JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition is directed against order of suspension from service, dated 21.6.1989, Annexure I, passed by the Member- Secretary of the District Administrative Committee, U.P. Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies Centralised Services, Lucknow. The order is challenged on the ground that it is without the approval of the Assistant Registrar and the Chairman of the District Administrative Committee and is therefore violative of Rule 14(v) of the U.P. Primary Agricultural Cooperative Credit Societies Centralised Service Rules, 1976, for short 1976 Rules. 2. It is not disputed that under the aforesaid Rule, Member-Secretary is competent to suspend the petitioner. That provision however requires prior concurrence of the "Assistant Registrar". The petitioner admits that the Member-Secretary is District Assistant Registrar but his learned counsel submits that he cannot be treated to be "Assistant Registrar". For making the submission he relies upon Section 3(2) of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, for short Act and Rule 2 (e) of the U.P. Co- operative Societies Rules, 1968, for short 1968 Rules. Rule 14 (v) of the 1976 Rules reads as follows: "14. Subject to the control and supervision of the Chairman of the District Committee, the Member-Secretary of the District Committee shall(v) ................ have power of suspending a member of the Centralised Service with the prior concurrence of Assistant Registrar". The term Assistant Registrar has not been defined in 1976 Rules but has been defined in Rule 2(e) of the 1968 Rules as follows: "(e) 'Assistant Registrar' means a person appointed as Assistant Registrar under sub-section (2) of Section 3 and 'District Assistant Registrar' means an Assistant Registrar appointed to hold charge of Co-operative activities of a district". Section 3 (1) of the Act empowers the State Government to "appoint a person to be the Registrar of Co-operative Societies for the State", sub-section (2) provides as follows: "The State Government may, for the purposes of this Act, also appoint other persons to assist the Registrar and by general or special order confer on any such person all or any of the powers of the Registrar". It is under the above provision that the State Government appoints Assistant Registrars. 3. Under Rule 2 (e) of 1968 Rules, six District Assistant Registrar is appointed from amongst the Assistant Registrars appointed under Section 3(2). This is apparent from the expression "District Assistant Registrar means an Assistant Registrar" used in Rule 2(e). It is under the above provision that the State Government appoints Assistant Registrars. 3. Under Rule 2 (e) of 1968 Rules, six District Assistant Registrar is appointed from amongst the Assistant Registrars appointed under Section 3(2). This is apparent from the expression "District Assistant Registrar means an Assistant Registrar" used in Rule 2(e). It is not disputed that the Member Secretary who passed the impugned order is District Assistant Registrar. He is therefore Assistant Registrar also for the purposes of Rule 2(e). The term "District" has no special significance. It only denotes the area of his jurisdiction. It extends over the entire district, of course, it is confined to co-operative activities. It is not the petitioner's case that the Member-Secretary who passed the impugned order has not been appointed Assistant Registrar under Section 3(2). His appointment as District Assistant Registrar does not have the effect of nullifying his appointment as "Assistant Registrar". Rather it is by virtue of his appointment as "Assistant Registrar" that he is appointed "District Assistant Registrar". 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner however submits that the posts of "Assistant Registrar" and District Assistant Registrar" are separate and distinct and they cannot be mi,.ed up. For the reasons already recorded. I am unable to accept the submission. 5. The next ground of challenge is that the impugned order of suspension has not been approved by the Chairman of the District Administrative Committee. The challenge is based on the use of the expression "subject to the control and supervision of the Chairman of the District Committee" in Rule 2 (e) of the 1968 Rules (sic). According to the learned counsel, for effective control it is necessary that the order should have specific approval of the Chairman. In support of the plea he has cited : Mohammed Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1968 Alld. 681, and V. Balasubramaniam & Ors. v. Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Ors. (1987) 4 SCC 738 . Neither of the two decisions has any application to the facts of the present case. The language of the provisions of law which came up for interpretation in these two cases was entirely different. The said provisions had made the administrative action subject to the approval of the higher authority, namely the Government. (1987) 4 SCC 738 . Neither of the two decisions has any application to the facts of the present case. The language of the provisions of law which came up for interpretation in these two cases was entirely different. The said provisions had made the administrative action subject to the approval of the higher authority, namely the Government. In the Allahabad case appointment to the post of Overseer in a Municipal Board was "Subject to the approval of the State Government". The Municipal Board made the appointment and took work from the petitioner before this Court on coming to know of it the State Government disapproved the appointment. The disapproval of the State Government was upheld and it was observed in Paragraph 2 of the report at page 683 as follows: "But as the appointment is subject to the approval of the higher authority or the Government the appointment though valid till it Is disapproved is nebulous and cannot be deemed to be perfect and binding". This observation which has been relied upon by the petitioner's learned counsel actually goes against him. By the application of the dictum contained in this observation, the impugned order will remain valid till it is disapproved by the Chairman. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Chairman has disapproved the impugned order. 6. In the Supreme Court case (supra) the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following observations occurring in paragraph 17 of the report at page 759: "In the context in which the words "subject to approval of the Government" appear in Regulation 28 (d) of the Regulations they have to be interpreted as meaning "conditional upon the approval of the Government", that is, that unless that approval is given by the Government the relaxation would not be valid because the regulation themselves, had been put into effect after obtaining the approval of the State Government orders. The words "subject to have been understood by this Court as meaning" conditional upon him K. R.C.S. Balakrishna Chetty & Sons and Co. v. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1152 . From the opening sentence it is apparent that the observations are not of universal application. They have been made in the context in which the words appear in the relevant regulations. v. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1152 . From the opening sentence it is apparent that the observations are not of universal application. They have been made in the context in which the words appear in the relevant regulations. From the context in which the words "subject to the control and supervision" appear in Rule 14(v) it is not possible to infer that the Suspension order will become effective only after it has been approved by the Chairman. In fact the only meaning that can be assigned to the expression is that the order remains valid till it is set aside by the Chairman. 7. Undoubtedly, suspension order in order to be valid requires under Rule 14 (v) of 1976. Rules, involvement of two officers, namely the Member-Secretary authorised to pass the suspension order and the Assistant Registrar authorised to give prior concurrence to the suspension. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the suspension order on the ground that one and the same person was not entitled to do both the Acts and so the Rule stood violated. In the instant case Sri Ashok Kumar who passed the suspension order was holding both the offices, namely that of the Member-Secretary and that of the District Assistant Registrar. It has already been held above that District Assistant Registrar (viz. Sri Ashok Kumar) was also the Assistant Registrar for the purpose of Rule 2(e). Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to make out that there existed any bar or prohibition in holding charge of the two or more offices by one and the same person, (namely Sri Ashok Kumar). As he was validly holding the two offices, there seems to be nothing wrong in his exercising powers of both the offices. This can be said to have been done by him under compulsion of law by virtue of which he was holding the offices of Member-Secretary as well as District Assistant Registrar/Assistant Registrar under Rule 2 (e). The suspension order was passed by him. So it is quite obvious, that it has the prior concurrence of the requisite officer, namely Assistant Registrar and was issued by the Member-Secretary authorised to pass the same. 8. In view of the above the petition is dismissed in limine.