S. C. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) PRAYER of the petitioners to drop the proceeding against them under S. 107, Cr. P. C. , having been rejected by the learned Executive Magistrate, this revision has been filed. ( 2 ) PROCEEDING against the petitioners was initiated on a police report on 26-12-1987. After petitioners appeared on 30-1-1988, inquiry commenced and one witness was examined on 4-7-1988 on which day petitioners were called upon to furnish interim bond. Petitioners filed a revision against the said order before learned Sessions Judge who directed stay of further proceedings on 1-11-1988. Such an order was recorded in the order sheet of the proceeding on 3-1-1989. Prior to it on 21-12-1988 order under S. 116 (6) Cr. P. C. was passed to continue the proceeding. Record of the proceeding was sent to Sessions Court and after dismissal of the revision, it was returned back. Order in revision was challenged in this Court and the record was again sent as per order dated 15-4-1989 of this Court. After dismissal of the application, record was received back as reported by the learned Magistrate on 29-7-1989. In this back ground an application was filed to drop the proceeding which has been refused by the learned Magistrate. ( 3 ) MR. S. D. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that learned Magistrate ought to have held that legislative intent is that the proceeding is to be completed within six months and it was never intended that a proceeding would continue for more than two years as in this case. In this case, scope of Section 116 (6) Cr. P. C. ought to have been considered by learned Magistrate to find that be passed the order dated 21-12-1988 after automatic termination of the proceeding. ( 4 ) TO appreciate the submission of Mr. Das Section 116 (6) Cr. In this case, scope of Section 116 (6) Cr. P. C. ought to have been considered by learned Magistrate to find that be passed the order dated 21-12-1988 after automatic termination of the proceeding. ( 4 ) TO appreciate the submission of Mr. Das Section 116 (6) Cr. P. C. is to be kept in mind which reads as follows:- " (6) The inquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs: provided that where any person has been kept in detention pending such inquiry, the proceeding against that person, unless terminated earlier, shall stand terminated on the expiry of a period of six months of such detention". Plain reading of the provision leaves no room for doubt that a proceeding is to be concluded within six months of the date of inquiry. In case enquiry is not possible to be completed within six months special reasons for continuance of the proceeding are to be recorded. Where a delinquent is under detention, special reason would not also assist continuance of the proceeding as envisaged in the proviso. To safeguard delinquents sub-sec. (7) empowers the Sessions Judges to examine the correctness of the order continuing the proceeding. There is no limitation for approaching the Sessions Judge under the said provision. It reads as follows: " (7) Where any direction is made under sub-section (6) permitting the continuance of proceedings, the Sessions Judge may; on an application made to him by the aggrieved party, vacate such direction if he is satisfied that it was not based on any special reason or was perverse". Sessions Judge does not exercise the revisional power. Accordingly, in just cases, this Court can exercise the power of revision to examine correctness of the order passed by the executive Magistrate and the Sessions Judge even when Sessions Judge finds the continuance of the proceeding is justified for the special reason recorded by the Executive Magistrate. ( 5 ) SINCE a proceeding under S. 107, Cr' P. C. is to be concluded within six months of commencement of inquiry, the meaning of the term 'commencement of inquiry' gains importance. ( 5 ) SINCE a proceeding under S. 107, Cr' P. C. is to be concluded within six months of commencement of inquiry, the meaning of the term 'commencement of inquiry' gains importance. In ILR (1980) 2 Cut 51 : (1981 Cri LJ 39) (Sone Khan v. State), Full Bench of this Court observed. . ". . . . . . . . The Division Bench held that the enquiry would commence as soon as the delinquent challenges the allegations made against him or refuses to admit the terms or submits a show cause petition against the allegations or the Magistrate otherwise has reason to proceed or proceeds or decides to ascertain the truth of the allegations by taking evidence or otherwise. This in our opinion is near about the correct position. . . . . . . . . . " (Emphasis supplied) full Bench further observed". . . . . . The Supreme Court has emphasised on the position that bare allegations cannot form the foundation of the order for a bond and failing furnishing of it detention of the delinquent. The allegations have got to be tested. It may be that in a particular case, oral evidence may not be necessary to test the truth or otherwise of the allegations. Affidavits may be enough. There may be documentary evidence which might substitute oral evidence which necessitates examination of witnesses. Parties may agree that the allegations are true and, therefore, there may not be any necessity of looking for evidence. Situation arising in daily life cannot be catalogued and discretion must be left to the Magistrate to deal with particular situations as may arise before him in different cases, but the mandate of the law is that the inquiry must common and the Magistrate must proceed to ascertain the truth of the allegations by application of his judicial mind and look for materials which would substitute allegations into facts. . . . . . . "so observing Full Bench concluded"the enquiry contemplated is an acceptable legal process by which allegations can be converted into fact. What that process would be should be left to the discretion of the Magistrate with reference to facts of each case, but he must adopt an acceptable judicial method for testing the allegations and recording findings of fact with reference to the acceptability or otherwise of such allegations. What that process would be should be left to the discretion of the Magistrate with reference to facts of each case, but he must adopt an acceptable judicial method for testing the allegations and recording findings of fact with reference to the acceptability or otherwise of such allegations. "full Bench again repeated"as we have already indicated, commencement of inquiry starts when a Magistrate attempts in a legal way to put the allegations to test for finding out whether they are facts". ( 6 ) AFORESAID observations of the Full Bench are to be kept in mind by an executive Magistrate while considering whether there are special reasons to continue the proceeding and by a Sessions judge while exercising power under Section 116 (7) Cr. P. C. This Court in revision against such orders is also to examine the facts to find out when enquiry commenced. As I had indicated in the decision reported in (1986) 61 Cut LJ 668 (Dr. Bhabendra Kumar Pattnaik v. Dr. Chandi Charan Das) the delinquent is to get an opportunity to be heard where he can convince the Executive Magistrate that there Is no reason far less to speak of special reason for passing the order for continuing the proceeding. Extending the said principle, it can be legitimately said that in case delinquent gets opportunity, it can bring facts in the proceeding to the notice of the Executive Magistrate that six months having already passed from the date of commencement of inquiry, the proceeding had automatically terminated and there is no scope for the Executive Magistrate to revive the same since commencement of inquiry depends on facts of a case as has been expressed by the Full Bench. ( 7 ) THIS Court had occasion to consider the question as to when the enquiry commenced and whether there was special reason for continuance of the proceeding. In (1981) 51 Cut LT 33 : (1981 Cri LJ NOC 41), (Arakhita Swain v. Banshidhar Sahu), it was held that in cases where the records were sent to High Court, it was beyond the powers of the Magistrate to complete the proceeding and he had no scope to pass an order under Section 116 (6), Cr. P. C. recording special reasons to continue the proceeding. P. C. recording special reasons to continue the proceeding. Accordingly, there being time left after receipt of record for completing six months excluding the period when the record was not available, magistrate has jurisdiction to complete the enquiry or pass order recording special reason for continuing the proceeding. ( 8 ) THE afore said decision is correct on the facts of the case. When a proceeding is initiated, a case record is maintained and the case is posted from date to date so that parties get notice of the next date. No fresh notice is issued for each date. Executive Magistrate also knows when the inquiry commenced. If record has been sent in the matter of execution of an interim bond, naturally the inquiry has commenced since no interim bond can be called for unless enquiry has commenced. Therefore, the Executive Magistrate is to pass an order before expiry of six months from the date of commencement of inquiry after calling upon the delinquent to explain why the proceeding shall not be continued. Absence of record is a good reason special to the case for continuance of the proceeding unless facts are brought to the notice of the Magistrate that there is no more any apprehension of breach of peace. A Magistrate cannot completely remain silent merely because the record has been sent since on account of such silence period of six months from the date of inquiry expires and in view of Section 116 (6), Cr. P. C. proceeding automatically comes to an end. There is no power vested in any Court to arrest the time of six months. Once an order for continuance of proceeding is passed by the Executive Magistrate, the proceeding continues subject to decision of the Sessions Judge under Section 116 (7) or the decision of this Court in revision. ( 9 ) IN (1985) 60 Cut LT 194 (M. Bhimarao Dora v. Bhajaram Swain), the proceeding was posted to 11-4-1983 on which day the party at whose instance the proceeding was initiated examined two witnesses. It was held that inquiry commenced on 11-4-1983. In (1988) Orissa LR 20 (Bhikari Charan Tripathy v. Jagabandhu Mishra), it was held that the date when the Magistrate issued summons to witnesses is the date of commencement of enquiry. It was held that inquiry commenced on 11-4-1983. In (1988) Orissa LR 20 (Bhikari Charan Tripathy v. Jagabandhu Mishra), it was held that the date when the Magistrate issued summons to witnesses is the date of commencement of enquiry. In (1988) 1 OCR 113 (Katiram Bahera v. State of Orissa), it was held that the date when the Magistrate first issued summon to witnesses is the date of commencement of inquiry. ( 10 ) LEARNED Magistrate in the present case held that on 4-7-1988, he examined, witness and accordingly, six months would have expired on 4-1-1989. Prior to it, he passed the order on 20-12-1988 giving special reason to continue the proceeding. As the records were sent to higher forums, he could not hold the enquiry. He has not examined from record as to, when he decided to issue summons or directed the party to produce witnesses. 20-12-1988 is to be considered with reference to that date to find out whether six months had expired from that date. ( 11 ) IN the premises as discussed above, order of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. The question is to be examined afresh. While so considering, learned Magistrate may consider the other circumstances in the proceeding should otherwise continue. ( 12 ) IN the result, this application is allowed. Application allowed.