of the remaining 90 employees, who are the members of the other Union i.e. the said Union. It was repeated and reiterated by Mr. Chatterjee, that if no interference is made and the said premises is allowed to be sold, in the manner as involved, the poor employees will not be paid and as indicated earlier, they will have to starve and suffer. It was repeated and reiterated by Mr. Chatterjee, that if no interference is made and the said premises is allowed to be sold, in the manner as involved, the poor employees will not be paid and as indicated earlier, they will have to starve and suffer. We also feel that whatever order we propose, we must also try and protect the interest of the poorer section of the litigants in this appeal viz. the employees. 45. Mr. Sunit Krishna Dutt appearing for the said. Union, who are appellants in the other appeal being Appeal No. 234 of 1989, which, we also intended to hear along with this appeal, claimed that his Union represents the balance of the employees concerned viz. 90 employees of the said Company. Apart from adopting the broad submissions as made by Mr. Chatterjee, Mr. Dutt submitted in case we make no interference with the order as impeached the effect would be, that the interest of the employees as a whole will suffer and the said Company, without duly paying the provident fund or other dues or such claims of the employees along with other claims will go cought free. Mr. Dutt also claimed that if we make any interference with the order as impeached and direct either reauction of the said premises or hearing of the writ proceedings on merits, the purpose of the said Union's appeal will also be served. 46. During the course of hearing of the appeals before us, M/s. Super Solid Builders viz. the subsequent purchaser, went in appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and we were served with the judgment and order dated 28th February, 1989, made in Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 9929 and 9439 of 1989. Whereby this Court was directed to bear out and dispose of the appeal before us, on merits, within four weeks. The appeals were taken up for consideration, but they could not be disposed of within four weeks, because of other continuing matters and adjournments taken by the parties. In the meantime, another order dated 16th February,1990, made in Civil Appeal Nos. 1199 and 1220 of 1990, arising out of Special Leave petition (C) Nos. 9929, 9439/89, from the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was served on us, whereby, we were directed to refund the sum of Rs. In the meantime, another order dated 16th February,1990, made in Civil Appeal Nos. 1199 and 1220 of 1990, arising out of Special Leave petition (C) Nos. 9929, 9439/89, from the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was served on us, whereby, we were directed to refund the sum of Rs. 61 lakhs along with interest to the said subsequent purchaser, if they ask for the same, out of the amount which was lying in deposit in the account, which was opened by the learned Receiver and it was also directed that such withdrawal will not affect the merit of the case. 47. After hearing the learned Advocates on receipt of the said order and so also the learned Receiver, it appeared to us that an amount of Rs. 62,26,188.72p was available with her in the concerned account No. 26504 with United Bank of India, High Court Branch. By our order dated 12th March, 1990, we have recorded that the entire deposited amount as available, was not appropriately informed to the Hon'bie Supreme Court of India and thus, if out of the amount as available, Rs. 61 lakhs with interest is paid to the said subsequent purchaser, then nothing will remain to be paid to M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd., for whom Mr. Roy Chowdhury is appearing. On consideration of the entries in the pass-book as produced by the learned Receiver, if appeared clear to us, that before encashment of the drafts as handed-over to her by the subsequent purchaser, she in fact withdrew about Rs. 3,24,180.00p on account of her remuneration at the fate of 5% as directed by the learned trial Judge. In fact, it also appeared to us that such amount was withdrawn by two cheques, first of which was for Rs. 1,74,180.00p by cheque dated 5th September, 1988 bearing No. 110441 and the second amount of Rs 1,50,000/- was withdrawn on 4th October, 1988 by Cheque No. 110442 and thus the said withdrawal of Rs. 1,74,180.00p was not taken out of the amount of Rs. 31 Lakhs as deposited on 6th September, 1988, but the Receiver's remuneration was taken, really out of the amount which was earlier deposited by the learned Receiver on receipt of the sum of Rs.3,83,612.89p. from M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and which was deposited by her on or about 10th August, 1988. 48. 31 Lakhs as deposited on 6th September, 1988, but the Receiver's remuneration was taken, really out of the amount which was earlier deposited by the learned Receiver on receipt of the sum of Rs.3,83,612.89p. from M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and which was deposited by her on or about 10th August, 1988. 48. On being asked, how the learned Receiver could take her remuneration of 5%, as directed by the learned Trial Judge for the said amount of Rs. 31 lakhs, when the draft in question, was not encashed on 5th September, 1988, she, appearing through Sri Harashit Chakraborty, informed that since the amount of Rs. 31 lakhs, through the. Bank Draft was handed-over to her and she was informed by an officer of the Bank that immediately such draft was deposited that would be encashed, she withdrew the money. It should be noted that the Draft covering Rs. 31 lakhs was drawn, not on United Bank of India, High Court Branch, but the same was drawn on Vaishaya Bank, Chittaranjan Avenue Branch, and not on the same Bank and as such, the said Draft could not be encashed on the same day. 49. The learned Receiver, even though took the stand that she was informed by an officer of the Bank that such Draft when presented, would immediately be encashed and she would be entitled to withdrew the money, she could not disclose the name of the officer concerned, which was required of her to disclose by an affidavit to which she agreed, but instead of that, she filed an affidavit dated 23rd March, 1990, disclosing that the learned Trial Judge allowed her to take 5% of Rs. 31 lakhs out of the pay order dated 2nd September, 1988 by way of her remuneration and hold the balance sum subject to further orders of the Court. It was her claim that the sale amount was a fixed one and the calculation of the remuneration on the sale amount was not dependent upon the deposit of .the entire amount on account of sale and/or consideration and as such, she was entitled, in terms of the order dated 2nd September, 1988, to deduct her remuneration out of the sale proceeds. She in fact, withdrew the said amount of Rs.3,24,180.00P., which could have been available to her on deposit of Rs. She in fact, withdrew the said amount of Rs.3,24,180.00P., which could have been available to her on deposit of Rs. 61 Lakhs ; and completion of the transaction, but withdrawals were made by her before the said amount of Rs. 61 lakhs were deposited through the drafts and encashed. The draft for Rs. 31,00,000/- was deposited on 5th September; 1988 and the same was encashed on the next day, but the remuneration of 5% was, as stated earlier, withdrawn on 5th September, 1983. It was her case that the pay order was nothing but a cash amount and any Bank would be liable to encash or honour it pay order issued by the same Bank or any other Bank and there cannot be any dispute and/or controversy to that effect and as such, the pay order should always be considered as cash money, It was her further case that with such bona fide belief, she withdrew the money, by two cheques from the Bank before the drafts were encashed and as she was entitled to deduct her entire remuneration out of the amount deposited by the subsequent purchaser and she also thought that she was entitled to deduct her remuneration and to deposit the balance amount with the Bank, subject to further orders of this Court. This stand as taken, appeared to us to be incorrect on consideration or the evidence as appearing from the paying in slips and the Pass Book of the concerned account. We fail to understand how and until the Bank Drafts, which were not on the same Bank, but on different Banks, could be encashed on the same day and how, before such encashments, the learned Receiver was entitled to deduct her remuneration. In fact, as indicated earlier. she has deducted her remuneration initially out of the money, not belonging to the said subsequent purchaser, but such remuneration has been taken out of the amount of deposited at the instance of M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. It should also be noted that for such depositing of the amount as received from M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd., the learned Receiver has also admittedly received her remuneration of 100 Gms from the said Company. The above is the position regarding the first Bank draft of Rs.31,00,000/- and same is also the position regarding the withdrawal of Rs. The above is the position regarding the first Bank draft of Rs.31,00,000/- and same is also the position regarding the withdrawal of Rs. 1,50,000/- on account of 5% remuneration from the second Bank draft of Rs.30,00,000/-. The draft was deposited on 4th October, 1988 and the same was encashed on 5th October, 1988. 50. We must also keep it on record that the learned Receiver produced Challan dated 30th March, 1989, showing that she has deposited Rs. 1,40,086/- with the Income-tax authorities through United Bank of India, High Court Branch, as self assessed tax. Shri Chakraborty also informed us on instructions that since this is the first time the learned Receiver has deposited the self-assessed tax, she has no permanent account number. 51. We feel that not only the remuneration as directed to be paid to the learned Receiver, was too excessive and unprecedented, but the way and manner in which the learned Receiver took out of her remuneration from the amount, lying in deposit with her on the account of M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd., was highly improper, such and Irregular apart from the fact, she could not have authorisedly withdrew/deduct her remuneration before the drafts are really encashed and the transaction was complete i.e. by execution of the necessary deed/document. The sale was not admittedly completed before the learned Receiver took out her remuneration and as such also, we feel that she acted rashly and Illegally. She, in our view, was not entitled to her remuneration until and unless the act, for which she was directed to be paid the remuneration, was complete. As stated earlier, we repeat and reiterate that the learned Receiver withdrew her remuneration before such completion of the act. While making our observation, we are also alive to the fact that the Court may grant to the Receiver such fee or commission or remuneration as it thinks fit and such remuneration may either be on percentage basis, or on the basis of gross sum. But one thing is certain that the amount as granted, should be reasonable and such test has not been satisfied in this case and for the duties which the learned Receiver has performed, the remuneration as directed to be paid was too heavy, excessive and unreasonable. 52. But one thing is certain that the amount as granted, should be reasonable and such test has not been satisfied in this case and for the duties which the learned Receiver has performed, the remuneration as directed to be paid was too heavy, excessive and unreasonable. 52. Above being the position, before deciding the appeals, which we have heard, we should first take the decision as to how the remuneration, which has been so rashly and irregularly taken by the learned Receiver, should be refunded. There would be no difficulty in having Rs. 1,40,086/- refunded from her or to get a refund of Rs.l,40,086/- which she has deposited as tax in the manner as indicated above. As such, we direct her to file a revised return, claiming refund of the said Rs. 1,40,086/-. Such revised return should be filed within two weeks from today and on such return being filed, we also direct the Income-tax authorities to deal with and dispose of the said revised return and. to have the said amount of Rs.1,40,086/- or such sum which would be refundable after some necessary deduction, be deposited to the learned Registrar, Original Side, forthwith. Regarding the balance sum of Rs.1,84,094/- we requested the learned Receiver to have the said amount refunded. But, she through her learned Advocate expressed her inability. Shri Chakraborty, although not satisfactorily, claimed that the entire amount has been spent by the learned Receiver and if at all, she can repay Rs. 25,000/-, if ordered. We feel that applying the tests and law as indicated earlier, such prayer, unless agreed to by the learned Advocate appearing for the other parties, cannot be allowed and since there has been no such agreement, the learned Receiver will have to refund the balance sum of Rs. 1,84,094/-. The payment of the remuneration in the instant case, in the words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, although expressed in Criminal Proceedings, we feel, is a rarest of the rare cases and if such remunerations are started to be paid to the learned Receivers, then the dignity and action of this Court in the appointment of the Receivers, will be jeopardised and bona fides, doubted in cases of the present nature. In fact, the necessary bonafide in the instant case, has already been doubted by many. In fact, the necessary bonafide in the instant case, has already been doubted by many. We direct the learned Receiver, to file by tomorrow" all in duplicate, the xerox copy of the Receipt dated 30th March, 1989 showing deposit of Rs. 1,40,086/on account of self-assessed tax, (2) the paying-in-slips showing the deposits made by her in S.B. A/c. No. 26504 and (3) the entries contained in the Pass Book for the said S.B. Account. 53. It must also be kept on record here that on 3rd April 1989, the learned Receiver had available with her a sum of Rs. 62,26,158.72P. including interest and in terms of the order as made by us, she opened a Fixed Deposit account with such account with the United Bank of India, for twelve months and the concerned receipt was kept with learned Registrar, Original Side and after the order of the Supreme Court, the sum as indicated earlier has been paid to M/s. Super Solid Builders, on premature encashment and the balance amount as available i.e. Rs. 6,38,85.22p. has been deposited with the learned Registrar, Original Side and he has again been directed to have the said sum invested in some short-time deposits with any Nationalised Bank. 54. On the basis of the facts which appeared from the pleadings and submissions as made, It would appear that the sale, so far as the said premises is concerned, has really a chequered career and even orders earlier made by this Court, have been frustrated. There is no doubt that certificate proceedings under the said Act, were initiated against the Company and ultimately, a Division Bench of this Court, by their order dated 18th September, 1985 and that too, by consent of the parties, made an order directing that the said premises should be sold in auction by the Certificate officer concerned, after following the necessary formalities under the said Act. Such sale was held on 18th November, 1985, wherein the Appellant in this appeal, was found and declared to be the highest bidder and he accordingly, deposited his bid amount, which was also received and accepted by the Certificate officer concerned and at that stage, one Nobo Kumar Kandoi moved this Court and he agreed to purchase the said premises for a specified amount. Such prayer of the said Shri Kandoi was allowed on 12th December, 1985, on completion on fulfilment of certain stipulations. Such prayer of the said Shri Kandoi was allowed on 12th December, 1985, on completion on fulfilment of certain stipulations. But, there were defaults committed by him and consequent thereto, the interim order as made, stood vacated and thus the sale in favour of the Appellant before us, was confirmed. 55. It would also appear that the Union concerned took out an appeal against the order made in favour of Shri Kandoi and after allowing them to be added, an order of maintenance of status qua for sometime, was made. 56. Against such order, again the Division Bench of this Court was moved, which was pleased to dispose of the appeal by directing that the concerned Union would be at liberty to pray for stay before the Appellant authority under the said Act and consequently, modified the earlier-order. After that, the Union concerned preferred an appeal before the Appellate authority under the said Act under Section 51, against the order dated 18th November, 1985, passed by the Certificate officer, for sale of the said premises and on 3rd April, 1986, an order was passed, allowing the appeal and consequently, setting aside the auction sale with further directions that the said premises, including buildings, plane and machineries be auction sold in accordance with law. 57. Such order was again challenged by the said Union in a Revisional Application to this Court, since they were claiming to be one of the certificate holders of the said Company and in that proceedings the Appellant in this appeal, was impleaded as a party Respondents. It would appear that a learned Division Bench of this Court, by their judgment dated 18th September, 1987, was pleased to modify the order of the Additional District Magistrate and disposed of the matter with certain directions. It has now been alleged before us that even after such order dated 18th September, 1987, made by the learned Division Bench, the certificate officer concerned has not taken expeditious steps for recovery or disposal of the said premises and it was the further allegation of the Appellant in this appeal that during the pendency of the proceedings in this Court, the said Company has agreed to sale the said premises in two lots viz. (1) one lot to M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and (2) the other lot to M/s. Manik Chand Damani. (1) one lot to M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and (2) the other lot to M/s. Manik Chand Damani. There has been a further allegation that the said Company has entered into two separate agreements dated 23rd September, 1986 and 9th October, 1986 respectively, although such was not the directions for having the said premises sold and that too, through private treaty, but the Division Bench as aforesaid, was of the view that the said premises should be sold in public auction in accordance with law. It was claimed that since the deposit, in terms of the Division Bench judgment were not duly made, so the order of the learned Additional District Magistrate stood confirmed or affirmed and as such also the said premises was required to be reauctioned. There is also no doubt that the Appellant of this appeal initially deposited their bid money, but thereafter he took refund of the amount as deposited and which was lying with the Certificate officer concerned. But it was claimed that he has not as yet been paid the poundage and other dues. On such facts, there was no dispute, but Mr. Bachawat appearing for the Company claimed that a separate writ proceeding is pending over that claim. But, one thing is certain, that in the proceedings, wherein the orders as indicated earlier were made the Appellant in this appeal, although was interested being the highest bidder in the open auction, was not made a party and it was his specific case that only on 29th September, 1988, for the first time, he came to know about the writ proceedings taken out by the said Company without impleading him although at all time, he was and still he is willing to purchase the said premises and interested in the same. It has been stated even inspite of such facts, the learned, Receiver, whose particulars we have indicated earlier, was appointed and the directions which have been given to her or the way and manner in which she has withdrawn Rs.3,24,180/-, would appear from the statements as recorded by us earlier, we have also indicated our views regarding such withdrawal of the money. 58. 58. One thing is further certain that the Appellant in this appeal, tried his best to have himself added in the proceedings or to intervene and to get some orders, for trying to protect his right, but failed, and ultimately this appeal was preferred on the basis of the leave granted on his oral prayer on 4th October, 1988, by a Division Bench of this Court and thereafter, an application was, ultimately filed and in the appeal, necessary stay of the impugned order was obtained. As a result of such impugned order, the learned Receiver, even though was directed to have the concerned deeds/documents executed within certain specified and stipulated time, could not execute them and as such also, we reiterate that even under the terms of the order, by which she was appointed the Receiver, she was not entitled to draw the remuneration as ordered. 59. Thus, on the basis of the pleadings, we should decide firstly, the question of maintainability of the appeal, as the locus standi of the Appellant before us, not only to prefer the appeal, but also maintain the same, was challenged. Then and secondly, we have got to find out and decide the propriety regarding the making of the impugned order, where by, the learned trial Judge has directed and ordered a private treaty between individuals, to be given effect to, in a writ proceedings and thirdly, whether by making such order or giving the directions as indicated, the learned trial Judge acted bona fide, since it was claimed that by such order, the determinations as made earlier by a Division Bench in C.O. No. 3644 of 1986, was sought to be frustrated. 60. The intention of the Appellant in this appeal, to auction purchase the said premises or that he was and is still willing to have the said premises on such purchase, cannot be doubted or disputed. He in fact, on being declared as the subsequent successful bidder, deposited the amount as indicated earlier but thereafter, he admittedly withdrew the same, presumably without prejudice to his rights and such being the position and more particularly when, such intention and willingness was known to the said Company, it was only expected of them to have the proceedings, out of which the present appeal has been taken, to have continued, confirmed and concluded the same in his presence. The way and manner in which the application of the appellant before us, for addition of himself in the proceedings was sought to be dealt with by the learned Judge, was also improper and we fail to understand, what was the haste, for which the proceedings, which was directed to appear on 7th September, 1988, was dealt with and disposed of much earlier than such date as fixed and more particularly on 2nd September, 1988, when the learned trial Judge was pleased to record that the subsequent purchaser, for whom Mr. Bidyut Banerjee appeared at that time, had handed over to the learned Receiver in Court on that date, a Pay Order of Rs. 31,00,000/- with Vaishya Bank Ltd., Chittaranjan Avenue Branch and gave directions on the learned Receiver to take steps in the matter. This undue haste and to have necessary orders passed before the date as fixed, was unexpected and cannot be explained, unless of course the said order was made with the intent to mislead all concerned, including the Appellant before us and to have such order in secrecy. In the facts and circumstances of the case and on the basis of the claims and counter-claims, it would have been better and which according to us should have been the appropriate steps to be taken by the learned Judge, to hear the Appellant in this appeal and if that was done, we feel that perhaps he would have no case to made out or to feel aggrieved by the steps as taken as he would have got an opportunity to bid for the said premises or at least to put forward his case. It will not be out of place to mention that while making the impugned order, the learned Judge failed to consider the fact that in the writ petition, there was no whisper or any evidence pleaded, regarding the earlier proceedings including the Division Bench judgment in the Civil Order proceedings as mentioned earlier and the learned Judge made the impugned order effecting the sale of the said premises through private treaty, when only the show cause notices as to why warrant of arrest for committing the petitioners in the writ proceedings, will not be issued in terms of Section 29 of the said Act, for dishonestly transferring, concealing and removing the portions of the immoveable properties and machineries of the said Company and refusing or neglecting to pay Government dues, as covered by different certificates which were issued. We further feel that if such sale through private treaty is allowed and that too, in the absence of interested parties then the course of justice will suffer and the same has really suffered in this case and the litigant public will be expected to loose faith in the judiciary. We of course, agree that if the challenges in the writ proceedings were due and proper, the learned Judge could have certainly directed stay of the concerned show cause proceedings, but the way and manner in which the said premises has been sought to be sold, could not in any event, be done or should not have been done and such sale fails to inspire the confidence and conscience of this Court. On the basis of the Division Bench judgment in the said Civil Order proceedings or on the basis of the records as produced before us, it cannot al this stage be held conveniently, that the Appellant in this appeal had or has no locus standi either to maintain the appeal or to have writ proceedings continued and completed in his presence. We make such observations on the basis of the observations as made in the cases which were referred to by the Appellant in this appeal or on his behalf. 61. While making this order as above, we have also, considered the import and effect of the provisions of the said Act as quoted, earlier. We make such observations on the basis of the observations as made in the cases which were referred to by the Appellant in this appeal or on his behalf. 61. While making this order as above, we have also, considered the import and effect of the provisions of the said Act as quoted, earlier. We really feel and that too on Interpretating and applying the provisions of the said Act and Rules as framed, thereunder, that by the Impugned order; the learned Trial Judge has sought to by-pass the incidents of the effect of them and to have a private treaty legalised through the blessings of this Court under writ proceedings, which power, She Appellant before us appropriately contended, the learned Trial Judge had no, had, not only in respect or the two concerned certificates, but also in respect of the other certificates, if necessary. 62. On the basis of the high authorities as cited at the Bar and on consideration of them, we also feel and observed that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to have the sale effected in the writ proceedings through private treaty and in the manner as the same was sought to be done and such jurisdiction, if at all, should have been allowed to be used and exercised by the statutory authorities under the said Act and that not having been done, the entire proceedings before the learned Judge became a nullity. We also keep it on record that the order which was made by the learned Judge in respect of M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd., through the appointment of a Receiver, was also improper. We repeat and reiterate that the learned Judge, through the impugned order, really gave effect to a private treaty between private individuals in a writ proceedings, which was improper and unauthorised and such giving of the effect to the sale through private treaty in a writ proceedings, was not only impossible in the facts of the case, but the same was contrary to all norms even under the present social welfare system and if such private treaty between the two individuals, is allowed to be given effect to or acted upon, the entire procedure or the law relating to matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will be frustrated. In fact by the order as proposed, the learned Judge has frustrated the order as made earlier by the Division Bench in the Civil Order proceedings. The position regarding the entering info private treaty for the sale of the said premises, perhaps could not have been a bar, if such sale was effected before the statutory Authority under the said Act, or with his sanction and with notice to the Appellant, as admittedly, he received a right in the facts of the case. In any event, such or any sale by private treaty could not get the stamp of legality through a writ proceedings and without notice or intimation to the Applicant in this appeal. If the impugned order is a nullity, which we have found or are of the view, so the submissions on behalf of the subsequent purchasers that this court should not make any interfere, as such order may be bad and illegal but the same would not be without jurisdiction will be of no substance. If an order is patently a nullity then the same is bound to be observed as without jurisdiction. If an order is prima facie a nullity then such point and so also the point of non-availability of the other remedies under the statute, we are of the view can well and very easily be agitated in appeal even though the same was not specifically urged or agitated in the initial proceedings, as a point of law. We feel that however remote the chances of success might be, the Appellant before us should have been given a proper and due hearing to his application for intervention in the facts of this case and without duly disposing of the same, the learned Trial Judge, should not have allowed the treaty concluded between the two private parties in a writ proceedings. By his application for intervention, the Appellant before us was only trying to have his right adjudicated and so also the proceedings, in his presence and he should have been given such opportunity, when admittedly, he approached this Court, immediately on receipt of the necessary information regarding the intention of the said Company, to have the said premises disposed of through Court and without any intimation to him. In the facts of the case, it cannot be agreed with the submissions of the said subsequent purchaser that the Appellant in this Appeal had or has no right to participate in the reauction or resale of the said premises and the appeal as filed, cannot be treated to be not bona fide, as claimed by the said subsequent purchaser. 63. On hearing Mr. Roy Chowdhury, appearing for M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and the pleadings and so also the records, we agree that the learned Trial Judge was not appropriately justified in appointing the learned Receiver over the demarcated portion of the said premises, which was in possession of the said M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and which they were holding since 1986 and more particularly. When, they had objected to the said appointment over the portion, which they were possessing. The learned Judge, if at all, could have directed sale of the portion of the said premises, which was in the possession of M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. 64. As pointed out earlier, it was one of the claims of the subsequent purchaser that the appeal filed by the applicant before us, was not maintainable, since on 3rd October, 1988, there were two orders passed by the learned Trial Judge and really, the appeal has been preferred against one of such orders. The memorandum of appeal indicates that the same was filed from order passed by the learned Trial Judge on 3rd October, 1988 and according to Mr. Mitra, appearing for the said subsequent purchaser, the said appeal was not really taken out against the order refusing leave to the applicant in this appeal to be added or to intervene. Mr. Joyanta Mitra disputed such submissions as put forward by Mr. Aninda Mitra and on a reference to the grounds of appeal indicated that they would, without any doubt, prove and establish that the appellant in this appeal, wanted to prefer and has preferred the appeal from both the concerned orders. In fact, Mr. Joyant Mitra further pointed out that the learned Trial Judge, by the order dated 2nd September, 1988, directed the matter to appear in the list on 3rd October, 1988 "for further orders" and on 3rd October, 1988, by one order, the deposit of Rs. In fact, Mr. Joyant Mitra further pointed out that the learned Trial Judge, by the order dated 2nd September, 1988, directed the matter to appear in the list on 3rd October, 1988 "for further orders" and on 3rd October, 1988, by one order, the deposit of Rs. 30,00,000/-, towards purchase price as made, was directed to be deposited by the learned Receiver with the concerned Bank and the learned Receiver was also directed and that too, strangely enough, to hand-over possession of the said premises to the subsequent purchaser and there was a further direction that the matter will again appear on 11th October, 1988, marked as "for orders". Mr. Joyanta Mitra further indicated that requisition for drawing up the orders dated 3rd October, 1988, whereby the application of the appellant before us, for leave to intervene or to be added as a party, was rejected, was given in time but one of the said orders and not the other has not as yet been drawn up or completed or certified copy of the some has been received. As such, reading the composite nature of the grounds as taken in the memorandum of appeal, it was Mr. Joyanta Mitra's specific claim that the appeal against the other order dated 3rd October, 1988 cannot be said to be barred and as such, this appeal against the said order is maintainable. He also claimed that since Sections 105 and 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or arising therefrom, so also, this appeal, cannot be said to be not maintainable on the grounds as stated by Mr. Aninda Mitra and which was also supported by Mr. Bachawat. Such submissions were sought to be supplemented by Mr. Joyanta Mitra on a reference to Rule 53 of the Rules framed by this Court for determinations of applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and which Rules states that "save and except as provided by this Rule and subject thereto, the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) in regard to the suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings for issue of a Writ". On the basis or the said Rule 53 thus, there cannot be any doubt that the provisions of Sections 105 and 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable in this proceedings. There is no doubt and as pointed out by Mr. Aninda Mitra that the said Company all throughout took the stand that they were ready and willing to pay the total amount of dues in respect of the certificates including costs and interests and as such, they, by an agreement agreed to sale of a part of the said premises for a consideration of Rs. 60,00,000/- and inspite of such willingness on their part, the Respondent authorities issued the concerned notices for sale and sale proclamation, without giving them any opportunity and as such, the action as sought to be taken, was void, apart, from being mala fide. It was also pointed out that the further and specific case of the said Company was that they had buyers in the market, who were interested to purchase the said premises at lease for a sum of Rs.75,00,000/- and in such circumstances, it would not be lawful and justified to sale the same through certificate proceedings and as such, all action, which was taken, was void and malafide. Mr. Joyanta Mitra, in our view, duly distinguished the cases as cited at the Bar and after hearing the parties, we are of the view that in all fairness and for ends of justice and more particularly when, his client was and still is willing to purchase the premises and that fact was known to the said Company, he should have been given an opportunity and the attempt of the said Company to have the sale of the said premises as sought to be entered and completed in the manner as indicated hereinbefore and without any notice to the appellant in this appeal, was improper and not bona fide. 65. Above being the position, two courses are open to us while allowing this appeal i.e. either to remand the matter back to the learned trial Judge, who is presently having jurisdiction over these matters, for a decision in accordance with law, after hearing the appellant in this appeal, on being added to the Writ proceedings or to have the auction sale effected afresh by the statutory authority under the said Act, after duly complying with the necessary formalities. We think that the second course as pointed out and suggested by us, is the best one, on the points as involved and more particularly when, the fact that the said Company was and is willing to have the property sold, is not in doubt. The said premises should thus be put to public auction sale by the authorities under the said Act. There is no doubt that a part of the property consisting of 14,771 cottahs and some construction was claimed to have been sold to M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and balance, to the said subsequent purchaser, for the values as mentioned earlier. That being the position, we think that it would be just and proper if the said premises is put to sale through two separate public auctions, one auction for the portion which has been claimed to have been purchased by M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and the other portion by the said subsequent purchaser. So far the portion, which was purchased by the said subsequent purchaser, the reserve price should be kept at Rupees 61 lakhs and the portion which has been claimed to have been purchased by M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd., the reserve price should be kept at 12 lakhs and we keep it on record further that if M/s. Trio Trend (P) Ltd. becomes the highest bidder in the said auction, the prices which they have already paid to the said company, should be adjusted against the price, which will be fetched in the auction. 66. Apart from the above, we direct that within two weeks from today, the learned Receiver should file a revised return and within six weeks thereafter the Income-tax authorities are requested to refund, either Rs. 1,40,000/- which has been deposited as indicated earlier or a portion of the same with the learned Registrar, Original Side, as would be found on necessary adjudication and the balance amount of the remuneration of the learned Receiver, as withdrawn in the manner as indicated earlier, should have to be refunded by her, as it was specifically claimed by all the learned Advocates for the parties, excepting those appearing for the learned Receiver if at all, would be entitled to her remuneration on completion of the deed/transaction and not otherwise. 67. 67. With the observations as above, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders as impeached and consequent to our findings as above, we also set aside the writ proceedings, holding the same to be not maintainable as other available statutory remedies have not been availed of and exhausted. As a result of our findings, the other appeal is also disposed of without going into the merits of keeping all points open. There will be no order as to costs. 68. All parties including the learned Receiver and the Income tax authorities and so also the learned Registrar, Original Side are directed to act on a signed copy of the ordering portion of the judgment as indicated above. 69. It should be noted that the said Company, through their affidavit dated 24th March. 1990, filed by John Chow Wachung asked for the following directions :- (a) Appellant/Petitioner be directed to deposit a sum or Rs.61,00,000 with the Receiver within a week from the date of the order to be made herein, (b) Alternatively the sale of the portion of the said premises being No. 14, Radhanath Choudhury Road, Calcutta to Trio Trend (P) Ltd. and Super Solid Builders (P)Ltd. be confirmed and the appeal be dismissed with costs, (c) The appellant be directed to pay the interest on the claimed amount under the Certificate proceedings being Rs. 29,14,539/- aggregate since the date of appeal to the date of the payment of the provident fund dues out of the sale proceeds, (d) An interim order of stay of all further proceedings in connection with the instant appeal, (e) An interim order of stay of all further proceedings in a connection with the original cases as referred in Annexure ‘A' to. the petition, (f) An ad interim order in terms of prayer, (d) and (e) above, (g) Such further or other Order or Orders be made and/or direction be given as to this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper. Such directions were asked for by the said Company stating that inspite of their best efforts and honest intention, they could not pay the provident fund dues, administrative charges and other dues amounting to a sum of Rs. Such directions were asked for by the said Company stating that inspite of their best efforts and honest intention, they could not pay the provident fund dues, administrative charges and other dues amounting to a sum of Rs. 29,00,000/- and on the other hand, received several certificate proceedings as well as notices directing them to show cause as to why the orders for committing their authorities to civil prison should not be issued, apart from receiving a notice for settling a sale proclamation whereby, they were informed that the total amount which became due and payable in respect of the Certificates including costs was Rs. 29,14,539/- and they were further, informed that in execution of the certificates, a sale will be held of their properties at premises Nos. 12, 14 and 16, Radha Nath Choudhury Road, Calcutta-15. 70. It was claimed that against such purported action, this Court was moved. The happenings and other relevant facts which arose out of the said proceedings, have been indicates earlier. It was stated by them that in terms of the necessary directions as given the said Company secured intending purchaser Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd., who as indicated earlier, offered a sum of Rs.61,00,000/- and another purchaser i.e. Trio Trend (P) Ltd., who elected to purchase another portion of the said premises for a sum of Rs. 12,00,000/-. But before the execution of the necessary deed of conveyance, the appellant in this appeal challenged the order as impeached. In fact, it was claimed that the said appeal was intended against the order refusing the application to intervene, It has been stated that not only the said application for intervention but also in this appeal, the appellant has indicated that he was and still how he is interested to purchase the said premises. Reference has also made to the earlier Division Bench order as made in this appeal, staying the operation of the order as made by the learned trial Judge, as a result whereof, the sale of the said premises, according to the said Company, could not be finalised and no amount could be paid out of the said sale proceeds on the account and different heads as indicated earlier. 71. 71. It has also been pointed out that for non-payment of provident fund dues, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner has initiated and is initiating several Criminal proceedings against the Directors of the said Company and regularly taking steps to send them to Police Custody. The lists of pending Criminal proceedings, which are may in number, have been disclosed as Annexure-A to the present application. It has also been stated that in Case No.C 646 to 650 of 1988, the learned First Judicial Magistrate. Sealdah has already passed an order for imprisonment of Mr. J.C. Wakin, Managing Director of the said Company, for non-payment of the Provident Fund dues and even on the statements as made that payments on account of Provident Fund dues have not as yet been made because of proceedings taken in this Court. It was the case of the said Company that they could have paid the entire Provident Fund dues and could pray for an order for permanent stay of the Criminal proceedings, but unfortunately, due to the action taken by the applicant in this appeal, the said Company could not pay the entire Provident Fund dues out of the sale proceeds of the said premises. 72. It has also been stated that as pending appeal has continued for sometime and it is expected that further time will be required since M/s. Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd. have moved an application for Special Leave before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, for withdrawal of the deposit made by them. So the orders as asked for in this application and the particulars whereof, we have quoted earlier, should be made, and more particularly when under orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the said Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd. have actually withdrawn Rs.60,00,000/- on account of the deposit as made by them under orders made by this Court on 12th March, 1990. Really, the said order was made on the basis of the order which was passed on 16th February, 1990 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, whereby the appellant M/s. Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd. was permitted to withdraw the amount along with the interest thereon, on allowing their appeals. Really, the said order was made on the basis of the order which was passed on 16th February, 1990 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, whereby the appellant M/s. Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd. was permitted to withdraw the amount along with the interest thereon, on allowing their appeals. By the said order it was also directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that since the matter is pending before this Court, no firm opinion was expressed on the merits of the case and such withdrawal as directed, will not affect the merits of the same. 73. The said Company has stated that if the said premises is put up for sale again, there may not be any buyer of the same and as a consequence thereof, they will lose the bona fide, ready and intending purchaser like M/s. Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd., who had already deposited a sum of Rs.91,00,000/- or more. It has been alleged that the applicant in this appeal, is not at all ready and willing to purchase the said premises at a sum of Rs. 61,00,000/- and will back out, immediately when and if the property is put up for sale again. 74. Mr. Joyanta Mitra, who was appearing for the appellant in this appeal, denied such allegations and specifically informed the Court that his client at all material times was ready and still is ready and willing to purchase the said premises. It was further stated by him that the order for withdrawal of Rs. 61,00,000/- on account by M/s. Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd., has been directed by this Court on the basis of an order made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and in such proceedings, the said Company was a party and they took no exceptions to the order of refund as was directed to be made. It was his further submission that if any such order as has been asked for now, is required to be made or obtained, this Court will have no power and if so advised, the said Company should move the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India for appropriate orders and directions. The fact that the said Company was present in the proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, of India, wherein, the order for withdrawal was made, could not be disputed by the learned Advocate appearing for the said Company. The fact that the said Company was present in the proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, of India, wherein, the order for withdrawal was made, could not be disputed by the learned Advocate appearing for the said Company. We agree with the submissions of Mr. Joyanta Mitra that when the refund has been directed or has been made and then taken by the said. M/s. Super Solid Builders (P) Ltd. without any exception on the basis of an order made by this Court, which was made in compliance with the order as made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, so this Court, at this stage, cannot entertain the prayers as made in this application and if so advised, such order may be obtained from the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and we further feel that the order which we have proposed earlier, is not prejudicial to anyone, since we have kept reserve prices for the two lots of the said premises, whereby the prices as fetched for those portions, have been sought to be protected. With the observations as above, the application of the said Company is also dismissed. There will be no order as co costs. Guin, J.: I agree.