JUDGMENT M.N. Mithal, J. - This is defendant's appeal arising from civil suit No. 713 of 1989 filed by respondent no. 1 for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant appellant from interfering in plaintiff's possession over the land in dispute and from obstructing the plaintiff in raising construction over the same. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy raised in this appeal .it will be necessary to have some background of facts. Admittedly, the two brothers Hetram & Kallu sons of Shibba were owners of plot No. 278 having an area of 3.73 acres in village Bagarpur in district Moradabad. Undisputedly Kallu sold his one half share in the land in favour of the appellant on 16.7.1989 in pursuance of an earlier agreement of sale in their favour. This sale deed was executed for a consideration of Rs. I,25,000/-. The remaining half share belonging to Kallu was also transferred and three sale deeds were executed by him. By the first sale deed executed on 20th July, 1989, Hetram had sold one half of his half share in favour of Anita Agarwal for Rs. 15,000/-. This sale deed is subject of attack in suit no. 689 of 1989 filed by Hetram questioning the validity of this sale deed. The ground of attack is his agreement with Smt. Anita Agarwal and her husband was to transfer his half share at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per bigha but on the request of Anita Agarwal's husband he agreed to execute the two sale deeds; one in favour of Anita Agarwal and the other in favour of M/S Alkrad Chemical Indian Pvt. Ltd. The two sale deeds were to be executed in respect of one fourth share each. The allegation of Hetram was that the sale deed was executed by him on the assurance that the sale consideration would be at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per Bigha but since the sale deed was not read over to him he signed it on the aforesaid representation. However, when the two sale deeds were put up for registration and only Rs. 15,000/- was offered as sale consideration on the assurance that the remaining amount will be paid outside the sub-Registrar's office he did not execute it and returned home. However, when the two sale deeds were put up for registration and only Rs. 15,000/- was offered as sale consideration on the assurance that the remaining amount will be paid outside the sub-Registrar's office he did not execute it and returned home. It was only at a later date that he came to know that one sale deed had been registered by the Sub-Registrar in collusion with Anita's Agarwal husband. In this suit Hetram sought injunction against Anita Agarwal but the same had been refused on opposition by her. That order has not been challenged in the appeal. Another suit No. 713 of 1989 was filed by M/s Alkrad Chemicals Indian Pvt. Ltd. against Kallu & three others i.e. Hetram, Abdul Jabbar & his son Fajal Jabbar. As mentioned earlier, this suit is for permanent injunction. The 3rd Suit No. 876 of 1989 was also filed by M/s Alkrad Chemicals Indian Pvt. Ltd. for mandatory injunction directing Hetram to get the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff registered. All the three suits were consolidated by the trial court by an order dated 11.1.1990. The plaintiff of suit no. 876 of 1989 also moved an application for temporary injunction restraining Abdul Jabbar from getting the sale deed registered but it was rejected as in-fructuous as the sale deed in favour of Abdul Jabbar had already been registered on 28.7.1989. Against this order also no appeal has been filed. 3. The main dispute between the parties in the trial court was in respect of the land sold by Hetram in favour of Abdul Jabbar on 28.7.1989. The case of the plaintiff was that Hetram & Kallu had mutually partitioned their land in such a manner that the middle portion fell to the share of Kallu and the eastern & western portions fell in the lot of Hetram. In the western portion there was one tube-well and a tree while north eastern portion was adjacent to the boundary of the land belonging to Fajal Jabbar. Since the north eastern portion was also coveted by Abdul Jabbar & Fajal Jabbar they did not like the ideas of its being sold to the plaintiff and, therefore, they instigated Kallu & Hetram and collusively obtained sale deed on 26th July, 1989 in respect thereof although the same had already been sold to Smt. Anita Agarwal. Since the north eastern portion was also coveted by Abdul Jabbar & Fajal Jabbar they did not like the ideas of its being sold to the plaintiff and, therefore, they instigated Kallu & Hetram and collusively obtained sale deed on 26th July, 1989 in respect thereof although the same had already been sold to Smt. Anita Agarwal. The sale deed which Hetram had executed in favour of the plaintiff was in respect of the western portion for a consideration of Rs. 15,000/-, besides Rs. 6,000/-, as the price of tube-well & tree standing thereon. This sale deed, however, could not be registered as Hetram refused to get it registered at the instigation of the appellant. 4. The case of the appellant, however, was different. According to him Kallu & Hetram had divided their land in two equal parts; western portion falling to the share of Kallu and eastern portion in favour of Hetram. This entire portion was leased out by him in favour of the appellant for cultivation for a period of ten months. Out of this land half portion had been sold in favour of Anita Agarwal but the remaining eastern portion with the adjoining land has been sold to the appellant vide sale deed dated 28.7.1989. 5. In view of differing case of the parties two questions arise; one as to the nature of portion of land between Kallu & Hetram and the second regard the land which has been actually sold to Smt. Anita Agarwal. After perusing various documents and respective pleadings of the parties the trial court came to the conclusion that the land falling to the share of Hetram was in two parts. In the western portion there existed a tube-well and one tree while in the north eastern portion adjacent to the land of the appellant did not have any tube-well or tree. This later portion had been sold by a registered deed in favour of Anita Agarwal and this very portion had been sold again by Hetram in favour of the appellant on 28.7.89. The title of the appellant is, therefore, subject to the validity of the sale deed dated 20.7.1989 in favour of Anita Agarwal which is subject of dispute in suit no. 689 of 1989. Obviously Hetram could not legally make a transfer in favour of Abdul Jabbar on 28.7.89. The title of the appellant is, therefore, subject to the validity of the sale deed dated 20.7.1989 in favour of Anita Agarwal which is subject of dispute in suit no. 689 of 1989. Obviously Hetram could not legally make a transfer in favour of Abdul Jabbar on 28.7.89. In case the earlier sale deed in respect of the said portion dated 20th July, 89 in favour of Anita Agarwal was found to be valid & binding on Hetram. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged before us that the view taken by the Trial Court was erroneous and that the land belonging to Hetram was actually in possession of the appellant as a lessee. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on a perusal of the evidence on record we are the opinion that the order passed by the Court below should be sustained. The sale deeds which have been filed do not indicate as to which portion of the land has been transferred by Kallu and Hetram under the various sale deeds. All the sale deeds speak about a share which has been sold to various vendees. One think is, however, clear that the land which has been sold to Anita Agarwal vide sale deed dated 20.7.1989 did not have any tube-well or tree. However, another sale deed of the same date which has not yet been registered by Hetram in favour of M/s Alkrad Chemicals India Pvt. Ltd. does mention a tube-well and tree therein and obviously it must be in respect of western portion of plot No. 278. Apart from this, the sale deed dated 28.7.1989. also docs not speak about any tube well or tree therein and there is specific mention that this plot does not contain any tube-well or tree. This goes to show that the sale deed executed in favour of Anita Agarwal and the one executed in favour of the appellant both were in respect of the same one fourth portion off erred to Hetram. Prima facie this appears to be so, If this be so that title of the appellant becomes suspect 8. As to the question of lease of Hetram's land in favour of the appellant is concerned copy of the document filed before us, Annexure 3' does not mention the date of the documents. Prima facie this appears to be so, If this be so that title of the appellant becomes suspect 8. As to the question of lease of Hetram's land in favour of the appellant is concerned copy of the document filed before us, Annexure 3' does not mention the date of the documents. In the affidavit in support of the objection, Annexure 2, the appellant has mentioned that about a year back the land was given to him on lease and he is in possession over the same as a lease holder. However, Annexure 3 shows that this lease deed was only for a period of ten months. The appellant's affidavit Annexure 2' is dated 11.1.1990. Reckoning a period of one year from this date it could be presumed that the lease deed must have been executed some time in January, 1989. This lease deed would automatically expire in October and, therefore, the appellant cannot claim any subsisting right therein. 9. There is one more aspect which needs consideration in this regard. We do not find mention of this lease deed in any of the sale deeds executed, not even in the sale deed executed in favour of the appellant on 28.7.1989. While mentioning about the delivery of possession the document says that the possession over the land has been delivered and the purchaser has been put in actual physical possession therein. Had it been a I fact that there was a lease deed in favour of the appellant there is no reason why a mention of this fact would not have been made in the sale deed. We may specify here that the observations that we have made above are only tentative and only for the purposes of disposing of the injunction matter and we do not mean to express any concluded opinion about the case of the parties which will have to be decided after the parties had led their evidence on record. However, prima facie we are satisfied that the plaintiff respondents have been able to make out a case in their favour. 10. So far as the balance of convenience is concerned, that means of the plaintiff respondents have already been mutated so far as the sale deeds dated 16.7.1989 and 20.7.1989. are concerned. The unregistered sale deed is only in respect of western portion and about that there is no dispute as regards possession. 10. So far as the balance of convenience is concerned, that means of the plaintiff respondents have already been mutated so far as the sale deeds dated 16.7.1989 and 20.7.1989. are concerned. The unregistered sale deed is only in respect of western portion and about that there is no dispute as regards possession. Therefore, it is obvious that on the disputed portion i.e. north eastern portion of the land adjoining to the land of the appellant the plaintiff respondents are in possession and there is documentary evidence on record in proof thereof. It appears difficult to rely upon the lease deed Annexure 3' at this stage as even in the affidavit Annexure 2' the date of the document has not been mentioned. Even Hetram has not mentioned anything about this lease. In view of this we find that the plaintiffs being possession the balance of convenience was in their favour. 11. So far as the question of irreparable injury is concerned it is obvious that if the plaintiff was in possession he had every right to defend the same and the appellant cannot be permitted to forcibly occupy the same by dispossessing the plaintiff. 12. In view of that we have said above, we are of the opinion that the appeal has no merit. However, before we part with this appeal we must note one argument advanced by the appellant. According to him, the Trial Court was not justified in granting the injunction in the form it has. The submission of the counsel was that the plaintiff's have been permitted to raise construction over the land in dispute and this will change the present conditions of the land. It cannot be disputed that the injunctions are normally granted for maintaining statusquo between the parties for the duration of the suit and no party should ordinarily be allowed to deal with the subject of die suit in a manner as will change its condition to the prejudice of the other. We are also conscious of the fact that the land has been purchased by the plaintiff respondent for the purposes of setting up a factory and any delay in setting it up is likely to cause immense harm to the profitability of their concern and to compensate it in terms of the money may be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 13. 13. In view of this, what we propose to do is that the plaintiff-respondent may be permitted to raise its construction but solely on its own risk and it will not be an answer later that the constructions are standing on the land if ultimately they are not successful in their suit. The plaintiff respondent, if they raise construction will not be entitled to any damages or other consideration in respect thereof. This direction will apply only to so much of the constructions as are raised on the th portion of the land of plot No. 278 which lies towards north east and adjoining land of the appellant and his son Falja Jabbar. We order accordingly. 14. Subject to what we have said above, the appeal is dismissed with costs.