The appellant in this case was the principal defendant in a suit filed by the respondent for declaration that the exparte decree obtained by the defendant-appellant in Title Suit No. 279 of 1967 was void and inoperative, the same having been obtained by fraudulent suppression of service of summons. The trial Court found that summonses were duly served on all the defendants. As the plaintiff-respondent declined to accept the summons the same was served by hanging at his residence in presence of witnesses. In that view of the matter, the suit for setting aside the exparte decree was dismissed. On appeal, the learned Assistant District Judge, Karimganj, revised the finding of the trial Court in regard to service of summons in the earlier suit where exparte decree had been passed and held that summons was not served in the regular manner and therefore, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The prayer of the plaintiff-appellant for declaration that the exparte decree obtained in the earlier title suit was fraudulent and void was allowed. Against the said appellate judgment the present appeal has been filed by the principal-defendant. The appellate judgment of reversal has been challenged mainly on the ground that in the absence of proof of fraud, the suit for setting aside the exparte decree was not maintainable. The submission is that mere non-service of summons is not enough for the purpose of maintaining a separate suit to set aside an exparte decree. What is necessary for that purpose is the proof of the facts that the suppression of summons was fraudulent. The case of the appellant is that in the instant case no such case has been made out, no particulars of fraud have been given in the pleadings, nor any evidence adduced to that effect. The Courts below too have neither applied their minds to this aspect nor recorded any rending, on the basis of any evidence, that there was fraudulent suppression of summons. Under the circumstances, it is contended that the judgment of the learned Assistant District Judge setting aside the exparte decree in a separate suit filed for the purpose is not in accordance with law and liable to be set aside I have carefully considered the submissions. I have also perused the judgments of both the Courts below. Under the circumstances, it is contended that the judgment of the learned Assistant District Judge setting aside the exparte decree in a separate suit filed for the purpose is not in accordance with law and liable to be set aside I have carefully considered the submissions. I have also perused the judgments of both the Courts below. It appears that what both the Courts considered was whether service of summons by hanging in the instant case was proper service or not. The trial Court held the service to be regular and proper and, accordingly, rejected the prayer for setting aside the exparte decree and dismissed the suit. Tae appellate Court held that the service of summons had not been affected in the regular manner and held it to be a case of non-service of summons. On the basis of the aforesaid finding, the judg­ment of the trial Court was reversed and the exparte judgment and decree in the earlier suit was set aside. The case of the appellant is that the learned first appellate Court misdirected itself in law and proceeded on a misconce­ption of law that an exparte decree in a previous suit can be set aside on the finding of non-service of summons in a subsequent suit. From a careful reading of the appellate judgment, it is clear that no evidence was adduced to show that the non-service of summons in the regular manner was 'fraudulent'. The first appellate Court arrived at a finding of fact as to non-service of summons and on the basis of the same, set aside the exparte decree in the earlier suit without recording any finding as to whether the non-service of summons was fraudulent. In such a factual situation the question that arises for consideration is whether in the absence of any finding in regard to fraud, an exparte decree passed in an earlier suit can beset aside merely upon the finding of non-service of summons. The law in this regard seems to be well-settled. There is a number of decisions of different High Courts. The consistent opinion appears to be that a fresh suit would not lie to set aside a decree on the mere ground of non-service of summons though it would be maintainable on the ground of fraud. The law in this regard seems to be well-settled. There is a number of decisions of different High Courts. The consistent opinion appears to be that a fresh suit would not lie to set aside a decree on the mere ground of non-service of summons though it would be maintainable on the ground of fraud. A party against whom a decrees is passed exparte can seek to set it aside by an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC or he cm appeal fro31 the decree, bat it is not open to him to start a fresh proceeding to set aside the decree merely on the ground of non-service of summons. Reference may be made in this connection to a decision of these Calcutta High Court in Narasingh Das vs. Mustt Bibi Rafikhaa, ILR 37 Cal 197 where it was held: "Afresh suit would not lie to set aside a decree on the mere ground of non-service of summons, though it would be maintainable on the ground of fraud.” To the same effect is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ibrahim Harun Jaffer vs. Iusuf Hussaio Jaffer, AIR 1920 Bombay 351, where it was observed.: "Now it is perfectly well recognised that it is only on certain grounds that the Court will entertain a suit to set aside a decree, and that is if it can be proved that the decree has bean obtained by fraud. Otherwise there would be no end to litigation. An unsuccessful party cannot file another suit to set aside a decree because he is not satisfied with it, on any other ground except fraud. Order IX Rule 13 of the Code prescribes the course which should be for owed by a party against whom a decree has been passed ex parte. He has to apply to the Court which passed the decree for an order to set it aside ……….or the party against whom an ex parte decree is passed may appeal, but he certainly cannot sport a fresh proceeding to set aside the decree." The same view was reiterated by the Calcutta High Court in Romesh Chandra vs. National Tobacco Co. AIR 1940 Calcutta 536 wherein also it was held that nr re non-service of summons, in the absence of fraud is not sufficient to support a subsequent suit to set aside the decree. AIR 1940 Calcutta 536 wherein also it was held that nr re non-service of summons, in the absence of fraud is not sufficient to support a subsequent suit to set aside the decree. Reference may also be made to another decision of the Calcutta High Court in Atul vs. East Bengal Commercial Bank Ltd., AIR 1960 Calcutta 309. Here also it was held that mere non-service of summons is not enough to found a cause of action for setting aside a decree. It was observed : "Where mere non-service is the complaint, that will be the subject matter to be decided under Order 9 Rule 13 of the C. P. C." Reference may also be made to a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Choksi Bhidarbhai Mathurbhai vs. Purshottamdas Bhogilal Shah, AIR 1962 Gujrat 10 where on consideration of a number of decisions of different High Court on the subject it was observed ; “A suit to set aside such a decree is maintainable notwithstanding the fact that it has not been preceded by an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C. P. C. Where, however, the only fraud alleged is a bare non-service of summons, such a suit would not be maintainable. But it is quite a different matter where the whole suit is attacked on the ground of fraud, and the incident of improper or defective service is relied on as one indicia of fraud. A fraudulent suppression in the matter of service of summons can afford a sufficient ground for setting aside an ex parte decree and the jurisdiction of the court to set aside a decree on the ground of fraud cannot in such cases be denied, though it is to be exercised with care and reserve...... In suits to set aside an exparte decree on the ground of fraud, it is the plaintiff's mental approach to the suit which is material, and the mere proof of non-service of summons or falsity of the claim by themselves will not be sufficient to sustain an action unless they form part of the scheme of affecting a general design to commit fraud. A decree can be reopened by a new action when the court passing it had been misled by fraud, but it cannot be re-opened when the court is simply mistaken. A decree can be reopened by a new action when the court passing it had been misled by fraud, but it cannot be re-opened when the court is simply mistaken. There is thus a substantial difference between a mere mistake of the court and the court being misled and in the case of exparte decrees where the defendant had never appeared in court the attempt to mislead the court by suppressing the summons, would itself be the contrivance and really an effective one for keeping the defendant in ignorance of the suit and depriving him of his legitimate right of suit and depriving him of his legitimate right of defending the suit." [emphasis supplied] On perusal of the decisions referred to above, it is clear that fresh suit would not lie to set aside a decree merely on the ground of non- service of summons though it would be maintainable on the ground of fraud. The next question that arises for consideration is what amounts to pleading 'fraud'. It is well settled that where fraud is alleged the allegation must be specific and there must be proper pleading to that effect. Requisite particulars of fraud must be furnished. As observed by Jenkins, C. J. in the case of Nanda Kumar vs. Ram in (1914) 18 Cal WN 681, a prior judgment cannot be set aside on a mere general allegation of fraud or collusion. It must be shown how, when, where and in what way the fraud was committed. A case of fraud must be clearly pleaded in the plaint. The particulars of fraud must be given in the plaint itself. General allegation of fraud will not be enough to give rise to a cause of action. Mere use of the expression "fraudulent" will not amount to pleading fraud. A case of fraud must be clearly pleaded in the plaint. The particulars of fraud must be given in the plaint itself. General allegation of fraud will not be enough to give rise to a cause of action. Mere use of the expression "fraudulent" will not amount to pleading fraud. In this connection we may refer to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Ibrahim Haron Jaffer vs. lusaf Hussain Jaffer, AIR 1920 Bombay 351 where it was observed : "it may be that there were vague allegations of misconduct and fraud in the plaint, but there were no particulars given of such fraud as is required by the rules of pleadings, and it is quite clear that the case went to trial only on the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to have the award decree set aside on the ground that it was made ex parte......" It is just clear that where there were no particulars given of the fraud as required by the rules of pleadings and the case went on trial on the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to have a decree set aside on the ground that it was made exparte no separate suit will lie. It is equally well settled that if a plaintiff in a suit alleges not only non-service but also fraudulent suppre­ssion of summons, a fresh suit to set aside the exparte decree may be main­tainable. Evidently there is a distinction between mere non-service or absence of due service of summons, which is the result of mistake or inadvertence and the suppression of service, and causing of a false return of service which must be the result of deliberate design. In such suit the plaintiff can succeed only upon the proof that he was prevented from appearing and placing his case before the Court in the original suit by means of fraudulent practice upon him which may include suppression of summons by fraudulent means. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case it appears that the suit for setting aside the ex parte decree was filed oh the ground of non-service of summons. Though the words "fraudulent suppression of summons were used in the plaint, no particulars were given of the alleged fraudulent suppressions. No notice can be taken by the Court of such vague allegations devoid of particulars. Though the words "fraudulent suppression of summons were used in the plaint, no particulars were given of the alleged fraudulent suppressions. No notice can be taken by the Court of such vague allegations devoid of particulars. The expressing "suppression of summons” as observed by the Privy Council in Wallingford vs. Mutual Society, (1880) 5 AC 685 at P. 697, by itself does not amount to sufficient averment of fraud. "To suppress" means "to keep secret", "not to reveal", "to withhold'. Suppression of summons, therefore, means keeping the summons secret or not revealing it or withholding it. By itself it means little more than not serving it. In the instant case it is clear that there was no sufficient averment of fraud. The case, in fact, was only of non-service of summons. The trial Court held the summonses were properly served and dismissed the suit. The first appellate Court held the service of summons was not regular and decreed the suit. There is no evidence on record or finding in regard to fraud. In fact, it is one of those cases where the plaint itself did not disclose any cause of action for a suit to set aside an exparte decree. In that view of the matter the judgment and decree passed by the learned A. D. J, on appeal cannot be sustained and the same are, therefore, set aside. The dismissal of the suit for setting aside the decree as ordered by the trial Court is affirmed on the ground that no case had been made out of fraudulent suppression of summons; and as such, even if the service of summons by hanging was not regular, a separate suit to set aside such a decree was not maintainable. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned A. D. J. are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent stands dismissed. No order as to costs.