JUDGMENT - A.D. MANE, J.:---In this writ petition, which is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India there involves a short but important question regarding procedure prescribed under section 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). By this order dated December 1, 1989 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Aurangabad, who is respondent No. 2 herein, has passed the order of externment under section 56(1)(a) of the Act, against the petitioner, requiring him to remove himself outside the district of Aurangabad, for a period of two years. The petitioner has filed his appeal under section 60 of the Act to the State Government-respondent No. 1, but his appeal has been dismissed on March 23, 1990. The petitioner is challenging these orders in this writ petition. 2. The petitioner is a permanent resident of Bidkin, Tahsil Paithan, District Aurangabad. The petitioner has stated that he is a active social worker and also political worker of Congress (1). He is a member of Panchayat Samiti Paithan (Bidkin circle) and also a member of Gram Panchayat, Bidkin for many years. 3. It may be stated that the respondent No. 2 is the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Aurangabad who is the externing authority under section 56 of the Act. The respondent No. 3 is the Sub-Divisional Police Officer (Rural) Aurangabad. The respondent No. 3 has issued a show-cause notice on August 15, 1989 under section 59 of the Act, calling upon the petitioner to show cause why be should not be externed from districts of Aurangabad, Ahmednagar and Jalna for a period of two years. 4. The petitioner submitted his written statements along with certain documents on September 18, 1989 to show cause to the respondent No. 3 inter alia denying the material allegations levelled against him in the show cause notice. 5. It appears that the respondent No. 3 acting under the direction of the respondent No. 2 has held enquiry and sent the entire record to respondent No. 2, who ultimately passed the externment order after considering the entire material so sent to him. 6. Now, in the petition the petitioner has averred that the respondent No. 2 has not given him any opportunity of being heard, although he has shown cause to the show cause notice issued by the respondent No. 3. 6. Now, in the petition the petitioner has averred that the respondent No. 2 has not given him any opportunity of being heard, although he has shown cause to the show cause notice issued by the respondent No. 3. This statement of fact as appearing in the petition has not been in any way controverted by the respondent by filing any affidavit in reply. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has however, fairly conceded that no personal hearing was offered to the petitioner, by respondent No. 2, before passing the ultimate order of externment under section 56(1)(a) of the Act. 7. Mrs. Chincholkar, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, therefore, argued that the order of externment must get vitiated because there has been violation of section 59 of the Act. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, it is incumbent on respondent No. 2 to give personal hearing before the impugned order was passed, even though respondent No. 3 has given him the opportunity to show cause. 8. Mr. Bhapkar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the hand, submitted that since the petitioner has been given opportunity of being heard by respondent No. 3, there was no necessity for respondent No. 2 to give him further opportunity of being heard, because the impugned order was passed in view of the provisions contained in section 59 of the Act. 9. In the facts and circumstances of the case important question which requires consideration is whether it is obligatory on the part of the externing authority to hear the proposed externee either in person or through his lawyer under section 59 of the Act before ultimate order of externment under section 56 of the Act is passed, irrespective of the fact that the proposed externee has been given such an opportunity of being heard by the officer subordinate of the externing authority. In order to appreciate this question, we may set out relevant part of section 59 of the Act. It reads as under: "59(1) Before an order under sections 55, 56, 57 or 57A is passed against any person the officer acting under any of the said sections or any officer above the rank of an Inspector authorised by that officer shall inform the person in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. If such person makes an application for the examination of any witness produced by him, the authority or officer concerned shall grant such application; and examine such witness, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the authority or officer is of opinion that such application is made for the purpose of vexation or delay. Any written statement put in by such person shall be filed with the record of the case. Such person shall be entitled to appear before the officer proceeding under this section by an Advocate or Attorney for the purpose of tendering his explanation and examining the witness produced by him. (2) ..........................................................................................." On its plain reading, the section 59 of the Actimposes certain obligations on the externing authority. It is obligatory upon the externing authority to inform the proposed externee of the general nature of the material allegations against him and to offer him opportunity to tender his explanation and for that purpose to allow him to appear before him either in person or through a Lawyer. The section also grants to the proposed externce a co-relating right which is generally  known as a slander safeguard. The section expressly confers on the proposed externce the right to have the opportunity to tender explanation and to appear before the externing authority either in person or through a lawyer, for that purpose, before the final order is passed against him under section 56 of the Act. Indeed, section 59 visualises that any officer above rank of Inspector of Police authorised by the officer competent to pass the order of externment under any of sections 56, 57 and 57A can issue a notice for calling explanation from the proposed externce with a view to give him opportunity of tendering explanation, regarding the general nature of material allegations against him. For that purpose it is open for such officer to hold a preliminary enquiry as he may deem fit and proper in exigency of the matter, but after he holds such enquiry, he has to send the entire record of the enquiry to the externing authority who ultimately passes the externment order after considering the entire material so sent to him. It may be that during the preliminary enquiry the proposed externee is given an opportunity of being heard personally, but that will not dispense with the requirement of section 59 which grants the right to the proposed externce to appear before the externing authority, either in person or through his lawyer for the purpose of tendering his explanation, before the ultimate order was passed. In other words, merely because the Enquiry Officer above the rank of Inspector of Police has given the personal hearing to the proposed externee, that by itself will not be due compliance of the procedure as embodied in section 59 of the Act. The basic condition which is clamped on the externing authority is to hear the proposed externee either in person or through his representative namely the lawyer or Advocate and be satisfied according to the due procedure, before the ultimate order of the externment is passed. This aspect of the matter has been amply made clear if we refer to the decision in case of (Hari Khemu Gavali v. The Commissioner of Police)1, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 559. At the out set it may be stated that one of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that under section 59 of the Act, proceedings are initiated by the police and it is the police which is the Judge in the case and that, therefore, the provisions of the Act militate against one of the accepted principles of the natural justice, that prosecutor should not also be the Judge. While rejecting that contention, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "The evidence or material on the basis of which a person may be proceeded against under any one of the sections 55, 56, or 57 may have been collected by Police Officers of the rank of an Inspector of Police Officer above the rank. The proceedings may be initiated by a Police or of lower rank above the rank of Inspector who has to inform the person proceeded against of the general nature of the material allegations against him. But the order of externment can be passed only by a Commissioner of Police or a District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf. Hence the satisfaction is not that of the person prosecuting, if that word can at all be used in the context of those sections. But the order of externment can be passed only by a Commissioner of Police or a District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf. Hence the satisfaction is not that of the person prosecuting, if that word can at all be used in the context of those sections. The person proceeded against is not prosecuted but is put out of the harm's way. The legislature has advisedly entrusted officers of comparatively higher rank in the police or in the magistracy with the responsible duty of examining the material and of being satisfied that such person is likely again to engage himself in the commission of an offence similar to that for which he had previously been convicted..." 10. Moreover, there is another authority which requires mention. That authority speaks about the nature of the right conferred on the proposed externee by section 59 and the consequences of its violation. In case of (Nawab Khan v. State)2, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1471, a constitutional challenge was made to the scheme under sections 56, 57, 57A and 59 of the Act, and Their Lordships have ruled that, "...The constitutional perspective must be clear in unlocking the mystique of 'void' and voidable vis-a-vis orders under the Act. The Act is a constraint on a fundamental right and so the scheme of Article 19 must be vividly before our minds if extra-ordinary controls over human rights statutorily vested in administrative tribunals are to be held in constitutional leash. Freedom of movement, of association, of profession and property, are founding commitments and severe restraints thereon must be strictly construed, not in the name of natural justice-and elusive phrase-nor in literal loyalty to section 59 but in plenary allegiance to the paramount law. The restriction on the fundamental right must be reasonable and the harsher the restriction the heavier the onus to prove reasonableness. The High Court in Special Criminal Application 18 of 1969 held that the basic condition clamped on the authority to hear and be satisfied according to the 'due process' prescriptions of section 59 had been violated and the order was liable to be quashed. In short, the finding was that the deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right having been effected in a mode which is not reasonable, as statutorily expressed in section 59 of the Act, is illegal and unconstitutional. In short, the finding was that the deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right having been effected in a mode which is not reasonable, as statutorily expressed in section 59 of the Act, is illegal and unconstitutional. Once the jurisprudential underpinning of sections 56 and 59 of the Act are seen, the invalidatory effect is plain. An un-constitutional order is void, consequential administrative inconveniences being out of place where an administrator abandons constitutional discipline and limits of power. What about the peril to the citizen if an official, in administrative absolutism, ignores the constitutional restrictions on his authority and condemns a person to flee his home? A determination is no determination if it is contrary to the constitutional mandate of Article 19. On the footing the externment order is of no effect and its violation is no offence..." It is in that view of the matter, the power conferred upon the externing authority under section 56, though conferred in abundant amplitude and affecting as it does the fundamental rights of a citizen has to be exercised in strict conformity with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 59 of the Act. Looked at from the angle the section 59 of the Act makes it imperative for the externing authority passing ultimate order under section 56(1)(a) to give the hearing to the proposed externee and that statutory obligation cannot be said to have been discharged merely because the proposed externee was given opportunity of being heard by the subordinate Police Officer, who is not the competent authority to pass the ultimate order of exterment. If we were to accept the contention of Shri Bhapkar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that there was no need to give personal hearing to the proposed externee when the respondent No. 3 has heard in person, the right conferred on the proposed externee would become an empty formality. It is an accepted principle that if one person hears and another decides then the personal hearing becomes an empty formality. This principle can be supported from the decision of Supreme Court in case of (Gullapalli Nageswar a Rao and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another)3, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 308. There would be no decision within the meaning of statute if there was anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice. 11. This principle can be supported from the decision of Supreme Court in case of (Gullapalli Nageswar a Rao and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another)3, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 308. There would be no decision within the meaning of statute if there was anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice. 11. In the instant case, no hearing was given to the petitioner by respondent No. 2, who is the externing authority. The impugned order of externment, therefore, suffers from fatal infirmity. 12. In consequence, the petition must succeed. The rule is, therefore, made absolute. The order of externment passed the petitioner and which has been confirmed in appeal by the State Government is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute. -----