JUDGMENT 1. - This petition has been filed with a prayer that award dated September 24, 1986 (Anx. 6) passed by Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan and order dated November 23, 1983 (Anx. 3) passed by Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Kota, be quashed and set aside and the petitioner be treated to be in service, as if no such orders had been passed and given all consequential benefits. 2. It is submitted by Mr. V.L. Mathur, learned counsel, that the petitioner was appointed as a Driver in the service of respondent No. 1 in the year, 1973 in permanent capacity. The petitioner was suspended vide order dated March 9, 1981 (Anx. 1), bur was re-instated pending enquiry vide order dated May 26, 1981 by the Works Manager (0), Raj. State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'RSRTC'). The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet on March 1/2, 1981 and reply to the same was filed by the petitioner. The departmental enquiry was held by Enquiry Officer, who submitted his report to the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Kota, who agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and removed the petitioner from service of RSRTC w.e.f. November 23, 1983 (Anx. 3). The petitioner filed an appeal to the General Manager (Operational), RSRTC, which was, however, dismissed vide order dated December 28, 1983 (Anx. 5). The petitioner, therefore, raised a dispute before the Settlement Officer, but since no settlement could be arrived at, a failure report was submitted to the State Government and the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, which passed an award dated September 24, 1986 (Anx. 6), by which, the termination of the services of the petitioner were held to be proper. 3. 6), by which, the termination of the services of the petitioner were held to be proper. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel that the suspension, thereafter removal from the service and award, by which the termination has been held to be proper, on the following grounds, which were also agitated before the Industrial Tribunal and during the course of an enquiry and appeal:- (i) The petitioner was appointed and suspended and re instated by a Higher Authority than the Authority, which has awarded punishment to the petitioner which is in complete violation of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) The award is passed on no evidence regarding charges No. 2 and 3, which have been held to be proved by various authorities; (iii) The petitioner has been victimised by discriminatory treatment to him and removing him from the service, whereas no action at all was taken against other employees, who admittedly, were guilty of committing the same alleged act of indiscipline. The provisions of Section 11A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'ID Act') were not considered while awarding punishment to the petitioner, as extreme punishment was not called for in any case, keeping in view the allegation made out against him. 4. It is submitted by Mr. J.K. Dhingra, learned counsel for the respondents, that it is incorrect to say that the punishment has been awarded to the petitioner by lower authority than the authority by which he was appointed/suspended. It is pointed out that the Divisional Mechanical Engineer was holding powers of Chief Mechanical Engineer also at the time when punishment was awarded to the petitioner. It is also submitted that the evidence has been properly appreciated and recorded regarding charges No. 2 and 3, which have been held to be proved and it cannot be said that the award is passed oil no evidence regarding these charges. So far as taking no action against other employees is concerned, it is staled by the learned counsel that the action was taken against other employees also and, therefore, there is no question of any discrimination. Lastly, it is submitted by the learned counsel that provisions of Section 11-A of ID Act were considered while the award was passed and the punishment awarded to the petitioner is appropriate, keeping in view the serious charge levelled against him. 5. Lastly, it is submitted by the learned counsel that provisions of Section 11-A of ID Act were considered while the award was passed and the punishment awarded to the petitioner is appropriate, keeping in view the serious charge levelled against him. 5. I have heard both the parties and also gone through the documents on record. 6. The services of the petitioner are governed by Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees' Standing Order, 1965 (for short, 'Standing Orders') and order 33 deals with the suspension of the employees. It provides that competent authority may suspend a worker for any act or omission of misconduct as described therein and an order in writing will be issued and served upon the worker with charge-sheet, containing specific charges on which each charge is based and he shall also be given personal hearing, if so desired by him. S.O. 36 provides the penalties, which may be awarded for good and sufficient reasons on a worker by a competent authority from the penalties enumerated therein. Thus, both these S. Os. refer to competent authority by which a work-mean may be suspended and charge sheeted and penalised for good and sufficient reasons. In the present case, the petitioner was suspended vide Anx. 1 by Works Manager/Chief Mechanical Engineer and was also re-instated by the same authority on May 26, 1981 (Anx. 2). However, the order of removal (Anx. 1) was passed by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Kota, who is subordinate to the Chief Mechanical Engineer. Apart from that, specific ground was raised by the petitioner during the course of enquiry as also in appeal and before the Industrial Tribunal that he has been removed from service by a lower authority than the authority, which appointed the petitioner on the post of driver in the first instance. The petitioner is more or less an illiterate person and the relevant documents to show, who was the appointing authority of the petitioner, were in possession of the respondents,which were, however,not produced at any stage of the proceedings. The petitioner is more or less an illiterate person and the relevant documents to show, who was the appointing authority of the petitioner, were in possession of the respondents,which were, however,not produced at any stage of the proceedings. Article 311 provides that "no person, who is a member of a Civil Service of the Union or an All India Service or a Civil Service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed." Thus, it was duty of the respondents to have produced the relevant documents to show that the petitioner has not been removed from service by a lower authority than the one by which he was appointed. In Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirija Khasim Ali Beg ( AIR 1977 SC 747 ) it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a dismissal order passed by a subordinate authority was without jurisdiction and as such void and inoperative having been passed in contravention of Article 311(1) and that the order was confirmed on appeal by Head of the Department cannot cure the initial defect. The dismissal from the service was held to be illegal and it was further held that the respondent is entitled to full pay. In Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway and others ( AIR 1979 SC 1912 ) it was held that removal from service by the authority subordinate to the appointing a civil servant was in patent violation of the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. In this case, it was further held that since the appellant had been removed from service by an order passed by the authority who, at any rate, was subordinate in rank to the Chief Electrical Engineer on the date of appellant's appointment the order of removal was in patent violation of the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Whether or not an authority is subordinate in rank to another has to be determined with reference to the state of affairs existing on the date of appointment. It is at that point of time that the constitutional guarantee under Article 311(1) becomes available. Whether or not an authority is subordinate in rank to another has to be determined with reference to the state of affairs existing on the date of appointment. It is at that point of time that the constitutional guarantee under Article 311(1) becomes available. The subsequent authorisation made in favour of the authority passing the order of removal in regard to making appointments to the post held by the appellant cannot confer upon him the power to remove him. Besides, delegation of the power to make a particular appointment does not enhance or improve the hierarchical status of the delegate. An Officer subordinate to another will not become his equal in rank by reason of his coming to possess some of the powers of that another. The Divisional Engineer did not cease to be subordinate in rank to the Chief Electrical (sic Mechanical) Engineer merely because the latter's power to make appointments to certain posts had been delegated to him. In this case also, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, even though subordinate to the Chief Mechanical Engineer, was delegated certain powers of Chief Mechanical Engineer. No such document is on record and the learned counsel wanted to file the same during the course of arguments, which was not proper and such documents should be filed at the appropriate time when the reply is filed by the respondent? so that the other party also has chance to look into the document and make any submission or file any counter document to substantiate the point raised on behalf of the petitioner. Therefore, permission to file any fresh document during the course of arguments was not allowed. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner has not been removed from service by the appointing authority and the Divisional Mechanical Engineer was, admittedly, not appointing authority of the petitioner and was, therefore, not authorised to terminate his services. 7. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the award being passed on no evidence is concerned, it may be stated that charge No. 2 was regarding missing the fourth trip, i.e., the last trip on Feb. 14, 1981 and that the petitioner most (sic must) have used the vehicle for that period for his personal use. 14, 1981 and that the petitioner most (sic must) have used the vehicle for that period for his personal use. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that from the record of the respondents themselves, it is evident that second trip was missed and not the fourth trip. In my opinion this aspect of the matter is immaterial. The question is whether any trip was missed by the petitioner It has come in evidence that on February 14, 1981, the petitioner took the vehicle to Workshop around 10.44 a.m. for filling air in one of the wheels of the bus and, therefore, one round of that day was curtailed. It is also in the copy of the log-sheet, which is signed and certified by the tyre filler Shri Lalchand that the petitioner was in the Workshop upto 11.30 a.m. Thus, it is evident from the documents of the respondents that the petitioner was in Workshop for filling air in one of the wheels of the bus, on account of which one trip was missed, The allegation that the petitioner must have used the vehicle during that period for his personal use had no basis and in face of above documentary evidence, it is also clear that the petitioner did not miss the trip deliberately. The petitioner also stated this fact in ms statement, which is Anx. 8. 8. Charge No. 3 relates to complaint dated February 20, 1981 of one Shri Shivdan Singh, Assistant Area Manager, where the petitioner is alleged to have used abusive language and alongwith several other employees, also 'gheraoed' an Officer for about 15 minutes. Shri Bhagwan Singh Chaudhary was examined on behalf of the respondents as he was the Officer, who said to have been abused by the petitioner. In cross-examination, he has clearly stated that the petitioner did not abuse himself. He has stated that the petitioner incited others to do so. There is nothing on record to show that any action was taken against other employees, who abused this Officer. However, action was taken only against this petitioner on this account and he has been found guilty, even though the officer concerned himself has stated that the petitioner did not abuse him. If any action on this account was to be taken against the petitioner, it was only proper that similar action should have been taken against other employees also. However, action was taken only against this petitioner on this account and he has been found guilty, even though the officer concerned himself has stated that the petitioner did not abuse him. If any action on this account was to be taken against the petitioner, it was only proper that similar action should have been taken against other employees also. I am, therefore, of considered opinion that the finding given in the award holding that both these charges have been proved, are based on no evidence and the conclusions drawn are perverse. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh ( AIR 1983 SC 454 ) , it was held that even though the High Court does not function as a court of appeal over the finding is disciplinary authority, but where the finding is utterly perverse, the High Court can also interfere with the same and can quash the penalty awarded. On the basis of charge No. 3, it can be said that while the petitioner was victimised by holding an enquiry against him on the charge of having abused an officer, since no action was taken against any other employee, who in fact had abused the concerned officer. In M/s Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Ram Dayal & others ( 1972 WLN 548 ) , while dealing with matter under Industrial Disputes Act, it was pointed out by this Court that word "victimisation" consists of punishing an employee in any object other than the one of inflicting just and appropriate punishment for a proving lapse. This authority, in my opinion, is of no help to the petitioner, as there are no reasons to draw conclusion that any punishment was awarded to the petitioner for motives other than for a proving lapse. 9. In the result, the award dated September 24, 1986 passed by learned Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan and order dated November 23, 1983 passed by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Kota, are quashed and set aside. However, since the petitioner was suspended in the year, 1981 and the litigation is still going on, after passage of nine years, I am not inclined to remand the enquiry for conducting it afresh against the petitioner. From the evidence of Shri Bhagwan Singh Chaudhary, it has come out that the petitioner incited other employees to abuse him and the officer was 'gheraoed' for about 15 minutes. From the evidence of Shri Bhagwan Singh Chaudhary, it has come out that the petitioner incited other employees to abuse him and the officer was 'gheraoed' for about 15 minutes. Once this Court quashes the order of imposing the penalty awarded to the petitioner and gives direction, which would not permit a fresh enquiry to be held, it can itself impose appropriate penalty to cut short another prolonged area and legal battle thereafter. The learned counsel for the respondents, during the course of arguments, contended that action was also taken against other employees, but this aspect of the matter has not been brought on record. I am fortified in my opinion as similar view was taken in the case of Bhagat Ram (supra) by the Apex Court and it was held that once the Supreme Court quashes the order of imposing the penalty, it is open to the Court 10 give any direction, which would not permit a fresh enquiry to be held. After all, what is the purpose of holding the fresh enquiry. Obviously, it is to impose some penalty. The Court in such circumstances, without prolonging the matter, may itself impose appropriate penalty. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the ends of justice shall be met, if two grade increments of the petitioner with cumulative effect are with-held. It is, therefore, directed that two grade increments of the petitioner with cumulative effect shall be with-held. It is further directed that the petitioner shall be re-instated within thirty days from the date of this order and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits, which shall be paid to him within a period of three months, after he is re-instated. 10. The writ petition is partly allowed, as indicated above, with no order as to costs.Petition Partly Allowed. *******