The only question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the appellant against the order of his removal from service. Before dealing with the question of law. the facts giving rise to this appeal may be briefly stated. The appellant, Tarasankar Chakravarty, as, plaintiff, filed a suit in the Court of the Munsiff, Karimganj against the Union of India, the Divisional Organiser, North Assam Division, and the Commandant, XXVIII, S.S.B. Bn. Haflong challenging the order dated 23rd June, 1977 passed by the Commandant of the Btn. removing him from service. The case of the plaintiff was that he was appointed to the post of Link Clerk by the Commandant of the XXIII Btn. S.S.B. Siang. In course of time, his appointment was duly approved and confirmed by defendant No. 2. He was later transferred to XXVIII Btn. S.S.B. at Haflong where the defendant No.3 was Officiating Commandant. It was alleged that as the defendant No. 3 did not have good relations with the plaintiff, he used to harass him without any reason. He was put under suspension with effect from 4.6.77 and ultimately removed from service vide order dated 23.6.77. The grievance of the plaintiff was that the order of removal was illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, without jurisdiction and against the procedure and, as such, null and void. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed : Is the suit maintainable in law? Is there any just and proper cause for removal of the plaintiff from his service ? Is the plaintiff entitled to have the declaration sought in the suit ? The plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the impugned order of removal was null and void and for cancellation of the same and for reinstatement with payment of his salary with interest. Before the trial Court though the maintainability of the suit was also one of the issues, it was not pressed by the defendants. On merits, the trial Court found that the plaintiff was confirmed in the post which he was holding at the time of removal. In course of the trial, the defendants could not adduce any evidence in support of the impugned action of defendant No. 3. On merits, the trial Court found that the plaintiff was confirmed in the post which he was holding at the time of removal. In course of the trial, the defendants could not adduce any evidence in support of the impugned action of defendant No. 3. The trial Court observed that defendants failed to show that the removal of the plaintiff was done in accordance with due procedure established by law arid therefore arrived at a finding that the defendant No.3 acted arbitrarily and illegally in removing the plaintiff-appellant from confirmed service. In view of the aforesaid finding, the trial Court decided issue No.2 in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. An appeal was preferred by the defendants before the Assistant District Judge, Karimganj against t e said order. The judgment of the trial Court was challenged not only on merits but also on the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the fact that there were provisions for appeal and revision in the relevant Service Rules governing the plaintiff. The learned Assistant District Judge, on hearing t e parties, affirmed the findings of the trial Court on merits and held that the procedure laid down in the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (hereinafter CRPF Rules) was not complied with in removing the plaintiff from service. However, as regards the jurisdiction of civil Court, the Assistant District Judge observed that as there were provisions for appeal and revision in Rules 28 and 29 of the CRPF Rules, the plaintiff was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil Court without availing the remedies provided under the said Rules. It was, therefore, held that the suit was not maintainable. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court were set aside. The plaintiff has come up in appeal before this Court against the aforesaid order of reversal passed by the Assistant District judge. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, there is a concurrent finding of both the Courts below that the, removal of the plaintiff-appellant was not made after following the procedure laid down in the CRPF Rules, and as such it was illegal. This finding has not been challenged by the defendants. This is an appeal by the plaintiff. This finding has not been challenged by the defendants. This is an appeal by the plaintiff. The only point for determination is whether the appellate Court was justified in non-suiting the appellant-plaintiff merely on the ground that he had approached the civil Court without exhausting the remedies available to him by way of appeal or revision under Rules 28 and 29 of the CRPF Rules. The determination of this question would depend upon the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The submission of Mr. S. K. Senapati, learned counsel for the appellant is that under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, hereinafter 'the C.P.C.' the civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except those which are expressly or impliedly barred. It is submitted that in the instant case as there was no provision in the Service Rules excluding the jurisdic­tion of the civil Court; the civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. Mr. Sk. Chand Mohammad, the learned Senior Central Govt. Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that exclusion of the jurisdiction in this case is implicit from the availability of remedy by way of appeal and revision to higher authorities under the relevant Service Rules. Counsel further submits that the suit is not maintainable also on the ground that contract of personal service cannot be enforced. I have carefully considered the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties. So far as the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Courts is concerned, it is well settled that such exclusion is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion must either be explicit, or clearly implied. It is equally settled that even if the jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil Court can still examine cases where the provisions of the statute have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Non-compliance of the pro­visions of the statute, however, means non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, the defect in procedure must also be fundamental, In either case, the defect must make the order invalid in law and void. Non-compliance of the pro­visions of the statute, however, means non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, the defect in procedure must also be fundamental, In either case, the defect must make the order invalid in law and void. (See Secretary of State vs. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 PC 105, Firm of lllnri Sabbayya Chetty & Sons vs. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 322 ; and Dhulabhai vs. State of VI.P. AIR 1969 SC 78 ) Equally recognised is the proposition that, the mere fact that a special statute provides for certain remedies does not, by itself, necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters covered by the said statute (See Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons vs. State of A. P., supra). These principles were analysed by the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai vs. State of M P., AIR 1969 SC 78 and it was reiterated, inter alia (as proposition No.l) that the jurisdiction of the civil Court would not be excluded in cases where tue provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Dealing with the effect of availability of remedies provided by the statute it was observed in Dhulabhai, supra, that where there is no express exclusion of the remedies by way of civil suit it may be necessary to see the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. This aspect was dealt with again by the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 where considering the principles governing the jurisdiction of the civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute, the Supreme Court laid down (as proposition No.2) that if the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. This aspect was further dealt by the Supreme Court recently in Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava vs. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 752 . The following proposition was laid down- "Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common-law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provides a machinery for the enforcement of the right both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil courts' jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil courts' jurisdiction, then both the common-law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence.", (emphasis supplied) All the aforesaid decisions were discussed by a Full Bench of this Court in Daulatram Lekbani vs. State of Assam. (1989) 1GLR 131 [1989 ( l)Gl J 37] where four general principles or propositions were st ted which govern a case where there is an exclusion clause. One of the proposition which is also relevant for the present purpose is that the bar would not operate if the conduct shows that the entire proceeding was illegal and without jurisdiction. It is thus clear that availability of remedy by way of appeal and revision under the relevant Service Rules, by itself, is not sufficient, in the absence of any exclusionary clause, to infer exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It is thus clear that availability of remedy by way of appeal and revision under the relevant Service Rules, by itself, is not sufficient, in the absence of any exclusionary clause, to infer exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The jurisdiction of the civil Court, in such a case, would depend upon the existence of the conditions indicated above. If the civil Court has jurisdiction in the matter, either because the authority has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, the availability of remedy by way of appeal or revision will not act as a bar to the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The remedy under the Rules, in such a case, will be concurrent leaving open to the aggrieved person to choose one of them. Before applying the aforesaid proposition of law to the facts of the present case it may be appropriate also to deal with the second submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service can be granted by the civil Court and, that the civil Court could not have entertained the suit in the present case even on that count. I have carefully considered this submission. There is no dispute about the proposition that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service is normally granted. But this rule is not absolute and is subject to certain well recognised exceptions. As observed by the Supreme in S. R Tewari vs District Board, Agra, AIR 1964 SC 1680 (at page 1682) this rule is subject to the following well-recognised exceptions : "It is open to the Courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. Similarly under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The Courts are also invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if oy making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do." To the same effect arc the decisions of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 and Sirsi Municipality vs. Cecelia Kom Francis, AIR 1973 SC 855 . All these decisions were reviewed at length by the Supreme Court in the Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College vs. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1976 SC 888 and on consideration thereat, it was observed: "...a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognized exceptions-(i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provision of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the industrial law ; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute." The instant case admittedly falls in the exceptions recognised by the Supreme Court. In that view of" the matter, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents on this count is not sustainable. In the light of the foregoing discussions, it is to be seen whether in the instant case the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The admitted position is that there is no provision in the CRPF Rules which expressly bars the civil Court's jurisdiction. In the light of the foregoing discussions, it is to be seen whether in the instant case the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The admitted position is that there is no provision in the CRPF Rules which expressly bars the civil Court's jurisdiction. The only contention of the respondent is that the exclusion of tne jurisdiction should be inferred from the fact that remedy by way of appeal or revision has been provided against the impugned order of removal from service under Rules 27 and 28 of the CRPF Rules. I have carefully considered the submission. The finding of both the Courts below in the instant case is that the provisions of the relevant Rules were not complied with by the respondents while removing the plaintiff from service. In effect the finding is that the fundamental principles of judi­cial procedure applicable in such cases were not fallowed by the respondents. That being so, as observed by Privy Council in Secretary of State vs. Mask & Co, AIR 1940 PC 105, 110 and reiterated by the Supreme Court in principle No. 1 in Dhulabhai, supra, the civil Court's jurisdiction shall not be excluded. So far as the remedy by way of appeal or revision available to the plaintiff under the Service Rules is concerned, it is clear from the fore­going discussion that in the absence of any express bar to the jurisdiction of the civil Court, exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court, exclusion of the jurisdiction cannot be inferred from the mere availability of remedy by way of appeal or revision. This view is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles, supra. In such cases, as observed by the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava, supra, both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the parsons of inherence In the instant case the admitted position is that there is no express provision in the rules exuding the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The contention of the respondents is that it should be inferred from the fact of availability of remedy provided in the Service Rules by way of appeal or revision. Such an inference, as indicated above, is not possible in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The contention of the respondents is that it should be inferred from the fact of availability of remedy provided in the Service Rules by way of appeal or revision. Such an inference, as indicated above, is not possible in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Besides, this objection has become more or less academic in view of the concurrent findings of both the Courts below that the fundamental principle of judicial procedure as that itself is enough to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court in the matter. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Assistant District Judge dismissing the suit on the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the case, are set aside. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are restored. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.