RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THESE two Writ Appeals are presented against the order of the learned single judge (reported in 1990 (1) Kar. L. J. 252) dismissing the two Writ Petitions presented by the Appellant (common Appellant in both the Writ Appeals), in which, the appellant had challenged the legality of the demand of property tax by the Corporation of the City of Bangalore, from the Appeliant in respect of the properties, in which, the appellant was only a lessee. ( 2 ) THE facts of The case, in brief, are these : The main contention of the petioner/appeilant is that, in respect of the properties, in respect of which, taxes are demanded from the appellant, he was only a lessee and therefore, in view of section 112 of the Karnataka Municipal corporations Act, 1976 (in short 'the act'), the primary liability to pay tax was on the lessor and therefore, the demand of property tax from the appellant was without authority of law. The above contention was negatived by the learned judge who dismissed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner/appellant has presented these two appeals. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the question of law, arising for consideration, it isnecessary to set out the basis facts. There existed a bui galow and a vacant site in Kempegowda Road. Bangalore. The bungalow was titled 'manorama' bearing Municipal Corporation No. 12. Apart from that Bungalow, there was also a vacant land, on which, the owners were running a petrol bunk. The land around including the buiiding 'manorama' as also the land on which the petrol bunk was situate were leased by its owners in favour of the appellant by lease deed dated 1 -6-1959 (Annexure ' A' ). The bungalow was described in Schedule 'a' of the lease deed and the land on which the petrol bunk was situate was described in Schedule :b' thereof. The relevant clauses of the agreement are these :"clause (3) ; The period of the lease shall be a period of 20 years, certain from the date these presents. Clause (5) : The lessors agreed to pay the Corporation tax payable on the building as it exists now, i e. , as on a monthly rent of Rs. The relevant clauses of the agreement are these :"clause (3) ; The period of the lease shall be a period of 20 years, certain from the date these presents. Clause (5) : The lessors agreed to pay the Corporation tax payable on the building as it exists now, i e. , as on a monthly rent of Rs. 1801/- (Rupees one thousand eight hundred and one) and all other charges and taxes payable to the State Corporation, Local Bodies or otherwise, or towards power lighting, water licence charges or any enhanced corporation tax shall be paid by the lessee themselves. Clause (6) : The lessors further agree that the lessees shall be at liberty during the subsistence of this lease to make such alteration, additions, changes or other structures (without in any way impairing the safety of the premises as may be necessary for the purposes of using the premises as a Boarding and lodging Establishment and shall also be at liberty to put-up such structure as they may deem profitable in the portion metioned as Schedule 'b' herein below. XX XX XX clause (12): The lessees shall be at perfect liberty during the period of the subsistance of the lease to continue to do their business of boarding and lodging Establishments in the premises but the lessees shall not without the consent in writing of the lessors sublease in full the whole of the property hereby demised or assign their rights as under the lease deed to any other person or persons. " ( 4 ) AS can be seen from the above clauses, the lease was for a period of 20 years in the first instance. According to clause (5), the lessor agreed to pay corporation Tax payable on the building as it existed at the time of lease. According to Clause (6), the appellant/lessee was permitted to put up constructions. According to Clause (12), the appellant was also at liberty to sub-lease the property with the consent of the lessors. ( 5 ) IT is common ground that theperiod of lease had been extended for another period of 15 years. During the currency of the lease, the appellant put up constructions on the vacant land (Schedule 'b' property) and sub-leased those premises in favour of three persons. ( 5 ) IT is common ground that theperiod of lease had been extended for another period of 15 years. During the currency of the lease, the appellant put up constructions on the vacant land (Schedule 'b' property) and sub-leased those premises in favour of three persons. It is not disputed that the sub-lease in favour of three sub-lessees was for a period of more than one year. The Competent authority of the Corporation made assessment of tax on the three sub-leased properties on the basis of the annual rental value. Aggrieved by the said assessment, the Appellant took the matters in appeal before the Standing Committee of the Corporation in the year 1981. As at the relevant point of time, the Corporation council had been superseded and an administrator was put in charge of the corporation, he was exercising the powers of the Standing Committee. The appeal was taken up by him for disposal. The two contentions urged before the Administrator was (1) that the annual rental value had not been correctly fixed and (2) that the revision of assessment was excessive. The Administrator heard the counsel for the appellant who appeared before him and he made the following order :"proceeding OF THE ADMINISTRATOR DATED 23-12-1981 exercising THE POWERS OF THETAXATION and Rl APPEALS COMMITTEE : subject No. TAC 233/80-81 : Mis. Chidambaram and Bros. , No. 19/3, Broadway Complex, Kempegowda Road, bangalore-9. Heard the Counsel for the appellant. His main contention is that as he is not getting the rent on the basis of which the A. R. V. is fixed, from his sublessees, he is not in a position to pay the taxes himself and he will have to collect extra taxes over and above the rent on which he has leased it out, from his sub-lessees as per Section 112 (6) of the KMC Act, 1976. He has also requested that a detailed order may be given so that basis he could approach his sub-lessees for giving him the difference. The A. R. V. has been fixed on the basis of the actual rents received from sublessees as per the tenant declaration, as follows : 1. M/s Mahtani's Dept. Stores Rs. 4,175-25 2. M/s. Mysore Saree Emporium. . . . Rs. 1,000-00 3. M/s. Jevan Cellar. . . . Total. . . . Rs. 4,000-00 Rs. The A. R. V. has been fixed on the basis of the actual rents received from sublessees as per the tenant declaration, as follows : 1. M/s Mahtani's Dept. Stores Rs. 4,175-25 2. M/s. Mysore Saree Emporium. . . . Rs. 1,000-00 3. M/s. Jevan Cellar. . . . Total. . . . Rs. 4,000-00 Rs. 9,175-25 the other point made out was that the revision of assessment cannot be brought into effect restrospectively. This is supported by the Act and hence the revision of assessment on the basis of the New A. R. V. to be brought into effect from 01-04-1980. "thereafter, the appellant has presented two Writ Petitions before this Court. ( 6 ) IN support of the contention that the appellant was not primarily liable to pay the tax, learned counsel for the appellant relies on the Judgment of the supreme Court in National and Grindlays bank Ltd. , v Municipal Corporstion for Greater Bombay (A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1048 ). Learned counsel submits that section 146 of the Bombay Municipal corporation Act was pari matria with section 112 of the Act and in the said case, the Supreme Court held that when a premises had been leased and the lessee had constructed a building at his own cost in respect of the Corporation Tax on the property so leased the primary liability to pay the tax was on the lessor. The contention of the lessor (owners) of the property that the primary liability was on the lessee was rejected. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the ratio of the said decision, it should be held in the present case also that the primary liability to pay the tax is on the lessor and not on the appellant who is a lessee. ( 7 ) IN our opinion, the case on handis clearly distinguishable from the case considered by the Supreme Court as this case falls squarely under Sub-section 2 of section 112 of the Act. ( 7 ) IN our opinion, the case on handis clearly distinguishable from the case considered by the Supreme Court as this case falls squarely under Sub-section 2 of section 112 of the Act. Section 112 of the Act reads :"section 112 : PROPERTY TAX FROM whom AND WHEN PAYABLE ; (1) subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the property tax shall be primarily payable as follows, namely: (a) if the premises ara held immediately from Government or the corporation, from the actual occupier thereof : (provided that the property tax due in respect of premises owned by the government and occupied by any person on payment of rent, shall be payable by the government ; provided further that no property tax shall be payable in respect of premises owned by the Corporation and occupied by any person on payment of rent ;) (b) If the premises are not so held (1) from the lessor if the premises are let ; (ii) from the superior lessor if the premises are sub-let ; (iii) from the person in whom the right to let the premises vests, if they are unlet. (2) If any land has been let for any term exceeding one year to a tenant and such tenant or any person deriving title howsoever from such tenant has built upon the land the property tax assessed upon the said land upon the building erected thereon shall be primarily payable by the said tenant or such person whether or not the premises be in the occupation of the said tenant or the petson, (3) The property tax shall be paid by the person primarily liable within sixty days after the commencement of every half-year according to Section 112 (1) (a) of the act, the primary liability to pay the tax in respect of a building belonging to the government or Corporation is that of the occupier, but in respect of a premises held by any person other than the Government or Corporation, according to clause (b) of Section 112, the primary liability to pay the tax on the property would be on the lessor if the premises are let and from the superior lessor if the premises are sub-let or from the person in whom the right to let the premises veses, if they are unlet. Therefore, if the appellant had taken a building on lease and had subleased the said building in favour of another parson there would have been force in the contention of the appellant that he would not be primarily liable to pay the tax and that such liability would be that of the lessor. ( 8 ) THE undisputed facts of this caseas stated earlier is that, two properties were taken on lease under the lease dated 1-6-1959 and out of them, Schedule 'a' property consisted of a building whereas schedule 'b' property consisted of vacant land on which a petrol bunk and some structures were in existence. According to clause (6) of the Lease Deed, the lessor undertook the liability to pay corporation tax on buildings existed on the land on the date of Lease only so long as the building remained as they were. As far as Schedule 'b' was concerned, in the lease deed, the appellant had acquired a right to put up new structures. Accordingly, three buildings which are the subject matter of property tax in this case were constructed by the appellant and he had sub-leased those premises to one person and the said sub-lease inturn further sub-let the premises in favour of three persons. In our opinion, in a case like this, provisions of sub-section (2) of section 112 gets attracted. According to the said provision, if any land has been let for any term exceeding one year to a tenant and such tenant or any person deriving title howsoever from such tenant has built upon the land, the property tax assessed upon the said land and upon the building erected thereon shall be primarily payable by the said tenant or such person whether or not the premises be in the occupation of the said tenant or such other person. It is not disputed that it is the appellant who put up the construction on 'schedule 'b' property'. Therefore, in view of sub-section (2) of Section 112 the primary liability to pay tax is on the appellant who put up the said construction. It is not disputed that it is the appellant who put up the construction on 'schedule 'b' property'. Therefore, in view of sub-section (2) of Section 112 the primary liability to pay tax is on the appellant who put up the said construction. It is true that sub-section (3) of section 146 of the Bombay Municipal corporation Act is in parr materia with section 112{2) of the Act, but, as could be seen from paragraph 4 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in National and grindpays Bank Ltd. , v Municipal corporation for Greater Bombay, the supreme Court observed that "it is specifically stated that admittedly the present case do not fall under Section 146 (3)" and therefore, the primary liability was placed upon the lessor. The present case, however, squarely falls under sub-section 2 of Section 112 of the Act and therefore the primary liability to pay the property tax on the building in question is upon by the appellant. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant submitted that if it were to be held that the primary liability to pay the property tax on the building in question is on the appellant as he was receiving only a small amount of rent than the actual rent which the sub-lessee is receiving from these to whom he has further sub-let the premises, the appellant would be entitled for reimbursement as provided under subsection (6) of Section 112 of the Act. ( 10 ) WE do not express any opinionon the said question. That is a separate right which the appellant, according to him, he is entitled to exercise, under subsection (6) of Section 112 of the Act in separate proceedings. In the result, we make the following order : the Appeals are dismissed without expressing any opinion on the right of the appellant for reimbursement under subsection (6) of Section 112 of the Act. Writ Appeals Dismissed. --- *** --- .