JUDGMENT M.P.Singh, J. 1. Petitioners are the tenants of the shop in question. 2. Om Prakash, opposite party No. 3, filed an application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for release of the shop. The need set up by him was that his son Yogesh Kumar was un-employed. He was not highly educated. He wanted to set up a cloth business in the said shop. There was no other accommodation available to him. It was also alleged that initially Jwala Prasad, husband of petitioner No. 1 and father of petitioners No. 2 and 3 was the tenant. After his death his sons joined services at different places. Petitioner No. 1, the widow of Jwala Prasad was living with her sons. The shop in dispute is lying closed. His need was bonafide and genuine. The petitioners contested the said release application stating that opposite party No. 3 was not the owner and landlord. He had no right to file the release application. Earlier also Ramji Lal, father of opposite party No. 3, had filed a release application. That matter came upto the High Court. On 11-1-1980 this court held that need of the landlord was not genuine, with the result the release application was dismissed. The present application is a mala fide one. The opposite party No. 3 was running a flourishing crockery business under the name and style of 'Om Crockery House' and all his sons were engaged in that business. The shop in dispute is situate in Halwai Market, which is not suited for the cloth business. The petitioners have been the tenants for the last more than 50 years and were doing ancestral business of Batasha and Pattal in the said shop. They had acquired a good-will. Since the petitioners had refused to enhance the rent the present release application has been filed. Need of the landlord was not bonafide and genuine. In case if the release application was allowed, greater hardship would be caused to him. 3. The Prescribed Authority allowed the release application. The said order was confirmed by the appellate authority and the petitioners' appeal was dismissed, against which the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Heard Sri B. D. Mandhyan, counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ajit Kumar, counsel for the respondent No. 3. 3. The Prescribed Authority allowed the release application. The said order was confirmed by the appellate authority and the petitioners' appeal was dismissed, against which the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Heard Sri B. D. Mandhyan, counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ajit Kumar, counsel for the respondent No. 3. Admittedly an application for release was filed by Ramji Lal, father of opposite party No. 3, in the year 1975. The need set up in that application was that he wanted to set up Dinesh Kumar in business. There was no shop available for enabling his son to carry on business. The need which was set up was said to be bonafide and genuine. 5. In that case it was held that Om Prakash, opposite party No. 3, and his son Dinesh Kumar were already doing crockery business. With this finding it was held that need of the landlord was not bonafide and genuine. The application for release was rejected finally on 11-1-1980 by this Court. IN that case the need of Dinesh Kumar was set up. IN the present case the need of Yogesh Kumar is to be considered. 6. The main contention raised by the counsel for the petitioners was that the present application was barred by the principles of res-judicata. His contention was that since the earlier application filed by Ramji Lal, father of the opposite party No. 3, was rejected finally by this Court holding that need was not bonafide, this finding will operate as res-judicata. The submission is entirely mis-conceived and is rejected for the following reasons. The principle of res-judicata will not be applicable in the present case inasmuch as in the earlier case the need which was set up was of Om Prakash and his son Dinesh Kumar and the finding was that they were happily settled in their business of crockery and their need was not bonafide. At that time need of Yogesh Kumar was not even in existence. In the present case only the need of Yogesh Kumar is to be considered while deciding the question of application for release. The matter in controversy in the present application and in the earlier application were entirely different. Under no stretch of imagination the present application can be said to be barred by the principle of res-judicata. 7. In the present case only the need of Yogesh Kumar is to be considered while deciding the question of application for release. The matter in controversy in the present application and in the earlier application were entirely different. Under no stretch of imagination the present application can be said to be barred by the principle of res-judicata. 7. The counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a decision of this court reported in 1983 (1) ARC 782 Dr. Sita Ram Gandhi v. IV Addl. District Judge, Meerut in which it has been held that :- 'In a case where no new facts have come into existence and there have been no intervening change of circumstance the second application may not be entertainable on the principles of res-judicata but where the landlord establishes a change of circumstances since the first application, the said case would require the court trying the second application to reinvestigate not only the question of bonafide requirement but also of greater hardship and to find on the basis of intervening changed circumstances as to whether the landlord is entitled to a release to be made in his favour under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972". 8. The case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is of no assistance inasmuch as the principle which has been enunciated by the said authority is against the proposition which has been advanced by him. In that case it has been held that where no new facts have come into existence and there have been no intervening change or circumstance, the second application may not be entertainable. In the instant case the present application has been filed for the need of another son, Yogesh Kumar, on entirely new facts and changed circumstances. Another case on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners is reported in 1985 AWC 455 Smt. Ram Kumari v. Additional District Judge. This case also has no bearing to the facts and circumstances of the present case. There is no controversy that the principle of res-judicata is applicable in these proceedings but in this case the second application has been filed on entirely new facts and changed circumstances. In the earlier case need of Dinesh Kumar was set up but in the present case need of Yogesh Kumar is to be considered. There is no controversy that the principle of res-judicata is applicable in these proceedings but in this case the second application has been filed on entirely new facts and changed circumstances. In the earlier case need of Dinesh Kumar was set up but in the present case need of Yogesh Kumar is to be considered. Moreover, in the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner the implication of Rule 18 (2) of the Rules has not been taken into consideration. 9. The learned counsel also referred to a decision reported in 1985 (2) ARC 455 Bengali v. District Judge, Allahabad. In that case it has been held that though Section 11 CPC does not apply in terms but the principles of res-judicata are applicable in the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority. I am not disputing so far as this settled view of law is concerned but the question is whether in this case need of the opposite party No. 3, Om Prakash and Yogesh Kumar can be said to be barred by the principles of res-judicata when this question was not in issue in the earlier proceedings of 1975. On facts, this case is also not applicable to the instant case. 10. He has also made a reference to the cases reported in ARC 1981 page 7, Smt. Kamla Devi v. V Additional District and Sessions Judge. Budaun and 1984 (1) ARC 226 Judgal Kishore v. District Judge, Saharanpur but none of these cases apply to the facts of the present case as the present application has been filed on entirely new facts and changed circumstances. Accordingly I hold that though the principle of res-judicata is applicable in the proceedings before the District Magistrate, appellate and revising authority but in the present case, claim of the landlord is not barred even under the provisions of Rule 18 (2) of the Rules which permit a landlord to file an application even on the same cause after expiry of one year. In the instant case the application has been filed after the expiry of six years and that also on a new cause of action. 11. I agree with the findings of the two authorities below that the claim of the landlord was not barred by the principle of res-judicata. In the instant case the application has been filed after the expiry of six years and that also on a new cause of action. 11. I agree with the findings of the two authorities below that the claim of the landlord was not barred by the principle of res-judicata. The findings on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship also need no interference as they are based on sound reasonings and nothing has been shown which may render the orders as bad. 12. Now coming to the question of comparative hardship, again the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the principle of res-judicata and according to him, once it has been held by this Court in 1980 that need of the landlord was not genuine, the same cannot be challenged now. This submission is devoid of any substance. If the second application for release is filed on a different cause of action setting up different need of a different person and the application is held to be maintainable without being barred by the principle of res-judicata then the court while deciding that application has got jurisdiction to record its own fresh finding on the question of comparative hardship the earlier finding will not debar the authorities to record its own finding. Another submission raised by the counsel for the petitioners is that the Commissioner's report has not been considered. The petitioners have not filed a copy of the objection which they have filed against the said Commissioner's report. This Court is not in a position to know about the exact objection taken by the petitioners. However, after looking to the contents of the Commissioner's report, I am satisfied that nothing substantial turns upon this document. The averments made by the petitioners in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the writ petition are that the Advocate Commissioner was a great friend of the counsel for the landlord. Where is the harm. Lawyers are supposed to be good friends. The only rider is that this friendship should not affect the judicial obligation and fairness to their respective clients. Moreover, this fact has been denied in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the counter affidavit. Except this bare suggestion nothing has been shown to me which may vitiate the impugned orders, I do not find any merit in the said contention. It is accordingly rejected. Moreover, this fact has been denied in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the counter affidavit. Except this bare suggestion nothing has been shown to me which may vitiate the impugned orders, I do not find any merit in the said contention. It is accordingly rejected. The findings on the question of comparative hardship recorded by the two authorities also do not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record. 13. No other point has been pressed by the counsel for the petitioners. 14. The petition has no force and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.