This is defendant's appeal against the judgment and decree dated 6. 5.1983 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 2, Cachar, Silchar, whereby the plaintiff's appeal against the judgment and decree dated 6. 12. 1980 passed by the learned trial Court was allowed and the plaintiff's suit for specific performance was decreed. 2. Briefly the plaintiff respondent had filed suit for specific perfor­mance of an agreement to sell the land in suit on the allegations, that on 2.4.1964 the plaintiff by registered sale deed had sold the suit land to the defendant for Rs. 1450/-with verbal agreement that the defendant would resell the suit land to the plaintiff and accordingly on 31.7.72. the defendant had executed an Ekrarnama binding himself to resell the suit land, to execute sale deed and to deliver khas possession for consideration of Rs. 14^0/- in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff approached the defendant to obtain suit land on payment of consideration money as per the agreement on repeated occasions, but the defendant did not listen, hence the suit was ruled. 3. The defendant - the present appellant had resisted the suit, and while purchase of suit land from the plaintiff was admitted it was denied that there was any agreement to re-sell the land or that any Ekrarnama had been executed. 4. The learned trial Court had framed necessary issues and by judgment dated 6.12. 1980 held that there was no agreement to sell and dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned appellate Court below held that the agreement Ext. 1 was executed by the defendant and was genuine and that the defendant not having transferred the land in suit to the plaintiff as agreed was bound to re-sell the land to the plaintiff. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was decreed. 5. Aggrieved, the defendant has come in second appeal and Shn S. A. Laskar, learned counsel, appearing on his behalf has submitted that the view taken by the learned appellate Court below that Ext. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was decreed. 5. Aggrieved, the defendant has come in second appeal and Shn S. A. Laskar, learned counsel, appearing on his behalf has submitted that the view taken by the learned appellate Court below that Ext. 1 agree­ment was genuine was not corrects that the plaintiff did not pay the consideration amount in terms of Ekrarnama that the suit for specific performance could not be decreed and that there was no averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the promise and accordingly the provisions of section 16 (3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 hereinafter referred as the Act had not been complied and the suit therefore could not be decreed. Shri Laskar has therefore submitted that the judgment and decree of the learned appellate Court below cannot be sustained and should be set aside. 6. Shri Abu Sariff, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent on the other hand, has refuted the submissions for the appellant and supported the judgment of the learned appellate Court below. 7. I have considered the submissions for the parties and the materials on record. 8. In so far as the first submission on behalf of the appellant in regard to the genuineness of Ext. 1 the agreement is concerned, I think the finding of the learned appellate Court below was correct. The learned trial Court was in error in taking the view that because the scribe was not examined and Ext. 1 Ekrarnama was not registered, it was not reliable. The plaintiff's evidence regarding execution of the document was not found acceptable also because it was improbable that the defendant would have agreed to re-sell the land in the year 1972 for Rs. 1450/- for the price of land had increased. 9. Shri S. A. Laskar, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that Ext. 1 was an Ekrarnama and argued that Ekrarnama was different from mere agreement, in that the plaintiff case was on the basis of agreement to re sell the land for the same price i.e. Rs.1450/- for which he had purchased it from the plaintiff and has contended that the Ekrarnama required registration. The submission is not sound for an Ekrarnama to re-sell, in law was nothing more than just an agreement. The submission is not sound for an Ekrarnama to re-sell, in law was nothing more than just an agreement. There is no substantial difference in the agreement even when it is described as Ekrarnama. The expression Ekrarnama derived from 'Ekrar' meaning 'agree' is only an agreement whatever be the promise or consideration for promise to do something. It should, therefore be clear that Ekrarnama is nothing but an agreement and accordingly it was not a document which compulsorily required to be registered under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. There is no other law which provides that an agreement to re-sell requires to be registered. The non registration as ground for not accepting Ext. 1 as genuine was not correct and cannot be sustained. It was true that the scribe of the document was not produced but that by itself was not material or significant particularly, when the plaintiff had examined two persons who had been witness to the execution of the document, by the defendant. The view taken by the learned Munsiff that the two witnesses were interested was hardly any sufficient reason to reject the evidence particularly when the plaintiff had also led the evidence of hand writing expert, Shri S. N. Patwari, who had in his evidence given the opinion that the signature on the Ekrarnama Ext. 1 i.e. Ext. 1 (1) and Ext. 1 (4) were those of the defendant. Shri S. N. Patwari could not be examined in Court but he had been examined on commission with the help of interrogatories and cross interrogatories and accordingly there was no reason at all to disbelieve his evidence and not to accept his opinion which for reasons stated in the report appeared to be quite sound and reasonable. The learned appellate Court below has duly considered the opinion of S. N. Patwari, hand writing expert and has come to the conclusion that the opinion was quite sound and reliable and should be accepted. In my opinion, the learned appellate Court below was justified in taking the view that the evidence of the two witnesses PW 2 and PW 3, the opinion of hand writing expert was reliable to establish that Ext. 1 was duly executed by the defendant. The submission that in 1972 the defendant could not have agreed to sell the land for Rs. 1 was duly executed by the defendant. The submission that in 1972 the defendant could not have agreed to sell the land for Rs. 1450/-for which he had purchased it earlier, because it was improbable, was not enough to reject the plaintiff's version. While it might be true that price of land had escalated, but the fact remained that the defendant had purchased the land from the plaintiff at Rs. 1450/- and there was nothing inherently improbable in the defendant having agreed to re-sell the land for the same price to the plaintiff. The finding of the learned appellate Court below that the defendant had executed the Ekrarnama Ext. 1 and that it was a genuine document was sound and correct. 10. Shri S. A. Laskar, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the Ext. 1, Ekrarnama stipulated that the plaintiff was to obtain the sale deed by paying Rs. 1450/- to the defendant but there was no evidence for the plaintiff that he had paid the amount and consequently the plaintiff suit was for specific performance was just not maintainable. Shri Laskar has cited P. C. Ghosh vs. Mohendra Nath, Vol 12 1951 1LR Calcutta Series 291 and K. Simrathmull vs. Nanjalingiah, AIR 1963 SC 1182 to contend that the plaintiff not having made the deposit could not seek specific performance of the agreement. The contention is not sound in that it was not a case where the plaintiff was required to make the deposit before he could ask for specific performance. The plaintiff had stated that he had repeatedly tried to obtain transfer of the land from the defendant but the defendant had not paid any heed which was sufficient compliance of offer to perform his part of the promise. The plaintiff was not required to deposit before he could sue for specific performance. The explanation (i) to clause (c) of section 16 of the Act provides that :- "where a contract involves the payment of money, it is note essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court." In view of the above clear stipulations in law, the submission for the appellant is not tenable. The authorities cited for the appellant are not attracted on the facts of the present case and are of no assistance to him. . 11. The authorities cited for the appellant are not attracted on the facts of the present case and are of no assistance to him. . 11. Shri S.A.Laskar learned counsel for the appellant submitted that section 16 (3) of the Act required averment in the plaint to be made that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the promise, but there was no such averment in the plaint and accordingly the learned appellate Court below should not have accepted the plaintiff's claim. Premraj vs. DLF Housing, AIR 1968 SC 1355 was cited wherein it was held that the plaintiff should state in the plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. A Division Bench decision of this Court Idiis Ali vs. Abdul Samad, AIR 1973 Gau 132 followed Premraj (supra) and held that in the absence of such averment in the plaint the suit for specific performance could not succeed. 12. Section 16(3) of the Act requires an. averment to be made in the plaint that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the promise. The said requirement of law may be considered satisfied from the entire plaint seen as a whole and in my opinion even though there be no such specific averment, yet it can be gathered from the statements made in the plaint that the plaintiff w. s always ready and willing to perform his part of the promise and the requirement of the law should be considered fulfilled. Where the plaint considered as a whole shows that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, it would not be just and proper to throw out the suit on a verbal omission here and there. The statement of facts made in the plaint and the institution of the suit for specific performance and it's prosecution in itself show readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. In Ramesh Ch. Chandik vs. Chunnllal, AIR 1971 SC 1238 the view was taken that the very fact that the suit was promptly filed showed keenness and readiness in the matter. The "readiness and willingness" should not be treated as a strait-jacket formula. It should be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. The "readiness and willingness" should not be treated as a strait-jacket formula. It should be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. In the present case the plaintiff had stated that he had approached and demanded sale repeatedly. The learned appellate Court below has accepted that there was readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the promise. On consideration of the averments in the plaint in its entirety in particular that he had repeatedly made 'TALAB TAK.ADA'. the suit was filed and duly prosecuted there was sufficient material to take the view that the plaintiff had been ready and willing throughout to perform his part of the promise, I find no sufficient reason on the facts of the present case to take a different view from that taken by the learned appellate Court below. The learned appellate Court below did not commit any error in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief prayed for. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal fails and is dismissed. However, no order as to cost is made.