Judgment 1. IN this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner prays for appropriate writs commanding the respondents not to withhold payment of his gratuity and provident fund dues. Facts leading to the filing of the petition are as under. 2. ON September 17, 1973, the petitioner joined the services of Bank of India, the respondent No. 1 herein, (hereinafter referred to as the 'bank') as a Probationary Officer in its Head Office at Bombay. On confirmation, he was posted in the Personal Department of the Bank, as an Officer thereof, at its Regional Office at Calcutta. While he was working there, the Head Office of the Bank issued a Circular on July 14, 1971 inviting applications from its Officers for recruitment to the posts of, among others, Industrial Relation Officers in the Personal Department at its various Centres. In that circular, it was stipulated, interalia, as under : "upon selection, such Officers will have to resign their present services and join as fresh recruits on probation and they will have no lien on their previous service during the period of probation. During the period of probation they will not contribute to the Bank's provident." The circular further stipulated : "consequent to their resignation- (a) Accumulated leave, if any, will lapse : (b) Provident Fund will be paid back according to the prevailing rules (Re : Bank's Contribution) : (c) Gratuity, if any, will be paid, as per prevailing rules." The petitioner responded to the above circular and consequent upon his selection, the Bank offered him the above post by its letter dated August 14, 1979 on terms and conditions detailed therein. Two of the terms thereof read as under : - "(a) Your appointment would be subject to the terms and conditions as set out in our Circular No. PERS : MRN : 78:24 of July 14, 1978 in terms of which your application was considered along with certain concessions as granted by the management subsequently, viz. , upon selection you will have to resign your present service and join as fresh recruit on probation and you will have no lien on your previous services during the period of probation. , upon selection you will have to resign your present service and join as fresh recruit on probation and you will have no lien on your previous services during the period of probation. During the period of probation, you will not contribute to the Bank's Provident Fund; (b) consequent to your resignation- (i) Provident fund will be paid back according to the prevailing rules (Re : Bank's Contribution) ; (ii) Gratuity, if any, will be paid as per prevailing rules. " 3. THE petitioner accepted the said offer by signing the duplicate copy of the offer letter and forwarding the same to the Bank. On such acceptance, he submitted a letter of resignation from his post as an Officer of the Personnel Department with effect from February 1, 1980 and the Bank in its turn, issued a letter on February 2, 1980, appointing him as an Industrial Relation Officer in its Regional Office at Calcutta. After working in that post for about seven and half years, the petitioner submitted his resignation by a letter dated May 18, 1987. While asking the Bank to accept his resignation, he requested it to pay his gratuity condoning the notional break of his service in February, 1980, it may be mentioned here that earlier also he had made similar request for such condonation. The Bank authorities, however, while accepting his resignation declined to accede to his such request. Thereafter, the petitioner wrote several letters reiterating his claim for gratuity and provident fund dues on the basis of his continuous service with the Bank for the period from September 17, 1973, when he first joined the Bank, till July 21, 1987, when his resignation was accepted, but as his claim was not entertained, he filed this writ petition. 4. WHEN the petition was first moved on January 6, 1989 in presence of the learned Advocate for the Bank, this Court passed an interim order to the effect that if any amount was payable to the petitioner the Bank would calculate the same and pay the petitioner would accept the same without prejudice to his rights and contentions. Pursuant to the said direction, the Bank authorities handed over a cheque for Rs. 38,300. 00, which amount according to them was only payable to him as his provident fund dues. The Bank, however, declined to pay any amount towards gratuity. Pursuant to the said direction, the Bank authorities handed over a cheque for Rs. 38,300. 00, which amount according to them was only payable to him as his provident fund dues. The Bank, however, declined to pay any amount towards gratuity. Admittedly in August, 1983, the petitioner got his provident fund dues for the period during which he first worked, viz. , September 17, 1973 to February 1, 1980 and pursuant to the Court's interim order, the petitioner got his provident fund dues for the period from February 2, 1981, from which date the Bank contributed to his provident fund in terms of his fresh letter of appointment, till July 21, 1987, the date of termination of his service. It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner cannot now have any legitimate grievance in respect of his provident fund dues. That brings us to the question whether the petitioner is entitled to claim gratuity in accordance with the Bank of India Gratuity Fund Rules ('rules' for short) which govern the constitution, management and administration of the Gratuity Fund called "bank of India Gratuity Fund" constituted by Bank of India for the benefit of its employees. Under Rule 8 thereof those employees of the Bank, who are governed by the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, become entitled to gratuity after rendering continuous service to the Bank for not less than five years. All other employees including Officers, however, have to render continuous service for not less than ten years to be entitled to gratuity. Since, admittedly, the petitioner fall under the latter category, he will be entitled to gratuity on proof of his having rendered continuous service to the Bank for not less than ten years. According to the Bank, the petitioner initially rendered continuous services for about 6. 1/2 years, i.e., from September 17, 1973 to January 31, 1980 and then with a break, again for about 7 (1/2) years, i.e., from February 2, 1980 to July 21, 1981 and as such he was not entitled to gratuity. In other words according to the Bank, consequent upon the petitioner's resignation from service on February 1, 1980 his earlier service terminated before completion of ten years and his service effective from his new appointment on February 2, 1980 also being for less than ten years, he could not claim any gratuity under the Rules. In other words according to the Bank, consequent upon the petitioner's resignation from service on February 1, 1980 his earlier service terminated before completion of ten years and his service effective from his new appointment on February 2, 1980 also being for less than ten years, he could not claim any gratuity under the Rules. It may be recalled that in the context of the above stand taken by the bank, that the petitioner requested it to treat his service as a continuous one by condoning the break of service for one day. 5. IN the writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the validity and legality of his offer of resignation on February 1, 1980 and acceptance of the same by the Bank. It has first been contended that the materials on record would unmistakably prove that the petitioner was compelled to resign from his post and as such his resignation should be treated as legally invalid. In support of his above contention, the petitioner has relied upon certain internal correspondences of the Bank. 6. HAVING considered the entire materials placed before me, I am unable to accept the contention of the petitioner. As noticed earlier, in its circular dated July 14, 1978, inviting applications from its employees for the posts of Industrial Relation Officers, the Bank specifically stated that to join the advertised posts, the concerned employees would have to resign and that they would join as fresh recruits. In the offer of appointment also, the Bank incorporated the above term. It is evidently clear, therefore, that the petitioner went for the interview and on selection joined the new post being fully aware of the above facts-and obviously with a view to furthering his career opportunities. It is too late in the day, therefore, for the petitioner to contend that he was compelled to resign his previous job and sign on the dotted lines of the letter of resignation. It has, however, been submitted on behalf of the petitioner, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Central in land Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath (1986 53 FLR 523 SC), that this Court will strike down the unfair and coercive resignation obtained from the petitioner, as he was not equal with the Bank in bargaining power. In that case, the Supreme Court while laying down the principle that the courts will not enforce and will, when earned upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power, has pointed out, that it will apply in a case where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice but to give his assent to contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however, unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules might be. It is undoubtedly true that in the instant case, as the internal correspondences indicate the petitioner was asked to sign on the dotted line while submitting his resignation, but then it is not a case where the petitioner had no choice, rather no meaningful choice, before signing the resignation letter. Even at the risk of repetition it may be stated that the circular was issued on July 14, 1978, the offer to the new post was given to the petitioner on August 14, 1979 and he resigned on February 1, 1980, and that necessarily means that he had sufficient time not only to ponder over but to decide upon the choice also. 7. RELYING upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank v. P. K. Mittal (1989 58 FLR 449 SC), it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the letter of resignation was invalid also for the reason that the petitioner was not allowed to give three months' notice though the rules governing his employment entitled him to do so. 8. I do not find any substance in this contention. In that case, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that resignation is a voluntary act of an employee and as such he may chose his resignation with immediate effect or with a notice of less than 3 months if the employer agrees to the same. 8. I do not find any substance in this contention. In that case, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that resignation is a voluntary act of an employee and as such he may chose his resignation with immediate effect or with a notice of less than 3 months if the employer agrees to the same. It has already been found that the resignation in the instant case was a voluntary act of the petitioner, and that he resigned with immediate effect is made amply clear by the fact that he joined the new post on the following day, i. e. , on February 2, 1980. It has lastly been contended on behalf of petitioner that as he had, in fact, rendered continuous service for more than 10 years that is from September 17, 1973 to July 21, 1987, he should be entitled to the gratuity under the Rules. To appreciate this contention, it will be pertinent to point out here that Rule 8, like Section 4 (1) of the Act speaks if 'rendering continuous service' for entitlement to gratuity "continuous service" has not been denned under the Rules but in view of sub-rule (3) of Rule: 1 thereof, its definition under Section 2-A of the Act will have to be relied upon. The moot question, therefore, in the instant case is as to whether the petitioner had "rendered continuous service" from 1973 to 1987 notwithstanding termination of his employment for one day in February, 1980, so as to entitle him to claim gratuity for the entire period. To seek an answer to this question, it will be profitable at this stage to look into the purpose for which the Act was brought into the statute book and similar Rules were framed and adopted by the various industrial undertakings for their employees. 9. THE concept of 'gratuity' was explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1970 20 FLR 176 SC) with the following words :- "gratuity paid to workmen is intended to help them after retirement on superannuation, death, retirement, physical incapacity, disability or otherwise. The object of providing a gratuity scheme is to provide a retiring benefit to workmen who have rendered long and unblemished service to the employer and thereby contributed to the prosperity of the employer. The object of providing a gratuity scheme is to provide a retiring benefit to workmen who have rendered long and unblemished service to the employer and thereby contributed to the prosperity of the employer. It is one of the efficiency devices and is considered necessary for an 'orderly and human elimination' from industry of superannuated or disabled employees who, but for such retiring benefits, would continue in employment even though they function, inefficiently. It is not paid to an employee gratuitously or merely as a matter of boon; it is paid to him for long and meritorious service rendered by him to the employer." 10. FROM the above observation, it is patently clear, therefore, that gratuity is in the nature of a retiring benefit given to an employee who has rendered long and unblemished services to the employer and has thus contributed to its prosperity. In that context, long and meritorious service would necessarily contemplate that an employee has, in fact, rendered service. It is, of course, true that continuous service in order to be rendered must no doubt presuppose a contract of employment but a contract of employment between a master and servant is not the same thing as rendering continuous service. In a given case, it may so happen that a person may be in continuous employment for more than ten, years yet he may not earn gratuity having failed to render 'continuous service' for that period within the meaning of Section 2-A of the Act. The emphasis, therefore, is on rendering continuous service and not on mere subsistence of a contract of employment. While on this point out it may be stated that in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which relates to retrenchment compensation the words used are "has been in continuous service" unlike the words "has rendered continuous service" in the Rules. Judged in the context of the above principle of law, the break of service of the petitioner for a day on paper is not of moment or relevance in the instant case as undisputedly he had rendered 'continuous service' within the meaning of Section 2-A of the Act for more than 13 years. Judged in the context of the above principle of law, the break of service of the petitioner for a day on paper is not of moment or relevance in the instant case as undisputedly he had rendered 'continuous service' within the meaning of Section 2-A of the Act for more than 13 years. For the foregoing discussion, I dispose of this petition by directing the respondents to pay him gratuity in accordance with Rule 9 of the bank of India Gratuity Fund Rules within two months from the date of communication of this order. 11. AS no one appeared for the Bank to contest this petition, there will be no order as to costs.