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1990 DIGILAW 225 (RAJ)

Abdul Zahid Khan v. The General Manager, R. S. R. T. C.

1990-03-22

I.S.ISRANI

body1990
JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed with a prayer that order dated May 29, 1980 (Anx. 2), by which, the services of the petitioner were terminated, be quashed and the petitioner be re-instated with all consequential benefits. 2. It is submitted by Mr. R.P. Garg, learned counsel, that the petitioner was selected by the Selection Committee for the post of Conductor on October 17, 1979 and he joined his duty at Jhalawar Depot. On April 12, 1980, when the petitioner was going with Bus No. 9197 on Jhalawar-Bhawanimandi route, a Judicial Magistrate (Roadways) checked the bus, prepared a memo on the spot, in which it was mentioned that the petitioner received 0.75 P. from one passenger and two passengers were not given tickets. The Judicial Magistrate (Roadways) on the spot charged Rs. 5/- as penalty from the petitioner and without affording any opportunity to him to defend himself, convicted the petitioner under Section 8 of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Service (Prevention of Ticketless Travel) Act, 1975 and sentenced him to three days' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 15/-. Certified copy of this order has been filed and is Anx. 1. It is further pointed out by learned counsel that vide order dated May 29, 1980, the services of the petitioner were termined in compliance of order dated April 15, 1980 issued by the Regional Manager, RSRTC, Kota, on account of conviction of the petitioner by the Judicial Magistrate (Roadways) on April 12, 1980. Copy of order dated April 15, 1980 is filed and marked Anx. 2. The petitioner filed revision against the order of learned Judicial Magistrate (Roadways) in the Sessions Court, Ajmer, which was transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Ajmer. This revision petition was allowed vide order dated November 14, 1984 (Anx. 3) and the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner were set aside and the case was transferred for further trial to the trial Court, which is still pending there. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel that even though, the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner have been set aside, the order dated April 15, 1980 (Anx. 2), by which the services of the petitioner were terminated, has not been set aside inspite of several applications made to this effect before the concerned Authorities of RSRTC. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel that even though, the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner have been set aside, the order dated April 15, 1980 (Anx. 2), by which the services of the petitioner were terminated, has not been set aside inspite of several applications made to this effect before the concerned Authorities of RSRTC. The petitioner, therefore, had no choice but to give notice for demand of justice dated November 14, 1987 (Anx. 4), but with no effect. It is also pointed out that as mentioned in para 11 of the petition Mohan Lal s/o Ladu Ram, whose services were also terminated on the same ground, was taken on duty since long, but the petitioner has been discriminated and similar treatment has not been given to him, which is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. No return has been filed on behalf of the respondents. However, it is pointed out by Mr. J.K. Dhingra, learned counsel for the respondents, that it is evident from order of revision (Anx. 3) that the petitioner had pleaded guilty before the Judicial Magistrate (Roadways) and had also pleaded guilty when his statement was recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner did not commit any offence, for which he was convicted and was also awarded sentence. It is contended by the learned counsel that the action was taken as provided under Section 8 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Service (Prevention of Ticketless Travel) Act, 1975 and, therefore, since the trial is still pending in the trial Court, the petitioner does not deserve to be re-instated, even though he was removed from the service on the ground of his conviction and sentence awarded to him. 5. I have heard both the parties and also gone through the documents on record. 6. It is evident from the bare reading of order dated March 29, 1980 (Anx. 2), by which, the services of the petitioner were terminated that after terminating the services, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced by the Judicial Magistrate (Roadways) vide his order dated April 12, 1980. The petitioner, as said above, went in revision against his order of conviction, which has been set aside vide Anx. 3 and the trial is still pending in this trial Court. The petitioner, as said above, went in revision against his order of conviction, which has been set aside vide Anx. 3 and the trial is still pending in this trial Court. There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that since the petitioner had pleaded guilty before the Judicial Magistrate (Roadways) when his bus was checked and had also pleaded guilty under Section 311, Cr.P.C. therefore, he does not deserve to be re-instated in service. Whether he pleaded guilty or not is of no consequence when the conviction and sentence have been set aside vide order Anx. 3 by the appellate Court and the trial Court is taking proceedings afresh, wherein it will be decided whether the petitioner is liable to conviction for the offence said to have been committed by him. 7. The incident took place in April, 1980 and the trial is still incomplete, even after passage of about ten years. There can, therefore, be no justification for not re-instating the petitioner on his job, which he was performing earlier when the conviction and sentence awarded to him have been already set aside. Moreover, as pointed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in similar circumstances one another employee whose name has been mentioned above, was re-instated. Therefore, there is no ground why discriminatory treatment is given to the petitioner. This will be clearly in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed, the order dated May 29, 1980 (Anx. 2), by which the services of the petitioner were terminated, is quashed and set aside and it is directed that the petitioner be re-instated on the job, which he was performing before the order dated 29.5.80 (Anx. 2) was passed within seven days from the date of this order. He shall also be entitled to get all consequential benefits, which arise on account of re-instatement of the petitioner. 9. The writ petition is allowed with no order as to costs.Petition Allowed. *******