JUDGMENT - T.D. SUGLA, J.:---This is an appeal by the State of Maharashtra against the judgment and order dated 20th December, 1980 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alibag in Land Acquisition Reference No. 2 of published in the months of September 1973 and April 1974. Special Land Acquisition Officer (for short the L.A.O.) awarded compensation by taking the fair market value of the land at Rs. 6,000/- per acre. In reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the trial Court accepted the applicants contention that the compensation awarded at the rate of Rs. 6,000/- per acre was inadequate and that it would be reasonable to award compensation taking the fair market value of the land at Rs. 500/- per guntha, i.e. Rs. 20,000/- per acre. Accordingly, he awarded an additional amount of compensation of Rs. 9.236/- and additional soletium of Rs. 1.385/- totalling to Rs. 10, 621/- with interest at the rate of 4% per annum on the amount of the compensation from the date of award till realisation. 2. It is the case of the State that the instance of acquisition cited by the claimant was not comparable and that the instance given by the Government, even though of the year 1980, were in fact comparable. It was argued that the additional compensation granted by the learned Judge was not justified and was in any event highly excessive. Shri Limaye, the learned Counsel for the claimant, on the others hand, on the others hand, strongly relied on the judgment of the learned Judge. 3. The trial Court has considered the entire evidence on record at great length in paragraphs 10 to 19 of his judgment. It may be true that the instance of acquisition cited by the claimant of 2 ½ gunthas of land out of Survey No. 26/3/4-A in the year 1964 was not really comparable. It, however, cannot be forgotten that facts in no two cases are going to be identical. What is to be borne in mind is whether the facts in two cases are broadly similar and whether the difference in the facts has been taken due note of. Considering the impugned judgement in this background, the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court appears to be quite reasonable. The Judge has taken due note of all such the suit land in the year 1973. Considering the impugned judgement in this background, the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court appears to be quite reasonable. The Judge has taken due note of all such the suit land in the year 1973. For instance, he has taken due note of the facts that as against acquisition of 2½ gunthas of land in that case, the land required in this case is about 26 gunthas and that though there is a gap of about 9 years between the acquisition of that land and the land in the instant case, no material was produced to show that the land price had gone down during the intervening period. As regards three sale instances given by the opponent State, the Judge rightly held that they could not form the basis for holding that the compensation awarded was adequate and proper. In this regard, the Judge noted that the lands involved in those cases were away from the suit land which had a distinct advantage of frontage of Pen Khopoli Road. He also noted that compensation at the rate of Rs. 600/- per guntha for some land out of the survey number from which the suit land was granted by competent Court. Accordingly, I am in agreement with the trial Court that the fair market value of the suit land required to be and was taken at Rs. 500/- per guntha. 4. As regards Nazarana, it is seen that question is covered by this Court's Full Bench decision in (State of Maharashtra v. Shrimant Govindrao Narayanrao Ghorpade)1, A.I.R. 1985 Bom. 336 in favour of the Government. Accordingly, it is held that the learned Judge was not justified in granting the relief to the claimant. The amount on account of Nazarana is required to be deducted from the amount of quantum of compensation and, therefore, should be deducted. 5. Further, Shri Limaye contended that the claimant was entitled to a higher rate of interest in view of the insertion of sub-section (1-A) in section 2 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with effect from September 1984. 5. Further, Shri Limaye contended that the claimant was entitled to a higher rate of interest in view of the insertion of sub-section (1-A) in section 2 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with effect from September 1984. Fairly admitting that the applicant had not filed an appeal and/or cross-objection, but placing strong reliance on Rule 33 of Order 41 Shri Limaye stated that the trial Court was enjoined to pass a decree or order as it ought to have passed and adjust that rights of the respondents even though the respondent is had not filed appeal of cross-objections. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in (Choudhary Sahu (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Bihar)2, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 98, Smt. Mutalik stated that the object of Rule 33 was to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. As the power under his rule was in derogation to the general principle that a party could not avoid a decree against him without filling an appeal or cross-objection, she contended that such a power was to be exercised with care and caution. She also relied on this Court's decision in (Smt. Padmadevi Shankarrao Jadhav and others v. Kabalsing Garmilsing Sardarji and others)3, A.I.R. 1985 Bombay 357. That was a case under Motor Vehicle Act. An amount was awarded as quantum of compensation on the finding of negligence by the tribunal. The original claimants had appealed against the quantum. The respondents had not come up in appeal nor filed cross-objections but claimed that no amount by way of compensation was payable as the finding given by the Tribunal about negligence itself was perverse. Following the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, this Court held that the opponent having not filed any appeal or cross-objections, it was not open to him to challenge the finding of negligence. Lastly she relied on another Supreme Court decision in (Mahant Dhangir and another v. Madan Mohan and others)4, 1987 (Supp.) S.C.C. 528. On behalf of the respondent an attempt was made to distinguish the decisions relied upon by Smt. Mutalik. Lastly she relied on another Supreme Court decision in (Mahant Dhangir and another v. Madan Mohan and others)4, 1987 (Supp.) S.C.C. 528. On behalf of the respondent an attempt was made to distinguish the decisions relied upon by Smt. Mutalik. While it was admitted that the respondent had other remedies available for claiming enhanced rate of interest, it was urged that it was only fair that he should not be unnecessarily dragged into further Iitigation when this Court has power under rule 33 of Order 41 to grant necessary relief particularly as it was a case of lis between the State and the citizen. If the respondent was entitled to enhanced rate of interest, there was no justification why it should not be granted merely because no appeal or cross-objections were filed. 6. Since Shri Limaye had in the first instance relied on amendment brought about in Rule 33 with effect from 1976, reference may usefully be made to the rule as it stood before and after its amendment in 1976. Order 41, Rule 33 reads as under: "The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection (and may, where there have been decree in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any or the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees.)" The bracketed portion was inserted in 1976. The result of the amendment is that 'power' contemplated in the rule may also be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees in the following two cases, namely,- (i) where there have been decrees in cross-suits, or (ii) where two or more decrees are passed in one suit. I am not able to appreciate how does the amendment supports Shri Limaye's contention. I am not able to appreciate how does the amendment supports Shri Limaye's contention. Therefore, the power of the Court will have to be exercised with reference to Rule 33 as it stood althrough, Supreme Court decision in A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 98 (supra), in my view, governs the issue squarely. Supreme Court, in that case, reiterated its earlier view taken in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1874 wherein it was stated that the rule did not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which had become final merely because the Appellate Court did not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from. The ratio of the decision, in my judgment, is that when a party allows a decree of the Court to become final by not appealing or filling cross-objections against the decree, it would not be open to another party to the litigation whose rights in the appeal are not otherwise affected to invoke the powers of the Appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 33. All the same, it stands to reason that Order 33 enables the Court of appeal to do justice in appropriate cases though it does not confer any right on the parties who have allowed the decrees of the lower Court to become final. In other words, where in a suit there are, say, four plaintiffs and a decree is passed and the appeal has been filed by one of them impleading other plaintiffs as respondents, the Court, in the event or its coming to a conclusion which affects all the rights of all original plaintiffs, may not deprive non-appellant plaintiffs of the resultant relief merely on the ground that they had not filed appeal or cross-objections. The instant case is certainly not of that type. The question of interest has no direct nexus with the quantum of compensation awarded. If the respondent was aggrieved, it was open to him to file an appeal or cross-objections. In this context, it may not be out of place to mention that Shri Limaye stated that the respondent has become entitled to enhanced rate of interest as a result of the amendment of section 23(1-A) in the year 1984, that the appeal in this case was filed in the year 1981 and that, therefore, the respondent could not have then filed appeal or cross-objections for claiming higher rate of interest. It may be so. It may be so. But in a case like the one here, the respondent could have filed appeal or cross-objections after the insertion of sub-section (1-A) in section 23 in 1984. It would have perhaps a good case for condonation of delay. For reasons best known to him, the respondent did not choose to do so, till this date. Supreme Court, in the decisions mentioned above, has held that while exercising the power under Rule 33 the Court should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code itself. In other words, the Court has to construct Rules 22 and 33 in such a manner that both can work harmoniously. Having regard to the above discussion, I hold that the respondent is not entitled to claim higher rate of interest in the appeal filed by the State of Maharashtra having not filed an appeal or cross-objections. 7. In the result the appeal filed by the State fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----