JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This is an appeal challenging the order passed by the District Judge rejecting the application of the appellant moved under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure . The appellants also moved an application that they may be permitted to withdraw the original application on which these proceedings were initiated in the court below out of which the present appeal arises. Sri R.C. Srivastva, learned counsel for the respondent has how- ever, raised an objection against the maintainability of the appeal as also the withdrawal of the application. However, at the time of argument, learned counsel for the appellants stated that he has been instructed by the appellants not to press the application for withdrawal of the proceedings. The application is accordingly dismissed as not pressed. 2. So far as the maintainability of the appeal is concerned, the argument of Shri R.C. Srivastava is that the original proceeding itself was not legally maintainable under Section 92 of the Code inasmuch as the Trust in question was neither one for charitable purpose or of a religious nature and that the application had been tightly rejected, by the Court below. The learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the appeal itself may be disposed of this stage and accordingly we have heard them at length. 3. A copy of the application on which these proceedings were initiated has been filed by the respondent as annexure to the affidavit in support of their application for dismissing the appeal as not maintainable. A perusal of this application will show that it has been moved by the Trust and one other applicant purporting to be one under Section 92(1)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to applicants, the property belonged to one Gregory warden who has executed a Deed of Trust on 8.1.1907 appointing himself as the first trustee of the said Trust during his life time. On his death, the Bishop of Cathedral at Allahabad was appointed as the Trustee. It is alleged that subsequently the management had vested in the Bishop of Diocese of Lucknow with Head office at Allahabad. The application proceeds to mention certain facts and thereafter it was alleged that an agreement of sale of some open land of the property in question has been entered into with the opposite party for which permission was sought from the Court. 4. The application proceeds to mention certain facts and thereafter it was alleged that an agreement of sale of some open land of the property in question has been entered into with the opposite party for which permission was sought from the Court. 4. This application has been rejected primarily on two grounds by the Court below. It is firstly mentioned that an application under Section 92 is not legally maintainable. A perusal of Section 92 will show that either the Advocate General or at least two persons having an interest in the Trust created for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature may, with the leave of the court, institute the suit for one of the reliefs mentioned in the Section. What is contemplated by Section 92, therefore, is a suit to be preceded by an application for leave to file as suit at the instance of two interested persons. In this case, as rightly pointed out by the District Judge, no suit has been filed and the proceedings have been indicated only by means of an application. 5. The other ground on which the application has been rejected is that the Trust in question was not for public purpose either of charitable or religious nature. The grievance made by the appellant before us is that the learned District Judge should have dismissed the application on a preliminary ground without entering into the merits of the case. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and in view of the fact that both the counsel have admitted before us that the Trust in question was not created for a public purpose of either charitable or religious nature, and also because the proceedings had been initiated not by way of suit but only through an application, the Court below would have been justified in rejecting the same on these two preliminary grounds alone and it was not necessary for it to have entered into the merits of the rival claims. Since we are clearly of the opinion that the proceedings had been initiated by moving an application and not by filing a suit as required by section 92 CPC the same was totally misconceived. With these observations, the appeal is disposed of finally.